Publish threat model and refresh native v1 docs

Add docs/THREAT_MODEL.md deriving a publishable threat model from
NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md sections 4-6: assets, in/out-of-scope attackers,
security properties vs SSH (including where Dosh aims to exceed it),
cryptographic building blocks as implemented, and an honest
accepted-residual-risks / known-gaps section.

Refresh docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md: feature matrix now reflects native
auth, host-key trust, authorized_keys policy, doctor, and -L/-R/-D
forwarding; add a per-item "Native v1 verification checklist status"
table mapping spec section 16 to done/in-progress/pending from code.

Update README.md status with a native v1 section and honest claim
posture pointing to THREAT_MODEL.md. Annotate NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md with a
v1 status block summarizing milestone progress. Point SPEC.md security
model and header at native auth and the threat model.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
DuProcess
2026-06-14 10:27:40 -04:00
parent 6c14d669b8
commit 828206f757
5 changed files with 378 additions and 22 deletions
+30
View File
@@ -267,3 +267,33 @@ resident PTY server, encrypted UDP bootstrap attach, UDP resume, sealed UDP atta
tickets, client ACKs, server retransmit bookkeeping, sliding replay protection,
server-side `vt100` screen snapshots/diffs, a hardened user systemd unit, an install
script, Docker SSH benchmark gates, CI, and protocol/integration tests.
### Native v1
Beyond the SSH-bootstrap core, native v1 (`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`) is substantially
implemented and aims to replace the day-to-day `ssh host` workflow on Dosh-installed
servers:
- **Native UDP auth** with X25519 key exchange, transcript-bound Ed25519 user auth
via ssh-agent or an encrypted OpenSSH key, ChaCha20-Poly1305 transport, and
`authorized_keys` policy enforcement (`from=`, `no-port-forwarding`, `permitopen=`;
unsupported options fail closed).
- **Dosh host-key trust**: pinned `known_hosts`, `dosh trust [--remove|--replace]`,
TOFU only when explicitly enabled, and hard-fail on host-key mismatch.
- **TCP forwarding**: local `-L`, remote `-R` (loopback bind by default), dynamic
SOCKS5 `-D`, forward-only `-N`, and background `-f`, with per-stream flow control so
bulk transfers do not lag the terminal.
- **Diagnostics**: `dosh doctor host` for config/auth/UDP/forwarding-policy checks.
Native auth is **opt-in alongside SSH fallback** (`auth_preference = "native,ssh"`):
the native authenticated path is tried first and falls back to SSH bootstrap
explicitly when native auth is disabled, unavailable, or rejected. It never silently
degrades to an unauthenticated mode.
Native v1 is **not yet fully verified**. Per-IP token-bucket rate limiting, protocol
VERSION negotiation hardening, fuzzing in CI, ECDSA/RSA user keys, and an external
security review are still open. See `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` for the published threat
model and accepted residual risks, and the "Native v1 verification checklist status"
table in `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` for the item-by-item state. Dosh does not yet
claim a fully verified SSH replacement; its defensible claim remains fast encrypted
native attach/reconnect with SSH-equivalent transport security and SSH fallback.