Implicit sessions (dosh host with no --session) get a random
term-<millis>-<pid> name you can never reattach to, so persisting them just
left unreattachable holder processes lingering across restarts. The server
now only uses a persistent holder for prewarmed or explicitly-named
sessions; implicit ones use the in-process shell that dies on restart and
reaps on disconnect, as before. Adds a shared
protocol::{generate,is}_implicit_session_name as the single source of truth
for the name shape, used by both client (generate) and server (detect).
Server-only behavior change; wire VERSION unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Item 3: SSH-agent forwarding, double-gated (client -A/forward_agent AND server
allow_agent_forwarding) and off by default on both ends.
Wire: new ForwardingKind::Agent (appended, existing bincode discriminants
unchanged). Bumped protocol VERSION 2 -> 3 so a pre-agent peer answers with a
clear version-mismatch reject instead of a deserialize error.
Client: -A / --forward-agent flag; requires local SSH_AUTH_SOCK. Requests an
Agent forwarding during native auth (agent forwarding requires native auth) and,
on a server-initiated StreamOpen carrying the reserved @dosh-agent sentinel,
splices the stream into the local agent unix socket (separate agent_writers map,
TCP forwarding paths untouched). Rejects agent StreamOpens unless it opted in, so
a server cannot reach the agent without consent.
Server: when the client opted in and allow_agent_forwarding is set, binds a
per-session proxy unix socket (dir 0700, socket 0600) before the shell spawns,
exports its path as the session's SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and tunnels each connection back
to the client over the agent sentinel stream. Applies only to freshly spawned
shells (documented). Socket cleaned up on auth/forward failure and when the
accept loop ends. SECURITY rationale documented in comments.
Tests: 2 end-to-end integration tests (full chain identities round-trip via a
PTY-hosted client + looping fake agent; and "no -A => no proxy socket"). Docs
updated (README forwarding + disconnect-status note, spec §12.1). fmt + full test
suite green (122 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Track A protocol hardening for native-v1.
1. Protocol VERSION discipline (protocol.rs, native.rs, dosh-server.rs,
dosh-client.rs): bump protocol::VERSION to 2 and NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION to 2.
Foreign wire-version datagrams now get a clear named "protocol version
mismatch - upgrade dosh" reject from the server instead of a silent timeout
(peek_foreign_wire_version + VERSION_MISMATCH_REASON). The native handshake's
plaintext protocol_version is also checked server-side before any crypto via
check_native_protocol_version, returning a typed ProtocolVersionMismatch.
2. Transport rekey (spec section 11/9): server rotates a client's traffic key
after rekey_after_packets OR rekey_after_secs (config knobs). Rotated keys are
derived independently of the handshake keys from the current key plus fresh
server CSPRNG material shipped confidentially in an AEAD Rekey packet
(derive_rekey_session_key). The previous epoch's key is retained briefly so
in-flight pre-rekey packets still decrypt (matched by session_key_id), and
stale-epoch packets are ignored, not fatal. Client handles Rekey/RekeyAck.
3. Connection migration (spec section 11): every authenticated, replay-accepted
packet now migrates client.endpoint to the new source address (input, resize,
ping, ack, resume, stream*, rekey-ack), not just resume. Ping now verifies its
AEAD tag before acting so migration cannot be spoofed.
4. Native auth rate limiting: per-source-IP token bucket
(native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute) enforced in handle_native_client_hello
BEFORE any X25519/Ed25519 work; over-limit hellos get a non-crypto reject.
5. Speed: replaced O(sessions x clients) per-packet linear scans with an O(1)
HashMap<conn_id, session_name> index in ServerState, kept in sync on every
client insert/remove (attach handlers, detach, remove_client, cleanup reap,
session-exit drain).
New config keys (ServerConfig, with defaults): rekey_after_packets = 100000,
rekey_after_secs = 3600.
Tests: version-mismatch reject (no hang), rate-limit flood reject, rekey
round-trip end-to-end + key-derivation unit tests, source-address migration,
client-index sync + cleanup purge. fmt and full test suite green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DuProcess