Track B (milestone 5 / §16 hardening):
- tests/hostile_network.rs: in-process UDP relay/shim between a test
client and a real dosh-server that can drop, reorder, and duplicate
datagrams, and rebind its upstream socket mid-session. Asserts:
session survives loss/reorder, duplicated/replayed Input is applied at
most once, stale packets after resume are ignored (not fatal), and a
client source-address change preserves the session.
- tests/parser_robustness.rs: deterministic randomized tests throwing
garbage at every reachable public parser (packet decode, from_body for
all protocol/native structs, authorized_keys, known_hosts, host-key
line, ssh-ed25519 blob, bootstrap, attach ticket); asserts none panic.
- fuzz/: standalone cargo-fuzz crate (own [workspace], non-default
member) with libfuzzer-sys harnesses for packet decode, from_body,
authorized_keys, known_hosts, handshake structs+verifiers, and attach
tickets. README documents the run command.
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: add fuzz-smoke job (nightly + cargo-fuzz,
short -max_total_time per target, tolerant if tooling unavailable);
existing fmt/test/build/bench steps unchanged.
cargo fmt --check and cargo test are green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add docs/THREAT_MODEL.md deriving a publishable threat model from
NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md sections 4-6: assets, in/out-of-scope attackers,
security properties vs SSH (including where Dosh aims to exceed it),
cryptographic building blocks as implemented, and an honest
accepted-residual-risks / known-gaps section.
Refresh docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md: feature matrix now reflects native
auth, host-key trust, authorized_keys policy, doctor, and -L/-R/-D
forwarding; add a per-item "Native v1 verification checklist status"
table mapping spec section 16 to done/in-progress/pending from code.
Update README.md status with a native v1 section and honest claim
posture pointing to THREAT_MODEL.md. Annotate NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md with a
v1 status block summarizing milestone progress. Point SPEC.md security
model and header at native auth and the threat model.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The native-v1 work changed the UDP wire format (HEADER_LEN 42->58) without a
version bump, so a current client silently timed out against the older
still-deployed server. The server just needed redeploying; alongside that,
fix the robustness bugs surfaced while restoring the connection:
- Server: clamp terminal size to >=1 at every PTY/parser resize site. A client
reporting a 0x0 terminal made vt100::Parser::set_size panic ("attempt to
subtract with overflow") and took down the whole single-threaded daemon.
- Client: treat size() == Ok((0,0)) like a missing size and fall back to 80x24
instead of sending 0x0 to the server.
- Reap abandoned sessions and their shells. PtyHandle now retains the child and
kills it on drop, and the cleanup task removes clientless, non-prewarmed
sessions after the grace period. Previously the shell leaked forever (one
zsh per abandoned session); prewarmed sessions still stay hot.
- Evict half-finished native handshakes (pending_native) after 30s so an
unauthenticated ClientHello flood can't grow the map without bound.
- Drop the per-client, per-packet vt100 Screen clone on the output hot path and
remove the write-only last_screen field.
- Guard load_or_create_server_secret against a <32-byte secret file (was an
index-out-of-range panic at startup).
- Reconcile stream flow-control credit (client and server) when StreamData hits
a missing writer, so a closed/unknown stream can't wedge the peer's window.
Adds a unit test for session reaping. cargo fmt + cargo test green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
DuProcess