Bump release candidate to rc5

Implicit sessions (dosh host with no --session) get a random
term-<millis>-<pid> name you can never reattach to, so persisting them just
left unreattachable holder processes lingering across restarts. The server
now only uses a persistent holder for prewarmed or explicitly-named
sessions; implicit ones use the in-process shell that dies on restart and
reaps on disconnect, as before. Adds a shared
protocol::{generate,is}_implicit_session_name as the single source of truth
for the name shape, used by both client (generate) and server (detect).

Server-only behavior change; wire VERSION unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ name: ci
 on:
   push:
   pull_request:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: "17 7 * * 1"
 
 jobs:
   test:
@@ -36,21 +39,53 @@ jobs:
         if: steps.nightly.outcome == 'success' && steps.install.outcome == 'success'
         run: |
           set -e
-          for target in \
+          if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "schedule" ] || [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "workflow_dispatch" ]; then
-            packet_decode \
+            DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS="${DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS:-300}" sh scripts/fuzz-run.sh
-            from_body \
+          else
-            authorized_keys \
+            sh scripts/fuzz-run.sh 20
-            known_hosts \
+          fi
-            handshake_structs \
-            attach_ticket; do
-            echo "== fuzzing $target =="
-            cargo +nightly fuzz run --fuzz-dir fuzz "$target" -- \
-              -max_total_time=20 -rss_limit_mb=4096
-          done
       - name: Note when fuzzing was skipped
         if: steps.nightly.outcome != 'success' || steps.install.outcome != 'success'
         run: echo "cargo-fuzz / nightly toolchain unavailable; skipped fuzz smoke run."
 
+  windows-client:
+    runs-on: windows-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - name: Build Windows client
+        run: cargo build --release --bin dosh-client --bin dosh-bench
+      - name: Package Windows client
+        shell: bash
+        run: sh scripts/package-release.sh
+
+  package-release:
+    if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' || startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
+    strategy:
+      matrix:
+        include:
+          - os: ubuntu-latest
+            name: linux-x86_64
+          - os: macos-14
+            name: macos-aarch64
+          - os: macos-13
+            name: macos-x86_64
+          - os: windows-latest
+            name: windows-x86_64
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - name: Package release
+        shell: bash
+        run: sh scripts/package-release.sh
+      - uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: dosh-${{ matrix.name }}
+          path: |
+            target/dosh-release/dosh-*
+            !target/dosh-release/stage/**
+
   remote-bench:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
     env:

.gitignore

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
 /target/
 **/*.rs.bk
 .DS_Store
+vscode-extension/*.vsix

Cargo.lock

@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e7c1832837b905bbfb5101e07cc24c8deddf52f93225eee6ead5f4d63d53ddcb"
 dependencies = [
  "const-oid",
+ "pem-rfc7468",
  "zeroize",
 ]
 
@@ -435,7 +436,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "dosh"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "1.0.0-rc5"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",
@@ -446,13 +447,17 @@ dependencies = [
  "crossterm",
  "dirs",
  "ed25519-dalek",
+ "filetime",
  "hkdf",
  "hmac",
+ "libc",
  "portable-pty",
  "rand",
  "rpassword",
+ "rsa",
  "serde",
  "sha2",
+ "signature",
  "ssh-key",
  "tempfile",
  "tokio",
@@ -573,6 +578,16 @@ dependencies = [
  "winapi",
 ]
 
+[[package]]
+name = "filetime"
+version = "0.2.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5c287a33c7f0a620c38e641e7f60827713987b3c0f26e8ddc9462cc69cf75759"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "libc",
+]
+
 [[package]]
 name = "foldhash"
 version = "0.1.5"
@@ -1498,6 +1513,7 @@ checksum = "3b86f5297f0f04d08cabaa0f6bff7cb6aec4d9c3b49d87990d63da9d9156a8c3"
 dependencies = [
  "bcrypt-pbkdf",
  "ed25519-dalek",
+ "num-bigint-dig",
  "p256",
  "p384",
  "p521",

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "dosh"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "1.0.0-rc5"
 edition = "2024"
 license = "MIT"
 
@@ -14,14 +14,18 @@ clap = { version = "4.5", features = ["derive"] }
 crossterm = "0.28"
 dirs = "5.0"
 ed25519-dalek = "2.1"
+filetime = "0.2"
 hkdf = "0.12"
 hmac = "0.12"
+libc = "0.2"
 portable-pty = "0.8"
 rand = "0.8"
+rsa = { version = "0.9.10", features = ["sha2"] }
 rpassword = "7.5.4"
 serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
 sha2 = "0.10"
-ssh-key = { version = "0.6.7", features = ["ed25519", "encryption"] }
+signature = "2.2"
+ssh-key = { version = "0.6.7", features = ["ed25519", "encryption", "p256", "rsa"] }
 tokio = { version = "1.41", features = ["full"] }
 toml = "0.8"
 vt100 = "0.15"
@@ -35,4 +39,4 @@ opt-level = 2
 codegen-units = 16
 incremental = true
 lto = false
-strip = false
+strip = "debuginfo"

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: build test fmt install bench-local bench-local-json bench-docker-ssh bench-docker-mosh
+.PHONY: build test fmt clippy release-check 1.0-check reconnect-check hostile-network-check persistence-check package-check install package-release package-release-linux package-release-windows publish-release bench-report bench-local bench-local-json bench-docker-ssh bench-docker-mosh fuzz-smoke fuzz-deep soak-local tui-harness
 
 build:
 	cargo build --release
@@ -9,8 +9,52 @@ test:
 fmt:
 	cargo fmt
 
+clippy:
+	cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
+
+release-check:
+	cargo fmt --check
+	sh -n install.sh scripts/*.sh
+	cargo clippy --all-targets -- -D warnings
+	cargo test
+	$(MAKE) tui-harness
+
+1.0-check: release-check reconnect-check hostile-network-check persistence-check package-check
+
+reconnect-check:
+	cargo test --test integration_smoke resume_updates_udp_endpoint_for_roaming -- --nocapture
+	DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS=$${DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS:-300} cargo test --test integration_smoke sleep_roaming_soak_30m -- --ignored --nocapture
+
+hostile-network-check:
+	cargo test --test hostile_network -- --nocapture
+	DOSH_BADNET_SOAK_SECONDS=$${DOSH_BADNET_SOAK_SECONDS:-300} cargo test --test hostile_network bad_network_tui_work_soak_30m -- --ignored --nocapture
+
+persistence-check:
+	cargo test --test integration_smoke session_survives_server_restart_same_shell_and_screen -- --nocapture
+	cargo test --test integration_smoke multiple_persistent_named_sessions_survive_restart_independently -- --nocapture
+
+package-check:
+	$(MAKE) package-release-linux
+	$(MAKE) package-release-windows
+	sh scripts/verify-release-artifacts.sh
+
 install:
-	sh packaging/install.sh
+	sh install.sh --from-current
+
+package-release:
+	sh scripts/package-release.sh
+
+package-release-linux:
+	DOSH_PACKAGE_OS=linux DOSH_PACKAGE_ARCH=x86_64 sh scripts/package-release.sh
+
+package-release-windows:
+	DOSH_PACKAGE_OS=windows DOSH_PACKAGE_ARCH=x86_64 DOSH_PACKAGE_TARGET=x86_64-pc-windows-gnu sh scripts/package-release.sh
+
+publish-release:
+	sh scripts/publish-gitea-release.sh
+
+bench-report:
+	sh scripts/bench-report.sh
 
 # Safe, self-contained local benchmark matrix (native cold auth, cached attach
 # ticket, local-auth) on a throwaway server bound to 127.0.0.1 on a free port in
@@ -28,3 +72,17 @@ bench-docker-ssh:
 
 bench-docker-mosh:
 	DOSH_BENCH_INCLUDE_MOSH=1 sh scripts/ci-docker-ssh-bench.sh
+
+fuzz-smoke:
+	sh scripts/fuzz-run.sh 20
+
+# Longer pre-launch fuzz pass. Override with DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS=NN.
+fuzz-deep:
+	DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS=$${DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS:-300} sh scripts/fuzz-run.sh
+
+tui-harness:
+	sh scripts/tui-harness.sh
+
+# 30-minute launch soak by default. Override with DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS=NN.
+soak-local:
+	DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS=$${DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS:-1800} cargo test --test integration_smoke sleep_roaming_soak_30m -- --ignored --nocapture

README.md

@@ -1,299 +1,112 @@
-# dosh - Dormant Shell
+# Dosh
 
-dosh is a low-latency remote terminal designed around fast attach and fast reconnect.
+Dosh is an encrypted remote terminal for fast reconnecting shells.
-It is mosh-shaped, but not a mosh clone: the server is a resident daemon, terminal
-sessions stay hot, and repeat connects try encrypted UDP before starting SSH.
 
-The core target is simple:
+It runs a `dosh-server` on a Unix-like host and a `dosh` client on macOS,
+Linux, or Windows. Setup can use SSH, then Dosh connects over encrypted UDP,
+keeps sessions alive across disconnects, supports terminal apps, and can carry
+TCP forwarding, file copy, and VS Code Remote-SSH streams.
 
-- First secure trust establishment uses SSH.
+## Support
-- Existing sessions attach in one encrypted UDP exchange whenever cached credentials allow it.
-- Reconnect after sleep, roaming, or network change resumes in one encrypted UDP exchange.
-- Cold SSH fallback stays competitive with plain `ssh` by doing less after auth.
 
-## Why not just mosh?
+- Client: macOS, Linux, Windows
+- Server: Linux and other Unix-like systems with PTYs
+- Default UDP port: `50000`
+- Windows: client only
 
-mosh is excellent at roaming and high-latency interactivity. Its startup path still
+Dosh is meant to replace Mosh and everyday interactive SSH sessions. It does
-has work dosh can avoid:
+not currently include SFTP, X11 forwarding, or a Windows server.
-
-1. SSH connects to the host.
-2. SSH starts `mosh-server`.
-3. The client receives connection material over SSH.
-4. SSH exits and the mosh UDP session begins.
-
-dosh keeps `dosh-server` running before the client arrives. Named PTY sessions can
-also be prewarmed, so attaching to `default` does not need to spawn a daemon, create
-a PTY, or start a shell on the user's critical path.
-
-This is not an encryption argument against mosh. dosh also encrypts its UDP data
-channel; the speed difference comes from keeping the server and session hot.
-
-## Fast Path Order
-
-The client always tries the cheapest valid path first:
-
-1. **UDP resume:** existing `ClientId` and session key. No SSH. One encrypted UDP
-   request, one encrypted UDP reply.
-2. **UDP attach ticket:** cached server-issued attach ticket for the same
-   host/user/session/mode. No SSH. One encrypted UDP request, one encrypted UDP
-   reply.
-3. **SSH bootstrap:** `ssh -T user@host ~/.local/bin/dosh-auth ...`, then one encrypted UDP
-   attach.
-4. **New session:** same as attach, but the server must create the PTY/shell unless
-   the session was prewarmed.
-
-The fastest path is not a custom SSH replacement. SSH remains the first trust root;
-dosh removes SSH from repeat attaches when the server has already issued valid
-credentials.
-
-Attach tickets are implemented because they are the way a fresh client process can
-skip SSH after a recent successful bootstrap.
-
-## Connection Speed Contract
-
-dosh is measured by terminal-ready time: elapsed time from running `dosh host` to the
-first usable terminal screen.
-
-- UDP resume: <= one measured UDP RTT + local render time.
-- UDP attach ticket: <= one measured UDP RTT + local render time.
-- Warm attach with ControlMaster: <= `ssh host true` over the existing master + one
-  measured UDP RTT.
-- Cold attach without ControlMaster: <= cold `ssh host` terminal-ready time + one
-  measured UDP RTT.
-- New session: measured separately because it may need PTY and shell creation.
-
-Server-side client resume state is kept for a day by default, so a sleeping laptop
-can resume the same encrypted client association without depending on a still-valid
-attach ticket. Attach tickets remain the fast path for fresh client processes.
-
-The client emits timing spans for credential lookup, SSH bootstrap, UDP resume,
-UDP ticket attach, and terminal-ready time.
-
-## Architecture
-
-```text
-dosh-server
-  UDP socket on one configurable port
-  session table keyed by name
-  one PTY per named session
-  optional prewarmed sessions, default ["default"]
-  terminal parser/screen state per session
-  client table per session
-  encrypted UDP protocol
-  tiny SSH-invoked dosh-auth helper mode
-
-dosh-client
-  terminal raw mode
-  local credential cache
-  UDP resume/attach first
-  SSH bootstrap fallback
-  PTY input/output forwarding
-  reconnect and roaming state machine
-```
 
 ## Install
 
-Default UDP port: `50000`. This is intentionally inside the common forwarded range
+Unix/macOS server and client:
-`50000-52000/udp`.
 
-Install on each Linux server you want to attach to:
+```sh
-
+curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh -s -- both --repo https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git --port 50000
-```bash
-curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh \
-  | DOSH_REPO=https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git DOSH_PORT=50000 sh -s -- server
 ```
 
-Install the client on macOS:
+Unix/macOS client only:
 
-```bash
+```sh
-curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh \
+curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh -s -- client --repo https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git
-  | DOSH_REPO=https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git DOSH_SERVER=palav DOSH_HOST=git.palav.dev DOSH_PORT=50000 sh -s -- client
 ```
 
-Update an installed client later:
+Windows client:
 
-```bash
+```powershell
+irm https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.ps1 | iex
+```
+
+## Use
+
+```sh
+dosh setup HOST
+dosh HOST
+dosh HOST COMMAND
 dosh update
 ```
 
-Install the client on Windows PowerShell:
+Useful commands:
 
-```powershell
+```sh
-$env:DOSH_REPO="https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git"; $env:DOSH_SERVER="palav"; $env:DOSH_HOST="git.palav.dev"; $env:DOSH_PORT="50000"; irm https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.ps1 | iex
+dosh exec HOST COMMAND
+dosh cp SRC DST
+dosh ls host:path
+dosh cat host:path
+dosh mkdir host:path
+dosh rm [-r] host:path
+dosh forward HOST -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80
+dosh forward HOST -D 1080
+dosh forward HOST -R 2222:127.0.0.1:22
+dosh status HOST
+dosh doctor HOST
+dosh recover HOST
+dosh restart HOST
 ```
 
-Attach:
+Agent forwarding is opt-in with `-A` and must also be enabled on the server.
+File copy must be enabled by the server config.
 
-```bash
+## VS Code
-dosh palav
+
+Dosh can carry VS Code Remote-SSH through its transport:
+
+```sh
+dosh vscode setup HOST
+dosh vscode HOST /remote/path
 ```
 
-Plain `dosh palav` opens a fresh terminal session. Use named sessions when you want
+This creates a managed SSH config entry using `ProxyCommand dosh proxy-stdio`.
-to reattach to the same persistent terminal from multiple clients:
+VS Code still uses Remote-SSH and its normal remote server; Dosh carries the
+SSH byte stream.
 
-```bash
+## Config
-dosh --session work palav
+
-dosh --session logs palav
+```text
+~/.config/dosh/client.toml
+~/.config/dosh/hosts.toml
+~/.config/dosh/server.toml
 ```
 
-Press `Ctrl-]` to detach the current client while leaving the server session alive.
+Common client settings:
-Typing `exit` in the remote shell closes that Dosh session and returns the client.
-If UDP packets stop arriving, Dosh keeps the terminal open, sends keepalive pings,
-and attempts ticket-based reconnect. The old in-band status overlay was removed
-because writing directly over the terminal could corrupt TUIs; a non-destructive
-status surface is tracked as a public-readiness item.
 
-If SSH and UDP use different public names, specify the UDP address:
+```toml
-
+default_session = "new"
-```bash
+predict = true
-dosh-client --dosh-host public.example.com --dosh-port 50000 user@host
+cache_attach_tickets = true
+disconnect_status = true
 ```
 
-Dosh already lets OpenSSH handle SSH aliases, users, keys, ports, known-hosts,
+## Rust Library
-ProxyJump, and other SSH config during bootstrap. It also runs `ssh -G` to infer the
-UDP host from an SSH alias when `dosh_host` is not configured. To make that explicit
-in Dosh's host config:
 
-```bash
+Dosh exposes a Rust transport for encrypted, reconnecting application streams.
-dosh import-ssh palav homelab
+Use `dosh::client::DoshClient` and `dosh::server::DoshServer` for the normal
+native-auth path. Use `dosh::transport::DoshTransport` only when you already
+own session setup and authentication.
+
+Runnable examples:
+
+```text
+examples/sdk_echo_client.rs
+examples/sdk_echo_server.rs
 ```
-
-## Develop
-
-Build:
-
-```bash
-cargo build
-```
-
-Attach locally, using local bootstrap instead of SSH:
-
-```bash
-target/debug/dosh-client --local-auth --no-cache local
-```
-
-Benchmark local attach:
-
-```bash
-target/debug/dosh-bench --local-auth --server local --iterations 5
-```
-
-Benchmark a remote host over SSH bootstrap:
-
-```bash
-target/release/dosh-bench --server user@host --ssh-port 22 --iterations 3
-```
-
-Benchmark the ControlMaster-backed SSH bootstrap path:
-
-```bash
-target/release/dosh-bench --server user@host --controlmaster --iterations 3
-```
-
-Run the Docker OpenSSH benchmark gate used by CI. It checks both cold SSH bootstrap
-and ControlMaster-backed SSH bootstrap against a containerized `sshd` plus resident
-`dosh-server`:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-ssh
-```
-
-Run the same Docker comparison with Mosh installed in the benchmark container:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-mosh
-```
-
-That prints `ssh_true_ms`, `dosh_attach_ms`, and `mosh_start_true_ms` under the same
-container, key, DNS, and network path. It also prints `dosh_cached_attach_ms`, which
-is the real Dosh fast path after the first SSH-authenticated bootstrap has issued an
-attach ticket. See `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` before using the numbers publicly;
-Dosh's current strongest claim is fast attach/reconnect, not full Mosh feature
-parity yet.
-
-The CI workflow includes an optional remote benchmark job. It runs when
-`DOSH_BENCH_HOST`, `DOSH_BENCH_USER`, and `DOSH_BENCH_SSH_KEY` repository secrets are
-configured.
-
-Install release binaries and the user systemd service:
-
-```bash
-make install
-```
-
-## Performance Rules
-
-The stack is performance-driven, not fixed by taste. Rust is the default because the
-likely bottlenecks are network RTT, SSH startup/auth, PTY/shell creation, packet
-size, and terminal rendering. Change language or runtime only if measurements show
-they are the bottleneck.
-
-Hot-path rules:
-
-- Custom UDP protocol with AEAD for v0; no QUIC handshake on attach.
-- Fixed binary packet headers for terminal traffic; no JSON on the protocol path.
-- Preallocated buffers; avoid per-packet heap churn.
-- Single-thread event loop is preferred for the hot path.
-- No PTY allocation, shell spawn, shell rc files, or MOTD on attach to an existing
-  session.
-- Initial snapshot should be sent in the first UDP reply when it fits under the
-  packet budget.
-
-## Goals
-
-- Connection speed as specified above.
-- UDP roaming and reconnect.
-- Encrypted terminal data.
-- Reuse SSH pubkeys for first trust establishment.
-- Named persistent sessions.
-- Multiple clients attached to one session.
-- Optional view-only clients.
-- Single server port, not one port per session.
-- Static server and client binaries where practical.
-
-## Non-Goals
-
-- Replacing SSH as the first public-key trust mechanism.
-- Multi-user access control.
-- Windows support in v0.
-- Full mosh compatibility.
-- Perfect predictive local echo in the first MVP.
-
-## Status
-
-Rust implementation is present in this repository. It contains `dosh-server`,
-`dosh-client`, `dosh-auth`, `dosh-bench`, shared auth/crypto/protocol modules, a
-resident PTY server, encrypted UDP bootstrap attach, UDP resume, sealed UDP attach
-tickets, client ACKs, server retransmit bookkeeping, sliding replay protection,
-server-side `vt100` screen snapshots/diffs, a hardened user systemd unit, an install
-script, Docker SSH benchmark gates, CI, and protocol/integration tests.
-
-### Native v1
-
-Beyond the SSH-bootstrap core, native v1 (`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`) is substantially
-implemented and aims to replace the day-to-day `ssh host` workflow on Dosh-installed
-servers:
-
-- **Native UDP auth** with X25519 key exchange, transcript-bound Ed25519 user auth
-  via ssh-agent or an encrypted OpenSSH key, ChaCha20-Poly1305 transport, and
-  `authorized_keys` policy enforcement (`from=`, `no-port-forwarding`, `permitopen=`;
-  unsupported options fail closed).
-- **Dosh host-key trust**: pinned `known_hosts`, `dosh trust [--remove|--replace]`,
-  TOFU only when explicitly enabled, and hard-fail on host-key mismatch.
-- **TCP forwarding**: local `-L`, remote `-R` (loopback bind by default), dynamic
-  SOCKS5 `-D`, forward-only `-N`, and background `-f`, with per-stream flow control so
-  bulk transfers do not lag the terminal.
-- **Diagnostics**: `dosh doctor host` for config/auth/UDP/forwarding-policy checks.
-
-Native auth is **opt-in alongside SSH fallback** (`auth_preference = "native,ssh"`):
-the native authenticated path is tried first and falls back to SSH bootstrap
-explicitly when native auth is disabled, unavailable, or rejected. It never silently
-degrades to an unauthenticated mode.
-
-Native v1 is **not yet fully verified**. Per-IP token-bucket rate limiting, protocol
-VERSION negotiation hardening, fuzzing in CI, ECDSA/RSA user keys, and an external
-security review are still open. See `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` for the published threat
-model and accepted residual risks, and the "Native v1 verification checklist status"
-table in `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` for the item-by-item state. Dosh does not yet
-claim a fully verified SSH replacement; its defensible claim remains fast encrypted
-native attach/reconnect with SSH-equivalent transport security and SSH fallback.

SPEC.md

@@ -1,602 +0,0 @@
-# dosh - Dormant Shell Spec
-
-**Status:** Implemented Rust build with local and Docker SSH verification  
-**Default language:** Rust, unless benchmarks prove the stack is the bottleneck  
-**Binaries:** `dosh-server`, `dosh-client`, `dosh-auth`, `dosh-bench`  
-**Helper mode:** `dosh-server auth` or `~/.local/bin/dosh-auth`, invoked by SSH with `-T`  
-**Native v1 plan:** `docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` (substantially implemented; see its v1 status block)  
-**Threat model:** `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`
-
----
-
-## 1. Product Shape
-
-dosh is a fast-attach remote terminal. It borrows the useful shape of mosh - UDP
-transport, roaming, and latency-tolerant terminal rendering - but optimizes a
-different first-order problem: getting the user back into an already-running terminal
-as quickly as possible.
-
-The daemon is resident. Sessions are named. A session owns one PTY and one
-authoritative terminal screen. Clients attach to that session over encrypted UDP.
-SSH is used for first trust establishment and as fallback when cached credentials are
-missing, expired, or rejected. Native Dosh auth is specified separately in
-`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` as the path toward replacing the day-to-day SSH workflow on
-Dosh-installed servers.
-
----
-
-## 2. Design Goals
-
-- Connection speed first:
-  - UDP resume: one encrypted UDP request and one encrypted UDP reply.
-  - UDP attach ticket: one encrypted UDP request and one encrypted UDP reply.
-  - Warm SSH bootstrap: existing-ControlMaster SSH command latency plus one UDP RTT.
-  - Cold SSH bootstrap: cold `ssh host` terminal-ready time plus at most one UDP RTT.
-- No daemon spawn, PTY spawn, shell startup, rc file execution, or MOTD on attach to
-  an existing session.
-- Prewarm configured sessions at daemon startup, including `default` by default.
-- Encrypted UDP terminal data.
-- Single configurable UDP port.
-- Multiple clients attached to one session.
-- Optional read-only clients.
-- Named persistent sessions.
-- Reuse existing SSH key infrastructure.
-- Instrument connection timing from the first implementation.
-
----
-
-## 3. Non-Goals
-
-- Replacing SSH as the first public-key trust mechanism.
-- Multi-user authorization or ACLs.
-- Windows support in v0.
-- Full mosh protocol compatibility.
-- Perfect local echo/prediction in the first MVP.
-- QUIC in v0. QUIC can be revisited if measurements show custom UDP is not enough.
-
----
-
-## 4. Connection Speed Contract
-
-Measure terminal-ready time: elapsed time from launching `dosh ...` to first usable
-terminal render.
-
-Benchmarks must use the same host, network, key, DNS path, and SSH config.
-
-| Path | Acceptance gate |
-| --- | --- |
-| UDP resume | <= one measured UDP RTT + local render time |
-| UDP attach ticket | <= one measured UDP RTT + local render time |
-| Warm SSH bootstrap | <= `ssh host true` over existing ControlMaster + one measured UDP RTT |
-| Cold SSH bootstrap | <= cold `ssh host` terminal-ready time + one measured UDP RTT |
-| New session | Report separately; PTY/shell creation is expected |
-
-Required timing evidence:
-
-- Client stderr spans for credential lookup, SSH bootstrap, UDP resume, UDP ticket
-  attach, and terminal-ready time.
-- `dosh-bench` samples for SSH `true`, Dosh attach, and optional ControlMaster-backed
-  SSH `true`.
-- `make bench-docker-ssh` gates both cold SSH bootstrap and ControlMaster-backed SSH
-  bootstrap against containerized OpenSSH plus resident `dosh-server`.
-
----
-
-## 5. Fast Path Order
-
-The client always tries the cheapest path that is valid for the requested
-host/user/session/mode:
-
-1. **UDP resume**
-   - Requires cached `ClientId`, session key, server identity, and unexpired resume
-     metadata.
-   - Sends `ResumeRequest`.
-   - Receives `ResumeOk` with a snapshot or diff.
-
-2. **UDP attach ticket**
-   - Requires cached attach ticket scoped to server identity, SSH username, session,
-     mode, and expiry.
-   - Sends `TicketAttachRequest`.
-   - Receives `AttachOk` with session key, `ClientId`, and snapshot.
-
-3. **SSH bootstrap**
-   - Runs `ssh -T user@host ~/.local/bin/dosh-auth ...`.
-   - Receives attach token, attach ticket, session key material, and server metadata.
-   - Sends `BootstrapAttachRequest`.
-   - Receives `AttachOk` with `ClientId` and snapshot.
-
-4. **New session**
-   - Same as attach, but if the session does not exist and is not prewarmed, the server
-     creates PTY and shell before first paint.
-
----
-
-## 6. Architecture
-
-```text
-dosh-server
-  config loader
-  secret manager
-  UDP socket on one port
-  session table: HashMap<SessionName, Session>
-  optional prewarm of configured sessions
-  auth helper mode for SSH bootstrap
-  metrics/timing logger
-
-Session
-  PTY master
-  child process/shell
-  terminal parser
-  authoritative screen model
-  scrollback ring
-  monotonic output sequence
-  client table: HashMap<ClientId, ClientState>
-
-ClientState
-  ClientId
-  UDP endpoint
-  mode: read-write | view-only
-  session key id
-  last acked sequence
-  terminal size
-  last seen timestamp
-
-dosh-client
-  config loader
-  local credential cache
-  terminal raw mode
-  UDP protocol engine
-  SSH bootstrap runner
-  reconnect state machine
-  renderer
-```
-
-Server hot-path ownership should avoid locks on every broadcast. A single event-loop
-owner per session is preferred. Cross-thread designs are allowed only if benchmarked.
-
----
-
-## 7. Security Model
-
-SSH is the first trust root and the recovery/bootstrap fallback. The v0 core relies
-on SSH for first authentication. Native v1 (`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`) adds an opt-in
-native public-key login over the Dosh UDP transport that is tried before SSH, with
-its assets, attackers, and residual risks documented in `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`. SSH
-remains the explicit fallback and the host-key trust bootstrap path.
-
-The UDP channel uses AEAD. Recommended default: `ChaCha20-Poly1305` for portable
-speed, with `AES-GCM` allowed when hardware acceleration is known to be available.
-The negotiated algorithm is recorded in the bootstrap response.
-
-All encrypted packets use:
-
-- Unique nonce per `(session_key_id, direction)`.
-- Monotonic packet counter.
-- Associated data containing protocol version, packet type, session name hash,
-  client id when known, and sequence numbers.
-- Replay rejection using the packet counter window.
-
-Secrets:
-
-- `server_secret`: generated on first server start; stored mode `0600`.
-- `session_key`: random 256-bit key per client attachment, rotated on SSH bootstrap
-  or ticket attach.
-- `attach_ticket_key`: derived from `server_secret` and rotated by server key epoch.
-
-No terminal bytes are sent outside AEAD after the attach handshake begins.
-
----
-
-## 8. SSH Bootstrap Auth
-
-Client command:
-
-```bash
-ssh -T user@host ~/.local/bin/dosh-auth \
-  --protocol 1 \
-  --nonce <client_nonce> \
-  --session <name> \
-  --mode <read-write|view-only> \
-  --size <cols>x<rows> \
-  --client-version <version>
-```
-
-`dosh-auth` must:
-
-- Not allocate a PTY.
-- Not start a shell.
-- Not run user shell rc files.
-- Read server config and secret directly.
-- Return one compact binary or base64url response on stdout.
-- Exit immediately.
-
-Bootstrap response fields:
-
-- `protocol_version`
-- `server_id`
-- `server_key_epoch`
-- `issued_at`
-- `expires_at`
-- `user`
-- `session`
-- `mode`
-- `terminal_size`
-- `attach_token`
-- `attach_ticket`
-- `attach_ticket_psk`
-- `session_key`
-- `session_key_id`
-- `udp_host`
-- `udp_port`
-- `aead_algorithm`
-
-`attach_token = HMAC-SHA256(server_secret, user || session || mode || terminal_size ||
-client_nonce || issued_at || expires_at || session_key_id)`.
-
-The token TTL defaults to 30 seconds. Attach tickets default to 1 hour and are
-server-configurable.
-
----
-
-## 9. Attach Tickets
-
-Attach tickets let a new client process attach without spawning SSH again.
-
-Ticket properties:
-
-- Server-sealed and authenticated by `attach_ticket_key`.
-- Paired with a client-held random `attach_ticket_psk` returned during SSH bootstrap.
-- Scoped to server identity, SSH username, session, mode, and key epoch.
-- Short-lived by default.
-- Revoked implicitly when server secret/key epoch changes.
-- Stored client-side with mode `0600`, along with `attach_ticket_psk`.
-
-Ticket attach does not prove fresh possession of the SSH private key. It proves recent
-possession of a server-issued credential. This is acceptable for speed, configurable,
-and can be disabled with `allow_attach_tickets = false`.
-
-Ticket attach flow:
-
-1. Client sends `TicketAttachRequest` containing the sealed ticket, client nonce, and
-   requested terminal size.
-2. The request body is AEAD-encrypted with a key derived from
-   `HKDF(attach_ticket_psk, client_nonce || "ticket-attach-request")`.
-3. Server opens the sealed ticket, validates scope/expiry/key epoch, derives the same
-   request key, and decrypts the request.
-4. Server creates a fresh session key and `ClientId`.
-5. `AttachOk` is AEAD-encrypted with
-   `HKDF(attach_ticket_psk, client_nonce || server_nonce || "ticket-attach-ok")` and
-   carries the fresh session key metadata plus first snapshot.
-6. Subsequent terminal packets use the fresh session key, not the ticket PSK.
-
----
-
-## 10. UDP Protocol
-
-UDP port defaults to `50000`. One socket handles all sessions and clients.
-
-Hot-path terminal packets use a fixed binary header:
-
-```text
-magic      4 bytes   "DOSH"
-version    1 byte    1
-type       1 byte
-flags      2 bytes
-conn_id    16 bytes  zero before client id is assigned
-seq        8 bytes   sender packet sequence
-ack        8 bytes   latest received peer sequence
-body_len   2 bytes
-body       body_len bytes
-tag        AEAD tag, length depends on algorithm
-```
-
-Packet types:
-
-| Type | Direction | Encrypted | Purpose |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| `BootstrapAttachRequest` | client -> server | token-authenticated | Attach after SSH bootstrap |
-| `TicketAttachRequest` | client -> server | ticket PSK | Attach with cached ticket |
-| `AttachOk` | server -> client | yes | Assign client id and send first snapshot |
-| `AttachReject` | server -> client | no terminal bytes | Reject and require SSH |
-| `ResumeRequest` | client -> server | yes | Resume known client |
-| `ResumeOk` | server -> client | yes | Endpoint updated; diff/snapshot follows |
-| `Input` | client -> server | yes | PTY input bytes |
-| `Resize` | client -> server | yes | Terminal size update |
-| `Frame` | server -> client | yes | Screen diff or PTY byte frame |
-| `Ack` | both | yes | Ack without payload |
-| `Ping` / `Pong` | both | yes | Keepalive and RTT |
-| `Detach` | client -> server | yes | Remove client, keep session |
-
-MTU target:
-
-- Default payload target: 1200 bytes.
-- Larger datagrams may be enabled only after path MTU discovery.
-- Snapshots larger than the target are chunked.
-
-Reliability:
-
-- Input packets are reliable and ordered per client.
-- Output frames are sequenced; clients ack rendered sequence.
-- Server retransmits unacked frames within a bounded window.
-- If a client falls too far behind, server sends a fresh snapshot instead of replaying
-  unlimited diffs.
-
----
-
-## 11. Sessions and PTYs
-
-Named sessions:
-
-```bash
-dosh host                  # open a fresh generated session
-dosh --session work host   # attach/create named persistent session
-dosh --session work --view-only host
-```
-
-Session behavior:
-
-- One PTY per session.
-- Sessions persist until killed or server exits.
-- If a session has zero clients, the PTY keeps running.
-- Plain client attaches use generated session names by default.
-- `--session <name>` intentionally reuses or shares a persistent session.
-- Configured sessions are prewarmed at daemon startup.
-- If a requested session does not exist:
-  - `attach` creates it only when `create_on_attach = true`.
-  - `new` always creates it and fails if it already exists.
-
-Resize policy:
-
-- One PTY means one size.
-- Read-write clients may resize.
-- View-only clients never resize.
-- Default policy: latest read-write resize wins.
-
----
-
-## 12. Screen State
-
-Server maintains the authoritative terminal model:
-
-- Visible grid.
-- Cursor position and style.
-- Alternate screen.
-- Text attributes and colors.
-- Scrollback ring.
-- Monotonic output sequence.
-
-Initial attach:
-
-- Server sends a snapshot in the first UDP reply if it fits the packet budget.
-- If not, server sends a minimal first frame immediately and follows with chunks.
-
-Diffs:
-
-- Diffs are computed per client from that client's last acked rendered sequence.
-- Lagging clients may receive larger diffs or a full snapshot.
-- Diffs are preferred over raw PTY bytes for reconnect correctness.
-
-Encoding:
-
-- Hot terminal frames use fixed binary headers and compact binary payloads.
-- MessagePack is allowed only for non-hot control/list/config responses.
-- JSON is not used on the protocol path.
-
----
-
-## 13. Multi-Client Model
-
-Default mode is shared input. Any read-write client can write to the session PTY.
-All clients see the same resulting screen.
-
-View-only mode:
-
-- Client suppresses local input.
-- Server rejects `Input` from view-only clients even if a malformed client sends it.
-- Promotion/demotion requires reconnect.
-
-Client timeout:
-
-- Clients are removed after `client_timeout_secs` without ack/ping.
-- The default is intentionally long enough for laptop sleep/resume, currently one
-  day. Short timeouts make Dosh fall back to attach tickets or SSH after sleep.
-- Removing a client never kills the session.
-
----
-
-## 14. Local Echo
-
-MVP local echo is conservative:
-
-- Printable keystrokes may be rendered optimistically only when the client is in a
-  simple shell line-editing state.
-- Server output is always authoritative.
-- On mismatch, client replaces local prediction with server state.
-
-Full mosh-style predictive display is a later feature. It must not delay the first
-implementation of fast attach/resume.
-
----
-
-## 15. Reconnect and Roaming
-
-Client detects possible disconnect when no server packet arrives for
-`reconnect_timeout_secs`.
-
-Reconnect order:
-
-1. Send encrypted `ResumeRequest` to the configured host/port.
-2. If accepted, update endpoint server-side and receive diff/snapshot.
-3. If rejected, try attach ticket.
-4. If ticket attach is rejected, run SSH bootstrap.
-
-The server matches resume by `ClientId` and session key id, not by source address.
-Successful resume updates the client's UDP endpoint.
-
----
-
-## 16. Configuration
-
-Server config: `~/.config/dosh/server.toml`
-
-```toml
-port = 50000
-bind = "0.0.0.0"
-scrollback = 5000
-auth_ttl_secs = 30
-attach_ticket_ttl_secs = 3600
-allow_attach_tickets = true
-client_timeout_secs = 86400
-retransmit_window = 256
-default_input_mode = "read-write"
-prewarm_sessions = ["default"]
-create_on_attach = true
-shell = "/usr/bin/zsh"
-sessions_dir = "~/.local/share/dosh/sessions"
-secret_path = "~/.config/dosh/secret"
-```
-
-Client config: `~/.config/dosh/client.toml`
-
-```toml
-server = "user@example.com"
-update_repo = "https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git"
-update_port = 50000
-ssh_auth_command = "~/.local/bin/dosh-auth"
-# ssh_port = 22
-dosh_port = 50000
-default_session = "new"
-reconnect_timeout_secs = 5
-view_only = false
-cache_attach_tickets = true
-credential_cache = "~/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
-```
-
----
-
-## 17. Performance-First Stack
-
-Default implementation:
-
-```text
-# server/client shared
-bytes
-chacha20poly1305
-aes-gcm optional
-hmac
-hkdf
-sha2
-rand
-serde
-toml
-
-# server
-mio or tokio    # benchmark; single-thread hot path either way
-rustix          # PTY/process/syscall wrappers where possible
-vt100           # authoritative terminal parser/model
-
-# client
-mio or tokio
-crossterm       # raw terminal mode
-vt100 optional  # only if client-side model is needed for prediction
-```
-
-Rules:
-
-- Benchmark `mio` vs single-thread `tokio` before committing to runtime.
-- Avoid locks on per-packet session broadcast.
-- Preallocate packet buffers.
-- Avoid serde on terminal frames.
-- Keep `dosh-auth` tiny and static where practical.
-- Optimize startup path before throughput.
-
----
-
-## 18. MVP Scope
-
-MVP must include:
-
-- `dosh-server` daemon.
-- `dosh-auth` SSH helper mode.
-- `dosh-client`.
-- One UDP port.
-- Prewarmed `default` session.
-- SSH bootstrap attach.
-- Attach-ticket UDP attach.
-- Encrypted UDP channel.
-- UDP resume.
-- Raw terminal input/output.
-- Basic resize.
-- Timing instrumentation.
-
-MVP may defer:
-
-- Sophisticated predictive local echo.
-- Per-cell minimal diffs; raw frame plus snapshot fallback is acceptable initially if
-  reconnect correctness is preserved.
-- Multi-session management commands beyond `attach`, `new`, `list`, and `kill`.
-
----
-
-## 19. Verification Checklist
-
-A build is not done until these are demonstrated:
-
-- Cold attach timing compared against cold `ssh host`.
-- Warm attach timing compared against `ssh host true` with ControlMaster.
-- UDP resume completes without spawning SSH.
-- Existing session attach does not spawn PTY or shell.
-- Prewarmed `default` exists before first client.
-- Terminal data is encrypted on UDP.
-- Replay counters reject duplicate encrypted packets.
-- View-only clients cannot write to PTY.
-- Multiple clients see the same screen.
-- Client survives source port/IP change by resume.
-- Snapshot fallback repairs a lagging client.
-- `README.md` and `SPEC.md` remain consistent with implemented behavior.
-
----
-
-## 20. Status
-
-Spec complete. The Rust implementation is present in this repository.
-
-Implemented:
-
-- Rust workspace and binaries: `dosh-server`, `dosh-client`, `dosh-auth`.
-- Server config and secret creation.
-- SSH/local bootstrap response generation.
-- HMAC bootstrap verification.
-- ChaCha20-Poly1305 encrypted UDP packets.
-- Fixed DOSH packet header.
-- Resident server with prewarmed named PTY sessions.
-- Authoritative server-side `vt100` terminal parser.
-- Full attach/resume snapshots from terminal screen state.
-- Per-client screen-state diffs for broadcast frames.
-- Raw terminal client attach.
-- UDP resume from cached client credentials.
-- Sealed attach-ticket UDP attach after server restart or unknown-client resume.
-- Client ACKs and server-side bounded pending retransmit window.
-- Sliding replay window for encrypted client packet counters.
-- View-only server-side input rejection.
-- Basic resize handling.
-- Timing output for bootstrap and terminal-ready.
-- `dosh-bench` benchmark harness for attach timing, SSH key/known-host options, and
-  ControlMaster-backed SSH measurement.
-- Hardened user systemd unit.
-- Release install script.
-- Docker OpenSSH benchmark gate covering cold SSH bootstrap and ControlMaster-backed
-  SSH bootstrap.
-- GitHub Actions CI for format, tests, release build, and Docker SSH benchmark gate.
-- Optional GitHub Actions remote benchmark job gated by repository secrets.
-- Auth/protocol tests.
-- Integration smoke tests for local attach, ticket attach after server restart, and
-  view-only input rejection.
-- Integration tests for retransmit, resize, multi-client shared screen, and UDP
-  endpoint roaming.
-
-Optional deployment evidence:
-
-- Configure `DOSH_BENCH_HOST`, `DOSH_BENCH_USER`, and `DOSH_BENCH_SSH_KEY` repository
-  secrets to run the same benchmark against a real remote host in addition to the
-  Docker OpenSSH gate.

build.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+use std::process::Command;
+
+fn git(args: &[&str]) -> Option<String> {
+    let output = Command::new("git").args(args).output().ok()?;
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let text = String::from_utf8(output.stdout).ok()?;
+    Some(text.trim().to_string())
+}
+
+fn main() {
+    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git/HEAD");
+    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git/index");
+
+    let hash = git(&["rev-parse", "--short=12", "HEAD"]).unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".into());
+    let date = git(&["show", "-s", "--format=%cs", "HEAD"]).unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".into());
+    let dirty = Command::new("git")
+        .args(["diff", "--quiet", "--ignore-submodules", "--"])
+        .status()
+        .map(|status| if status.success() { "" } else { "+dirty" })
+        .unwrap_or("");
+
+    println!("cargo:rustc-env=DOSH_GIT_HASH={hash}{dirty}");
+    println!("cargo:rustc-env=DOSH_COMMIT_DATE={date}");
+}

docs/BENCHMARKS.md

@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Benchmarks
-
-This document explains how to run the Dosh benchmarks, what each metric means,
-and how to read the results honestly. Dosh's headline claim is *insane speed on
-repeat attach/reconnect* — these benchmarks exist to make that claim measurable
-and reproducible.
-
-> **Read first:** `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md`. The defensible public claim is fast
-> attach/reconnect, not full Mosh feature parity, and **not** cold startup. Cite
-> `dosh_cached_attach_ms` for the core speed claim; cite cold metrics only to show
-> the fallback path stays competitive with ordinary SSH.
-
-## TL;DR
-
-```bash
-make bench-local          # safe, self-contained matrix on a throwaway server
-make bench-local-json     # same, machine-readable JSON with raw samples
-make bench-docker-ssh     # containerized SSH-vs-Dosh gate used by CI
-make bench-docker-mosh    # same, with Mosh installed for a three-way comparison
-```
-
-`make bench-local` never touches a running production server: it builds release
-binaries, starts its own `dosh-server` bound to `127.0.0.1` on a random free UDP
-port inside a temporary `HOME`, runs the matrix, prints raw samples plus summary
-statistics, and tears everything down on exit. It will refuse to bind UDP port
-`50000` (the default production port).
-
-## The benchmark binary: `dosh-bench`
-
-`dosh-bench` spawns the real `dosh-client` once per iteration and times the whole
-process from launch to terminal-ready-and-detached. That wall-clock cost is the
-apples-to-apples comparison against `ssh host true`: it is the startup price each
-tool pays before any useful remote work begins.
-
-Every run prints, per metric, a summary line (count, min, median, p95, mean, max
-in milliseconds) **and** a raw-samples line. Pass `--json` for one machine-readable
-object per run (with the full `samples_ms` array) so published numbers can always
-include raw data, as required by `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md`.
-
-### Path matrix
-
-`dosh-bench` can benchmark these Dosh attach paths. Without an explicit path flag
-it keeps its legacy single-path behavior (driven by `--local-auth` / `--warm-cache`
-/ `--no-cache`) so existing CI scripts keep working.
-
-| Flag | Metric | What it measures |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `--cold-native` | `dosh_cold_native_ms` | Native cold auth: full `--auth native --no-cache` handshake to first frame and detach. The cold fallback when no cache exists. |
-| `--cached-ticket` | `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | Cached attach-ticket fast path. Warms the cache once, then measures repeat attaches using cached UDP credentials/tickets. **This is the core speed claim.** |
-| `--resume` | `dosh_resume_ms` | UDP resume of a session whose endpoint changes. See the caveat below — only meaningful when a live session is kept open out-of-band. |
-| `--local-auth` | `dosh_local_attach_ms` | Self-contained local bootstrap; no SSH, no native handshake. Useful as a lower-bound sanity check on loopback. |
-| *(default, no flag)* | `dosh_attach_ms` | Cold SSH bootstrap plus UDP attach (legacy single-path mode). |
-
-Existing baseline/comparison metrics are unchanged:
-
-| Metric | Meaning |
-| --- | --- |
-| `ssh_true_ms` | `ssh host true` with the same key/options. |
-| `mosh_start_true_ms` | `mosh host -- true` bootstrap, run `true`, exit (timed inside a PTY). |
-
-### Assertions / gates
-
-| Flag | Gate |
-| --- | --- |
-| `--assert-ssh-plus-ms N` | The primary Dosh metric must be ≤ `ssh_true_ms` mean + `N` ms. |
-| `--assert-mosh-minus-ms N` | The primary Dosh metric must be at least `N` ms faster than `mosh_start_true_ms`. |
-| `--assert-dosh-max-ms N` | The primary Dosh metric mean must be ≤ `N` ms. |
-
-The "primary Dosh metric" for assertions is, in priority order:
-`dosh_cached_attach_ms` → `dosh_resume_ms` → `dosh_cold_native_ms` →
-`dosh_attach_ms` → `dosh_local_attach_ms`.
-
-## What each benchmark does
-
-### `make bench-local` (`scripts/bench-local.sh`)
-
-Self-contained, no SSH, no Docker. It:
-
-1. Builds release binaries (`DOSH_BENCH_PROFILE=debug` for the debug profile).
-2. Picks a free UDP port (never `50000`) and a temp `HOME`.
-3. Generates a throwaway client identity (`ssh-keygen`), authorizes it on the
-   server, and writes a throwaway server + client config (native auth,
-   trust-on-first-use, localhost UDP).
-4. Starts `dosh-server serve` bound to `127.0.0.1` on that port.
-5. Runs `dosh-bench --cold-native --cached-ticket`, then `--local-auth --no-cache`.
-6. Sanity-checks that native cold auth actually trusted the host (so a silent
-   config-parse fallback can't make the benchmark measure the wrong path).
-7. Kills the server and removes the temp `HOME` on exit.
-
-Tunables: `scripts/bench-local.sh [ITERATIONS]` (default 20), `DOSH_BENCH_JSON=1`,
-`DOSH_BENCH_PROFILE=release|debug`.
-
-### `make bench-docker-ssh` / `make bench-docker-mosh` (`scripts/ci-docker-ssh-bench.sh`)
-
-Builds one Ubuntu image with OpenSSH, `dosh-server`, `dosh-auth` (and Mosh for the
-`-mosh` target), then runs `ssh_true_ms`, cold + ControlMaster `dosh_attach_ms`,
-`dosh_cached_attach_ms`, and optionally `mosh_start_true_ms` against the same
-container, key, and loopback network path. This is the gate CI enforces; it asserts
-cold Dosh stays within 500 ms of SSH and that cached attach stays under a small
-budget. See `README.md` "Develop" for the exact invocations.
-
-## Methodology and caveats
-
-- **Same machine, same network path.** `bench-local` runs everything on loopback,
-  so it isolates Dosh's own process/handshake/render overhead and removes network
-  RTT from the comparison. Real-world cached attach is approximately *network RTT
-  plus the local overhead these numbers measure*. Publish the machine, OS, CPU,
-  network path, and sample count alongside any numbers.
-- **Wall-clock of the whole client process.** Each sample includes process spawn,
-  attach, first-frame render, and detach. That is deliberately the same thing
-  `ssh host true` pays, but it means a few ms is fixed process-startup cost, not
-  protocol cost.
-- **Do not cite cold metrics as the headline.** `dosh_cold_native_ms` and
-  `dosh_attach_ms` still pay first-authentication cost. They exist to show the
-  fallback path stays competitive with ordinary SSH. Cite `dosh_cached_attach_ms`
-  for repeat attach/reconnect, per `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md`.
-- **UDP resume is the roaming path, not cold reconnect.** Resume reconnects a
-  client that is *still attached* when its network endpoint changes (sleep/Wi-Fi
-  switch). The `--attach-only` benchmark model detaches after every iteration,
-  which removes the client on the server, so a fresh-process resume has nothing
-  live to resume and is not meaningful in `bench-local`. The cold fresh-process
-  reconnect fast path is the attach ticket (`dosh_cached_attach_ms`). Roaming
-  resume correctness is covered by the integration test
-  `resume_updates_udp_endpoint_for_roaming` in `tests/integration_smoke.rs`.
-  `dosh-bench --resume` remains available for scenarios that keep a live session
-  open out-of-band (for example remote soak tests).
-- **These are not identical workloads.** SSH/Mosh/Dosh do different work at
-  startup. The comparison is still useful because it measures the startup tax each
-  tool charges before useful remote work begins.
-
-## Sample results (loopback, self-contained)
-
-Captured with `make bench-local` (`scripts/bench-local.sh 30`), all times in
-milliseconds, 30 samples per metric.
-
-- Machine: Intel Core i5-9500 @ 3.00 GHz, 6 cores
-- OS: Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, Linux 6.8.0-124-generic, x86_64
-- Toolchain: rustc 1.96.0, release profile
-- Network path: loopback (`127.0.0.1`), throwaway server on a free UDP port
-- Workload: `dosh-client --attach-only` to first frame and detach
-
-| Metric | n | min | median | p95 | mean | max |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| `dosh_cold_native_ms` | 30 | 8.10 | 9.01 | 10.40 | 9.18 | 10.82 |
-| `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | 30 | 2.73 | 2.96 | 3.25 | 2.96 | 3.30 |
-| `dosh_local_attach_ms` | 30 | 2.66 | 2.78 | 3.24 | 2.87 | 3.33 |
-
-Raw samples (ms):
-
-```
-dosh_cold_native_ms:
-8.32, 8.23, 10.31, 10.37, 8.83, 8.81, 9.20, 9.04, 10.14, 8.98, 10.82, 9.87,
-10.22, 10.42, 9.76, 9.09, 9.19, 8.94, 8.69, 8.67, 8.74, 9.33, 9.25, 8.92, 8.39,
-8.55, 8.38, 9.81, 8.17, 8.10
-
-dosh_cached_attach_ms:
-2.99, 2.99, 2.93, 2.87, 2.95, 2.80, 2.80, 2.90, 3.10, 2.73, 3.19, 2.80, 2.87,
-2.82, 2.89, 3.03, 3.06, 3.21, 2.97, 2.83, 3.00, 2.82, 3.04, 2.97, 3.03, 3.24,
-3.30, 2.73, 2.79, 3.25
-
-dosh_local_attach_ms:
-3.05, 3.00, 2.84, 3.04, 3.33, 2.89, 2.76, 2.74, 2.73, 3.32, 3.14, 2.75, 2.83,
-2.88, 2.99, 2.77, 2.75, 2.79, 2.69, 2.78, 2.75, 2.77, 2.75, 2.77, 3.03, 2.75,
-2.94, 2.74, 2.82, 2.66
-```
-
-Reading these numbers: cold native auth is ~9 ms because it pays the native
-handshake; cached attach is ~3 ms because it reuses cached credentials and skips
-the handshake entirely. On loopback there is no network RTT, so this is the local
-overhead floor. Over a real link, expect cached attach ≈ this floor + one network
-round trip — which is exactly the "near network RTT" target in the spec. There is
-no SSH/Mosh baseline in this loopback table because those paths need an SSH server;
-use `make bench-docker-ssh` / `make bench-docker-mosh` for the head-to-head.

docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md

@@ -1,622 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Native v1 Spec
-
-> **v1 status (annotation, not part of the spec text below).** Native v1 is
-> substantially implemented and being stabilized; it is not yet fully verified.
-> Milestone progress against section 15:
->
-> - Milestone 1 — host identity and trust: **done.** Host key generation, `dosh trust`,
->   `known_hosts`, and mismatch hard-fail are implemented.
-> - Milestone 2 — native user auth: **done.** `ClientHello`/`ServerHello`/`UserAuth`/
->   `AuthOk`, ssh-agent and encrypted-key Ed25519, and `authorized_keys` verification
->   exist. ECDSA/RSA user keys are still pending (Ed25519 only today).
-> - Milestone 3 — default native auth: **done.** `auth_preference = "native,ssh"` is
->   the default with explicit, visible SSH fallback. Cold-auth benchmark gates are
->   pending (Track C / `BENCHMARKS.md`).
-> - Milestone 4 — forwarding: **done.** Stream mux, `-L`, `-R`, `-D`, `-N`, `-f`, and
->   per-stream flow control are implemented; hostile-network and load tests pending.
-> - Milestone 5 — hardening: **in progress.** Full per-IP token-bucket rate limiting,
->   protocol VERSION negotiation hardening, fuzzing in CI, and external review are not
->   yet complete. The threat model is published (`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`).
-> - Milestone 6 — workflow parity: **mostly done.** `dosh doctor`, host-trust
->   management, and the encrypted-key prompt flow exist; cross-OS daily-driver soak is
->   ongoing.
->
-> The section 16 verification checklist is **not yet fully green** — see the
-> item-by-item status table in `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` and the residual-risk list in
-> `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`. The section 17 public-claim gate is therefore **not met**.
-
-Native Dosh is a remote-login protocol for Dosh-installed servers. It is intended to
-replace the user's day-to-day `ssh host` workflow for terminals and forwarding while
-keeping SSH as a compatibility and recovery fallback.
-
-Native Dosh is not an RFC-compatible SSH implementation. It deliberately avoids the
-full SSH transport/channel protocol and implements the smaller set of behavior Dosh
-needs: authenticated login, encrypted terminal transport, reconnect/roaming, and TCP
-forwarding.
-
-## 1. Product Contract
-
-User-facing commands:
-
-```bash
-dosh host
-dosh host command...
-dosh -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80 host
-dosh -R 9000:127.0.0.1:9000 host
-dosh --session work host
-dosh --view-only --session work host
-```
-
-Compatibility expectations:
-
-- Existing SSH keys and `ssh-agent` are reused.
-- Server-side authorization uses `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`.
-- Host trust is pinned in a Dosh known-hosts file and can be bootstrapped by SSH.
-- `~/.ssh/config` host aliases, `HostName`, `User`, `Port`, `IdentityFile`,
-  `ProxyJump`, and `UserKnownHostsFile` are honored where practical.
-- SSH bootstrap remains available with `--auth=ssh` and is used automatically when
-  native auth is disabled or cannot complete.
-
-Native v1 is complete only if a normal interactive user can switch their daily
-workflow from `ssh` to `dosh` without keeping SSH open in another tab for routine
-tasks.
-
-Non-goals for v1:
-
-- RFC-compatible SSH server/client behavior.
-- Arbitrary SSH subsystems.
-- X11 forwarding.
-- SFTP/SCP compatibility.
-- Multi-user daemon mode with privileged account switching.
-- Replacing OpenSSH on hosts that do not run `dosh-server`.
-
-## 2. SSH Workflow Parity Target
-
-Native v1 targets the SSH workflows interactive users actually use, not the entire
-OpenSSH feature universe.
-
-Must work in v1:
-
-- Interactive shell: `dosh host`.
-- Remote command: `dosh host command...`.
-- Fresh terminal by default.
-- Named persistent terminal: `dosh --session work host`.
-- Shared/view-only session: `dosh --view-only --session work host`.
-- Local forwarding: `dosh -L [bind:]listen:target:target_port host`.
-- Remote forwarding: `dosh -R [bind:]listen:target:target_port host`.
-- Dynamic forwarding: `dosh -D [bind:]listen host`, if stream flow control is proven;
-  otherwise it is the first v1.1 item and must be called out honestly.
-- Multiple forwards in one connection.
-- Forward-only mode: `dosh -N -L ... host`.
-- Background forwarding: `dosh -f -N -L ... host`, or an equivalent supervised
-  user-service mode.
-- SSH-agent authentication.
-- Encrypted OpenSSH private-key authentication with prompt.
-- `~/.ssh/config` host aliases for `Host`, `HostName`, `User`, `Port`,
-  `IdentityFile`, `ProxyJump`, `UserKnownHostsFile`, and `IdentitiesOnly`.
-- Dosh host config overrides for user, Dosh-specific UDP host/port/auth policy.
-- Clear host-key trust and mismatch errors.
-- Clear auth failure errors that name the attempted key source.
-- Stable reconnect after sleep, network switch, NAT rebinding, and server packet loss.
-- `dosh update`.
-- `dosh doctor host` for config/auth/UDP reachability diagnostics.
-- `dosh sessions host` for session visibility.
-
-Should work in v1 if it does not compromise the transport schedule:
-
-- Agent forwarding with an explicit opt-in flag and clear warning.
-- `ProxyJump` through SSH for bootstrap/trust and through Dosh-native relay later.
-- `SendEnv`/`SetEnv` equivalent for explicit environment variables.
-- Clipboard integration as a separate opt-in channel.
-
-Explicitly not v1:
-
-- X11 forwarding.
-- SFTP/SCP wire compatibility.
-- Full OpenSSH config language.
-- Full `sshd` replacement for arbitrary SSH clients.
-- Forced-command subsystems beyond fail-closed enforcement.
-
-## 3. Stability Contract
-
-Native v1 must be boring under real use:
-
-- A closed laptop must not kill the remote session.
-- A client crash must not kill the remote session.
-- Server restart may drop live PTYs in v1 unless session persistence is implemented,
-  but the client must fail clearly and reconnect cleanly afterward.
-- Decrypt failures from stale packets must be ignored or trigger reconnect, never
-  terminate the terminal by themselves.
-- Terminal cleanup must restore cursor, mouse mode, bracketed paste, alternate
-  screen, and raw mode on exit.
-- Forwarding streams must close cleanly without leaving orphan listeners.
-- Every public error must be actionable: host trust, auth failure, UDP blocked,
-  forwarding denied, version mismatch, or server unavailable.
-- `dosh host` must never attach to another active unnamed terminal by accident.
-- The default install must be secure without hand-editing configs.
-- Upgrades must preserve existing trusted host keys and credentials unless explicitly
-  rotated.
-
-## 4. Security Contract
-
-Native Dosh must match the security properties users rely on from SSH for this use
-case:
-
-- Server authentication before terminal data is trusted.
-- User authentication by possession of an authorized private key or agent key.
-- Forward secrecy for terminal and forwarding traffic.
-- AEAD encryption and authentication for every post-handshake packet.
-- Replay protection for handshake and transport packets.
-- Host-key pinning with explicit first-use behavior.
-- No plaintext terminal bytes after handshake begins.
-- No custom cryptographic primitives.
-- Clear downgrade behavior: native auth failure must not silently fall back to an
-  unauthenticated mode.
-
-Native Dosh does not claim SSH's full protocol security surface. It claims equivalent
-security for Dosh terminal and forwarding sessions on Dosh-installed servers.
-
-## 5. Threat Model
-
-In scope:
-
-- Passive network observer.
-- Active network attacker that can spoof, drop, replay, reorder, or modify packets.
-- NAT rebinding and client IP/port changes.
-- Stolen attach-ticket cache without the user's private key.
-- Server restart and key rotation.
-- Malicious unauthenticated client flooding auth attempts.
-- Compromised low-privilege local user trying to read Dosh caches on a shared client.
-
-Out of scope:
-
-- Compromised client machine.
-- Compromised server account.
-- Malicious kernel, terminal emulator, or PTY implementation.
-- Protecting against a server that is already authorized and then becomes malicious.
-
-## 6. Cryptographic Building Blocks
-
-Allowed primitives:
-
-- Handshake pattern: Noise `NK` or `XX` through a maintained Rust Noise framework, or
-  a small audited construction over `x25519-dalek` plus transcript binding.
-- KEX: X25519.
-- Signatures for user auth: Ed25519 and ECDSA P-256 via SSH-agent and OpenSSH key
-  formats. RSA may be accepted only for compatibility and must use SHA-2 signatures.
-- AEAD: ChaCha20-Poly1305 by default; AES-GCM optional when hardware support is known.
-- KDF: HKDF-SHA256.
-- Hash/transcript: SHA-256.
-- Randomness: OS CSPRNG only.
-
-Disallowed:
-
-- Homegrown ciphers, MACs, padding, or key derivation.
-- Reusing a nonce/key pair.
-- Unauthenticated encryption.
-- MD5/SHA-1 signatures for user auth.
-
-## 7. Identity And Trust
-
-### Server Identity
-
-Each `dosh-server` has a persistent host key:
-
-```text
-~/.config/dosh/host_key
-~/.config/dosh/host_key.pub
-```
-
-Default host-key algorithm: Ed25519.
-
-Client pins host keys in:
-
-```text
-~/.config/dosh/known_hosts
-```
-
-Entry format:
-
-```text
-host-pattern key-type base64-public-key first-seen=unix-seconds source=tofu|ssh|manual
-```
-
-First-use policy:
-
-- Default for public internet: refuse unknown native host key and suggest
-  `dosh trust host` or SSH bootstrap.
-- Default for local/private hosts may be TOFU only when `trust_on_first_use = true`.
-- `dosh trust host` may verify the Dosh host key over the existing SSH bootstrap path.
-
-Host-key mismatch:
-
-- Hard fail.
-- Print old fingerprint, new fingerprint, and known-hosts file path.
-- Never auto-replace.
-
-### User Identity
-
-Native auth user identity is the login user resolved from:
-
-1. Explicit CLI user: `user@host`.
-2. Dosh host config.
-3. `ssh -G host` `user`.
-4. Local username.
-
-Server verifies user keys against:
-
-```text
-~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys
-```
-
-`~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys` is optional and may restrict Dosh access without
-changing SSH access.
-
-Authorized-key options required in v1:
-
-- `from=`
-- `command=` must reject native Dosh terminal login unless explicitly supported later.
-- `restrict`
-- `no-port-forwarding`
-- `permitopen=`
-
-Unsupported restrictive options must fail closed.
-
-## 8. Native Auth Handshake
-
-Native auth runs over UDP on the same Dosh port. It establishes a short-lived
-authenticated control channel and returns the same terminal attach material that SSH
-bootstrap returns today.
-
-Target path:
-
-```text
-client -> server: ClientHello
-server -> client: ServerHello
-client -> server: UserAuth
-server -> client: AuthOk + first terminal snapshot
-```
-
-The server may combine `AuthOk` and `AttachOk` to get terminal-ready in the final
-handshake flight.
-
-### ClientHello
-
-Fields:
-
-- protocol version
-- client random
-- client ephemeral X25519 public key
-- requested host alias
-- requested user
-- requested session
-- requested mode
-- terminal size
-- supported AEAD algorithms
-- supported user key algorithms
-- optional cached host-key id
-- optional attach ticket envelope
-
-### ServerHello
-
-Fields:
-
-- protocol version
-- server random
-- server ephemeral X25519 public key
-- server host public key
-- server host-key signature over transcript
-- chosen AEAD
-- server key epoch
-- auth challenge
-- rate-limit metadata when applicable
-
-The client must verify the host key before sending user authentication.
-
-### UserAuth
-
-Fields:
-
-- selected public key
-- key algorithm
-- signature over transcript and auth challenge
-- optional agent identity metadata
-- optional requested forwarding declarations
-
-The signature must bind:
-
-- both ephemeral keys
-- both randoms
-- server host key
-- requested user/session/mode/terminal size
-- selected algorithms
-- protocol version
-
-### AuthOk
-
-Fields:
-
-- assigned `ClientId`
-- session name
-- mode
-- session key id
-- encrypted session key material or derived key confirmation
-- attach ticket
-- attach ticket PSK encrypted to the handshake key
-- initial output sequence
-- first snapshot
-- server policy flags
-
-`AuthOk` is AEAD-encrypted under the handshake traffic key.
-
-## 9. Key Schedule
-
-Handshake transcript:
-
-```text
-H = SHA256(protocol_label || ClientHello || ServerHello || UserAuth)
-```
-
-Shared secret:
-
-```text
-dh = X25519(client_ephemeral, server_ephemeral)
-```
-
-Handshake key:
-
-```text
-handshake_key = HKDF-SHA256(dh, H, "dosh/native/handshake/v1")
-```
-
-Session traffic keys:
-
-```text
-c2s_key = HKDF-SHA256(handshake_key, H, "dosh/native/c2s/v1")
-s2c_key = HKDF-SHA256(handshake_key, H, "dosh/native/s2c/v1")
-```
-
-Attach ticket PSKs and rotated session keys must be derived independently from server
-secret material and fresh randomness. They must not reuse handshake traffic keys.
-
-## 10. Attach Tickets And Cache
-
-Native attach tickets replace most cold auth after first login.
-
-Ticket properties:
-
-- Server-sealed AEAD blob.
-- Scoped to server host key, user, session, mode, client key fingerprint, server key
-  epoch, and policy flags.
-- Paired with a client-held random PSK.
-- Default TTL: 24 hours for trusted personal machines, configurable down to zero.
-- Stored mode `0600`.
-- Revoked by server host-key rotation, server secret rotation, or user key removal.
-
-Client cache path:
-
-```text
-~/.local/share/dosh/credentials/
-```
-
-Cache entries must include:
-
-- host identity fingerprint
-- user
-- session
-- mode
-- ticket expiry
-- last rendered sequence
-- client id
-- session key id
-- attach ticket
-- attach ticket PSK
-
-## 11. Transport
-
-Post-auth terminal traffic continues to use the current Dosh UDP packet model:
-
-- fixed binary header
-- AEAD body
-- monotonic packet sequence
-- ack field
-- replay window
-- server snapshots for recovery
-
-Required v1 changes:
-
-- Separate packet namespaces for terminal frames, control messages, and forwarding
-  streams.
-- Explicit `key_epoch` or `session_key_id` in packet metadata so stale packets can be
-  ignored without fatal decrypt errors.
-- Rekey command after configurable packet count or wall-clock interval.
-- Connection migration must be accepted after any valid encrypted packet from a new
-  source address.
-
-## 12. Forwarding
-
-Native forwarding is a Dosh stream multiplexer over the encrypted transport.
-
-CLI:
-
-```bash
-dosh -L [bind_host:]listen_port:target_host:target_port host
-dosh -R [bind_host:]listen_port:target_host:target_port host
-dosh -D [bind_host:]listen_port host
-```
-
-Stream packet types:
-
-- `StreamOpen`
-- `StreamOpenOk`
-- `StreamOpenReject`
-- `StreamData`
-- `StreamWindowAdjust`
-- `StreamEof`
-- `StreamClose`
-
-Forwarding rules:
-
-- Terminal traffic has priority over stream bulk data.
-- Each stream has independent flow control.
-- Backpressure must not block PTY input or output.
-- Server enforces `no-port-forwarding` and `permitopen=`.
-- Remote listeners bind to loopback by default.
-- Non-loopback remote bind requires explicit config.
-- `-N` opens forwarding without creating a PTY.
-- `-f` backgrounds only after all requested listeners are successfully active.
-- Listener setup failures fail the entire command unless `--partial-forwarding` is
-  explicitly requested.
-- Forwarding reconnect must preserve listeners and re-open streams after network
-  migration when protocol state allows it.
-- Stream packet scheduling must enforce terminal priority; a large port-forward copy
-  cannot make shell keystrokes lag.
-
-## 13. Diagnostics And Operations
-
-Native v1 must include operations commands:
-
-```bash
-dosh doctor host
-dosh trust host
-dosh trust --remove host
-dosh sessions host
-dosh update
-```
-
-`dosh doctor host` checks:
-
-- host alias resolution
-- Dosh known-host state
-- SSH fallback reachability
-- native UDP reachability
-- server version
-- native auth enabled/disabled
-- usable keys from ssh-agent and identity files
-- server authorization result without opening a terminal
-- configured forwarding policy
-
-`dosh trust host` checks:
-
-- fetch Dosh host key through SSH fallback when available
-- show fingerprint before writing trust
-- refuse overwrite on mismatch unless `--replace` is explicit
-
-## 14. Config
-
-Client:
-
-```toml
-auth_preference = "native,ssh"
-trust_on_first_use = false
-native_auth_timeout_ms = 700
-known_hosts = "~/.config/dosh/known_hosts"
-credential_cache = "~/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
-identity_files = ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519"]
-use_ssh_agent = true
-forward_agent = false
-send_env = ["LANG", "LC_*", "TERM", "COLORTERM"]
-set_env = {}
-forwardings = []
-```
-
-Server:
-
-```toml
-native_auth = true
-host_key = "~/.config/dosh/host_key"
-authorized_keys = ["~/.ssh/authorized_keys", "~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys"]
-native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute = 30
-attach_ticket_ttl_secs = 86400
-allow_tcp_forwarding = true
-allow_remote_forwarding = false
-allow_remote_non_loopback_bind = false
-allow_agent_forwarding = false
-accept_env = ["LANG", "LC_*", "TERM", "COLORTERM"]
-```
-
-## 15. Migration Plan
-
-Milestone 1: host identity and trust
-
-- Generate Dosh host key on server install.
-- Add `dosh trust host`.
-- Add known-hosts file and mismatch handling.
-- Keep SSH bootstrap as the only auth path.
-
-Milestone 2: native user auth
-
-- Implement `ClientHello`/`ServerHello`/`UserAuth`/`AuthOk`.
-- Support ssh-agent Ed25519 first.
-- Verify against `authorized_keys`.
-- Add `--auth=native|ssh|auto`.
-
-Milestone 3: default native auth
-
-- Make `auth_preference = "native,ssh"` default.
-- Keep SSH fallback explicit and visible.
-- Add benchmark gates for native cold auth.
-
-Milestone 4: forwarding
-
-- Add stream mux.
-- Add `-L`, `-N`, and `-f`.
-- Add `-R`.
-- Add `-D` only after flow control is proven.
-
-Milestone 5: hardening
-
-- Fuzz packet parsing, authorized-key parsing, known-host parsing, and handshake state.
-- Add hostile-network integration tests.
-- Add external review checklist before public security claims.
-
-Milestone 6: workflow parity
-
-- Implement `dosh doctor`.
-- Implement complete host-trust management.
-- Implement private-key prompt flow.
-- Implement forwarding policy diagnostics.
-- Run daily-driver soak on macOS and Linux clients.
-
-## 16. Verification
-
-Native v1 is not complete until all are true:
-
-- Unknown host key fails by default unless TOFU is explicitly enabled.
-- Known host key mismatch hard fails.
-- Native Ed25519 auth succeeds via ssh-agent.
-- Native Ed25519 auth succeeds via encrypted private key prompt.
-- Removed authorized key can no longer authenticate.
-- Restrictive unsupported authorized-key options fail closed.
-- Replayed handshake packets are rejected.
-- Replayed transport packets are rejected.
-- Stale encrypted packets after reconnect are ignored, not fatal.
-- Client IP/port change preserves the session.
-- Native cold auth benchmark beats cold `ssh host true` on the same host.
-- Cached attach remains near network RTT plus local render overhead.
-- `-L` forwarding works without delaying terminal input.
-- `-R` forwarding enforces bind and permission policy.
-- `-N -L` forward-only mode does not allocate a PTY.
-- `-f -N -L` backgrounds only after listener readiness.
-- Multiple forwards in one command work.
-- `dosh doctor` identifies UDP-blocked, auth-denied, host-key-mismatch, and
-  forwarding-denied states.
-- Closing the laptop for at least 30 minutes does not kill the remote session.
-- Three concurrent Dosh terminals remain independent unless explicitly named.
-- Large forwarded transfers do not add visible terminal input lag.
-- Fuzz targets run in CI.
-- Threat model is updated with any accepted residual risks.
-
-## 17. Public Claim Gate
-
-Dosh may claim "native SSH replacement for Dosh-installed servers" only after:
-
-- Native auth is default on at least one real host.
-- SSH fallback remains available.
-- The verification checklist is green.
-- The threat model is published.
-- Benchmarks include raw samples for SSH cold, Dosh native cold, Dosh cached attach,
-  and Mosh startup.
-
-Dosh must not claim generic SSH compatibility unless it implements the SSH protocol.

docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md

@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Public Readiness
-
-Dosh's defensible public claim is fast terminal attach and reconnect. It should not
-claim full Mosh replacement status until the feature matrix below is green and the
-comparison benchmark is reproducible outside the author's homelab.
-
-The plan for replacing the day-to-day SSH workflow with native Dosh authentication
-and forwarding is specified in `docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`, and the published threat
-model is in `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`. Native v1 is now substantially implemented:
-native key-exchange + user auth, host-key pinning/trust, `-L`/`-R`/`-D` forwarding,
-and `dosh doctor` all exist (see the feature matrix and the verification-checklist
-status table below). It is **not yet fully verified**: per-IP token-bucket rate
-limiting, protocol-version negotiation hardening, fuzzing in CI, and external review
-are still open. Until the verification checklist (`NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 16) is
-green and that review is done, Dosh's defensible public security claim remains fast
-encrypted native attach/reconnect with SSH-equivalent transport security and an
-explicit SSH bootstrap fallback — not a fully verified, externally reviewed SSH
-replacement.
-
-## Objective Benchmarks
-
-Run the same-host SSH comparison:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-ssh
-```
-
-Run the Dosh, SSH, and Mosh comparison:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-mosh
-```
-
-The Mosh-inclusive target builds one Docker image with OpenSSH, Mosh, `dosh-server`,
-and `dosh-auth`. It uses the same generated key, localhost network path, SSH server,
-and container for all samples.
-
-Reported metrics:
-
-| Metric | Meaning |
-| --- | --- |
-| `ssh_true_ms` | Time to run `ssh host true` with the same key/options. |
-| `dosh_attach_ms` | Time for `dosh-client --attach-only` to render the first frame and detach on the configured path. With `--no-cache`, this is cold SSH bootstrap plus UDP attach. |
-| `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | Time for a warmed Dosh client to attach using cached UDP credentials/tickets, render the first frame, and detach. This is the fast-path claim and should be approximately network RTT plus local process/render overhead. |
-| `mosh_start_true_ms` | Time for `mosh host -- true` to bootstrap, run `true`, and exit. |
-
-These are not identical workloads. They are still useful because they measure the
-startup path each tool must pay before useful remote work begins. Public numbers
-must include the command, machine, OS, CPU, network path, and sample count.
-
-Do not cite cold `dosh_attach_ms` as the core speed claim. Cold Dosh still pays SSH
-startup/authentication. Cite `dosh_cached_attach_ms` for repeat attach/reconnect
-speed, and cite cold `dosh_attach_ms` only to show that fallback remains competitive
-with ordinary SSH.
-
-## Feature Matrix
-
-| Feature | Mosh | Dosh now | Public status |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| SSH-based first authentication | yes | yes | ready |
-| Native UDP key auth (no SSH per attach) | no | yes, Ed25519 via ssh-agent or encrypted key | implemented; pending full verification |
-| Dosh host-key pinning and trust | no | yes, `known_hosts` + `dosh trust` + mismatch hard-fail | implemented |
-| `authorized_keys` policy enforcement | no | yes, `from=`/`no-port-forwarding`/`permitopen=`, unsupported fail closed | implemented |
-| `dosh doctor` diagnostics | no | yes, config/auth/UDP/forwarding-policy check | implemented |
-| Encrypted UDP terminal data | yes | yes | ready |
-| Roaming by client address change | yes | yes | needs more hostile-network tests |
-| Survive sleep or network loss | yes | yes | needs long-running soak tests |
-| Fast repeat attach without SSH | no | yes, via attach tickets | core differentiator |
-| Resident server daemon | no | yes | core differentiator |
-| One UDP port for all sessions | port range by default | yes | ready |
-| Fresh session by default | yes | yes | ready |
-| Named persistent sessions | no built-in shared session model | yes | ready |
-| Multiple clients on one session | no | yes | needs conflict-policy docs |
-| View-only clients | no | yes | ready |
-| Full-screen TUI correctness | yes | improving | must stay green before public push |
-| Predictive local echo | mature | guarded printable-only opt-in | not parity |
-| Non-destructive disconnect UI | yes | not currently | needed |
-| Unicode edge-case handling | strong | basic terminal emulator dependent | not parity |
-| X11 forwarding | no | no | non-goal unless tunneled separately |
-| SSH agent forwarding | no | no | planned as forwarding channel |
-| Local TCP forwarding, `-L` | no | yes, native encrypted stream mux | implemented; needs hostile-network tests |
-| Remote TCP forwarding, `-R` | no | yes, loopback bind by default | implemented; needs hostile-network tests |
-| Dynamic SOCKS forwarding, `-D` | no | yes, SOCKS5 over native streams | implemented; needs hostile-network tests |
-| Forward-only / background forwarding, `-N` / `-f` | no | yes, `-f` requires `-N` | implemented |
-| Per-stream flow control / terminal priority | no | yes, windowed credit per stream | implemented; needs load tests |
-
-## SSH Config Inheritance
-
-Dosh intentionally delegates SSH parsing and authentication to OpenSSH. Bootstrap
-uses the user's normal `ssh` command, so `~/.ssh/config` options such as `Host`,
-`HostName`, `User`, `Port`, `IdentityFile`, `ProxyJump`, and `UserKnownHostsFile`
-continue to apply.
-
-Dosh also calls `ssh -G <alias>` to infer the UDP target host when no `dosh_host` is
-configured. To write explicit Dosh host entries from SSH aliases:
-
-```bash
-dosh import-ssh palav homelab
-```
-
-This appends entries to `~/.config/dosh/hosts.toml` without trying to become an
-OpenSSH config parser.
-
-## Forwarding (Implemented)
-
-SSH forwarding cannot be copied by keeping the bootstrap SSH connection open,
-because that would remove Dosh's fast reconnect advantage and would break after
-roaming. Dosh forwarding therefore runs as native encrypted stream channels over the
-Dosh transport, and is now implemented.
-
-| CLI | Meaning |
-| --- | --- |
-| `dosh -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80 host` | Local listener on the client; server connects to target. |
-| `dosh -R 8080:127.0.0.1:80 host` | Remote listener on the server (loopback by default); client connects to target. |
-| `dosh -D 1080 host` | SOCKS5 listener on the client; server connects to whatever the SOCKS request names. |
-
-Implemented:
-
-- `StreamOpen`/`StreamOpenOk`/`StreamOpenReject`/`StreamData`/`StreamWindowAdjust`/
-  `StreamEof`/`StreamClose` packet types.
-- Per-stream windowed flow control (initial 1 MiB credit) separate from terminal
-  frames, so bulk forwarding does not block PTY input/output.
-- Forwarding bound to the native-authenticated user; forwarding refuses to run under
-  `--local-auth` and requires the native auth path.
-- Server-side policy enforcement: `allow_tcp_forwarding`, `allow_remote_forwarding`,
-  loopback-only remote bind unless `allow_remote_non_loopback_bind`, plus per-key
-  `no-port-forwarding` and `permitopen=`.
-- `-N` forward-only (no PTY) and `-f` background (requires `-N`, backgrounds only
-  after listeners are ready).
-
-Still open before claiming forwarding parity:
-
-- A dedicated dropped/reordered/replayed-UDP forwarding test suite.
-- Load tests proving large forwarded transfers add no visible terminal input lag.
-
-## Native v1 Verification Checklist Status
-
-This maps each item in `NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 16 to its status based on what the
-code in `src/` actually does. Done = implemented and exercised by tests or obvious
-from code; in progress = partially implemented; pending = not yet implemented.
-
-| Spec section 16 item | Status | Evidence / note |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| Unknown host key fails unless TOFU explicitly enabled | done | Client refuses `KnownHostStatus::Unknown` unless `trust_on_first_use`. |
-| Known host-key mismatch hard fails | done | `KnownHostStatus::Mismatch` aborts; `trust_host` refuses overwrite without `--replace`. |
-| Native Ed25519 auth via ssh-agent | done | `src/ssh_agent.rs` signs the user-auth transcript. |
-| Native Ed25519 auth via encrypted key prompt | done | `load_ed25519_identity_with_passphrase` decrypts OpenSSH keys. |
-| Removed authorized key can no longer authenticate | done | Covered by `native_user_auth_accepts_authorized_key_and_rejects_removed_key`. |
-| Unsupported authorized-key options fail closed | done | `ensure_native_allowed` bails on any unsupported option. |
-| Replayed handshake packets rejected | done | Handshake is transcript-bound and signature-verified; pending entries TTL-evicted. |
-| Replayed transport packets rejected | done | `ReplayWindow` (128-wide) over per-direction counter. |
-| Stale encrypted packets after reconnect ignored, not fatal | done | `session_key_id` mismatch drops the packet instead of erroring fatally. |
-| Client IP/port change preserves session | done | Server matches by `ClientId`/session key id, updates endpoint. |
-| Native cold auth beats cold `ssh host true` | pending | Benchmark gate not yet run for native cold path (Track C / `BENCHMARKS.md`). |
-| Cached attach near network RTT | pending | Same benchmark dependency. |
-| `-L` works without delaying terminal input | in progress | Implemented with per-stream window; load proof pending. |
-| `-R` enforces bind and permission policy | done | `remote_bind_allowed` + `start_remote_forwards` policy checks. |
-| `-N -L` does not allocate a PTY | done | `forward-only` mode skips PTY allocation. |
-| `-f -N -L` backgrounds only after listener readiness | done | `spawn_background_forwarder` waits for a readiness token. |
-| Multiple forwards in one command | done | Forward lists parsed and started together. |
-| `dosh doctor` identifies UDP-blocked/auth-denied/mismatch/forwarding-denied | done | `run_doctor_command` reports each state. |
-| Closing laptop 30+ min does not kill session | in progress | Long `client_timeout_secs` + resume; 30-min soak evidence pending. |
-| Three concurrent terminals independent unless named | done | Generated session names per attach; named sessions shared on purpose. |
-| Large forwarded transfers add no visible input lag | in progress | Per-stream flow control exists; load test pending. |
-| Fuzz targets run in CI | pending | No `fuzz/` dir; CI runs fmt/test/build/bench only. |
-| Threat model updated with accepted residual risks | done | `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`. |
-
-Additional security hardening tracked outside the section 16 list:
-
-- Full per-IP token-bucket rate limiting: in progress (another track). Today only
-  handshake-map eviction and a static `rate_limit_remaining` hint exist.
-- Protocol VERSION negotiation: in progress. Single version, fail-closed reject; no
-  multi-version negotiation yet.
-- ECDSA P-256 / SHA-2 RSA user keys: pending. Ed25519 only today.
-
-## Before Public Launch
-
-- Keep `cargo test`, `make bench-docker-ssh`, and `make bench-docker-mosh` green.
-- Add a non-destructive disconnect indicator.
-- Run scripted TUI tests for alternate-screen apps, arrow keys, resize, mouse mode,
-  bracketed paste, and terminal cleanup.
-- Publish benchmark output with raw samples, not just averages.
-- Mark prediction as experimental until it has a real framebuffer model.
-- Land full per-IP token-bucket auth rate limiting and wire fuzz targets into CI.
-- Complete the native-v1 verification checklist above and an external security review
-  before making any "native SSH replacement" claim (`NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 17).

docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Threat Model
-
-This is the published threat model for Dosh native v1, derived from
-`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` sections 4-6. It states the assets Dosh protects, the
-attackers it does and does not defend against, the security properties Dosh claims
-relative to SSH, the cryptographic building blocks actually in use, and an honest
-list of accepted residual risks and known gaps.
-
-Dosh is a remote-login transport for Dosh-installed servers. It is intended to
-replace the day-to-day `ssh host` workflow for terminals and TCP forwarding while
-keeping OpenSSH as a recovery and bootstrap fallback. Dosh is **not** an
-RFC-compatible SSH implementation and does not claim SSH's entire protocol security
-surface. It claims security that is **equivalent to, and in some respects stronger
-than, SSH for the Dosh terminal and forwarding use case** on hosts running
-`dosh-server`.
-
-## 1. Assets
-
-Dosh protects:
-
-- **Terminal session contents.** Keystrokes, command output, and the authoritative
-  screen state for every named or generated session.
-- **Forwarded TCP streams.** Bytes carried over `-L`, `-R`, and `-D` channels.
-- **User authentication credentials.** The user's SSH/Dosh private keys and any
-  ssh-agent identities. Dosh never sees private key material in plaintext on the
-  wire; signatures are produced locally or by the agent.
-- **Server-issued credentials.** Session keys, `ClientId` association state,
-  server-sealed attach tickets, and the client-held attach-ticket PSK.
-- **Server identity.** The persistent Dosh host key (`~/.config/dosh/host_key`) and
-  the server secret used to seal attach tickets and derive bootstrap material.
-- **Host-trust state.** The client's pinned known-hosts file
-  (`~/.config/dosh/known_hosts`).
-- **Authorization policy.** `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` /
-  `~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys` and the forwarding policy they encode.
-
-## 2. Attackers
-
-### In scope (Dosh must defend against these)
-
-- **Passive network observer.** May record all UDP traffic between client and
-  server.
-- **Active network attacker.** May spoof, drop, replay, reorder, or modify any
-  packet, and may attempt to inject forged packets in either direction.
-- **NAT rebinding / roaming.** Client source IP and port may change mid-session,
-  including across sleep, network switch, and NAT timeout.
-- **Stolen attach-ticket cache without the user's private key.** An attacker who
-  reads a client cache copies a server-sealed ticket plus its PSK but does not have
-  the user's SSH private key.
-- **Server restart and key rotation.** Stale session keys, tickets, and replay
-  state must not be usable after the server rotates its secret or host key.
-- **Malicious unauthenticated client flooding auth attempts.** A peer that has no
-  authorized key tries to exhaust server resources or guess credentials.
-- **Compromised low-privilege local user on a shared client.** A different local
-  user attempts to read Dosh credential caches on the same machine.
-
-### Out of scope (explicitly not defended against)
-
-- **Compromised client machine.** If the endpoint running `dosh-client` is owned by
-  the attacker, the attacker has the user's keys and terminal.
-- **Compromised server account.** If the login account on the server is owned, the
-  attacker already has the shell Dosh would have given them.
-- **Malicious kernel, terminal emulator, or PTY implementation** on either side.
-- **A server that was legitimately authorized and later turns malicious.** Host-key
-  pinning detects a *substituted* server, not a trusted server that decides to
-  misbehave.
-
-These exclusions match SSH's own boundaries: SSH likewise cannot protect a
-compromised endpoint or a malicious authorized peer.
-
-## 3. Security Properties Claimed vs SSH
-
-| Property | SSH | Dosh native v1 | Notes |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| Server authentication before trusting session data | yes | yes | Host key signs the handshake transcript; client verifies before sending user auth or accepting terminal bytes. |
-| User authentication by private-key possession | yes | yes | Ed25519 via ssh-agent or encrypted OpenSSH key; signature binds the full transcript. |
-| Forward secrecy | yes | yes | Ephemeral X25519 per connection; long-term host/user keys never derive the traffic key. |
-| AEAD on every post-handshake packet | yes | yes | ChaCha20-Poly1305 with per-direction, per-sequence nonces. |
-| Replay protection | yes | yes | Sliding replay window over the AEAD packet counter, plus transcript-bound handshake. |
-| Host-key pinning with explicit first use | TOFU, weakly tied to transport | yes, with explicit policy | Default refuses unknown host keys; TOFU only when `trust_on_first_use` is set; mismatch hard-fails and never auto-replaces. |
-| No plaintext terminal bytes after handshake | yes | yes | All `Frame`/`Input`/stream packets are AEAD-sealed. |
-| No custom cryptographic primitives | yes | yes | Standard X25519/HKDF-SHA256/ChaCha20-Poly1305/Ed25519 crates only. |
-| Fail-closed downgrade behavior | yes | yes | Native auth failure surfaces an explicit error and SSH fallback is explicit; it never silently drops to an unauthenticated mode. |
-| Fast resumption without re-auth | ControlMaster only | yes, native | Cached session/ticket attach skips a fresh round of public-key proof; this is a deliberate speed/security trade discussed in section 6. |
-
-### Where Dosh aims to *exceed* SSH for this use case
-
-- **Tighter transcript binding.** A user-auth signature binds both ephemeral keys,
-  both randoms, the server host key, requested user/session/mode/terminal size,
-  selected algorithms, and protocol version into one transcript. This forecloses
-  cross-protocol and partial-replay confusion classes for the narrow Dosh surface.
-- **Smaller attack surface.** Dosh deliberately omits the full SSH transport/channel
-  machinery, arbitrary subsystems, X11, SFTP/SCP, and forced-command subsystems.
-  Fewer features means fewer parsers and fewer reachable states.
-- **Explicit, file-pinned host trust.** Host trust is a first-class, inspectable
-  known-hosts entry with source provenance (`tofu`/`ssh`/`manual`) and a hard-fail
-  mismatch path, rather than the looser default TOFU behavior most SSH clients ship.
-- **Modern primitives only.** Ed25519 and X25519 by default; no DSA, no SHA-1
-  signatures, no CBC-and-MAC constructions.
-
-Dosh does **not** claim generic SSH compatibility and must not be described as an
-SSH-protocol implementation.
-
-## 4. Cryptographic Building Blocks (as implemented)
-
-These reflect the code in `src/crypto.rs`, `src/native.rs`, `src/auth.rs`, and
-`src/protocol.rs`, not just the spec.
-
-- **Key exchange:** X25519 ephemeral-ephemeral (`x25519-dalek`). The shared secret
-  is checked for contributory behaviour; a non-contributory result is rejected.
-- **Handshake/transport KDF:** HKDF-SHA256 (`hkdf`), salted with the SHA-256 of the
-  serialized `ClientHello` and `ServerHello`, binding traffic keys to the transcript.
-- **AEAD:** ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`chacha20poly1305`) for every encrypted packet and
-  for sealed attach tickets. Nonces are derived as `direction || sequence`, giving a
-  unique nonce per `(key, direction, sequence)`. AES-GCM is reserved for later and is
-  not selectable today.
-- **Host-key signatures:** Ed25519 (`ed25519-dalek`) over the handshake transcript.
-- **User-auth signatures:** Ed25519, produced either by ssh-agent over a Unix socket
-  (`src/ssh_agent.rs`) or from an encrypted/plaintext OpenSSH private key
-  (`ssh-key`). The signature covers the user-auth transcript described above.
-- **Bootstrap auth (SSH fallback path):** HMAC-SHA256 attach tokens and HKDF-SHA256
-  derived session keys, with attach tickets sealed under an HKDF-derived
-  ticket key. Token comparison is constant-time.
-- **Hashing/transcript:** SHA-256 (`sha2`).
-- **Randomness:** OS CSPRNG via `rand::thread_rng()` / `OsRng`.
-
-No homegrown ciphers, MACs, padding schemes, or key derivation are used. No nonce or
-key pair is reused within a direction.
-
-## 5. How the Properties Are Enforced (handshake and transport)
-
-- **Server authentication.** `ServerHello` carries the host public key and an Ed25519
-  signature over `dosh/native/server-hello/v1 || ClientHello || ServerHello(unsigned)`.
-  The client verifies this signature *and* checks the host key against its pinned
-  known-hosts entry before sending user auth or accepting terminal bytes. Unknown
-  keys are refused unless TOFU is enabled; mismatches hard-fail with both
-  fingerprints and the file path.
-- **User authentication.** `UserAuth` carries an Ed25519 signature over
-  `dosh/native/user-auth/v1 || ClientHello || ServerHello || UserAuth(unsigned)`. The
-  server looks the public key up in `authorized_keys`, enforces authorized-key
-  options, then verifies the signature. A removed key can no longer authenticate.
-- **Authorization options.** `from=` (with CIDR, glob, and negation),
-  `no-port-forwarding`, and `permitopen=` are enforced. `command=` is rejected for
-  native terminal login. Any unrecognized restrictive option fails closed rather than
-  being silently ignored.
-- **Forwarding policy.** The server enforces `allow_tcp_forwarding`,
-  `allow_remote_forwarding`, and a loopback-only default for remote binds
-  (`allow_remote_non_loopback_bind`), in addition to per-key `permitopen=` /
-  `no-port-forwarding`.
-- **Replay protection.** A 128-wide sliding window over the per-direction packet
-  counter rejects duplicates and stale sequences. Sequence 0 is never accepted.
-- **Stale-key tolerance.** Each encrypted packet carries a `session_key_id`; packets
-  under an old key are dropped as "stale or wrong session key id" rather than treated
-  as fatal decrypt failures, so reconnect after rotation is non-destructive.
-- **Roaming.** The server keys clients by `ClientId` and session key id, not by
-  source address, and updates the endpoint after any valid encrypted packet from a
-  new address — without weakening authentication, because the packet must still
-  decrypt and verify.
-
-## 6. Accepted Residual Risks and Known Gaps
-
-These are stated openly so the public claim gate (`NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 17) can
-be evaluated honestly. Items here are *not* yet "green".
-
-### Accepted residual risks (by design)
-
-- **Attach tickets prove recent server-issued possession, not fresh private-key
-  possession.** A stolen client cache containing both the sealed ticket and its PSK
-  can attach until the ticket expires (default TTL 24h, configurable down to zero) or
-  until the server rotates its secret/host key or the user key is removed. This is the
-  deliberate speed trade. It is bounded by TTL, scoped to host/user/session/mode, and
-  can be disabled. SSH ControlMaster has an analogous live-socket exposure.
-- **Local cache confidentiality relies on filesystem permissions.** Host keys,
-  server secret, known-hosts, and credential caches are written `0600`. A
-  same-machine attacker who can already read another user's `0600` files (e.g. via
-  root) is out of scope, as with SSH's `~/.ssh`.
-- **A trusted server that turns malicious is not detected.** Host-key pinning
-  detects substitution, not betrayal by an already-authorized server. This matches
-  SSH.
-
-### Known gaps / work in progress (must close before the public claim)
-
-- **Per-IP rate limiting is partial.** The server evicts half-finished native
-  handshakes on a TTL so a flood of `ClientHello` packets cannot grow the pending map
-  without bound, and it reports a static `rate_limit_remaining` hint in `ServerHello`.
-  A full per-source token-bucket limiter is **in progress on another track** and is
-  not yet enforced. Until it lands, sustained auth flooding is mitigated only by the
-  handshake-eviction TTL and OS-level limits.
-- **Protocol VERSION negotiation is being hardened.** The wire format pins a single
-  protocol version: the packet header rejects any non-matching `VERSION` byte and the
-  native handshake rejects any non-matching `protocol_version`. There is no
-  multi-version negotiation yet, so cross-version interop and downgrade-resistance for
-  future versions are still being designed. Today's behavior is fail-closed (reject),
-  not silent downgrade.
-- **Fuzzing is not yet wired into CI.** CI currently runs format, tests, release
-  build, and the Docker SSH benchmark gate. Fuzz targets for packet parsing,
-  authorized-key parsing, known-host parsing, and handshake state (spec milestone 5)
-  are **being wired in** and are not yet running in CI.
-- **User-key algorithm coverage is Ed25519-only today.** The spec permits ECDSA
-  P-256 and (compatibility-only, SHA-2) RSA, but native auth currently accepts and
-  produces `ssh-ed25519` only. ECDSA/RSA support is pending. This is a parity gap, not
-  a weakening of what *is* supported.
-- **Hostile-network and long-soak integration tests are partial.** Roaming,
-  retransmit, resize, and multi-client tests exist; a dedicated adversarial
-  drop/reorder/replay suite and 30-minute-sleep soak (spec section 16) are still being
-  expanded.
-- **No external security review yet.** The spec's milestone 5 requires an external
-  review checklist before public security claims. That review has not happened.
-
-### Auth posture
-
-Native auth is **opt-in alongside SSH fallback**. `auth_preference` defaults to
-`native,ssh`: Dosh tries the native authenticated path first and falls back to SSH
-bootstrap explicitly and visibly when native auth is disabled, unavailable, or
-rejected. Native auth failure never silently degrades to an unauthenticated mode.
-Forwarding (`-L`/`-R`/`-D`) requires the native authenticated path and refuses to run
-under `--local-auth`.
-
-## 7. Verification and Public-Claim Status
-
-Dosh may claim "native SSH replacement for Dosh-installed servers" only after the
-conditions in `NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 17 are met: native auth default on a real
-host, SSH fallback available, the section 16 checklist green, this threat model
-published, and benchmarks with raw samples for SSH cold, Dosh native cold, Dosh
-cached attach, and Mosh startup.
-
-Current status: this threat model is published (this document). The verification
-checklist is **not yet fully green** — see the item-by-item status table in
-`docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` ("Native v1 verification checklist status") and the known
-gaps in section 6 above. Until the gaps close and an external review is complete,
-Dosh's defensible public claim remains **fast, encrypted native attach/reconnect with
-SSH-equivalent transport security and SSH bootstrap fallback** — not a fully verified,
-externally reviewed SSH replacement.

examples/sdk_echo_client.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+use anyhow::{Result, bail};
+use dosh::client::DoshClient;
+use dosh::transport::{SessionEvent, TransportEvent};
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    let mut args = std::env::args().skip(1);
+    let host = args.next().unwrap_or_else(|| "server".to_string());
+    let message = args.collect::<Vec<_>>().join(" ");
+    let message = if message.is_empty() {
+        "hello from dosh".to_string()
+    } else {
+        message
+    };
+
+    let client = DoshClient::load()?;
+    let mut transport = client
+        .connect(host)
+        .service("echo")
+        .connect()
+        .await?
+        .into_transport();
+    let stream = transport.open_service("echo").await?;
+
+    loop {
+        match transport.recv().await? {
+            SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::OpenOk { stream_id, .. })
+                if stream_id == stream =>
+            {
+                transport.send(stream, message.as_bytes().to_vec()).await?;
+            }
+            SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::Data(data)) if data.stream_id == stream => {
+                for chunk in data.chunks {
+                    print!("{}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&chunk));
+                }
+                println!();
+                transport.close(stream).await?;
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+            SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::OpenReject { reason, .. }) => {
+                bail!("server rejected echo stream: {reason}");
+            }
+            SessionEvent::Stream(_)
+            | SessionEvent::Ping
+            | SessionEvent::Pong
+            | SessionEvent::Ignored => {}
+        }
+        transport.maintenance().await?;
+    }
+}

examples/sdk_echo_server.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+use anyhow::Result;
+use dosh::server::{DoshServer, DoshServerConfig, DoshServerEvent};
+use dosh::transport::{SessionEvent, TransportEvent};
+
+#[tokio::main]
+async fn main() -> Result<()> {
+    let config = DoshServerConfig::default().service("echo")?;
+    let mut server = DoshServer::bind(config).await?;
+    eprintln!("listening on {}", server.local_addr()?);
+
+    loop {
+        match server.recv().await? {
+            DoshServerEvent::Accepted(client) => {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "accepted user={} session={} conn={:?}",
+                    client.user, client.session, client.conn_id
+                );
+            }
+            DoshServerEvent::Session {
+                conn_id,
+                event: SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::Open(open)),
+            } => {
+                server.accept_stream(conn_id, open.stream_id).await?;
+            }
+            DoshServerEvent::Session {
+                conn_id,
+                event: SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::Data(data)),
+            } => {
+                for chunk in data.chunks {
+                    server.send(conn_id, data.stream_id, chunk).await?;
+                }
+            }
+            DoshServerEvent::Session { .. } | DoshServerEvent::Ignored => {}
+        }
+        server.maintenance().await?;
+    }
+}

fuzz/README.md

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-# dosh fuzz targets
-
-cargo-fuzz / libFuzzer harnesses for the `dosh` parsers and handshake verifiers
-(spec milestone 5 / §16: "Fuzz packet parsing, authorized-key parsing,
-known-host parsing, and handshake state", "Fuzz targets run in CI").
-
-This is a **standalone crate** (its own `[workspace]`) so it never affects the
-main crate's `cargo build` / `cargo test` / `cargo fmt --check`.
-
-## Targets
-
-| Target | Parser(s) exercised |
-| --- | --- |
-| `packet_decode` | `protocol::Header::parse`, `protocol::decode`, `protocol::decrypt_body` |
-| `from_body` | `protocol::from_body::<T>` for every protocol & native wire struct |
-| `authorized_keys` | `native::parse_authorized_keys`, `native::parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob` |
-| `known_hosts` | `native::parse_known_hosts`, `native::parse_host_public_key_line` |
-| `handshake_structs` | handshake struct decode + `verify_server_hello`, `user_auth_transcript`, `verify_native_user_auth` |
-| `attach_ticket` | `auth::open_attach_ticket`, `auth::verify_attach_ticket`, `auth::decode_bootstrap` |
-
-Every target's objective is the same: **no panics on any input** (a panic on
-untrusted bytes is a robustness/DoS bug per threat model §5).
-
-## Prerequisites
-
-```sh
-rustup toolchain install nightly
-cargo install cargo-fuzz
-```
-
-cargo-fuzz requires a nightly toolchain (it builds with `-Z sanitizer=address`).
-
-## Run
-
-From the repository root:
-
-```sh
-# List targets
-cargo +nightly fuzz list --fuzz-dir fuzz
-
-# Run a single target indefinitely
-cargo +nightly fuzz run --fuzz-dir fuzz packet_decode
-
-# Short, CI-style smoke run of one target (10 seconds)
-cargo +nightly fuzz run --fuzz-dir fuzz packet_decode -- -max_total_time=10
-```
-
-Or from inside `fuzz/`:
-
-```sh
-cd fuzz
-cargo +nightly fuzz run packet_decode -- -max_total_time=10
-```
-
-## CI
-
-`.github/workflows/ci.yml` has a `fuzz-smoke` job that installs nightly +
-cargo-fuzz and runs each target briefly (`-max_total_time`). The job is tolerant
-if the toolchain/tooling is unavailable so it never blocks the main test gate.

install.ps1

@@ -1,11 +1,17 @@
 param(
     [ValidateSet("client")]
     [string]$Role = $(if ($env:DOSH_ROLE) { $env:DOSH_ROLE } else { "client" }),
-    [string]$Repo = $env:DOSH_REPO,
+    [string]$Repo = $(if ($env:DOSH_REPO) { $env:DOSH_REPO } else { "https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git" }),
     [string]$Server = $env:DOSH_SERVER,
     [string]$DoshHost = $(if ($env:DOSH_HOST) { $env:DOSH_HOST } else { $env:DOSH_DOSH_HOST }),
     [int]$Port = $(if ($env:DOSH_PORT) { [int]$env:DOSH_PORT } else { 50000 }),
     [string]$Prefix = $(if ($env:PREFIX) { $env:PREFIX } else { Join-Path $HOME ".local" }),
+    [switch]$UsePrebuilt = $(-not $env:DOSH_USE_PREBUILT -or $env:DOSH_USE_PREBUILT -ne "0"),
+    [string]$BinaryUrl = $env:DOSH_BINARY_URL,
+    [string]$BinaryBase = $env:DOSH_BINARY_BASE,
+    [string]$BinaryName = $env:DOSH_BINARY_NAME,
+    [string]$BinaryVersion = $(if ($env:DOSH_BINARY_VERSION) { $env:DOSH_BINARY_VERSION } else { "latest" }),
+    [switch]$BinaryRequired = $($env:DOSH_BINARY_REQUIRED -and $env:DOSH_BINARY_REQUIRED -ne "0"),
     [switch]$ForceConfig
 )
 
@@ -17,12 +23,187 @@ function Require-Command($Name) {
     }
 }
 
-Require-Command cargo
+function Normalize-Arch {
+    switch ($env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE) {
+        "AMD64" { "x86_64"; break }
+        "ARM64" { "aarch64"; break }
+        default { $env:PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE.ToLowerInvariant() }
+    }
+}
 
-$tmp = $null
+function Release-ArtifactName {
-if (Test-Path "Cargo.toml") {
+    if ($BinaryName) {
+        return $BinaryName
+    }
+    "dosh-windows-$(Normalize-Arch).zip"
+}
+
+function Repo-WebBase($Value) {
+    if (-not $Value) {
+        return $null
+    }
+    $base = $Value.TrimEnd("/")
+    if ($base.EndsWith(".git")) {
+        $base = $base.Substring(0, $base.Length - 4)
+    }
+    if ($base -notmatch "^https?://") {
+        return $null
+    }
+    $base
+}
+
+function Release-DownloadUrl {
+    if ($BinaryUrl) {
+        return $BinaryUrl
+    }
+    $name = Release-ArtifactName
+    if ($BinaryBase) {
+        return "$($BinaryBase.TrimEnd('/'))/$name"
+    }
+    $web = Repo-WebBase $Repo
+    if (-not $web) {
+        return $null
+    }
+    if ($BinaryVersion -eq "latest") {
+        return "$web/releases/latest/download/$name"
+    }
+    "$web/releases/download/$BinaryVersion/$name"
+}
+
+function Release-LatestTagDownloadUrl {
+    if ($BinaryUrl -or $BinaryBase -or $BinaryVersion -ne "latest") {
+        return $null
+    }
+    $web = Repo-WebBase $Repo
+    if (-not $web) {
+        return $null
+    }
+    try {
+        $response = Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri "$web/releases/latest" -MaximumRedirection 5
+        $effective = $null
+        if ($response.BaseResponse.ResponseUri) {
+            $effective = $response.BaseResponse.ResponseUri.AbsoluteUri
+        } elseif ($response.BaseResponse.RequestMessage -and $response.BaseResponse.RequestMessage.RequestUri) {
+            $effective = $response.BaseResponse.RequestMessage.RequestUri.AbsoluteUri
+        }
+        $prefix = "$web/releases/tag/"
+        if ($effective -and $effective.StartsWith($prefix)) {
+            $tag = $effective.Substring($prefix.Length)
+            if ($tag) {
+                return "$web/releases/download/$tag/$(Release-ArtifactName)"
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        return $null
+    }
+    return $null
+}
+
+function Verify-ArchiveChecksum($Url, $Archive) {
+    $checksumPath = "$Archive.sha256"
+    try {
+        Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri "$Url.sha256" -OutFile $checksumPath
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Warning "prebuilt checksum unavailable; continuing without sidecar verification"
+        return
+    }
+    $expected = ((Get-Content $checksumPath -Raw).Trim() -split "\s+")[0].ToLowerInvariant()
+    $actual = (Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 $Archive).Hash.ToLowerInvariant()
+    if ($expected -ne $actual) {
+        throw "prebuilt checksum mismatch for $Url"
+    }
+}
+
+function Expected-ArchiveVersion($Url) {
+    if ($Url -match "/releases/download/v([^/]+)/") {
+        return $Matches[1]
+    }
+    if (-not $BinaryUrl -and -not $BinaryBase -and $BinaryVersion -ne "latest") {
+        return $BinaryVersion.TrimStart("v")
+    }
+    return $null
+}
+
+function Verify-ArchiveVersion($ExtractDir, $Url) {
+    $expected = Expected-ArchiveVersion $Url
+    if (-not $expected) {
+        return
+    }
+    $versionFile = Get-ChildItem -Path $ExtractDir -Recurse -File -Filter VERSION | Select-Object -First 1
+    if (-not $versionFile) {
+        throw "prebuilt archive missing VERSION for $Url"
+    }
+    $actual = (Get-Content $versionFile.FullName -Raw).Trim()
+    if ($actual -ne $expected) {
+        throw "prebuilt archive version mismatch for ${Url}: expected $expected, got $actual"
+    }
+}
+
+function Install-Binary($Source, $Destination) {
+    $dir = Split-Path -Parent $Destination
+    $name = Split-Path -Leaf $Destination
+    $tmp = Join-Path $dir ".$name.tmp.$PID"
+    Copy-Item $Source $tmp -Force
+    try {
+        Move-Item $tmp $Destination -Force
+    }
+    catch {
+        Remove-Item $tmp -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+        throw
+    }
+}
+
+$bindir = Join-Path $Prefix "bin"
+$configDir = Join-Path $HOME ".config\dosh"
+New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $bindir, $configDir | Out-Null
+
+function Install-Prebuilt {
+    $url = Release-LatestTagDownloadUrl
+    if (-not $url) {
+        $url = Release-DownloadUrl
+    }
+    if (-not $url) {
+        return $false
+    }
+    $tmp = Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) ("dosh-bin-" + [guid]::NewGuid())
+    $zip = Join-Path $tmp (Release-ArtifactName)
+    $extract = Join-Path $tmp "extract"
+    try {
+        New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $tmp, $extract | Out-Null
+        Write-Host "Trying Dosh prebuilt $(Release-ArtifactName)"
+        Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri $url -OutFile $zip
+        Verify-ArchiveChecksum $url $zip
+        Expand-Archive -Force -Path $zip -DestinationPath $extract
+        Verify-ArchiveVersion $extract $url
+        foreach ($bin in @("dosh-client.exe", "dosh-bench.exe")) {
+            $found = Get-ChildItem -Path $extract -Recurse -File -Filter $bin | Select-Object -First 1
+            if (-not $found) {
+                throw "prebuilt archive missing $bin"
+            }
+            Install-Binary $found.FullName (Join-Path $bindir $bin)
+        }
+        Install-Binary (Join-Path $bindir "dosh-client.exe") (Join-Path $bindir "dosh.exe")
+        return $true
+    }
+    catch {
+        Write-Warning "prebuilt install failed: $_"
+        return $false
+    }
+    finally {
+        if (Test-Path $tmp) {
+            Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $tmp
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+function Install-FromSource {
+    Require-Command cargo
+    $tmp = $null
+    if (Test-Path "Cargo.toml") {
         $src = (Get-Location).Path
-} else {
+    } else {
         if (-not $Repo) {
             throw "DOSH_REPO is required when running the installer from irm/iex"
         }
@@ -30,22 +211,38 @@ if (Test-Path "Cargo.toml") {
         $tmp = Join-Path ([System.IO.Path]::GetTempPath()) ("dosh-" + [guid]::NewGuid())
         git clone --depth 1 $Repo $tmp | Out-Null
         $src = $tmp
-}
+    }
 
-try {
+    try {
         Push-Location $src
         cargo build --release --bin dosh-client --bin dosh-bench
+        Install-Binary "target\release\dosh-client.exe" (Join-Path $bindir "dosh-client.exe")
+        Install-Binary "target\release\dosh-client.exe" (Join-Path $bindir "dosh.exe")
+        Install-Binary "target\release\dosh-bench.exe" (Join-Path $bindir "dosh-bench.exe")
+    }
+    finally {
+        Pop-Location
+        if ($tmp) {
+            Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $tmp
+        }
+    }
+}
 
-    $bindir = Join-Path $Prefix "bin"
+if ($UsePrebuilt) {
-    $configDir = Join-Path $HOME ".config\dosh"
+    $ok = Install-Prebuilt
-    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $bindir, $configDir | Out-Null
+    if (-not $ok) {
+        if ($BinaryRequired) {
+            throw "prebuilt install failed and DOSH_BINARY_REQUIRED=1"
+        }
+        Write-Host "Falling back to source build"
+        Install-FromSource
+    }
+} else {
+    Install-FromSource
+}
 
-    Copy-Item "target\release\dosh-client.exe" (Join-Path $bindir "dosh-client.exe") -Force
+$clientConfig = Join-Path $configDir "client.toml"
-    Copy-Item "target\release\dosh-client.exe" (Join-Path $bindir "dosh.exe") -Force
+if ($ForceConfig -or -not (Test-Path $clientConfig)) {
-    Copy-Item "target\release\dosh-bench.exe" (Join-Path $bindir "dosh-bench.exe") -Force
-
-    $clientConfig = Join-Path $configDir "client.toml"
-    if ($ForceConfig -or -not (Test-Path $clientConfig)) {
     $defaultServer = if ($Server) { $Server } else { "user@example.com" }
     $updateRepo = if ($Repo) { $Repo } else { "https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git" }
     $doshHostLine = if ($DoshHost) { "dosh_host = `"$DoshHost`"" } else { "# dosh_host = `"public.example.com`"" }
@@ -60,28 +257,29 @@ dosh_port = $Port
 default_session = "new"
 reconnect_timeout_secs = 5
 view_only = false
+predict = true
+predict_mode = "experimental"
 cache_attach_tickets = true
 credential_cache = "~/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
+escape_key = "^]"
 "@ | Set-Content -NoNewline -Encoding utf8 $clientConfig
-    }
+}
 
-    $userPath = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable("Path", "User")
+$userPath = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable("Path", "User")
-    if (-not (($userPath -split ';') -contains $bindir)) {
+if (-not (($userPath -split ';') -contains $bindir)) {
     [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable("Path", "$userPath;$bindir", "User")
-    }
+}
 
-    Write-Host "Installed Dosh client to $bindir"
+Write-Host "Installed Dosh client to $bindir"
-    Write-Host "Configured UDP port $Port"
+Write-Host "Configured UDP port $Port"
-    Write-Host ""
+Write-Host ""
-    $displayServer = if ($Server) { $Server } else { "user@host" }
+$displayServer = if ($Server) { $Server } else { "user@host" }
-    Write-Host "Client command:"
+Write-Host "Client commands:"
-    Write-Host "  $bindir\dosh.exe $displayServer"
+Write-Host "  $bindir\dosh.exe $displayServer"
-    Write-Host ""
+Write-Host "  $bindir\dosh.exe setup <ssh-alias>"
-    Write-Host "Open a new terminal for PATH changes to apply."
+Write-Host "  $bindir\dosh.exe update --check"
-}
+Write-Host ""
-finally {
+Write-Host "Client config:"
-    Pop-Location
+Write-Host "  $configDir\client.toml"
-    if ($tmp) {
+Write-Host ""
-        Remove-Item -Recurse -Force $tmp
+Write-Host "Open a new terminal for PATH changes to apply."
-    }
-}

install.sh

@@ -12,6 +12,12 @@ start_server=1
 force_config=0
 update_cache="${DOSH_UPDATE_CACHE:-$HOME/.cache/dosh/source}"
 quiet="${DOSH_UPDATE_QUIET:-0}"
+use_prebuilt="${DOSH_USE_PREBUILT:-1}"
+binary_url="${DOSH_BINARY_URL:-}"
+binary_base="${DOSH_BINARY_BASE:-}"
+binary_name="${DOSH_BINARY_NAME:-}"
+binary_version="${DOSH_BINARY_VERSION:-latest}"
+binary_required="${DOSH_BINARY_REQUIRED:-0}"
 
 usage() {
   cat <<'EOF'
@@ -32,6 +38,18 @@ Options:
 Environment alternatives:
   DOSH_REPO, DOSH_ROLE, DOSH_SERVER, DOSH_HOST, DOSH_PORT, PREFIX,
   DOSH_UPDATE_CACHE
+  DOSH_USE_PREBUILT=0
+                  Build from source instead of trying a release tarball first
+  DOSH_BINARY_URL URL
+                  Exact release tarball URL to install
+  DOSH_BINARY_BASE URL
+                  Release download base; otherwise derived from the latest tag
+  DOSH_BINARY_NAME NAME
+                  Release tarball name; defaults to dosh-OS-ARCH.tar.gz
+  DOSH_BINARY_VERSION TAG
+                  Release tag when deriving DOSH_BINARY_BASE; default latest
+  DOSH_BINARY_REQUIRED=1
+                  Fail instead of falling back to source when binary install fails
 EOF
 }
 
@@ -112,8 +130,6 @@ ensure_cargo() {
   . "$HOME/.cargo/env"
 }
 
-ensure_cargo
-
 cleanup() {
   if [ -n "${tmpdir:-}" ]; then
     rm -rf "$tmpdir"
@@ -121,9 +137,221 @@ cleanup() {
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
 
-if [ "$from_current" -eq 1 ] || [ -f Cargo.toml ]; then
+bindir="$prefix/bin"
+config_dir="$HOME/.config/dosh"
+data_dir="$HOME/.local/share/dosh"
+systemd_user_dir="$HOME/.config/systemd/user"
+src_dir=""
+
+mkdir -p "$bindir" "$config_dir" "$data_dir"
+
+normalize_os() {
+  case "$(uname -s)" in
+    Darwin) printf '%s\n' macos ;;
+    Linux) printf '%s\n' linux ;;
+    FreeBSD) printf '%s\n' freebsd ;;
+    *) uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+normalize_arch() {
+  case "$(uname -m)" in
+    x86_64|amd64) printf '%s\n' x86_64 ;;
+    arm64|aarch64) printf '%s\n' aarch64 ;;
+    armv7l) printf '%s\n' armv7 ;;
+    *) uname -m | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+repo_web_base() {
+  repo_base="$1"
+  case "$repo_base" in
+    http://*|https://*)
+      repo_base="${repo_base%.git}"
+      printf '%s\n' "${repo_base%/}"
+      ;;
+    *)
+      return 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+release_artifact_name() {
+  if [ -n "$binary_name" ]; then
+    printf '%s\n' "$binary_name"
+  else
+    printf 'dosh-%s-%s.tar.gz\n' "$(normalize_os)" "$(normalize_arch)"
+  fi
+}
+
+release_download_url() {
+  if [ -n "$binary_url" ]; then
+    printf '%s\n' "$binary_url"
+    return 0
+  fi
+  if [ -n "$binary_base" ]; then
+    printf '%s/%s\n' "${binary_base%/}" "$(release_artifact_name)"
+    return 0
+  fi
+  if [ -z "$repo" ]; then
+    return 1
+  fi
+  web_base="$(repo_web_base "$repo")" || return 1
+  if [ "$binary_version" = "latest" ]; then
+    printf '%s/releases/latest/download/%s\n' "$web_base" "$(release_artifact_name)"
+  else
+    printf '%s/releases/download/%s/%s\n' "$web_base" "$binary_version" "$(release_artifact_name)"
+  fi
+}
+
+release_latest_tag_download_url() {
+  if [ -n "$binary_url" ] || [ -n "$binary_base" ] || [ "$binary_version" != "latest" ] || [ -z "$repo" ]; then
+    return 1
+  fi
+  web_base="$(repo_web_base "$repo")" || return 1
+  latest_url="$(curl -fsSL -o /dev/null -w '%{url_effective}' "$web_base/releases/latest" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+  case "$latest_url" in
+    "$web_base"/releases/tag/*)
+      tag="${latest_url##"$web_base"/releases/tag/}"
+      [ -n "$tag" ] || return 1
+      printf '%s/releases/download/%s/%s\n' "$web_base" "$tag" "$(release_artifact_name)"
+      ;;
+    *)
+      return 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+find_extracted_binary() {
+  find "$1" -type f -name "$2" 2>/dev/null | sed -n '1p'
+}
+
+install_binary() {
+  src="$1"
+  dst="$2"
+  dst_dir="$(dirname "$dst")"
+  dst_base="$(basename "$dst")"
+  tmp="$dst_dir/.$dst_base.tmp.$$"
+  install -m 0755 "$src" "$tmp"
+  if ! mv -f "$tmp" "$dst"; then
+    rm -f "$tmp"
+    return 1
+  fi
+}
+
+install_extracted_binary() {
+  found="$(find_extracted_binary "$1" "$2")"
+  if [ -z "$found" ]; then
+    echo "prebuilt archive missing $2" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+  install_binary "$found" "$3"
+}
+
+sha256_file() {
+  if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    sha256sum "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
+  elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    shasum -a 256 "$1" | awk '{print $1}'
+  else
+    return 1
+  fi
+}
+
+verify_archive_checksum() {
+  url="$1"
+  archive="$2"
+  checksum_file="$3"
+  if ! curl -fsL "$url.sha256" -o "$checksum_file"; then
+    echo "prebuilt checksum unavailable; continuing without sidecar verification" >&2
+    return 0
+  fi
+  expected="$(awk '{print $1}' "$checksum_file" | sed -n '1p')"
+  actual="$(sha256_file "$archive")" || {
+    echo "sha256sum/shasum not found for checksum verification" >&2
+    return 1
+  }
+  if [ "$expected" != "$actual" ]; then
+    echo "prebuilt checksum mismatch for $url" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+}
+
+expected_archive_version() {
+  url="$1"
+  case "$url" in
+    */releases/download/v*/*)
+      tag="${url#*/releases/download/v}"
+      tag="${tag%%/*}"
+      printf '%s\n' "$tag"
+      return 0
+      ;;
+  esac
+  if [ -z "$binary_url" ] && [ -z "$binary_base" ] && [ "$binary_version" != "latest" ]; then
+    printf '%s\n' "${binary_version#v}"
+    return 0
+  fi
+  return 1
+}
+
+verify_archive_version() {
+  extract_dir="$1"
+  url="$2"
+  expected="$(expected_archive_version "$url" || true)"
+  [ -n "$expected" ] || return 0
+  version_file="$(find "$extract_dir" -type f -name VERSION 2>/dev/null | sed -n '1p')"
+  if [ -z "$version_file" ]; then
+    echo "prebuilt archive missing VERSION for $url" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+  actual="$(tr -d '\r\n' <"$version_file")"
+  if [ "$actual" != "$expected" ]; then
+    echo "prebuilt archive version mismatch for $url: expected $expected, got $actual" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+}
+
+try_install_prebuilt() {
+  download_url="$(release_latest_tag_download_url || release_download_url)" || return 1
+  tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
+  archive="$tmpdir/$(release_artifact_name)"
+  checksum_file="$archive.sha256"
+  [ "$quiet" = "1" ] && echo "Trying Dosh prebuilt $(release_artifact_name)"
+  need curl
+  need tar
+  if ! curl -fsL "$download_url" -o "$archive" 2>/dev/null; then
+    alt_download_url="$(release_download_url || true)"
+    if [ -z "$alt_download_url" ] || ! curl -fsL "$alt_download_url" -o "$archive"; then
+      echo "prebuilt unavailable: $download_url" >&2
+      [ -z "$alt_download_url" ] || echo "prebuilt unavailable: $alt_download_url" >&2
+      return 1
+    fi
+    download_url="$alt_download_url"
+  fi
+  verify_archive_checksum "$download_url" "$archive" "$checksum_file" || return 1
+  mkdir -p "$tmpdir/extract"
+  if ! tar -xzf "$archive" -C "$tmpdir/extract"; then
+    echo "prebuilt archive could not be extracted: $download_url" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+  verify_archive_version "$tmpdir/extract" "$download_url" || return 1
+  install_extracted_binary "$tmpdir/extract" dosh-client "$bindir/dosh-client" || return 1
+  ln -sf dosh-client "$bindir/dosh"
+  if [ "$role" = "server" ] || [ "$role" = "both" ]; then
+    install_extracted_binary "$tmpdir/extract" dosh-server "$bindir/dosh-server" || return 1
+    install_extracted_binary "$tmpdir/extract" dosh-auth "$bindir/dosh-auth" || return 1
+  fi
+  if found_bench="$(find_extracted_binary "$tmpdir/extract" dosh-bench)" && [ -n "$found_bench" ]; then
+    install_binary "$found_bench" "$bindir/dosh-bench"
+  fi
+  return 0
+}
+
+install_from_source() {
+  ensure_cargo
+  if [ "$from_current" -eq 1 ] || [ -f Cargo.toml ]; then
     src_dir="$(pwd)"
-else
+  else
     if [ -z "$repo" ]; then
       echo "DOSH_REPO or --repo is required when running the installer from curl" >&2
       exit 2
@@ -155,39 +383,69 @@ else
       fi
     fi
     src_dir="$update_cache"
-fi
+  fi
 
-cd "$src_dir"
+  cd "$src_dir"
-[ "$quiet" = "1" ] && echo "Building Dosh $role"
+  [ "$quiet" = "1" ] && echo "Building Dosh $role"
-if [ "$role" = "client" ]; then
+  if [ "$role" = "client" ]; then
     if [ "$quiet" = "1" ]; then
       cargo build -q --release --bin dosh-client
     else
       cargo build --release --bin dosh-client
     fi
-else
+  else
     if [ "$quiet" = "1" ]; then
       cargo build -q --release
     else
       cargo build --release
     fi
-fi
+  fi
 
-bindir="$prefix/bin"
+  install_binary target/release/dosh-client "$bindir/dosh-client"
-config_dir="$HOME/.config/dosh"
+  ln -sf dosh-client "$bindir/dosh"
-data_dir="$HOME/.local/share/dosh"
+  if [ "$role" = "server" ] || [ "$role" = "both" ]; then
-systemd_user_dir="$HOME/.config/systemd/user"
+    install_binary target/release/dosh-server "$bindir/dosh-server"
+    install_binary target/release/dosh-auth "$bindir/dosh-auth"
+  fi
+  if [ -f target/release/dosh-bench ]; then
+    install_binary target/release/dosh-bench "$bindir/dosh-bench"
+  fi
+}
 
-mkdir -p "$bindir" "$config_dir" "$data_dir"
+write_systemd_service() {
+  if [ -n "$src_dir" ] && [ -f "$src_dir/packaging/systemd/dosh-server.service" ]; then
+    sed "s#ExecStart=%h/.local/bin/dosh-server serve#ExecStart=$bindir/dosh-server serve#" \
+      "$src_dir/packaging/systemd/dosh-server.service" >"$systemd_user_dir/dosh-server.service"
+  else
+    cat >"$systemd_user_dir/dosh-server.service" <<EOF
+[Unit]
+Description=dosh dormant shell server
+After=network-online.target
+Wants=network-online.target
 
-install -m 0755 target/release/dosh-client "$bindir/dosh-client"
+[Service]
-ln -sf dosh-client "$bindir/dosh"
+Type=simple
-if [ "$role" = "server" ] || [ "$role" = "both" ]; then
+ExecStart=$bindir/dosh-server serve
-  install -m 0755 target/release/dosh-server "$bindir/dosh-server"
+Restart=always
-  install -m 0755 target/release/dosh-auth "$bindir/dosh-auth"
+RestartSec=1
-fi
+KillMode=process
-if [ -f target/release/dosh-bench ]; then
+
-  install -m 0755 target/release/dosh-bench "$bindir/dosh-bench"
+[Install]
+WantedBy=default.target
+EOF
+  fi
+}
+
+if [ "$use_prebuilt" != "0" ]; then
+  if ! try_install_prebuilt; then
+    if [ "$binary_required" = "1" ]; then
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    [ "$quiet" = "1" ] && echo "Falling back to source build"
+    install_from_source
+  fi
+else
+  install_from_source
 fi
 
 if [ "$role" = "server" ] || [ "$role" = "both" ]; then
@@ -206,8 +464,9 @@ scrollback = 5000
 auth_ttl_secs = 30
 attach_ticket_ttl_secs = 3600
 allow_attach_tickets = true
-client_timeout_secs = 86400
+client_timeout_secs = 2592000
 retransmit_window = 256
+output_frame_interval_ms = 16
 default_input_mode = "read-write"
 prewarm_sessions = ["default"]
 create_on_attach = true
@@ -221,15 +480,16 @@ native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute = 30
 allow_tcp_forwarding = true
 allow_remote_forwarding = false
 allow_agent_forwarding = false
+persist_sessions = true
 EOF
   fi
 
   if command -v systemctl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     mkdir -p "$systemd_user_dir"
-    sed "s#ExecStart=%h/.local/bin/dosh-server serve#ExecStart=$bindir/dosh-server serve#" \
+    write_systemd_service
-      packaging/systemd/dosh-server.service >"$systemd_user_dir/dosh-server.service"
     if [ "$start_server" -eq 1 ] && systemctl --user daemon-reload >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-      systemctl --user enable --now dosh-server.service
+      systemctl --user enable dosh-server.service
+      systemctl --user restart dosh-server.service
     fi
   elif [ "$start_server" -eq 1 ]; then
     nohup "$bindir/dosh-server" serve >"$data_dir/dosh-server.log" 2>&1 &
@@ -272,7 +532,8 @@ dosh_port = $port
 default_session = "new"
 reconnect_timeout_secs = 5
 view_only = false
-predict = false
+predict = true
+predict_mode = "experimental"
 cache_attach_tickets = true
 credential_cache = "~/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
 auth_preference = "native,ssh"
@@ -282,6 +543,7 @@ known_hosts = "~/.config/dosh/known_hosts"
 identity_files = ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519"]
 use_ssh_agent = true
 forward_agent = false
+escape_key = "^]"
 EOF
   fi
 
@@ -295,18 +557,18 @@ EOF
     fi
     cat >"$hosts_config" <<EOF
 # Example:
-# [palav]
+# [server]
-# ssh = "palav"
+# ssh = "server"
-# dosh_host = "palav.dev"
+# dosh_host = "server.example.com"
 # port = 50000
 # default_command = "tm"
-# predict = false
+# predict = true
 
 [default]
 ssh = "$default_server"
 dosh_host = "$host_udp"
 port = $port
-predict = false
+predict = true
 EOF
   fi
 fi
@@ -317,10 +579,17 @@ Configured UDP port $port
 EOF
 
 if [ "$role" = "client" ] || [ "$role" = "both" ]; then
+  next_server="${server:-user@host}"
   cat <<EOF
 
-Client command:
+Client commands:
-  $bindir/dosh ${server:-user@host}
+  $bindir/dosh $next_server
+  $bindir/dosh setup <ssh-alias>
+  $bindir/dosh update --check
+
+Client config:
+  $config_dir/client.toml
+  $config_dir/hosts.toml
 EOF
 fi
 

llms.txt

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-# dosh (Dormant Shell)
-
-> dosh is a low-latency remote terminal for homelab/personal servers. It is mosh-shaped
-> but not a mosh clone: `dosh-server` is a resident daemon that keeps terminal sessions
-> hot, and the client reconnects over encrypted UDP — so attach and reconnect are
-> near-instant (~3 ms of local overhead + one network RTT). SSH is used once to
-> establish trust; after that, repeat attaches skip SSH entirely. It also does SSH-style
-> TCP port forwarding (`-L`/`-R`/`-D`) over the same encrypted transport, which is what
-> makes back-and-forth client↔server homelab comms easy.
-
-This file orients an AI agent (or a human) on what dosh is, what it can do, and how to
-drive it. It is intentionally self-contained. For deeper detail, see the linked docs at
-the bottom.
-
-## What dosh is for
-
-Use dosh instead of `ssh`/`mosh` for **interactive shells and TCP forwarding** to a
-server where you control both ends and have installed `dosh-server` (typically a homelab
-box, VPS, or workstation). It shines when you:
-
-- want a terminal that survives laptop sleep, Wi-Fi changes, and NAT rebinding, and
-  resumes instantly instead of hanging;
-- reconnect to the same box many times a day and don't want to pay SSH startup each time;
-- need to reach services on the server from your laptop (or vice-versa) without standing
-  up a VPN.
-
-dosh is **not** a drop-in for every SSH use. It does not do `scp`/`sftp` file transfer,
-X11, or act as an `sshd` for arbitrary SSH clients. Keep `ssh` installed for those.
-
-## Core capabilities
-
-- **Encrypted UDP terminal transport** — AEAD-encrypted, with packet sequencing, a
-  sliding replay window, ACKs, and server-side retransmit of unacked output.
-- **Resident server + hot sessions** — `dosh-server` runs as a daemon; named sessions
-  (and a prewarmed `default`) stay alive across client disconnects.
-- **Fast attach / reconnect** — see "Fast path order" below; cached attach is ~one RTT.
-- **Roaming** — the session follows the client across IP/port changes.
-- **Named & shared sessions** — reattach the same persistent terminal from multiple
-  clients; optional **view-only** clients.
-- **TCP port forwarding** — local (`-L`), remote (`-R`), and dynamic SOCKS (`-D`) over
-  the encrypted transport, with per-stream flow control and terminal-priority
-  scheduling (bulk transfers don't lag your keystrokes).
-- **Native UDP auth** — Ed25519 user auth via ssh-agent or an (optionally encrypted)
-  OpenSSH key, verified against `authorized_keys`. Falls back to SSH bootstrap when
-  native auth isn't available. SSH host config (`HostName`, `User`, `Port`,
-  `IdentityFile`, `ProxyJump`, etc.) is honored.
-- **Host-key pinning** — TOFU/known-hosts with hard-fail on mismatch.
-- **Speculative local echo** — optional predictive echo for laggy links (display-only;
-  real input is always sent to the server).
-- **Ops commands** — `doctor`, `sessions`, `trust`, `import-ssh`, `update`.
-
-## Quickstart
-
-Install the server on each box you want to reach (default UDP port `50000`):
-
-```bash
-curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh \
-  | DOSH_PORT=50000 sh -s -- server
-```
-
-Install the client (macOS/Linux), then attach:
-
-```bash
-curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh \
-  | DOSH_SERVER=homelab DOSH_HOST=homelab.example.com DOSH_PORT=50000 sh -s -- client
-
-dosh homelab                 # fresh interactive shell
-dosh homelab uptime          # run one command
-dosh --session work homelab  # named, persistent, reattachable session
-```
-
-- Detach (leave the server session running): **Ctrl-]**.
-- End the session: type `exit` in the remote shell.
-- If UDP stalls, dosh keeps the terminal open, sends keepalives, and ticket-reconnects.
-
-## Client↔server homelab comms (the back-and-forth)
-
-Forwarding is the key to "make homelab comms easy." Three directions:
-
-| Command | Direction | Effect |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `dosh -L [bind:]LPORT:THOST:TPORT host` | pull server→you | A listener on **your machine** (`bind`, default localhost) forwards to `THOST:TPORT` reached **from the server**. |
-| `dosh -R [bind:]LPORT:THOST:TPORT host` | push you→server | A listener on **the server** (loopback by default) forwards to `THOST:TPORT` reached **from your machine**. |
-| `dosh -D [bind:]LPORT host` | SOCKS via server | A SOCKS5 proxy on **your machine**; traffic egresses **from the server**. |
-
-Concrete homelab patterns:
-
-```bash
-# Reach the homelab's internal Grafana (server-side :3000) from your laptop browser:
-dosh -L 3000:127.0.0.1:3000 homelab            # open http://localhost:3000
-
-# Reach a DB that only listens on the homelab LAN:
-dosh -L 5432:10.0.0.5:5432 homelab             # psql -h 127.0.0.1 -p 5432
-
-# Let the homelab hit a dev server running on your laptop (e.g. a webhook target):
-dosh -R 9000:127.0.0.1:8080 homelab           # homelab curls http://127.0.0.1:9000
-
-# Route browser traffic out through the homelab's network:
-dosh -D 1080 homelab                           # SOCKS5 proxy at 127.0.0.1:1080
-
-# Forward-only, no shell; multiple forwards; background after listeners are up:
-dosh -N -L 3000:127.0.0.1:3000 -L 5432:10.0.0.5:5432 homelab
-dosh -f -N -L 3000:127.0.0.1:3000 homelab
-```
-
-Server policy controls forwarding: `allow_tcp_forwarding`, `allow_remote_forwarding`,
-`allow_remote_non_loopback_bind`, and per-key `permitopen=`/`no-port-forwarding` in
-`authorized_keys`. Remote listeners bind to loopback unless explicitly allowed.
-
-## Fast path order (why it's quick)
-
-The client tries the cheapest valid path first:
-
-1. **UDP resume** — existing client id + session key; one encrypted UDP round-trip.
-2. **UDP attach ticket** — cached server-issued ticket; one round-trip, no SSH.
-3. **Native UDP auth** — Ed25519 handshake (ssh-agent/key) when enabled.
-4. **SSH bootstrap** — `ssh user@host dosh-auth …` once, then a UDP attach.
-
-Measured locally (loopback, release): cached attach ≈ **3 ms**, cold native auth ≈ 9 ms.
-Over a real link, add one RTT. See `docs/BENCHMARKS.md`.
-
-## Architecture (1-minute model)
-
-- **dosh-server** — single UDP socket on one port; a session table keyed by name; one
-  PTY per named session; per-session terminal screen state (vt100) for snapshots/diffs;
-  a per-session client table; encrypted UDP protocol; a small SSH-invoked `dosh-auth`
-  helper. Abandoned (clientless, non-prewarmed) sessions and their shells are reaped
-  after a grace period; prewarmed sessions stay hot.
-- **dosh-client** — raw-mode terminal; local credential cache; tries resume/ticket/native
-  before SSH; forwards PTY I/O; reconnect/roaming state machine; optional predictive echo.
-- **Binaries** — `dosh-server`, `dosh-client` (symlinked as `dosh`), `dosh-auth`
-  (SSH-invoked trust helper), `dosh-bench` (benchmarks).
-
-## Security model (summary)
-
-- First trust via SSH; thereafter encrypted Dosh transport. Native auth available.
-- KEX X25519; AEAD ChaCha20-Poly1305; KDF HKDF-SHA256; host & user auth Ed25519;
-  SHA-256 transcript binding. Per-direction, per-sequence nonces; replay window.
-- Host keys pinned in `~/.config/dosh/known_hosts`; mismatch hard-fails.
-- User auth against `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` (+ optional `~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys`);
-  removed keys can't authenticate; unsupported restrictive options fail closed.
-- Forward secrecy from ephemeral X25519; attach tickets are server-sealed and scoped.
-
-dosh claims security **equivalent to, and in places stronger than, SSH for the dosh
-terminal/forwarding use case** — not full SSH-protocol parity. Read `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`
-for the honest stance, residual risks, and what's still pending before public claims.
-
-## Configuration
-
-- **Client** `~/.config/dosh/client.toml` — `auth_preference` (e.g. `"native,ssh"`),
-  `trust_on_first_use`, `identity_files`, `use_ssh_agent`, `forward_agent`, `send_env`,
-  `set_env`, `dosh_port`, `default_session`, `predict`, `reconnect_timeout_secs`,
-  `credential_cache`, `known_hosts`.
-- **Hosts** `~/.config/dosh/hosts.toml` — per-alias `[name]` with `ssh`, `dosh_host`,
-  `port`, `user`, `default_command`, `predict`. Generate from SSH aliases with
-  `dosh import-ssh <alias> <name>`.
-- **Server** `~/.config/dosh/server.toml` — `port`, `bind`, `shell`, `prewarm_sessions`,
-  `native_auth`, `host_key`, `authorized_keys`, `attach_ticket_ttl_secs`,
-  `client_timeout_secs`, `allow_tcp_forwarding`, `allow_remote_forwarding`,
-  `allow_remote_non_loopback_bind`, `allow_agent_forwarding`, `accept_env`,
-  `native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute`.
-
-Paths: host key `~/.config/dosh/host_key`; credential cache
-`~/.local/share/dosh/credentials/`.
-
-## Operating & diagnostics
-
-```bash
-dosh doctor homelab     # host resolution, trust state, UDP reachability, server
-                        # version, usable keys, auth result, forwarding policy
-dosh sessions homelab   # list live sessions
-dosh trust homelab      # fetch + pin the Dosh host key (via SSH fallback)
-dosh trust --remove homelab
-dosh import-ssh palav homelab   # write a hosts.toml entry from an SSH alias
-dosh update             # update the installed client
-```
-
-If something fails, `dosh doctor <host>` is the first stop — every public error is meant
-to be actionable (host trust, auth failure, UDP blocked, forwarding denied, version
-mismatch, server unavailable).
-
-## For agents driving dosh
-
-- Run one command and exit: `dosh <host> <cmd...>`. Render one frame and detach:
-  `dosh --attach-only <host>`. Both are non-interactive-friendly.
-- A real terminal size is needed for full-screen rendering; with no TTY the client falls
-  back to 80×24. Pass `-v`/`-vv` for timing/diagnostic logs on stderr.
-- Prefer `--session <name>` to reattach a known session; bare `dosh <host>` opens a
-  fresh, uniquely-named session each time.
-- Never assume file transfer or X11 — use `ssh`/`scp` for those.
-- Diagnostics are scriptable via `dosh doctor <host>`.
-
-## Reference docs
-
-- `README.md` — overview, install, develop, performance rules.
-- `docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` — the native auth + forwarding v1 contract and verification
-  checklist (with current status).
-- `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` — security claims, threat model, residual risks.
-- `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` — feature matrix and §16 verification status.
-- `docs/BENCHMARKS.md` — how to benchmark; metric definitions; sample numbers.
-- `SPEC.md` — protocol/wire details.

packaging/install.sh

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env sh
-set -eu
-
-repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
-cd "$repo_root"
-exec sh ./install.sh --from-current "$@"

packaging/systemd/dosh-server.service

@@ -6,17 +6,9 @@ Wants=network-online.target
 [Service]
 Type=simple
 ExecStart=%h/.local/bin/dosh-server serve
-Restart=on-failure
+Restart=always
 RestartSec=1
-NoNewPrivileges=true
+KillMode=process
-PrivateTmp=true
-ProtectSystem=strict
-ProtectHome=read-only
-ReadWritePaths=%h/.config/dosh %h/.local/share/dosh
-RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX
-RestrictRealtime=true
-LockPersonality=true
-MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
 
 [Install]
 WantedBy=default.target

scripts/bench-local.sh

@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ cleanup() {
     kill "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
     wait "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || true
   fi
+  pkill -f "$server_bin hold --runtime-dir $home/sessions/run" 2>/dev/null || true
   rm -rf "$home"
 }
 trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
@@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ scrollback = 5000
 auth_ttl_secs = 30
 attach_ticket_ttl_secs = 3600
 allow_attach_tickets = true
+persist_sessions = false
 client_timeout_secs = 60
 retransmit_window = 256
 default_input_mode = "read-write"
@@ -183,8 +185,7 @@ server_pid=""
 # meaningful here. The cold fresh-process reconnect fast path is the attach
 # ticket (measured above). Roaming resume is validated by the integration test
 # `resume_updates_udp_endpoint_for_roaming`. `dosh-bench --resume` exists for
-# scenarios that keep a live session out-of-band (e.g. remote soak tests); see
+# scenarios that keep a live session out-of-band (e.g. remote soak tests).
-# docs/BENCHMARKS.md.
 rm -rf "$home/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
 write_client_config true
 start_server

scripts/bench-report.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repo_root"
+
+out="${DOSH_BENCH_REPORT:-target/dosh-bench/report.md}"
+iters="${DOSH_BENCH_ITERS:-10}"
+server="${DOSH_BENCH_SERVER:-${1:-local}}"
+label="${DOSH_BENCH_LABEL:-$(uname -s) $(uname -m)}"
+
+cargo build --release >/dev/null
+mkdir -p "$(dirname "$out")"
+
+exec target/release/dosh-bench \
+  --server "$server" \
+  --iterations "$iters" \
+  --label "$label" \
+  --markdown \
+  --output "$out" \
+  ${DOSH_BENCH_ARGS:-}

scripts/ci-docker-ssh-bench.sh

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ for _ in 1 2 3 4 5; do
 done
 
 ssh-keyscan -p "$ssh_port" 127.0.0.1 > "$workdir/known_hosts"
-mkdir -p "$workdir/home" "$workdir/home-controlmaster" "$workdir/home-cached" "$workdir/home-mosh"
+mkdir -p "$workdir/home" "$workdir/home-controlmaster" "$workdir/home-native" "$workdir/home-cached" "$workdir/home-mosh"
 
 if ! HOME="$workdir/home" target/release/dosh-bench \
     --server bench@127.0.0.1 \
@@ -64,6 +64,32 @@ if ! HOME="$workdir/home-controlmaster" target/release/dosh-bench \
   exit 1
 fi
 
+if ! HOME="$workdir/home-native" target/release/dosh-client \
+    --ssh-port "$ssh_port" \
+    --ssh-key "$workdir/id_ed25519" \
+    --ssh-known-hosts "$workdir/known_hosts" \
+    --ssh-auth-command /usr/local/bin/dosh-auth \
+    trust bench@127.0.0.1 >/dev/null; then
+  docker logs "$container_id" || true
+  docker exec "$container_id" sh -lc 'cat /tmp/dosh-server.log 2>/dev/null || true' || true
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if ! HOME="$workdir/home-native" target/release/dosh-bench \
+    --server bench@127.0.0.1 \
+    --ssh-port "$ssh_port" \
+    --dosh-port "$dosh_port" \
+    --dosh-host 127.0.0.1 \
+    --ssh-key "$workdir/id_ed25519" \
+    --ssh-known-hosts "$workdir/known_hosts" \
+    --iterations 5 \
+    --cold-native \
+    --assert-ssh-plus-ms "${DOSH_BENCH_NATIVE_SSH_PLUS_MS:-0}"; then
+  docker logs "$container_id" || true
+  docker exec "$container_id" sh -lc 'cat /tmp/dosh-server.log 2>/dev/null || true' || true
+  exit 1
+fi
+
 if ! HOME="$workdir/home-cached" target/release/dosh-bench \
     --server bench@127.0.0.1 \
     --ssh-port "$ssh_port" \

scripts/fuzz-run.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+seconds="${DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS:-${1:-20}}"
+targets="
+packet_decode
+from_body
+authorized_keys
+known_hosts
+handshake_structs
+attach_ticket
+"
+
+if ! command -v cargo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  [ -f "$HOME/.cargo/env" ] && . "$HOME/.cargo/env"
+fi
+
+for target in $targets; do
+  echo "== fuzzing $target for ${seconds}s =="
+  cargo +nightly fuzz run --fuzz-dir fuzz "$target" -- \
+    -max_total_time="$seconds" -rss_limit_mb="${DOSH_FUZZ_RSS_MB:-4096}"
+done

scripts/package-release.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repo_root"
+
+out_dir="${DOSH_PACKAGE_DIR:-target/dosh-release}"
+version="${DOSH_VERSION:-$(sed -n 's/^version = "\(.*\)"/\1/p' Cargo.toml | sed -n '1p')}"
+
+normalize_os() {
+  case "$(uname -s)" in
+    Darwin) printf '%s\n' macos ;;
+    Linux) printf '%s\n' linux ;;
+    FreeBSD) printf '%s\n' freebsd ;;
+    MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*) printf '%s\n' windows ;;
+    *) uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+normalize_arch() {
+  case "$(uname -m)" in
+    x86_64|amd64) printf '%s\n' x86_64 ;;
+    arm64|aarch64) printf '%s\n' aarch64 ;;
+    armv7l) printf '%s\n' armv7 ;;
+    *) uname -m | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+host_os="$(normalize_os)"
+os="${DOSH_PACKAGE_OS:-$host_os}"
+arch="${DOSH_PACKAGE_ARCH:-$(normalize_arch)}"
+target="${DOSH_PACKAGE_TARGET:-}"
+if [ -z "$target" ] && [ "$os" = "windows" ] && [ "$host_os" != "windows" ]; then
+  case "$arch" in
+    x86_64) target="x86_64-pc-windows-gnu" ;;
+    *) echo "set DOSH_PACKAGE_TARGET for windows/$arch" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+  esac
+fi
+if [ "$os" = "windows" ]; then
+  artifact="dosh-$os-$arch.zip"
+  versioned_artifact="dosh-$version-$os-$arch.zip"
+else
+  artifact="dosh-$os-$arch.tar.gz"
+  versioned_artifact="dosh-$version-$os-$arch.tar.gz"
+fi
+stage="$out_dir/stage/dosh"
+write_versioned="${DOSH_PACKAGE_VERSIONED:-0}"
+
+if [ -n "$target" ]; then
+  release_dir="target/$target/release"
+else
+  release_dir="target/release"
+fi
+
+if [ "$os" = "windows" ]; then
+  if [ -n "$target" ]; then
+    cargo build --release --target "$target" --bin dosh-client --bin dosh-bench
+  else
+    cargo build --release --bin dosh-client --bin dosh-bench
+  fi
+else
+  if [ -n "$target" ]; then
+    cargo build --release --target "$target"
+  else
+    cargo build --release
+  fi
+fi
+
+rm -rf "$stage"
+mkdir -p "$stage/bin" "$out_dir"
+for bin in dosh-client dosh-server dosh-auth dosh-bench; do
+  if [ -f "$release_dir/$bin" ]; then
+    install -m 0755 "$release_dir/$bin" "$stage/bin/$bin"
+  elif [ -f "$release_dir/$bin.exe" ]; then
+    install -m 0755 "$release_dir/$bin.exe" "$stage/bin/$bin.exe"
+  fi
+done
+if [ -f "$stage/bin/dosh-client.exe" ]; then
+  cp "$stage/bin/dosh-client.exe" "$stage/bin/dosh.exe"
+elif [ -f "$stage/bin/dosh-client" ]; then
+  cp "$stage/bin/dosh-client" "$stage/bin/dosh"
+fi
+
+strip_bin() {
+  file="$1"
+  [ -f "$file" ] || return 0
+  case "$file" in
+    *.exe)
+      if command -v x86_64-w64-mingw32-strip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        x86_64-w64-mingw32-strip "$file" 2>/dev/null || true
+      elif command -v strip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        strip "$file" 2>/dev/null || true
+      fi
+      ;;
+    *)
+      if command -v strip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        strip "$file" 2>/dev/null || true
+      fi
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+for bin in "$stage"/bin/*; do
+  strip_bin "$bin"
+done
+
+printf '%s\n' "$version" >"$stage/VERSION"
+
+if [ "$os" = "windows" ]; then
+  if command -v powershell.exe >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "Compress-Archive -Force -Path '$stage' -DestinationPath '$out_dir/$artifact'"
+  elif command -v zip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    (cd "$out_dir/stage" && zip -qr "../$artifact" dosh)
+  else
+    echo "windows packaging requires powershell.exe or zip" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+else
+  tar -C "$out_dir/stage" -czf "$out_dir/$artifact" dosh
+fi
+write_sha256() {
+  file="$1"
+  if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    sha256sum "$file" >"$file.sha256"
+  elif command -v shasum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    shasum -a 256 "$file" >"$file.sha256"
+  else
+    echo "warning: sha256sum/shasum not found; skipping checksum for $file" >&2
+  fi
+}
+
+write_sha256 "$out_dir/$artifact"
+
+if [ "$write_versioned" = "1" ]; then
+  cp "$out_dir/$artifact" "$out_dir/$versioned_artifact"
+  write_sha256 "$out_dir/$versioned_artifact"
+fi
+
+printf 'Wrote:\n'
+cat <<EOF
+  $out_dir/$artifact
+  $out_dir/$artifact.sha256
+EOF
+
+if [ "$write_versioned" = "1" ]; then
+  cat <<EOF
+  $out_dir/$versioned_artifact
+  $out_dir/$versioned_artifact.sha256
+EOF
+fi

scripts/publish-gitea-release.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+usage() {
+  cat <<'EOF'
+Usage:
+  scripts/publish-gitea-release.sh [TAG]
+
+Publishes the current Dosh release to Gitea.
+
+Defaults:
+  TAG                 v<Cargo.toml version>
+  DOSH_PUBLISH_BUILD 1: run scripts/package-release.sh first
+  DOSH_PUBLISH_PUSH  1: push TAG to origin
+  DOSH_PUBLISH_PRUNE 1: remove stale dosh-<version>-* duplicate assets
+
+Environment:
+  GITEA_URL, GITEA_REPO, GITEA_TOKEN: same as upload-gitea-release.sh
+  DOSH_PUBLISH_ALLOW_DIRTY=1          allow uncommitted changes
+EOF
+}
+
+if [ "${1:-}" = "-h" ] || [ "${1:-}" = "--help" ]; then
+  usage
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repo_root"
+
+version="$(sed -n 's/^version = "\(.*\)"/\1/p' Cargo.toml | sed -n '1p')"
+tag="${1:-v$version}"
+base="${GITEA_URL:-https://git.palav.dev}"
+repo="${GITEA_REPO:-Palav/dosh}"
+token="${GITEA_TOKEN:-}"
+build="${DOSH_PUBLISH_BUILD:-1}"
+push_tag="${DOSH_PUBLISH_PUSH:-1}"
+prune="${DOSH_PUBLISH_PRUNE:-1}"
+
+if [ -z "$token" ] && [ -f "$HOME/.config/dosh/gitea-token" ]; then
+  token="$(tr -d '\r\n' <"$HOME/.config/dosh/gitea-token")"
+fi
+
+need() {
+  if ! command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "missing required command: $1" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
+need git
+need curl
+
+if [ "${DOSH_PUBLISH_ALLOW_DIRTY:-0}" != "1" ] && [ -n "$(git status --porcelain)" ]; then
+  echo "refusing to publish with uncommitted changes" >&2
+  echo "commit first, or set DOSH_PUBLISH_ALLOW_DIRTY=1" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+head="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
+if git rev-parse -q --verify "refs/tags/$tag" >/dev/null; then
+  tagged="$(git rev-list -n 1 "$tag")"
+  if [ "$tagged" != "$head" ]; then
+    echo "tag $tag points at $tagged, not HEAD $head" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+else
+  git tag "$tag" "$head"
+fi
+
+if [ "$push_tag" = "1" ]; then
+  git push origin "$tag"
+fi
+
+if [ "$build" = "1" ]; then
+  sh scripts/package-release.sh
+fi
+
+scripts/upload-gitea-release.sh "$tag"
+
+api="$base/api/v1/repos/$repo"
+auth_header="Authorization: token $token"
+release_json="$(curl -fsS -H "$auth_header" "$api/releases/tags/$tag")"
+release_id=""
+if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  release_id="$(printf '%s\n' "$release_json" | jq -r '.id // empty')"
+fi
+
+if [ "$prune" = "1" ] && [ -n "$release_id" ] && command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  printf '%s\n' "$release_json" \
+    | jq -r '.assets[]? | select(.name | test("^dosh-[0-9]")) | [.id, .name] | @tsv' \
+    | while IFS="$(printf '\t')" read -r asset_id name; do
+      [ -n "$asset_id" ] || continue
+      echo "deleting duplicate $name"
+      curl -fsS -H "$auth_header" -X DELETE "$api/releases/$release_id/assets/$asset_id" >/dev/null
+    done
+  release_json="$(curl -fsS -H "$auth_header" "$api/releases/tags/$tag")"
+fi
+
+web_repo="${base%/}/${repo}"
+failed=0
+artifact_version() {
+  artifact="$1"
+  case "$artifact" in
+    *.tar.gz)
+      tar -xOf "$artifact" dosh/VERSION 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r\n'
+      ;;
+    *.zip)
+      unzip -p "$artifact" dosh/VERSION 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r\n'
+      ;;
+    *)
+      return 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+for artifact in target/dosh-release/dosh-linux-*.tar.gz target/dosh-release/dosh-macos-*.tar.gz target/dosh-release/dosh-windows-*.zip; do
+  [ -f "$artifact" ] || continue
+  name="$(basename "$artifact")"
+  case "$name" in
+    dosh-[0-9]*)
+      continue
+      ;;
+  esac
+  actual="$(artifact_version "$artifact" || true)"
+  if [ "$actual" != "$version" ]; then
+    echo "skipping stale artifact $name: version ${actual:-unknown}, expected $version" >&2
+    continue
+  fi
+  url="$web_repo/releases/download/$tag/$name"
+  if curl -fsSI "$url" >/dev/null; then
+    echo "verified $url"
+  else
+    echo "missing release asset: $url" >&2
+    failed=1
+  fi
+done
+
+if [ "$failed" != "0" ]; then
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  printf '%s\n' "$release_json" | jq -r '"assets=\(.assets|length)", (.assets[] | "\(.name) \(.size)")'
+fi

scripts/tui-harness.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repo_root"
+
+for test_name in \
+  live_output_forwards_terminal_control_sequences \
+  tui_control_sequences_survive_transport_verbatim \
+  unicode_output_survives_transport \
+  tui_graph_glyphs_survive_fast_repaints_without_snapshot_substitution \
+  btop_style_graph_output_stays_raw_when_retransmit_history_overflows \
+  large_tui_paint_is_delivered_in_mtu_safe_frames \
+  resume_snapshot_preserves_alternate_screen_mode
+do
+  cargo test --test integration_smoke "$test_name" -- --nocapture
+done

scripts/upload-gitea-release.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+usage() {
+  cat <<'EOF'
+Usage:
+  GITEA_TOKEN=... scripts/upload-gitea-release.sh TAG [artifact...]
+
+Environment:
+  GITEA_URL       Base URL, default https://git.palav.dev
+  GITEA_REPO      owner/repo, default Palav/dosh
+  GITEA_TOKEN     Token with release write permission
+  GITEA_TITLE     Release title, default TAG
+EOF
+}
+
+if [ "${1:-}" = "-h" ] || [ "${1:-}" = "--help" ]; then
+  usage
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+tag="${1:-}"
+if [ -z "$tag" ]; then
+  usage >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+shift
+
+base="${GITEA_URL:-https://git.palav.dev}"
+repo="${GITEA_REPO:-Palav/dosh}"
+token="${GITEA_TOKEN:-}"
+title="${GITEA_TITLE:-$tag}"
+expected_version="${tag#v}"
+
+artifact_version() {
+  artifact="$1"
+  case "$artifact" in
+    *.tar.gz)
+      tar -xOf "$artifact" dosh/VERSION 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r\n'
+      ;;
+    *.zip)
+      unzip -p "$artifact" dosh/VERSION 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r\n'
+      ;;
+    *)
+      return 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+if [ -z "$token" ] && [ -f "$HOME/.config/dosh/gitea-token" ]; then
+  token="$(tr -d '\r\n' <"$HOME/.config/dosh/gitea-token")"
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$token" ]; then
+  echo "GITEA_TOKEN is required (or put it in ~/.config/dosh/gitea-token)" >&2
+  exit 2
+fi
+
+if [ "$#" -eq 0 ]; then
+  for artifact in \
+    target/dosh-release/dosh-linux-*.tar.gz \
+    target/dosh-release/dosh-macos-*.tar.gz \
+    target/dosh-release/dosh-windows-*.zip; do
+    [ -f "$artifact" ] || continue
+    case "$(basename "$artifact")" in
+      dosh-[0-9]*)
+        continue
+        ;;
+    esac
+    actual="$(artifact_version "$artifact" || true)"
+    if [ "$actual" != "$expected_version" ]; then
+      echo "skipping $artifact: version ${actual:-unknown}, expected $expected_version" >&2
+      continue
+    fi
+    if [ -f "$artifact.sha256" ]; then
+      set -- "$@" "$artifact" "$artifact.sha256"
+    else
+      set -- "$@" "$artifact"
+    fi
+  done
+fi
+
+api="$base/api/v1/repos/$repo"
+auth_header="Authorization: token $token"
+
+release_json="$(curl -fsS -H "$auth_header" "$api/releases/tags/$tag" 2>/dev/null || true)"
+release_id=""
+if [ -n "$release_json" ] && command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  release_id="$(printf '%s\n' "$release_json" | jq -r '.id // empty')"
+elif [ -n "$release_json" ]; then
+  release_id="$(printf '%s\n' "$release_json" | sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*{"id":[[:space:]]*\([0-9][0-9]*\).*/\1/p' | sed -n '1p')"
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$release_id" ]; then
+  payload="$(printf '{"tag_name":"%s","target_commitish":"main","name":"%s","body":"Dosh release %s","draft":false,"prerelease":false}\n' "$tag" "$title" "$tag")"
+  release_json="$(curl -fsS -H "$auth_header" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -X POST "$api/releases" -d "$payload")"
+  if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    release_id="$(printf '%s\n' "$release_json" | jq -r '.id // empty')"
+  else
+    release_id="$(printf '%s\n' "$release_json" | sed -n 's/^[[:space:]]*{"id":[[:space:]]*\([0-9][0-9]*\).*/\1/p' | sed -n '1p')"
+  fi
+fi
+
+if [ -z "$release_id" ]; then
+  echo "could not determine Gitea release id for $tag" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+delete_existing_asset() {
+  name="$1"
+  if ! command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    return 0
+  fi
+  printf '%s\n' "$release_json" \
+    | jq -r --arg name "$name" '.assets[]? | select(.name == $name) | .id' \
+    | while IFS= read -r asset_id; do
+      [ -n "$asset_id" ] || continue
+      echo "replacing $name"
+      curl -fsS \
+        -H "$auth_header" \
+        -X DELETE \
+        "$api/releases/$release_id/assets/$asset_id" >/dev/null
+    done
+}
+
+verify_release_artifact_version() {
+  artifact="$1"
+  name="$(basename "$artifact")"
+  case "$name" in
+    *.sha256)
+      return 0
+      ;;
+    dosh-*.tar.gz|dosh-*.zip)
+      actual="$(artifact_version "$artifact" || true)"
+      if [ -z "$actual" ]; then
+        echo "release artifact missing dosh/VERSION: $artifact" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      if [ "$actual" != "$expected_version" ]; then
+        echo "release artifact version mismatch: $artifact has $actual, expected $expected_version" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+uploaded=0
+for artifact in "$@"; do
+  if [ ! -f "$artifact" ]; then
+    continue
+  fi
+  name="$(basename "$artifact")"
+  verify_release_artifact_version "$artifact"
+  delete_existing_asset "$name"
+  echo "uploading $name"
+  curl -fsS \
+    -H "$auth_header" \
+    -X POST \
+    -F "attachment=@$artifact" \
+    "$api/releases/$release_id/assets?name=$name" >/dev/null
+  uploaded=$((uploaded + 1))
+done
+
+if [ "$uploaded" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo "no release artifacts uploaded" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi

scripts/verify-release-artifacts.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repo_root"
+
+version="$(sed -n 's/^version = "\(.*\)"/\1/p' Cargo.toml | sed -n '1p')"
+out_dir="${DOSH_PACKAGE_DIR:-target/dosh-release}"
+
+artifact_version() {
+  artifact="$1"
+  case "$artifact" in
+    *.tar.gz)
+      tar -xOf "$artifact" dosh/VERSION 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r\n'
+      ;;
+    *.zip)
+      unzip -p "$artifact" dosh/VERSION 2>/dev/null | tr -d '\r\n'
+      ;;
+    *)
+      return 1
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+failed=0
+for artifact in \
+  "$out_dir/dosh-linux-x86_64.tar.gz" \
+  "$out_dir/dosh-macos-aarch64.tar.gz" \
+  "$out_dir/dosh-windows-x86_64.zip"; do
+  if [ ! -f "$artifact" ]; then
+    echo "missing release artifact: $artifact" >&2
+    failed=1
+    continue
+  fi
+  if [ ! -f "$artifact.sha256" ]; then
+    echo "missing release checksum: $artifact.sha256" >&2
+    failed=1
+  fi
+  actual="$(artifact_version "$artifact" || true)"
+  if [ "$actual" != "$version" ]; then
+    echo "artifact version mismatch: $artifact has ${actual:-unknown}, expected $version" >&2
+    failed=1
+  fi
+done
+
+exit "$failed"

src/auth.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::fs;
 use std::io::Write;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
 
@@ -82,10 +83,11 @@ pub fn load_or_create_server_secret(config: &ServerConfig) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
         fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| format!("create {}", parent.display()))?;
     }
     let secret = crypto::random_32();
-    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+    let mut options = fs::OpenOptions::new();
-        .create_new(true)
+    options.create_new(true).write(true);
-        .write(true)
+    #[cfg(unix)]
-        .mode(0o600)
+    options.mode(0o600);
+    let mut file = options
         .open(&path)
         .with_context(|| format!("create {}", path.display()))?;
     file.write_all(URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(secret).as_bytes())?;
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ pub fn load_or_create_server_secret(config: &ServerConfig) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
     Ok(secret)
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub fn build_bootstrap(
     config: &ServerConfig,
     secret: &[u8; 32],
@@ -159,6 +162,7 @@ pub fn build_bootstrap(
     })
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub fn attach_token(
     secret: &[u8; 32],
     user: &str,
@@ -204,6 +208,7 @@ pub fn verify_bootstrap(resp: &BootstrapResponse, secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<b
     Ok(expected == resp.attach_token)
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub fn build_attach_ticket(
     secret: &[u8; 32],
     server_id: [u8; 32],

src/bin/dosh-auth.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ use dosh::config::load_server_config;
 use dosh::native::{host_public_key, host_public_key_line, load_or_create_host_key};
 
 #[derive(Debug, Parser)]
+#[command(
+    name = "dosh-auth",
+    version = dosh::build_info::VERSION,
+    long_version = dosh::build_info::LONG_VERSION
+)]
 struct Args {
     #[arg(long, default_value_t = 1)]
     protocol: u8,

src/bin/dosh-bench.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow};
 use clap::Parser;
 use portable_pty::{CommandBuilder, NativePtySystem, PtySize, PtySystem};
 use std::ffi::OsStr;
+use std::fmt::Write as _;
+use std::fs;
 use std::io::Read;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 use std::process::Command;
@@ -9,7 +11,11 @@ use std::sync::mpsc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
 #[derive(Debug, Parser)]
-#[command(name = "dosh-bench")]
+#[command(
+    name = "dosh-bench",
+    version = dosh::build_info::VERSION,
+    long_version = dosh::build_info::LONG_VERSION
+)]
 struct Args {
     #[arg(long, default_value = "local")]
     server: String,
@@ -63,6 +69,12 @@ struct Args {
     /// Emit machine-readable JSON (one object per metric, with raw samples).
     #[arg(long)]
     json: bool,
+    /// Emit a publishable Markdown benchmark report.
+    #[arg(long)]
+    markdown: bool,
+    /// Write the report to a file instead of stdout.
+    #[arg(long)]
+    output: Option<PathBuf>,
     /// Optional label printed in summary/JSON output (e.g. machine/OS identifier).
     #[arg(long)]
     label: Option<String>,
@@ -179,11 +191,14 @@ fn main() -> Result<()> {
         results.push(MetricSamples::new("mosh_start_true_ms", mosh_times));
     }
 
-    if args.json {
+    let report = if args.json {
-        print_json(&args, &results);
+        render_json(&args, &results)
+    } else if args.markdown {
+        render_markdown(&args, &results)
     } else {
-        print_table(&args, &results);
+        render_table(&args, &results)
-    }
+    };
+    write_report(&args, &report)?;
 
     run_assertions(&args, &results)?;
     Ok(())
@@ -560,17 +575,20 @@ fn percentile(sorted: &[f64], pct: f64) -> f64 {
     }
 }
 
-fn print_table(args: &Args, results: &[MetricSamples]) {
+fn render_table(args: &Args, results: &[MetricSamples]) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::new();
     if let Some(label) = &args.label {
-        println!("# label: {label}");
+        let _ = writeln!(out, "# label: {label}");
     }
-    println!(
+    let _ = writeln!(
+        out,
         "{:<24} {:>6} {:>9} {:>9} {:>9} {:>9} {:>9}",
         "metric", "n", "min", "median", "p95", "mean", "max"
     );
     for metric in results {
         let s = metric.stats();
-        println!(
+        let _ = writeln!(
+            out,
             "{:<24} {:>6} {:>9.2} {:>9.2} {:>9.2} {:>9.2} {:>9.2}",
             metric.name, s.count, s.min, s.median, s.p95, s.mean, s.max
         );
@@ -578,11 +596,12 @@ fn print_table(args: &Args, results: &[MetricSamples]) {
     // Raw per-iteration samples, so published numbers can include raw data.
     for metric in results {
         let ms: Vec<String> = metric.ms().iter().map(|v| format!("{v:.2}")).collect();
-        println!("{} samples_ms=[{}]", metric.name, ms.join(", "));
+        let _ = writeln!(out, "{} samples_ms=[{}]", metric.name, ms.join(", "));
     }
+    out
 }
 
-fn print_json(args: &Args, results: &[MetricSamples]) {
+fn render_json(args: &Args, results: &[MetricSamples]) -> String {
     let mut entries = Vec::new();
     for metric in results {
         let s = metric.stats();
@@ -603,11 +622,58 @@ fn print_json(args: &Args, results: &[MetricSamples]) {
         Some(label) => format!("\"{}\"", label.replace('"', "\\\"")),
         None => "null".to_string(),
     };
-    println!(
+    format!(
         "{{\"label\":{label},\"iterations\":{},\"metrics\":[{}]}}",
         args.iterations.max(1),
         entries.join(",")
+    )
+}
+
+fn render_markdown(args: &Args, results: &[MetricSamples]) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::new();
+    let label = args.label.as_deref().unwrap_or("Dosh benchmark");
+    let _ = writeln!(out, "# {label}\n");
+    let _ = writeln!(out, "- server: `{}`", args.server);
+    let _ = writeln!(out, "- iterations: `{}`", args.iterations.max(1));
+    let _ = writeln!(
+        out,
+        "- generated_by: `dosh-bench {}`\n",
+        env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")
     );
+    let _ = writeln!(
+        out,
+        "| metric | n | min ms | median ms | p95 ms | mean ms | max ms |"
+    );
+    let _ = writeln!(out, "|---|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|---:|");
+    for metric in results {
+        let s = metric.stats();
+        let _ = writeln!(
+            out,
+            "| `{}` | {} | {:.2} | {:.2} | {:.2} | {:.2} | {:.2} |",
+            metric.name, s.count, s.min, s.median, s.p95, s.mean, s.max
+        );
+    }
+    let _ = writeln!(out, "\n## Raw Samples\n");
+    for metric in results {
+        let ms: Vec<String> = metric.ms().iter().map(|v| format!("{v:.2}")).collect();
+        let _ = writeln!(out, "- `{}`: [{}]", metric.name, ms.join(", "));
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+fn write_report(args: &Args, report: &str) -> Result<()> {
+    if let Some(path) = &args.output {
+        if let Some(parent) = path.parent()
+            && !parent.as_os_str().is_empty()
+        {
+            fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| format!("create {}", parent.display()))?;
+        }
+        fs::write(path, report).with_context(|| format!("write {}", path.display()))?;
+        println!("wrote {}", path.display());
+    } else {
+        println!("{report}");
+    }
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 fn metric_mean(results: &[MetricSamples], name: &str) -> Option<f64> {
@@ -677,3 +743,69 @@ fn default_client_path() -> PathBuf {
         .and_then(|path| path.parent().map(|parent| parent.join("dosh-client")))
         .unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("dosh-client"))
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn args_for_render() -> Args {
+        Args {
+            server: "local".to_string(),
+            session: "default".to_string(),
+            ssh_port: 22,
+            dosh_port: 50000,
+            dosh_host: None,
+            iterations: 2,
+            local_auth: true,
+            cold_native: false,
+            cached_ticket: false,
+            resume: false,
+            client: None,
+            ssh_auth_command: "~/.local/bin/dosh-auth".to_string(),
+            ssh_key: None,
+            ssh_known_hosts: None,
+            ssh_control_path: None,
+            controlmaster: false,
+            no_cache: false,
+            warm_cache: false,
+            skip_ssh_baseline: true,
+            include_mosh: false,
+            mosh: PathBuf::from("mosh"),
+            mosh_server_command: "mosh-server".to_string(),
+            mosh_port: None,
+            json: false,
+            markdown: true,
+            output: None,
+            label: Some("test host".to_string()),
+            assert_ssh_plus_ms: None,
+            assert_mosh_minus_ms: None,
+            assert_dosh_max_ms: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn markdown_report_contains_summary_and_samples() {
+        let args = args_for_render();
+        let metrics = vec![MetricSamples::new(
+            "dosh_cached_attach_ms",
+            vec![Duration::from_millis(3), Duration::from_millis(5)],
+        )];
+        let report = render_markdown(&args, &metrics);
+        assert!(report.contains("# test host"));
+        assert!(report.contains("| `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | 2 | 3.00"));
+        assert!(report.contains("- `dosh_cached_attach_ms`: [3.00, 5.00]"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn json_report_contains_metrics() {
+        let args = args_for_render();
+        let metrics = vec![MetricSamples::new(
+            "dosh_local_attach_ms",
+            vec![Duration::from_millis(7)],
+        )];
+        let report = render_json(&args, &metrics);
+        assert!(report.contains("\"label\":\"test host\""));
+        assert!(report.contains("\"metric\":\"dosh_local_attach_ms\""));
+        assert!(report.contains("\"samples_ms\":[7.0000]"));
+    }
+}

src/build_info.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+pub const VERSION: &str = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
+pub const GIT_HASH: &str = env!("DOSH_GIT_HASH");
+pub const COMMIT_DATE: &str = env!("DOSH_COMMIT_DATE");
+pub const LONG_VERSION: &str = concat!(
+    env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
+    " (",
+    env!("DOSH_GIT_HASH"),
+    ", ",
+    env!("DOSH_COMMIT_DATE"),
+    ")"
+);

src/client.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+use crate::config::{
+    ClientConfig, HostConfig, expand_tilde, load_client_config, load_hosts_config,
+};
+use crate::crypto;
+use crate::native::{
+    self, EnvVar, ForwardingKind, ForwardingRequest, KnownHostStatus, NativeClientHello,
+    derive_native_session_key, generate_native_ephemeral, sign_user_auth_with_private_key,
+    supported_user_key_algorithms, trust_host, verify_known_host, verify_server_hello,
+};
+use crate::protocol::{
+    self, AttachReject, CLIENT_TO_SERVER, NativeAuthOkBody, NativeClientHelloBody,
+    NativeServerHelloBody, NativeUserAuthBody, PacketKind, SERVER_TO_CLIENT,
+};
+use crate::ssh_agent;
+use crate::transport::{DoshTransport, SessionRole, SessionTransportConfig, TransportConfig};
+use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow, bail};
+use std::net::{SocketAddr, ToSocketAddrs};
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct DoshClient {
+    config: ClientConfig,
+    hosts: crate::config::HostsConfig,
+}
+
+impl DoshClient {
+    pub fn load() -> Result<Self> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            config: load_client_config(None)?,
+            hosts: load_hosts_config(None)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn load_from_paths(
+        client_config: Option<PathBuf>,
+        hosts_config: Option<PathBuf>,
+    ) -> Result<Self> {
+        Ok(Self {
+            config: load_client_config(client_config)?,
+            hosts: load_hosts_config(hosts_config)?,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn with_config(config: ClientConfig, hosts: crate::config::HostsConfig) -> Self {
+        Self { config, hosts }
+    }
+
+    pub fn connect(&self, host: impl Into<String>) -> DoshClientBuilder {
+        DoshClientBuilder::new(self.clone(), host.into())
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct DoshClientBuilder {
+    client: DoshClient,
+    host: String,
+    services: Vec<String>,
+    identity_files: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    session: Option<String>,
+    user: Option<String>,
+    udp_host: Option<String>,
+    udp_port: Option<u16>,
+    trust_on_first_use: Option<bool>,
+    use_ssh_agent: Option<bool>,
+    timeout: Option<Duration>,
+    env: Vec<EnvVar>,
+}
+
+impl DoshClientBuilder {
+    pub fn new(client: DoshClient, host: String) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            client,
+            host,
+            services: Vec::new(),
+            identity_files: Vec::new(),
+            session: None,
+            user: None,
+            udp_host: None,
+            udp_port: None,
+            trust_on_first_use: None,
+            use_ssh_agent: None,
+            timeout: None,
+            env: Vec::new(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn service(mut self, name: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        self.services.push(name.into());
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn services(mut self, names: impl IntoIterator<Item = impl Into<String>>) -> Self {
+        self.services.extend(names.into_iter().map(Into::into));
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn identity_file(mut self, path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
+        self.identity_files.push(path.into());
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn session(mut self, session: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        self.session = Some(session.into());
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn user(mut self, user: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        self.user = Some(user.into());
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn udp_host(mut self, host: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        self.udp_host = Some(host.into());
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn udp_port(mut self, port: u16) -> Self {
+        self.udp_port = Some(port);
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn trust_on_first_use(mut self, trust: bool) -> Self {
+        self.trust_on_first_use = Some(trust);
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn use_ssh_agent(mut self, value: bool) -> Self {
+        self.use_ssh_agent = Some(value);
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn timeout(mut self, timeout: Duration) -> Self {
+        self.timeout = Some(timeout);
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn env(mut self, name: impl Into<String>, value: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        self.env.push(EnvVar {
+            name: name.into(),
+            value: value.into(),
+        });
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub async fn connect(self) -> Result<ConnectedDoshClient> {
+        let host_config = self
+            .client
+            .hosts
+            .hosts
+            .get(&self.host)
+            .cloned()
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+        let raw_server = host_config.ssh.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| self.host.clone());
+        let requested_user = self
+            .user
+            .clone()
+            .or_else(|| host_config.user.clone())
+            .or_else(|| user_from_destination(&raw_server))
+            .or_else(|| std::env::var("USER").ok())
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string());
+        let udp_host = self
+            .udp_host
+            .clone()
+            .or_else(|| host_config.dosh_host.clone())
+            .or_else(|| self.client.config.dosh_host.clone())
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| destination_host(&raw_server));
+        let udp_port = self
+            .udp_port
+            .or(host_config.port)
+            .unwrap_or(self.client.config.dosh_port);
+        let peer_addr = resolve_addr(&udp_host, udp_port)?;
+        let timeout = self.timeout.unwrap_or_else(|| {
+            Duration::from_millis(self.client.config.native_auth_timeout_ms.max(1))
+        });
+        let session = self.session.unwrap_or_else(default_sdk_session);
+        let requested_forwardings = self
+            .services
+            .iter()
+            .map(|service| {
+                Ok(ForwardingRequest {
+                    kind: ForwardingKind::Local,
+                    bind_host: None,
+                    listen_port: 0,
+                    target_host: Some(crate::transport::service_target(service)?),
+                    target_port: Some(0),
+                })
+            })
+            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
+        let socket = UdpSocket::bind("0.0.0.0:0").await?;
+        let (client_secret, client_public) = generate_native_ephemeral();
+        let hello = NativeClientHello {
+            protocol_version: native::NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            client_random: crypto::random_32(),
+            client_ephemeral_public: client_public,
+            requested_host: self.host.clone(),
+            requested_user,
+            requested_session: session.clone(),
+            requested_mode: "forward-only".to_string(),
+            terminal_size: (80, 24),
+            supported_aead: vec!["chacha20poly1305".to_string()],
+            supported_user_key_algorithms: supported_user_key_algorithms(),
+            cached_host_key_fingerprint: None,
+            attach_ticket_envelope: None,
+            requested_env: self.env,
+        };
+        let packet = protocol::encode_plain(
+            PacketKind::NativeClientHello,
+            [0u8; 16],
+            1,
+            0,
+            &protocol::to_body(&NativeClientHelloBody {
+                hello: hello.clone(),
+            })?,
+        )?;
+        socket.send_to(&packet, peer_addr).await?;
+
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; 65535];
+        let (n, _) = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, socket.recv_from(&mut buf)).await??;
+        let packet = protocol::decode(&buf[..n])?;
+        if packet.header.kind != PacketKind::NativeServerHello {
+            if packet.header.kind == PacketKind::AttachReject {
+                let reject: AttachReject = protocol::from_body(&packet.body)?;
+                bail!("native auth rejected: {}", reject.reason);
+            }
+            bail!("native auth received unexpected server response");
+        }
+        let server_hello: NativeServerHelloBody = protocol::from_body(&packet.body)?;
+        verify_server_hello(&hello, &server_hello.hello)?;
+        verify_or_trust_host(
+            &self.client.config,
+            &self.host,
+            &server_hello.hello.host_key,
+            self.trust_on_first_use,
+        )?;
+
+        let session_key = derive_native_session_key(
+            &client_secret,
+            server_hello.hello.server_ephemeral_public,
+            &hello,
+            &server_hello.hello,
+        )?;
+        let auth = sign_auth(
+            &self.client.config,
+            &host_config,
+            &hello,
+            &server_hello.hello,
+            requested_forwardings,
+            self.identity_files,
+            self.use_ssh_agent,
+        )?;
+        let mut pending_id = [0u8; 16];
+        pending_id.copy_from_slice(&server_hello.hello.auth_challenge[..16]);
+        let auth_packet = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+            PacketKind::NativeUserAuth,
+            pending_id,
+            2,
+            1,
+            &session_key,
+            CLIENT_TO_SERVER,
+            &protocol::to_body(&NativeUserAuthBody { auth })?,
+        )?;
+        socket.send_to(&auth_packet, peer_addr).await?;
+        let (n, _) = tokio::time::timeout(timeout, socket.recv_from(&mut buf)).await??;
+        let packet = protocol::decode(&buf[..n])?;
+        if packet.header.kind != PacketKind::NativeAuthOk {
+            if packet.header.kind == PacketKind::AttachReject {
+                let reject: AttachReject = protocol::from_body(&packet.body)?;
+                bail!("native auth rejected: {}", reject.reason);
+            }
+            bail!("native auth received unexpected auth response");
+        }
+        let plain = protocol::decrypt_body(&packet, &session_key, SERVER_TO_CLIENT)?;
+        let ok: NativeAuthOkBody = protocol::from_body(&plain)?;
+        let transport = DoshTransport::new_owned(
+            socket,
+            SessionTransportConfig {
+                role: SessionRole::Client,
+                conn_id: ok.ok.client_id,
+                session_key: ok.ok.session_key,
+                peer_addr,
+                initial_send_seq: 2,
+                initial_ack: ok.ok.initial_seq,
+                stream: TransportConfig::default(),
+            },
+        );
+        Ok(ConnectedDoshClient {
+            host: self.host,
+            session: ok.ok.session,
+            transport,
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+pub struct ConnectedDoshClient {
+    pub host: String,
+    pub session: String,
+    pub transport: DoshTransport,
+}
+
+impl ConnectedDoshClient {
+    pub fn into_transport(self) -> DoshTransport {
+        self.transport
+    }
+}
+
+fn verify_or_trust_host(
+    config: &ClientConfig,
+    host: &str,
+    host_key: &native::HostPublicKey,
+    trust_override: Option<bool>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let known_hosts = expand_tilde(&config.known_hosts);
+    match verify_known_host(&known_hosts, host, host_key)? {
+        KnownHostStatus::Trusted => Ok(()),
+        KnownHostStatus::Unknown if trust_override.unwrap_or(config.trust_on_first_use) => {
+            trust_host(&known_hosts, host, host_key, "sdk-tofu", false)?;
+            Ok(())
+        }
+        KnownHostStatus::Unknown => Err(anyhow!(
+            "Dosh host key for {host} is not trusted; run `dosh trust {host}` first or enable trust_on_first_use"
+        )),
+        KnownHostStatus::Mismatch { expected, actual } => Err(anyhow!(
+            "Dosh host key mismatch for {host}: expected {expected}, got {actual}"
+        )),
+    }
+}
+
+fn sign_auth(
+    config: &ClientConfig,
+    host_config: &HostConfig,
+    hello: &NativeClientHello,
+    server_hello: &native::NativeServerHello,
+    requested_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
+    explicit_identity_files: Vec<PathBuf>,
+    use_ssh_agent: Option<bool>,
+) -> Result<native::NativeUserAuth> {
+    let use_agent = use_ssh_agent.unwrap_or(config.use_ssh_agent);
+    let mut errors = Vec::new();
+    if use_agent {
+        match ssh_agent::sign_user_auth_with_agent(
+            hello,
+            server_hello,
+            requested_forwardings.clone(),
+        ) {
+            Ok(auth) => return Ok(auth),
+            Err(err) => errors.push(format!("ssh-agent: {err:#}")),
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut paths = explicit_identity_files;
+    if paths.is_empty() {
+        paths.extend(config.identity_files.iter().map(|path| expand_tilde(path)));
+    }
+    if paths.is_empty() {
+        paths.extend(default_identity_paths());
+    }
+    for path in paths {
+        match native::load_native_identity(&path).and_then(|identity| {
+            sign_user_auth_with_private_key(
+                &identity,
+                hello,
+                server_hello,
+                requested_forwardings.clone(),
+            )
+        }) {
+            Ok(auth) => return Ok(auth),
+            Err(err) => errors.push(format!("{}: {err:#}", path.display())),
+        }
+    }
+    let _ = host_config;
+    Err(anyhow!(
+        "native auth found no usable identity: {}",
+        errors.join("; ")
+    ))
+}
+
+fn default_identity_paths() -> Vec<PathBuf> {
+    ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519", "~/.ssh/id_ecdsa", "~/.ssh/id_rsa"]
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(expand_tilde)
+        .collect()
+}
+
+fn resolve_addr(host: &str, port: u16) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
+    (host, port)
+        .to_socket_addrs()
+        .with_context(|| format!("resolve UDP target {host}:{port}"))?
+        .next()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("no UDP address resolved for {host}:{port}"))
+}
+
+fn destination_host(destination: &str) -> String {
+    destination
+        .rsplit('@')
+        .next()
+        .unwrap_or(destination)
+        .split(':')
+        .next()
+        .unwrap_or(destination)
+        .to_string()
+}
+
+fn user_from_destination(destination: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    destination
+        .rsplit_once('@')
+        .map(|(user, _)| user.to_string())
+        .filter(|user| !user.is_empty())
+}
+
+fn default_sdk_session() -> String {
+    let millis = SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+        .as_millis();
+    format!("sdk-{millis}-{}", std::process::id())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parses_user_and_host_from_destination() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            user_from_destination("palav@example.com").as_deref(),
+            Some("palav")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(destination_host("palav@example.com"), "example.com");
+        assert_eq!(destination_host("example.com:2222"), "example.com");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn default_identity_paths_are_expanded() {
+        assert!(
+            default_identity_paths()
+                .iter()
+                .any(|path| path.ends_with(".ssh/id_ed25519"))
+        );
+    }
+}

src/config.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ pub struct ServerConfig {
     pub allow_attach_tickets: bool,
     pub client_timeout_secs: u64,
     pub retransmit_window: usize,
+    #[serde(default = "default_output_frame_interval_ms")]
+    pub output_frame_interval_ms: u64,
     pub default_input_mode: String,
     pub prewarm_sessions: Vec<String>,
     pub create_on_attach: bool,
@@ -44,8 +46,16 @@ pub struct ServerConfig {
     pub allow_remote_non_loopback_bind: bool,
     #[serde(default)]
     pub allow_agent_forwarding: bool,
+    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
+    pub allow_file_transfer: bool,
+    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
+    pub allow_exec_command: bool,
     #[serde(default = "default_accept_env")]
     pub accept_env: Vec<String>,
+    /// Run terminal sessions under per-session holder processes so shells
+    /// survive a quick `dosh-server` restart and clients can reconnect.
+    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
+    pub persist_sessions: bool,
 }
 
 impl Default for ServerConfig {
@@ -57,8 +67,9 @@ impl Default for ServerConfig {
             auth_ttl_secs: 30,
             attach_ticket_ttl_secs: 3600,
             allow_attach_tickets: true,
-            client_timeout_secs: 86400,
+            client_timeout_secs: 2_592_000,
             retransmit_window: 256,
+            output_frame_interval_ms: default_output_frame_interval_ms(),
             default_input_mode: "read-write".to_string(),
             prewarm_sessions: vec!["default".to_string()],
             create_on_attach: true,
@@ -75,7 +86,10 @@ impl Default for ServerConfig {
             allow_remote_forwarding: false,
             allow_remote_non_loopback_bind: false,
             allow_agent_forwarding: false,
+            allow_file_transfer: true,
+            allow_exec_command: true,
             accept_env: default_accept_env(),
+            persist_sessions: true,
         }
     }
 }
@@ -92,7 +106,7 @@ pub struct ClientConfig {
     pub default_session: String,
     pub reconnect_timeout_secs: u64,
     pub view_only: bool,
-    #[serde(default)]
+    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
     pub predict: bool,
     /// Prediction display policy: "off", "experimental" (adaptive, the default),
     /// or "always". Controls when speculative local echo is shown.
@@ -114,10 +128,23 @@ pub struct ClientConfig {
     pub use_ssh_agent: bool,
     #[serde(default)]
     pub forward_agent: bool,
+    /// Show a non-destructive, mosh-style status line on the bottom screen row
+    /// when UDP packets stop arriving ("[dosh] last contact Ns ago …"). Drawn
+    /// with save/restore cursor so it never moves the app cursor or corrupts a
+    /// full-screen TUI, and cleared the instant packets resume. Default on.
+    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
+    pub disconnect_status: bool,
+    #[serde(default = "default_escape_key")]
+    pub escape_key: String,
     #[serde(default = "default_send_env")]
     pub send_env: Vec<String>,
     #[serde(default)]
     pub set_env: HashMap<String, String>,
+    /// Optional client-side command extensions. These are just shell command
+    /// templates expanded into the remote session's startup input; Dosh does not
+    /// depend on the tools they name.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub extensions: HashMap<String, CommandExtension>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -133,6 +160,22 @@ pub struct HostConfig {
     pub send_env: Option<Vec<String>>,
     #[serde(default)]
     pub set_env: HashMap<String, String>,
+    /// Per-host extension overrides. A host can replace a global extension or set
+    /// `disabled = true` to opt out of it.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub extensions: HashMap<String, CommandExtension>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct CommandExtension {
+    /// Remote shell command template. `{args}` expands to shell-quoted extra
+    /// words after the extension name. When absent, extra args are appended.
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub command: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub description: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub disabled: bool,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -154,7 +197,7 @@ impl Default for ClientConfig {
             default_session: "new".to_string(),
             reconnect_timeout_secs: 5,
             view_only: false,
-            predict: false,
+            predict: true,
             predict_mode: default_predict_mode(),
             cache_attach_tickets: true,
             credential_cache: "~/.local/share/dosh/credentials".to_string(),
@@ -165,8 +208,11 @@ impl Default for ClientConfig {
             identity_files: default_identity_files(),
             use_ssh_agent: true,
             forward_agent: false,
+            disconnect_status: true,
+            escape_key: default_escape_key(),
             send_env: default_send_env(),
             set_env: HashMap::new(),
+            extensions: HashMap::new(),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -190,6 +236,10 @@ fn default_native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute() -> u32 {
     30
 }
 
+fn default_output_frame_interval_ms() -> u64 {
+    16
+}
+
 fn default_rekey_after_packets() -> u64 {
     // Rotate well before any AEAD nonce-reuse concern; ChaCha20-Poly1305 with a
     // per-direction monotonic seq is safe far beyond this, but a bounded epoch
@@ -218,6 +268,10 @@ fn default_known_hosts() -> String {
     "~/.config/dosh/known_hosts".to_string()
 }
 
+fn default_escape_key() -> String {
+    "^]".to_string()
+}
+
 fn default_identity_files() -> Vec<String> {
     vec!["~/.ssh/id_ed25519".to_string()]
 }
@@ -263,10 +317,10 @@ pub fn load_hosts_config(path: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<HostsConfig> {
 }
 
 pub fn expand_tilde(path: &str) -> PathBuf {
-    if let Some(rest) = path.strip_prefix("~/") {
+    if let Some(rest) = path.strip_prefix("~/")
-        if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
+        && let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir()
+    {
         return home.join(rest);
     }
-    }
     PathBuf::from(path)
 }

src/exec_service.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+
+pub const EXEC_STREAM_SENTINEL: &str = "@dosh-exec";
+pub const FRAME_MAX_LEN: usize = 1024 * 1024;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct ExecRequest {
+    pub command: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ExecResponse {
+    Stdout(Vec<u8>),
+    Stderr(Vec<u8>),
+    Exit { code: Option<i32> },
+    Error { message: String },
+}
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct FrameDecoder {
+    buf: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl FrameDecoder {
+    pub fn push(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
+        self.buf.extend_from_slice(bytes);
+        let mut frames = Vec::new();
+        loop {
+            if self.buf.len() < 4 {
+                break;
+            }
+            let len = u32::from_be_bytes(self.buf[..4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
+            if len > FRAME_MAX_LEN {
+                bail!("exec protocol frame too large: {len} bytes");
+            }
+            if self.buf.len() < 4 + len {
+                break;
+            }
+            frames.push(self.buf[4..4 + len].to_vec());
+            self.buf.drain(..4 + len);
+        }
+        Ok(frames)
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn encode_request(request: &ExecRequest) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    encode_frame(&bincode::serialize(request).context("encode exec request")?)
+}
+
+pub fn encode_response(response: &ExecResponse) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    encode_frame(&bincode::serialize(response).context("encode exec response")?)
+}
+
+pub fn decode_request(frame: &[u8]) -> Result<ExecRequest> {
+    bincode::deserialize(frame).context("decode exec request")
+}
+
+pub fn decode_response(frame: &[u8]) -> Result<ExecResponse> {
+    bincode::deserialize(frame).context("decode exec response")
+}
+
+fn encode_frame(payload: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    if payload.len() > FRAME_MAX_LEN {
+        bail!("exec protocol frame too large: {} bytes", payload.len());
+    }
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(4 + payload.len());
+    out.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(payload);
+    Ok(out)
+}

src/file_transfer.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow, bail};
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+pub const FILE_STREAM_SENTINEL: &str = "@dosh-file";
+pub const FRAME_MAX_LEN: usize = 1024 * 1024;
+pub const CHUNK_SIZE: usize = 32 * 1024;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum FileRequest {
+    Stat {
+        path: String,
+    },
+    List {
+        path: String,
+    },
+    Mkdir {
+        path: String,
+        mode: Option<u32>,
+    },
+    Remove {
+        path: String,
+        recursive: bool,
+    },
+    PutStart {
+        path: String,
+        size: u64,
+        mode: Option<u32>,
+        modified_secs: Option<u64>,
+        overwrite: bool,
+        resume: bool,
+    },
+    PutChunk {
+        offset: u64,
+        bytes: Vec<u8>,
+    },
+    PutFinish {
+        sha256: [u8; 32],
+    },
+    Get {
+        path: String,
+        offset: u64,
+    },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum FileResponse {
+    Ok,
+    Resume { offset: u64 },
+    Stat { meta: FileMeta },
+    List { entries: Vec<FileEntry> },
+    Start { meta: FileMeta, offset: u64 },
+    Chunk { offset: u64, bytes: Vec<u8> },
+    Done { sha256: [u8; 32], bytes: u64 },
+    Error { message: String },
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct FileMeta {
+    pub path: String,
+    pub kind: FileKind,
+    pub len: u64,
+    pub mode: Option<u32>,
+    pub modified_secs: Option<u64>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum FileKind {
+    File,
+    Directory,
+    Symlink,
+    Other,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct FileEntry {
+    pub name: String,
+    pub meta: FileMeta,
+}
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub struct FrameDecoder {
+    buf: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+impl FrameDecoder {
+    pub fn push(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<Vec<u8>>> {
+        self.buf.extend_from_slice(bytes);
+        let mut frames = Vec::new();
+        loop {
+            if self.buf.len() < 4 {
+                break;
+            }
+            let len = u32::from_be_bytes(self.buf[..4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
+            if len > FRAME_MAX_LEN {
+                bail!("file protocol frame too large: {len} bytes");
+            }
+            if self.buf.len() < 4 + len {
+                break;
+            }
+            frames.push(self.buf[4..4 + len].to_vec());
+            self.buf.drain(..4 + len);
+        }
+        Ok(frames)
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn encode_request(request: &FileRequest) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    encode_frame(&bincode::serialize(request).context("encode file request")?)
+}
+
+pub fn encode_response(response: &FileResponse) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    encode_frame(&bincode::serialize(response).context("encode file response")?)
+}
+
+pub fn decode_request(frame: &[u8]) -> Result<FileRequest> {
+    bincode::deserialize(frame).context("decode file request")
+}
+
+pub fn decode_response(frame: &[u8]) -> Result<FileResponse> {
+    bincode::deserialize(frame).context("decode file response")
+}
+
+pub fn encode_frame(payload: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    if payload.len() > FRAME_MAX_LEN {
+        bail!("file protocol frame too large: {} bytes", payload.len());
+    }
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(4 + payload.len());
+    out.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(payload);
+    Ok(out)
+}
+
+pub fn parse_copy_endpoint(raw: &str) -> CopyEndpoint {
+    if looks_like_windows_path(raw) {
+        return CopyEndpoint::Local(PathBuf::from(raw));
+    }
+    let Some(index) = raw.find(':') else {
+        return CopyEndpoint::Local(PathBuf::from(raw));
+    };
+    let host = &raw[..index];
+    let path = &raw[index + 1..];
+    if host.is_empty() || host.contains('/') || host.contains('\\') {
+        return CopyEndpoint::Local(PathBuf::from(raw));
+    }
+    CopyEndpoint::Remote {
+        host: host.to_string(),
+        path: if path.is_empty() {
+            ".".to_string()
+        } else {
+            path.to_string()
+        },
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum CopyEndpoint {
+    Local(PathBuf),
+    Remote { host: String, path: String },
+}
+
+pub fn remote_join(parent: &str, child: &str) -> String {
+    if parent.is_empty() || parent == "." {
+        return child.to_string();
+    }
+    format!("{}/{}", parent.trim_end_matches('/'), child)
+}
+
+pub fn remote_basename(path: &str) -> String {
+    path.trim_end_matches('/')
+        .rsplit('/')
+        .next()
+        .filter(|value| !value.is_empty())
+        .unwrap_or(path)
+        .to_string()
+}
+
+pub fn clean_remote_path(path: &str, home: &Path) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    if path.as_bytes().contains(&0) {
+        bail!("remote path contains NUL");
+    }
+    let expanded = if path == "~" {
+        home.to_path_buf()
+    } else if let Some(rest) = path.strip_prefix("~/") {
+        home.join(rest)
+    } else {
+        let raw = Path::new(path);
+        if raw.is_absolute() {
+            raw.to_path_buf()
+        } else {
+            home.join(raw)
+        }
+    };
+    Ok(expanded)
+}
+
+pub fn ensure_relative_child(path: &Path) -> Result<String> {
+    let name = path
+        .file_name()
+        .and_then(|name| name.to_str())
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("path has no final component: {}", path.display()))?;
+    if name.is_empty() || name == "." || name == ".." {
+        bail!("invalid path final component: {}", path.display());
+    }
+    Ok(name.to_string())
+}
+
+fn looks_like_windows_path(raw: &str) -> bool {
+    let bytes = raw.as_bytes();
+    bytes.len() >= 3
+        && bytes[0].is_ascii_alphabetic()
+        && bytes[1] == b':'
+        && (bytes[2] == b'\\' || bytes[2] == b'/')
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn frames_round_trip_incrementally() {
+        let first = encode_response(&FileResponse::Ok).unwrap();
+        let second = encode_response(&FileResponse::Error {
+            message: "nope".to_string(),
+        })
+        .unwrap();
+        let mut decoder = FrameDecoder::default();
+        assert!(decoder.push(&first[..2]).unwrap().is_empty());
+        let frames = decoder.push(&first[2..]).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(decode_response(&frames[0]).unwrap(), FileResponse::Ok);
+        let frames = decoder.push(&second).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(frames.len(), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn copy_endpoint_parses_scp_style_but_not_windows_drive() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_copy_endpoint("palav:tmp/file"),
+            CopyEndpoint::Remote {
+                host: "palav".to_string(),
+                path: "tmp/file".to_string()
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_copy_endpoint("C:\\Users\\palav\\x"),
+            CopyEndpoint::Local(PathBuf::from("C:\\Users\\palav\\x"))
+        );
+    }
+}

src/lib.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
+//! Dosh is an encrypted UDP transport for remote terminals and embeddable Rust
+//! application streams.
+//!
+//! Use [`client::DoshClient`] and [`server::DoshServer`] when you want Dosh to
+//! handle native authentication, host key checks, roaming, keepalives, reliable
+//! streams, and service routing. Use [`transport::DoshTransport`] only when an
+//! application already owns session establishment and wants direct access to the
+//! encrypted stream transport.
+
 pub mod auth;
+pub mod build_info;
+pub mod client;
 pub mod config;
 pub mod crypto;
+pub mod exec_service;
+pub mod file_transfer;
 pub mod native;
+#[cfg(unix)]
+pub mod persist;
 pub mod protocol;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 pub mod pty;
+pub mod server;
 pub mod ssh_agent;
+pub mod transport;
+pub mod udp;

src/native.rs

@@ -5,10 +5,13 @@ use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
 use base64::Engine;
 use base64::engine::general_purpose::{STANDARD, URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
 use ed25519_dalek::{Signature, Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};
+use rsa::traits::PublicKeyParts;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use signature::{SignatureEncoding, Signer as SignatureSigner, Verifier as SignatureVerifier};
 use std::fs;
 use std::io::Write;
 use std::net::IpAddr;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
 use std::path::Path;
 use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -91,6 +94,12 @@ pub enum ForwardingKind {
     Local,
     Remote,
     Dynamic,
+    /// SSH-agent forwarding: the client opts in and, if the server policy allows
+    /// (`allow_agent_forwarding`), the server exports a proxy unix socket as
+    /// `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` in the remote session and tunnels each connection back to
+    /// the client's local agent over a Dosh stream. Added at the end of the enum
+    /// so bincode discriminants for the existing variants are unchanged.
+    Agent,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -145,10 +154,11 @@ pub fn load_or_create_host_key(config: &ServerConfig) -> Result<SigningKey> {
         fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| format!("create {}", parent.display()))?;
     }
     let bytes = crypto::random_32();
-    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+    let mut options = fs::OpenOptions::new();
-        .create_new(true)
+    options.create_new(true).write(true);
-        .write(true)
+    #[cfg(unix)]
-        .mode(0o600)
+    options.mode(0o600);
+    let mut file = options
         .open(&path)
         .with_context(|| format!("create {}", path.display()))?;
     file.write_all(URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes).as_bytes())?;
@@ -333,6 +343,92 @@ pub fn sign_user_auth(
     Ok(auth)
 }
 
+pub fn sign_user_auth_with_private_key(
+    private_key: &ssh_key::PrivateKey,
+    client: &NativeClientHello,
+    server: &NativeServerHello,
+    requested_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
+) -> Result<NativeUserAuth> {
+    anyhow::ensure!(!private_key.is_encrypted(), "OpenSSH identity is encrypted");
+    let public_key = private_key.public_key();
+    let key_algorithm = public_key.algorithm().as_str().to_string();
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        is_supported_user_key_algorithm(&key_algorithm),
+        "unsupported native identity key algorithm {key_algorithm}"
+    );
+    let public_key_blob = ssh_public_blob_from_public_key(public_key)?;
+    let public_key_for_auth = if key_algorithm == "ssh-ed25519" {
+        parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob(&public_key_blob)?.to_vec()
+    } else {
+        public_key_blob
+    };
+    let signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm_for_private_key(&key_algorithm)?;
+    let mut auth = NativeUserAuth {
+        public_key_algorithm: signature_algorithm.to_string(),
+        public_key: public_key_for_auth,
+        signature: Vec::new(),
+        requested_forwardings,
+    };
+    let transcript = user_auth_transcript(client, server, &auth)?;
+    auth.signature = if key_algorithm == "ssh-rsa" {
+        sign_rsa_sha512_private_key(private_key, &transcript)?
+    } else {
+        let signature = SignatureSigner::try_sign(private_key, &transcript)
+            .context("sign native user auth with OpenSSH private key")?;
+        anyhow::ensure!(
+            signature.algorithm().as_str() == auth.public_key_algorithm,
+            "private key produced signature algorithm {}, expected {}",
+            signature.algorithm().as_str(),
+            auth.public_key_algorithm
+        );
+        signature.as_bytes().to_vec()
+    };
+    Ok(auth)
+}
+
+fn sign_rsa_sha512_private_key(
+    private_key: &ssh_key::PrivateKey,
+    transcript: &[u8],
+) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let rsa_keypair = private_key
+        .key_data()
+        .rsa()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("OpenSSH identity is not ssh-rsa"))?;
+    let rsa_private = rsa_private_key_from_ssh_keypair(rsa_keypair)?;
+    let signing_key = rsa::pkcs1v15::SigningKey::<sha2::Sha512>::new(rsa_private);
+    let signature: rsa::pkcs1v15::Signature = SignatureSigner::sign(&signing_key, transcript);
+    Ok(signature.to_vec())
+}
+
+fn rsa_private_key_from_ssh_keypair(
+    keypair: &ssh_key::private::RsaKeypair,
+) -> Result<rsa::RsaPrivateKey> {
+    let private = rsa::RsaPrivateKey::from_components(
+        rsa::BigUint::try_from(&keypair.public.n).context("convert RSA modulus")?,
+        rsa::BigUint::try_from(&keypair.public.e).context("convert RSA public exponent")?,
+        rsa::BigUint::try_from(&keypair.private.d).context("convert RSA private exponent")?,
+        vec![
+            rsa::BigUint::try_from(&keypair.private.p).context("convert RSA p prime")?,
+            rsa::BigUint::try_from(&keypair.private.q).context("convert RSA q prime")?,
+        ],
+    )
+    .context("convert OpenSSH RSA private key")?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        private.size().saturating_mul(8) >= 2048,
+        "OpenSSH RSA identity is smaller than 2048 bits"
+    );
+    Ok(private)
+}
+
+fn signature_algorithm_for_private_key(key_algorithm: &str) -> Result<&'static str> {
+    match key_algorithm {
+        "ssh-ed25519" => Ok("ssh-ed25519"),
+        "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" => Ok("ecdsa-sha2-nistp256"),
+        "ssh-rsa" => Ok("rsa-sha2-512"),
+        _ => bail!("unsupported native identity key algorithm {key_algorithm}"),
+    }
+}
+
 pub fn verify_native_user_auth(
     client: &NativeClientHello,
     server: &NativeServerHello,
@@ -341,10 +437,54 @@ pub fn verify_native_user_auth(
     source_ip: Option<IpAddr>,
 ) -> Result<AuthorizedKey> {
     anyhow::ensure!(
-        auth.public_key_algorithm == "ssh-ed25519",
+        is_supported_user_signature_algorithm(&auth.public_key_algorithm),
         "unsupported native user key algorithm {}",
         auth.public_key_algorithm
     );
+    let authorized_algorithm = authorized_key_algorithm_for_auth(&auth.public_key_algorithm)?;
+    let authorized = authorized_keys
+        .iter()
+        .find(|key| key.algorithm == authorized_algorithm && key.key == auth.public_key)
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("native user key is not authorized"))?;
+    authorized.ensure_native_allowed(auth, source_ip)?;
+
+    let transcript = user_auth_transcript(client, server, auth)?;
+    verify_native_user_signature(auth, &transcript)?;
+    Ok(authorized.clone())
+}
+
+pub fn supported_user_key_algorithms() -> Vec<String> {
+    vec![
+        "ssh-ed25519".to_string(),
+        "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256".to_string(),
+        "rsa-sha2-512".to_string(),
+        "rsa-sha2-256".to_string(),
+    ]
+}
+
+pub fn is_supported_user_key_algorithm(algorithm: &str) -> bool {
+    matches!(algorithm, "ssh-ed25519" | "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" | "ssh-rsa")
+}
+
+pub fn is_supported_user_signature_algorithm(algorithm: &str) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        algorithm,
+        "ssh-ed25519" | "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" | "rsa-sha2-512" | "rsa-sha2-256"
+    )
+}
+
+fn authorized_key_algorithm_for_auth(signature_algorithm: &str) -> Result<&'static str> {
+    match signature_algorithm {
+        "ssh-ed25519" => Ok("ssh-ed25519"),
+        "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" => Ok("ecdsa-sha2-nistp256"),
+        "rsa-sha2-512" | "rsa-sha2-256" => Ok("ssh-rsa"),
+        _ => bail!("unsupported native user key algorithm {signature_algorithm}"),
+    }
+}
+
+fn verify_native_user_signature(auth: &NativeUserAuth, transcript: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    match auth.public_key_algorithm.as_str() {
+        "ssh-ed25519" => {
             anyhow::ensure!(
                 auth.public_key.len() == 32,
                 "ssh-ed25519 public key must be 32 bytes"
@@ -353,23 +493,69 @@ pub fn verify_native_user_auth(
                 auth.signature.len() == 64,
                 "ssh-ed25519 signature must be 64 bytes"
             );
-    let authorized = authorized_keys
-        .iter()
-        .find(|key| key.algorithm == "ssh-ed25519" && key.key == auth.public_key)
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("native user key is not authorized"))?;
-    authorized.ensure_native_allowed(auth, source_ip)?;
-
             let mut public_key = [0u8; 32];
             public_key.copy_from_slice(&auth.public_key);
-    let verifying_key = VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&public_key).context("parse user public key")?;
+            let verifying_key =
+                VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&public_key).context("parse user public key")?;
             let mut signature = [0u8; 64];
             signature.copy_from_slice(&auth.signature);
             let signature = Signature::from_bytes(&signature);
-    let transcript = user_auth_transcript(client, server, auth)?;
             verifying_key
-        .verify(&transcript, &signature)
+                .verify(transcript, &signature)
                 .context("verify native user signature")?;
-    Ok(authorized.clone())
+        }
+        "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" => {
+            let public_key = ssh_public_key_from_blob(&auth.public_key)
+                .context("parse native user SSH public key")?;
+            let algorithm =
+                ssh_key::Algorithm::from_str(&auth.public_key_algorithm).with_context(|| {
+                    format!("parse signature algorithm {}", auth.public_key_algorithm)
+                })?;
+            let signature = ssh_key::Signature::new(algorithm, auth.signature.clone())
+                .context("parse native user SSH signature")?;
+            SignatureVerifier::verify(public_key.key_data(), transcript, &signature)
+                .context("verify native user SSH signature")?;
+        }
+        "rsa-sha2-512" | "rsa-sha2-256" => {
+            verify_rsa_sha2_signature(
+                &auth.public_key,
+                &auth.public_key_algorithm,
+                transcript,
+                &auth.signature,
+            )?;
+        }
+        algorithm => bail!("unsupported native user key algorithm {algorithm}"),
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn verify_rsa_sha2_signature(
+    public_key_blob: &[u8],
+    signature_algorithm: &str,
+    transcript: &[u8],
+    signature: &[u8],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let (e, n) = parse_ssh_rsa_public_blob(public_key_blob)?;
+    let public = rsa::RsaPublicKey::new(
+        rsa::BigUint::from_bytes_be(n),
+        rsa::BigUint::from_bytes_be(e),
+    )
+    .context("parse RSA public key")?;
+    let signature =
+        rsa::pkcs1v15::Signature::try_from(signature).context("parse RSA PKCS#1v1.5 signature")?;
+    match signature_algorithm {
+        "rsa-sha2-256" => {
+            let key = rsa::pkcs1v15::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha256>::new(public);
+            SignatureVerifier::verify(&key, transcript, &signature)
+                .context("verify RSA-SHA256 signature")
+        }
+        "rsa-sha2-512" => {
+            let key = rsa::pkcs1v15::VerifyingKey::<sha2::Sha512>::new(public);
+            SignatureVerifier::verify(&key, transcript, &signature)
+                .context("verify RSA-SHA512 signature")
+        }
+        _ => bail!("legacy ssh-rsa/SHA-1 signatures are not accepted"),
+    }
 }
 
 pub fn verify_native_user_auth_from_config(
@@ -464,6 +650,35 @@ pub fn load_ed25519_identity_with_passphrase(
         .with_context(|| format!("parse ssh-ed25519 identity {}", path.display()))
 }
 
+pub fn load_native_identity(path: &Path) -> Result<ssh_key::PrivateKey> {
+    load_native_identity_with_passphrase(path, None)
+}
+
+pub fn load_native_identity_with_passphrase(
+    path: &Path,
+    passphrase: Option<&str>,
+) -> Result<ssh_key::PrivateKey> {
+    let raw = fs::read_to_string(path).with_context(|| format!("read {}", path.display()))?;
+    let private_key = ssh_key::PrivateKey::from_openssh(&raw)
+        .with_context(|| format!("parse OpenSSH identity {}", path.display()))?;
+    let private_key = if private_key.is_encrypted() {
+        let passphrase = passphrase
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("OpenSSH identity {} is encrypted", path.display()))?;
+        private_key
+            .decrypt(passphrase)
+            .with_context(|| format!("decrypt OpenSSH identity {}", path.display()))?
+    } else {
+        private_key
+    };
+    let algorithm = private_key.public_key().algorithm().as_str().to_string();
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        is_supported_user_key_algorithm(&algorithm),
+        "OpenSSH identity {} has unsupported native key algorithm {algorithm}",
+        path.display()
+    );
+    Ok(private_key)
+}
+
 impl AuthorizedKey {
     fn ensure_native_allowed(
         &self,
@@ -513,6 +728,10 @@ impl AuthorizedKey {
                             "authorized key permitopen= cannot authorize remote or dynamic forwarding"
                         );
                     }
+                    // Agent forwarding does not open a host:port, so permitopen
+                    // (which restricts which targets may be opened) does not apply;
+                    // it is gated separately by the server's allow_agent_forwarding.
+                    ForwardingKind::Agent => {}
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -555,7 +774,7 @@ fn parse_authorized_key_line(line_number: usize, line: &str) -> Result<Authorize
         fields.len() >= 2,
         "authorized_keys:{line_number}: expected key fields"
     );
-    let (options, key_type_index) = if fields[0].starts_with("ssh-") {
+    let (options, key_type_index) = if is_supported_user_key_algorithm(&fields[0]) {
         (AuthorizedKeyOptions::default(), 0)
     } else {
         (parse_authorized_key_options(&fields[0])?, 1)
@@ -566,15 +785,20 @@ fn parse_authorized_key_line(line_number: usize, line: &str) -> Result<Authorize
     let key_blob = fields
         .get(key_type_index + 1)
         .with_context(|| format!("authorized_keys:{line_number}: missing key blob"))?;
-    anyhow::ensure!(
-        algorithm == "ssh-ed25519",
-        "authorized_keys:{line_number}: unsupported key type {algorithm}"
-    );
     let decoded = STANDARD
         .decode(key_blob)
         .with_context(|| format!("authorized_keys:{line_number}: decode key blob"))?;
-    let key = parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob(&decoded)
+    anyhow::ensure!(
-        .with_context(|| format!("authorized_keys:{line_number}: parse ssh-ed25519 key"))?;
+        is_supported_user_key_algorithm(algorithm),
+        "authorized_keys:{line_number}: unsupported key type {algorithm}"
+    );
+    validate_supported_public_key_blob(algorithm, &decoded)
+        .with_context(|| format!("authorized_keys:{line_number}: parse {algorithm} key"))?;
+    let key = if algorithm == "ssh-ed25519" {
+        parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob(&decoded)?.to_vec()
+    } else {
+        decoded
+    };
     let comment = if fields.len() > key_type_index + 2 {
         Some(fields[key_type_index + 2..].join(" "))
     } else {
@@ -588,6 +812,51 @@ fn parse_authorized_key_line(line_number: usize, line: &str) -> Result<Authorize
     })
 }
 
+fn validate_supported_public_key_blob(algorithm: &str, blob: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    let blob_algorithm = ssh_public_key_blob_algorithm(blob)?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(
+        blob_algorithm == algorithm,
+        "key blob type {blob_algorithm} does not match authorized_keys type {algorithm}"
+    );
+    match algorithm {
+        "ssh-ed25519" => {
+            parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob(blob)?;
+        }
+        "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" | "ssh-rsa" => {
+            let _ = ssh_public_key_from_blob(blob)?;
+        }
+        _ => bail!("unsupported key type {algorithm}"),
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn ssh_public_key_blob_algorithm(blob: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
+    let mut cursor = blob;
+    let algorithm = read_ssh_string(&mut cursor)?;
+    Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(algorithm).to_string())
+}
+
+fn ssh_public_key_from_blob(blob: &[u8]) -> Result<ssh_key::PublicKey> {
+    let algorithm = ssh_public_key_blob_algorithm(blob)?;
+    let encoded = STANDARD.encode(blob);
+    ssh_key::PublicKey::from_openssh(&format!("{algorithm} {encoded}"))
+        .with_context(|| format!("parse OpenSSH public key blob {algorithm}"))
+}
+
+fn ssh_public_blob_from_public_key(public_key: &ssh_key::PublicKey) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
+    let line = public_key
+        .to_openssh()
+        .context("encode OpenSSH public key")?;
+    let mut fields = line.split_whitespace();
+    let _algorithm = fields
+        .next()
+        .context("encoded public key missing algorithm")?;
+    let encoded = fields.next().context("encoded public key missing blob")?;
+    STANDARD
+        .decode(encoded)
+        .context("decode encoded OpenSSH public key blob")
+}
+
 fn split_authorized_key_fields(line: &str) -> Vec<String> {
     line.split_whitespace().map(ToString::to_string).collect()
 }
@@ -755,6 +1024,18 @@ pub fn parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob(blob: &[u8]) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
     Ok(out)
 }
 
+fn parse_ssh_rsa_public_blob(blob: &[u8]) -> Result<(&[u8], &[u8])> {
+    let mut cursor = blob;
+    let key_type = read_ssh_string(&mut cursor)?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(key_type == b"ssh-rsa", "key blob type mismatch");
+    let e = read_ssh_mpint(&mut cursor)?;
+    let n = read_ssh_mpint(&mut cursor)?;
+    anyhow::ensure!(cursor.is_empty(), "trailing data in ssh-rsa key blob");
+    anyhow::ensure!(!e.is_empty(), "ssh-rsa exponent is empty");
+    anyhow::ensure!(!n.is_empty(), "ssh-rsa modulus is empty");
+    Ok((e, n))
+}
+
 pub fn ssh_ed25519_public_blob(public_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
     let mut out = Vec::new();
     write_ssh_string(&mut out, b"ssh-ed25519");
@@ -762,6 +1043,12 @@ pub fn ssh_ed25519_public_blob(public_key: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
     out
 }
 
+fn read_ssh_mpint<'a>(cursor: &mut &'a [u8]) -> Result<&'a [u8]> {
+    let raw = read_ssh_string(cursor)?;
+    let raw = raw.strip_prefix(&[0]).unwrap_or(raw);
+    Ok(raw)
+}
+
 fn read_ssh_string<'a>(cursor: &mut &'a [u8]) -> Result<&'a [u8]> {
     anyhow::ensure!(cursor.len() >= 4, "truncated SSH string length");
     let len = u32::from_be_bytes(cursor[..4].try_into().unwrap()) as usize;
@@ -948,11 +1235,11 @@ fn write_known_host_entries(path: &Path, entries: &[KnownHost]) -> Result<()> {
         ));
         out.push('\n');
     }
-    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+    let mut options = fs::OpenOptions::new();
-        .create(true)
+    options.create(true).truncate(true).write(true);
-        .truncate(true)
+    #[cfg(unix)]
-        .write(true)
+    options.mode(0o600);
-        .mode(0o600)
+    let mut file = options
         .open(path)
         .with_context(|| format!("write {}", path.display()))?;
     file.write_all(out.as_bytes())
@@ -994,16 +1281,16 @@ mod tests {
         let second = host_public_key(&SigningKey::from_bytes(&[2u8; 32]));
 
         assert_eq!(
-            trust_host(&path, "palav", &first, "ssh", false).unwrap(),
+            trust_host(&path, "homelab", &first, "ssh", false).unwrap(),
             TrustResult::Trusted
         );
         assert_eq!(
-            trust_host(&path, "palav", &first, "ssh", false).unwrap(),
+            trust_host(&path, "homelab", &first, "ssh", false).unwrap(),
             TrustResult::AlreadyTrusted
         );
-        assert!(trust_host(&path, "palav", &second, "ssh", false).is_err());
+        assert!(trust_host(&path, "homelab", &second, "ssh", false).is_err());
         assert_eq!(
-            trust_host(&path, "palav", &second, "ssh", true).unwrap(),
+            trust_host(&path, "homelab", &second, "ssh", true).unwrap(),
             TrustResult::Trusted
         );
     }
@@ -1016,16 +1303,16 @@ mod tests {
         let second = host_public_key(&SigningKey::from_bytes(&[2u8; 32]));
 
         assert_eq!(
-            verify_known_host(&path, "palav", &first).unwrap(),
+            verify_known_host(&path, "homelab", &first).unwrap(),
             KnownHostStatus::Unknown
         );
-        trust_host(&path, "palav", &first, "ssh", false).unwrap();
+        trust_host(&path, "homelab", &first, "ssh", false).unwrap();
         assert_eq!(
-            verify_known_host(&path, "palav", &first).unwrap(),
+            verify_known_host(&path, "homelab", &first).unwrap(),
             KnownHostStatus::Trusted
         );
         assert!(matches!(
-            verify_known_host(&path, "palav", &second).unwrap(),
+            verify_known_host(&path, "homelab", &second).unwrap(),
             KnownHostStatus::Mismatch { .. }
         ));
     }
@@ -1074,6 +1361,45 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(verify_native_user_auth(&client, &server, &auth, &removed, None).is_err());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn native_user_auth_accepts_ecdsa_p256_private_key() {
+        let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
+        let private = ssh_key::PrivateKey::random(
+            &mut rng,
+            ssh_key::Algorithm::Ecdsa {
+                curve: ssh_key::EcdsaCurve::NistP256,
+            },
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let host_signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[10u8; 32]);
+        let client = test_client_hello();
+        let mut server = test_server_hello(&host_signing);
+        sign_server_hello(&host_signing, &client, &mut server).unwrap();
+        let auth = sign_user_auth_with_private_key(&private, &client, &server, Vec::new()).unwrap();
+        let authorized =
+            parse_authorized_keys(&private.public_key().to_openssh().unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(auth.public_key_algorithm, "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256");
+        verify_native_user_auth(&client, &server, &auth, &authorized, None).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn native_user_auth_accepts_rsa_sha2_private_key() {
+        let mut rng = rand::rngs::OsRng;
+        let private =
+            ssh_key::PrivateKey::random(&mut rng, ssh_key::Algorithm::Rsa { hash: None }).unwrap();
+        let host_signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[11u8; 32]);
+        let client = test_client_hello();
+        let mut server = test_server_hello(&host_signing);
+        sign_server_hello(&host_signing, &client, &mut server).unwrap();
+        let auth = sign_user_auth_with_private_key(&private, &client, &server, Vec::new()).unwrap();
+        let authorized =
+            parse_authorized_keys(&private.public_key().to_openssh().unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        assert_eq!(auth.public_key_algorithm, "rsa-sha2-512");
+        verify_native_user_auth(&client, &server, &auth, &authorized, None).unwrap();
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn native_user_auth_rejects_tampered_transcript() {
         let host_signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[3u8; 32]);
@@ -1301,8 +1627,8 @@ mod tests {
             protocol_version: NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
             client_random: [1u8; 32],
             client_ephemeral_public: [2u8; 32],
-            requested_host: "palav".to_string(),
+            requested_host: "homelab".to_string(),
-            requested_user: "palav".to_string(),
+            requested_user: "alice".to_string(),
             requested_session: "term".to_string(),
             requested_mode: "read-write".to_string(),
             terminal_size: (80, 24),

src/persist.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,666 @@
+//! Session persistence across server restarts.
+//!
+//! A persistent dosh session's shell does not run as a child of `dosh-server`.
+//! Instead the server spawns a tiny per-session *holder* process (the same
+//! `dosh-server` binary re-exec'd as `dosh-server hold ...`). The holder calls
+//! `setsid()` to leave the server's process group/session, opens a PTY, spawns
+//! the shell as ITS own child, and listens on a Unix socket in a per-session
+//! runtime directory. The server connects to that socket and the holder hands it
+//! the PTY master fd over `SCM_RIGHTS`.
+//!
+//! Because the shell belongs to the holder (which is in its own session and is
+//! not waited on by the server), killing or restarting `dosh-server` leaves the
+//! holder + shell alive. On startup the server scans the runtime directory,
+//! reconnects to each live holder, receives the master fd again, and rebuilds the
+//! in-memory session so clients reattach to the very same shell.
+//!
+//! Screen / scrollback state lives only in server memory, so it is also mirrored
+//! to disk (atomically) and restored on re-adoption, letting a reattaching client
+//! repaint the screen exactly as it was before the restart.
+
+use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow, bail};
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::os::fd::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd, IntoRawFd, RawFd};
+use std::os::unix::net::{UnixListener, UnixStream};
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+/// One-byte commands a server sends to a holder over its control socket after
+/// the holder has handed back the master fd.
+const HOLDER_CMD_SHUTDOWN: u8 = b'X';
+const HOLDER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(750);
+
+/// Magic written into a holder's `meta` file, bumped if the on-disk layout
+/// changes so a stale holder from an incompatible build is ignored.
+const META_MAGIC: &str = "dosh-holder-1";
+
+/// Per-session runtime metadata persisted next to the holder socket.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct HolderMeta {
+    pub session: String,
+    pub shell_pid: i32,
+}
+
+/// Root runtime directory holding one subdirectory per persistent session.
+/// Lives under `sessions_dir/run` so it shares the session storage location and
+/// can be wiped with it.
+pub fn runtime_root(sessions_dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
+    sessions_dir.join("run")
+}
+
+/// Map a session name to a filesystem-safe directory name. Session names are
+/// user-controlled, so hex-encode them rather than trusting them as path
+/// components (avoids traversal, slashes, NULs, length issues).
+fn session_dir_name(session: &str) -> String {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(session.len() * 2);
+    for byte in session.as_bytes() {
+        out.push(char::from_digit((byte >> 4) as u32, 16).unwrap());
+        out.push(char::from_digit((byte & 0xf) as u32, 16).unwrap());
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+fn decode_session_dir_name(name: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    if !name.len().is_multiple_of(2) {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(name.len() / 2);
+    let raw = name.as_bytes();
+    let mut i = 0;
+    while i < raw.len() {
+        let hi = (raw[i] as char).to_digit(16)?;
+        let lo = (raw[i + 1] as char).to_digit(16)?;
+        bytes.push(((hi << 4) | lo) as u8);
+        i += 2;
+    }
+    String::from_utf8(bytes).ok()
+}
+
+/// Directory for one session's holder runtime state.
+pub fn session_runtime_dir(sessions_dir: &Path, session: &str) -> PathBuf {
+    runtime_root(sessions_dir).join(session_dir_name(session))
+}
+
+fn holder_sock_path(dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
+    dir.join("holder.sock")
+}
+
+fn meta_path(dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
+    dir.join("meta")
+}
+
+fn screen_path(dir: &Path) -> PathBuf {
+    dir.join("screen")
+}
+
+/// Create the runtime directory tree with private (0700) permissions.
+pub fn ensure_runtime_dir(sessions_dir: &Path, session: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+    let root = runtime_root(sessions_dir);
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&root).with_context(|| format!("create {}", root.display()))?;
+    let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&root, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700));
+    let dir = session_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, session);
+    std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).with_context(|| format!("create {}", dir.display()))?;
+    std::fs::set_permissions(&dir, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))
+        .with_context(|| format!("chmod {}", dir.display()))?;
+    Ok(dir)
+}
+
+/// Atomically write `data` to `path` (write temp + rename), so a concurrent
+/// reader (e.g. a restarting server) never sees a half-written file.
+fn atomic_write(path: &Path, data: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
+    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+    let tmp = path.with_extension("tmp");
+    {
+        let mut file =
+            std::fs::File::create(&tmp).with_context(|| format!("create {}", tmp.display()))?;
+        let _ = file.set_permissions(std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
+        file.write_all(data)
+            .with_context(|| format!("write {}", tmp.display()))?;
+        file.sync_all().ok();
+    }
+    std::fs::rename(&tmp, path)
+        .with_context(|| format!("rename {} -> {}", tmp.display(), path.display()))?;
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Persist the vt100 screen snapshot plus recent raw output for a session so a
+/// post-restart reattach repaints correctly. `snapshot` is the bytes a fresh
+/// attach would receive (alt-screen toggle + `state_formatted`).
+pub fn save_screen(
+    sessions_dir: &Path,
+    session: &str,
+    cols: u16,
+    rows: u16,
+    output_seq: u64,
+    snapshot: &[u8],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = session_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, session);
+    if !dir.exists() {
+        // No holder runtime for this session (non-persistent): nothing to do.
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(snapshot.len() + 32);
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&cols.to_be_bytes());
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&rows.to_be_bytes());
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&output_seq.to_be_bytes());
+    buf.extend_from_slice(&(snapshot.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    buf.extend_from_slice(snapshot);
+    atomic_write(&screen_path(&dir), &buf)
+}
+
+/// A restored screen for a re-adopted session.
+pub struct SavedScreen {
+    pub cols: u16,
+    pub rows: u16,
+    pub output_seq: u64,
+    pub snapshot: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+/// Load a previously persisted screen, if any.
+pub fn load_screen(sessions_dir: &Path, session: &str) -> Option<SavedScreen> {
+    let dir = session_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, session);
+    let data = std::fs::read(screen_path(&dir)).ok()?;
+    if data.len() < 16 {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let cols = u16::from_be_bytes(data[0..2].try_into().ok()?);
+    let rows = u16::from_be_bytes(data[2..4].try_into().ok()?);
+    let output_seq = u64::from_be_bytes(data[4..12].try_into().ok()?);
+    let len = u32::from_be_bytes(data[12..16].try_into().ok()?) as usize;
+    if data.len() < 16 + len {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(SavedScreen {
+        cols,
+        rows,
+        output_seq,
+        snapshot: data[16..16 + len].to_vec(),
+    })
+}
+
+fn write_meta(dir: &Path, meta: &HolderMeta) -> Result<()> {
+    let body = format!("{META_MAGIC}\n{}\n{}\n", meta.shell_pid, meta.session);
+    atomic_write(&meta_path(dir), body.as_bytes())
+}
+
+fn read_meta(dir: &Path) -> Option<HolderMeta> {
+    let body = std::fs::read_to_string(meta_path(dir)).ok()?;
+    let mut lines = body.lines();
+    if lines.next()? != META_MAGIC {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let shell_pid: i32 = lines.next()?.parse().ok()?;
+    let session = lines.next()?.to_string();
+    Some(HolderMeta { session, shell_pid })
+}
+
+/// Spawn a holder process for `session`: re-exec this binary as `dosh-server
+/// hold` with the runtime dir, shell, terminal size, and accepted env. The
+/// holder daemonizes (setsid, owns the PTY) and listens on its control socket.
+/// Returns once the holder has signalled readiness by creating its socket.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub fn spawn_holder(
+    sessions_dir: &Path,
+    session: &str,
+    shell: &str,
+    cols: u16,
+    rows: u16,
+    env: &[(String, String)],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let dir = ensure_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, session)?;
+    let sock = holder_sock_path(&dir);
+    // Clear any stale socket left by a crashed holder with the same name.
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&sock);
+
+    let exe = std::env::current_exe().context("locate current executable")?;
+    let mut cmd = std::process::Command::new(exe);
+    cmd.arg("hold")
+        .arg("--runtime-dir")
+        .arg(&dir)
+        .arg("--session")
+        .arg(session)
+        .arg("--shell")
+        .arg(shell)
+        .arg("--cols")
+        .arg(cols.to_string())
+        .arg("--rows")
+        .arg(rows.to_string());
+    for (name, value) in env {
+        cmd.arg("--env").arg(format!("{name}={value}"));
+    }
+    cmd.stdin(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null());
+    let mut child = cmd.spawn().context("spawn holder process")?;
+
+    // Wait (briefly) for the holder to come up. The holder forks/setsids before
+    // creating the socket; once the socket exists we can connect. We also reap
+    // the short-lived launcher child so it never becomes a zombie.
+    let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + HOLDER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT;
+    loop {
+        if sock.exists() {
+            break;
+        }
+        if let Some(status) = child.try_wait().context("wait holder launcher")? {
+            bail!("holder launcher for session {session} exited before socket was ready: {status}");
+        }
+        if std::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
+            let _ = child.kill();
+            let _ = child.wait();
+            bail!("holder for session {session} did not come up in time");
+        }
+        std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(20));
+    }
+    // The launcher exits immediately after the grandchild setsids; reap it.
+    let _ = child.wait();
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Connect to a session's holder and receive the PTY master fd over SCM_RIGHTS.
+/// Returns the raw fd (caller owns it) and the holder control socket, kept open
+/// so the server can later ask the holder to shut down. Returns an error if the
+/// holder is gone (caller then degrades to a fresh, non-persistent session).
+pub fn adopt_holder(sessions_dir: &Path, session: &str) -> Result<(RawFd, UnixStream)> {
+    let dir = session_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, session);
+    let sock = holder_sock_path(&dir);
+    let mut stream = UnixStream::connect(&sock)
+        .with_context(|| format!("connect holder socket {}", sock.display()))?;
+    stream.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(5))).ok();
+    let fd = recv_fd(&mut stream).context("receive master fd from holder")?;
+    Ok((fd, stream))
+}
+
+/// Ask a holder to terminate its shell and exit, then clean its runtime dir.
+/// Used when reaping a truly-abandoned persistent session.
+pub fn request_shutdown(sessions_dir: &Path, session: &str, control: Option<&mut UnixStream>) {
+    if let Some(stream) = control {
+        let _ = stream.write_all(&[HOLDER_CMD_SHUTDOWN]);
+        let _ = stream.flush();
+    } else {
+        let dir = session_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, session);
+        if let Ok(mut stream) = UnixStream::connect(holder_sock_path(&dir)) {
+            // Drain the fd the holder sends on connect, then send shutdown.
+            let _ = recv_fd(&mut stream);
+            let _ = stream.write_all(&[HOLDER_CMD_SHUTDOWN]);
+            let _ = stream.flush();
+        }
+    }
+    // Give the holder a moment to tear down, then remove its runtime dir.
+    std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
+    let dir = session_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, session);
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+}
+
+/// Remove a session's runtime directory unconditionally (best effort).
+pub fn remove_runtime_dir(sessions_dir: &Path, session: &str) {
+    let dir = session_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, session);
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+}
+
+/// Scan the runtime root for holders left behind by a previous server. Returns
+/// `(session_name, meta)` for each one whose holder process still appears alive.
+/// Stale entries (no live process) are cleaned up.
+pub fn scan_existing_holders(sessions_dir: &Path) -> Vec<HolderMeta> {
+    let root = runtime_root(sessions_dir);
+    let mut found = Vec::new();
+    let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(&root) else {
+        return found;
+    };
+    for entry in entries.flatten() {
+        let dir = entry.path();
+        if !dir.is_dir() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let Some(name) = dir.file_name().and_then(|n| n.to_str()) else {
+            continue;
+        };
+        // Decode the on-disk name back to a session name; skip junk dirs.
+        if decode_session_dir_name(name).is_none() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        match read_meta(&dir) {
+            Some(meta) if process_alive(meta.shell_pid) && holder_sock_path(&dir).exists() => {
+                found.push(meta);
+            }
+            _ => {
+                // Holder gone or meta unreadable: clean up so we don't try to
+                // adopt a dead session (degrade to fresh on next attach).
+                let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    found
+}
+
+/// Whether a pid refers to a live process (signal 0 probe).
+fn process_alive(pid: i32) -> bool {
+    if pid <= 0 {
+        return false;
+    }
+    unsafe {
+        libc::kill(pid, 0) == 0
+            || std::io::Error::last_os_error().raw_os_error() == Some(libc::EPERM)
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Holder process entry point
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Run as a holder process. Daemonizes (double-fork + setsid), opens a PTY,
+/// spawns the shell as its own child, and serves the control socket: every
+/// accepted connection is handed the master fd (SCM_RIGHTS); a subsequent
+/// SHUTDOWN byte (or the shell exiting) tears everything down.
+///
+/// This function does not return on success — it `exit`s the process. Errors
+/// before the daemonization point are returned to the launcher.
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+pub fn run_holder(
+    runtime_dir: &Path,
+    session: &str,
+    shell: &str,
+    cols: u16,
+    rows: u16,
+    env: &[(String, String)],
+) -> Result<()> {
+    use portable_pty::{NativePtySystem, PtySize, PtySystem};
+
+    // Detach from the launching server: own session + process group so a server
+    // exit (even a process-group kill of the service) does not take us down.
+    daemonize().context("daemonize holder")?;
+
+    let pty_system = NativePtySystem::default();
+    let pair = pty_system
+        .openpty(PtySize {
+            rows,
+            cols,
+            pixel_width: 0,
+            pixel_height: 0,
+        })
+        .context("holder open pty")?;
+    let cmd = crate::pty::build_shell_command(shell, env);
+    let mut child = pair
+        .slave
+        .spawn_command(cmd)
+        .context("holder spawn shell")?;
+    drop(pair.slave);
+    let master_fd = pair
+        .master
+        .as_raw_fd()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("holder master has no raw fd"))?;
+    let shell_pid = child.process_id().map(|p| p as i32).unwrap_or(-1);
+
+    write_meta(
+        runtime_dir,
+        &HolderMeta {
+            session: session.to_string(),
+            shell_pid,
+        },
+    )?;
+
+    let sock = holder_sock_path(runtime_dir);
+    let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&sock);
+    let listener =
+        UnixListener::bind(&sock).with_context(|| format!("holder bind {}", sock.display()))?;
+    {
+        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
+        let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&sock, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
+    }
+    listener
+        .set_nonblocking(false)
+        .context("holder listener blocking")?;
+
+    // A watcher thread reaps the shell: when it exits, the holder cleans up and
+    // exits too, so an abandoned shell does not linger forever.
+    let runtime_owned = runtime_dir.to_path_buf();
+    std::thread::spawn(move || {
+        let _ = child.wait();
+        // Shell exited: remove runtime dir and exit the holder process.
+        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&runtime_owned);
+        std::process::exit(0);
+    });
+
+    // Accept loop: each connecting server gets the master fd; a SHUTDOWN byte
+    // from any of them tears the holder down. Multiple servers never run at once
+    // in practice (one service), but serving repeated connections lets a server
+    // restart re-adopt cleanly.
+    for stream in listener.incoming() {
+        let Ok(mut stream) = stream else { continue };
+        if send_fd(&mut stream, master_fd).is_err() {
+            continue;
+        }
+        // Wait for an optional command byte. EOF (server dropped the control
+        // socket on its own exit) just means "keep running, await re-adoption".
+        let mut cmd = [0u8; 1];
+        match stream.read(&mut cmd) {
+            Ok(1) if cmd[0] == HOLDER_CMD_SHUTDOWN => {
+                if shell_pid > 0 {
+                    let _ = unsafe { libc::kill(shell_pid, libc::SIGHUP) };
+                    let _ = unsafe { libc::kill(shell_pid, libc::SIGTERM) };
+                }
+                let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(runtime_dir);
+                std::process::exit(0);
+            }
+            _ => {
+                // Server detached (exit/restart) or sent nothing actionable:
+                // loop back and wait for the next server to re-adopt us.
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Double-fork + `setsid` so the holder runs in its own session, detached from
+/// the server's controlling terminal and process group. Without this a
+/// `systemctl restart` (which signals the whole service cgroup/process group)
+/// could take the holder down with the server.
+fn daemonize() -> Result<()> {
+    // First fork: parent (launcher) returns to reap; child continues.
+    match unsafe { libc::fork() } {
+        -1 => bail!("fork: {}", std::io::Error::last_os_error()),
+        0 => {}
+        _ => {
+            // Parent process: exit so the launcher's wait() returns promptly and
+            // the grandchild is reparented to init.
+            std::process::exit(0);
+        }
+    }
+    // New session: detaches from controlling tty and the server's process group.
+    if unsafe { libc::setsid() } == -1 {
+        bail!("setsid: {}", std::io::Error::last_os_error());
+    }
+    // Second fork: ensures we are not a session leader, so we can never
+    // re-acquire a controlling terminal.
+    match unsafe { libc::fork() } {
+        -1 => bail!("fork2: {}", std::io::Error::last_os_error()),
+        0 => Ok(()),
+        _ => std::process::exit(0),
+    }
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// SCM_RIGHTS file-descriptor passing over a Unix domain socket
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Send a single fd over `stream` using SCM_RIGHTS, with one byte of normal data
+/// (sendmsg requires at least one iovec byte for the ancillary data to ride on).
+fn send_fd(stream: &mut UnixStream, fd: RawFd) -> Result<()> {
+    let dummy: [u8; 1] = [0];
+    let mut iov = libc::iovec {
+        iov_base: dummy.as_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void,
+        iov_len: 1,
+    };
+    let mut cmsg_buf = [0u8; cmsg_space_one_fd()];
+    let mut msg: libc::msghdr = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
+    msg.msg_iov = &mut iov;
+    msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+    msg.msg_control = cmsg_buf.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void;
+    msg.msg_controllen = cmsg_buf.len() as _;
+
+    unsafe {
+        let cmsg = libc::CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+        if cmsg.is_null() {
+            bail!("CMSG_FIRSTHDR null");
+        }
+        (*cmsg).cmsg_level = libc::SOL_SOCKET;
+        (*cmsg).cmsg_type = libc::SCM_RIGHTS;
+        (*cmsg).cmsg_len = libc::CMSG_LEN(std::mem::size_of::<RawFd>() as u32) as _;
+        std::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(
+            &fd as *const RawFd as *const u8,
+            libc::CMSG_DATA(cmsg),
+            std::mem::size_of::<RawFd>(),
+        );
+        let n = libc::sendmsg(stream.as_raw_fd(), &msg, 0);
+        if n < 0 {
+            return Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error()).context("sendmsg SCM_RIGHTS");
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Receive a single fd sent via SCM_RIGHTS. Returns a fresh fd owned by the
+/// caller.
+fn recv_fd(stream: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<RawFd> {
+    let mut dummy = [0u8; 1];
+    let mut iov = libc::iovec {
+        iov_base: dummy.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void,
+        iov_len: 1,
+    };
+    let mut cmsg_buf = [0u8; cmsg_space_one_fd()];
+    let mut msg: libc::msghdr = unsafe { std::mem::zeroed() };
+    msg.msg_iov = &mut iov;
+    msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+    msg.msg_control = cmsg_buf.as_mut_ptr() as *mut libc::c_void;
+    msg.msg_controllen = cmsg_buf.len() as _;
+
+    unsafe {
+        let n = libc::recvmsg(stream.as_raw_fd(), &mut msg, 0);
+        if n < 0 {
+            return Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error()).context("recvmsg SCM_RIGHTS");
+        }
+        if n == 0 {
+            bail!("holder closed connection before sending fd");
+        }
+        let cmsg = libc::CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+        if cmsg.is_null() {
+            bail!("no ancillary data (fd) received from holder");
+        }
+        if (*cmsg).cmsg_level != libc::SOL_SOCKET || (*cmsg).cmsg_type != libc::SCM_RIGHTS {
+            bail!("unexpected ancillary message from holder");
+        }
+        let mut fd: RawFd = -1;
+        std::ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(
+            libc::CMSG_DATA(cmsg),
+            &mut fd as *mut RawFd as *mut u8,
+            std::mem::size_of::<RawFd>(),
+        );
+        if fd < 0 {
+            bail!("invalid fd received from holder");
+        }
+        Ok(fd)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Space, in bytes, needed for a control-message buffer carrying exactly one fd.
+const fn cmsg_space_one_fd() -> usize {
+    // CMSG_SPACE is not const in libc; this is the equivalent for one RawFd.
+    // cmsghdr is aligned to size_of::<usize>(); add data length rounded up.
+    let data = std::mem::size_of::<RawFd>();
+    let hdr = std::mem::size_of::<libc::cmsghdr>();
+    let align = std::mem::size_of::<usize>();
+    // round(hdr) + round(data)
+    ((hdr + align - 1) & !(align - 1)) + ((data + align - 1) & !(align - 1))
+}
+
+/// Helper used by `adopt_holder` callers to turn the received raw fd into an
+/// owned `File`-like object if they need RAII (the server hands it to
+/// `pty::adopt_pty_from_fd`, which takes ownership of the raw fd).
+pub fn fd_into_file(fd: RawFd) -> std::fs::File {
+    unsafe { std::fs::File::from_raw_fd(fd) }
+}
+
+/// Convert a `File` back into a raw fd it no longer owns (so it can be handed to
+/// `adopt_pty_from_fd`). Currently unused outside tests but kept symmetric.
+pub fn file_into_fd(file: std::fs::File) -> RawFd {
+    file.into_raw_fd()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn session_dir_name_round_trips() {
+        for name in ["default", "work", "a/b/../c", "weird name", "日本語"] {
+            let encoded = session_dir_name(name);
+            assert!(encoded.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit()));
+            assert_eq!(decode_session_dir_name(&encoded).as_deref(), Some(name));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decode_rejects_non_hex() {
+        assert!(decode_session_dir_name("zz").is_none());
+        assert!(decode_session_dir_name("abc").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn save_and_load_screen_round_trips() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let sessions_dir = tmp.path();
+        ensure_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, "work").unwrap();
+        let snap = b"\x1b[?1049lhello world".to_vec();
+        save_screen(sessions_dir, "work", 100, 40, 7, &snap).unwrap();
+        let loaded = load_screen(sessions_dir, "work").expect("screen restored");
+        assert_eq!(loaded.cols, 100);
+        assert_eq!(loaded.rows, 40);
+        assert_eq!(loaded.output_seq, 7);
+        assert_eq!(loaded.snapshot, snap);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn load_screen_absent_is_none() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        assert!(load_screen(tmp.path(), "missing").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scan_skips_dead_and_junk_entries() {
+        let tmp = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let sessions_dir = tmp.path();
+        // A meta pointing at a definitely-dead pid is cleaned up, not returned.
+        let dir = ensure_runtime_dir(sessions_dir, "ghost").unwrap();
+        write_meta(
+            &dir,
+            &HolderMeta {
+                session: "ghost".to_string(),
+                shell_pid: 2_000_000_000, // not a live pid
+            },
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        // A junk (non-hex) directory is ignored.
+        std::fs::create_dir_all(runtime_root(sessions_dir).join("not-hex")).unwrap();
+        let found = scan_existing_holders(sessions_dir);
+        assert!(found.is_empty(), "dead/junk holders must be skipped");
+        assert!(!dir.exists(), "dead holder dir should be cleaned up");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn send_and_recv_fd_round_trips() {
+        use std::io::Seek;
+        // Pass a temp file's fd across a socketpair and confirm both ends point
+        // at the same open file (write via one, read via the other).
+        let (mut a, mut b) = UnixStream::pair().unwrap();
+        let mut file = tempfile::tempfile().unwrap();
+        writeln!(file, "shared-fd-marker").unwrap();
+        file.flush().unwrap();
+        send_fd(&mut a, file.as_raw_fd()).unwrap();
+        let received = recv_fd(&mut b).unwrap();
+        let mut got = fd_into_file(received);
+        got.rewind().unwrap();
+        let mut contents = String::new();
+        got.read_to_string(&mut contents).unwrap();
+        assert!(contents.contains("shared-fd-marker"));
+    }
+}

src/protocol.rs

@@ -3,9 +3,49 @@ use crate::crypto;
 use crate::native::{EnvVar, NativeAuthOk, NativeClientHello, NativeServerHello, NativeUserAuth};
 use anyhow::{Context, Result, bail};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
+
+/// Generate a name for an implicit, ephemeral terminal session — the kind
+/// created by `dosh host` with no `--session`. Single source of truth shared by
+/// the client (which generates it) and the server (which recognizes it via
+/// [`is_implicit_session_name`] to decide a session is NOT worth persisting).
+pub fn generate_implicit_session_name() -> String {
+    let millis = SystemTime::now()
+        .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+        .as_millis();
+    format!("term-{millis}-{}", std::process::id())
+}
+
+/// Whether `name` is a client-generated implicit session name
+/// (`term-<digits>-<digits>`). Such sessions are ephemeral: the user can never
+/// reattach by name, so the server must not persist them across restarts.
+/// Explicitly-named (`--session work`) and prewarmed sessions are not implicit.
+pub fn is_implicit_session_name(name: &str) -> bool {
+    let Some(rest) = name.strip_prefix("term-") else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    let mut parts = rest.split('-');
+    match (parts.next(), parts.next(), parts.next()) {
+        (Some(millis), Some(pid), None) => {
+            !millis.is_empty()
+                && millis.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit())
+                && !pid.is_empty()
+                && pid.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit())
+        }
+        _ => false,
+    }
+}
 
 pub const MAGIC: &[u8; 4] = b"DOSH";
-pub const VERSION: u8 = 2;
+// v4: added reliable stream offsets/acks to `StreamData` and
+// `StreamWindowAdjust`.
+// v3: added `ForwardingKind::Agent` (SSH-agent forwarding). The new variant rides
+// inside `NativeUserAuth.requested_forwardings`, so a pre-agent peer would fail to
+// deserialize it; bumping the wire version makes such a peer answer with a clear
+// version-mismatch reject instead. Existing variants' bincode discriminants are
+// unchanged, so the bump is purely a compatibility gate.
+pub const VERSION: u8 = 4;
 pub const HEADER_LEN: usize = 58;
 
 /// Stable, user-facing reason string the server puts in an `AttachReject` when a
@@ -240,7 +280,7 @@ pub fn decode(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Packet> {
 
 pub fn decrypt_body(packet: &Packet, key: &[u8; 32], direction: u32) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     if packet.header.flags & 1 == 0 {
-        return Ok(packet.body.clone());
+        bail!("packet body is not encrypted");
     }
     let nonce = crypto::nonce_from(direction, packet.header.seq);
     let aad = packet.header.aad();
@@ -317,6 +357,10 @@ pub struct NativeAuthCheckOkBody {
     pub allow_tcp_forwarding: bool,
     pub allow_remote_forwarding: bool,
     pub allow_agent_forwarding: bool,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub allow_file_transfer: bool,
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub allow_exec_command: bool,
     pub policy_flags: Vec<String>,
     #[serde(default)]
     pub server_version: String,
@@ -378,12 +422,14 @@ pub struct StreamOpenReject {
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct StreamData {
     pub stream_id: u64,
+    pub offset: u64,
     pub bytes: Vec<u8>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct StreamWindowAdjust {
     pub stream_id: u64,
+    pub received_offset: u64,
     pub bytes: u32,
 }
 
@@ -491,3 +537,41 @@ impl ReplayWindow {
         }
     }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod session_name_tests {
+    use super::{generate_implicit_session_name, is_implicit_session_name};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generated_names_are_recognized_as_implicit() {
+        let name = generate_implicit_session_name();
+        assert!(is_implicit_session_name(&name), "generated: {name}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn explicit_and_prewarm_names_are_not_implicit() {
+        for name in [
+            "default",
+            "work",
+            "logs",
+            "term",
+            "term-",
+            "term-abc-1",
+            "term-1-x",
+            "term-1",
+            "term-1-2-3",
+            "",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !is_implicit_session_name(name),
+                "should not be implicit: {name:?}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn implicit_shape_matches() {
+        assert!(is_implicit_session_name("term-1781470634216-76685"));
+        assert!(is_implicit_session_name("term-0-0"));
+    }
+}

src/pty.rs

@@ -1,15 +1,42 @@
 use anyhow::{Context, Result};
 use portable_pty::{Child, CommandBuilder, MasterPty, NativePtySystem, PtySize, PtySystem};
 use std::io::{Read, Write};
-use std::path::Path;
+use std::os::unix::io::{AsRawFd, FromRawFd, RawFd};
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
 use std::thread;
 use tokio::sync::mpsc;
 
-pub struct PtyHandle {
+// Keep live terminal output comfortably below common path MTUs after Dosh's
-    writer: Arc<Mutex<Box<dyn Write + Send>>>,
+// protocol header, AEAD tag, UDP/IP headers, and bincode framing. Full-screen
+// TUIs often write several KiB on the first draw; sending that as one UDP
+// datagram can fragment and vanish, leaving only a blank alternate screen.
+const PTY_OUTPUT_CHUNK_BYTES: usize = 1024;
+
+/// Backing for a PTY master held by the server.
+///
+/// `Owned` means this process spawned the shell as a child and is responsible
+/// for it: dropping the handle kills the shell. This is the original,
+/// non-persistent model and stays the default.
+///
+/// `Adopted` means the shell lives in a separate holder process and this handle
+/// only borrows the master fd (received over a Unix socket via SCM_RIGHTS).
+/// Dropping it must NOT kill the shell — it just closes our copy of the fd and
+/// stops the reader thread, leaving the holder + shell alive so a server restart
+/// can re-adopt them.
+enum Backing {
+    Owned {
         child: Mutex<Box<dyn Child + Send + Sync>>,
         _master: Box<dyn MasterPty + Send>,
+    },
+    Adopted {
+        master: Mutex<std::fs::File>,
+    },
+}
+
+pub struct PtyHandle {
+    writer: Arc<Mutex<Box<dyn Write + Send>>>,
+    backing: Backing,
 }
 
 impl PtyHandle {
@@ -21,23 +48,40 @@ impl PtyHandle {
     }
 
     pub fn resize(&self, cols: u16, rows: u16) -> Result<()> {
-        self._master.resize(PtySize {
+        match &self.backing {
+            Backing::Owned { _master, .. } => {
+                _master.resize(PtySize {
                     rows,
                     cols,
                     pixel_width: 0,
                     pixel_height: 0,
                 })?;
+            }
+            Backing::Adopted { master } => {
+                let file = master.lock().expect("pty master poisoned");
+                resize_fd(file.as_raw_fd(), cols, rows)?;
+            }
+        }
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// True for a handle backed by a separate holder process. Such a handle must
+    /// be detached (not killed) when the server lets go of a session, so the
+    /// shell survives a server restart.
+    pub fn is_persistent(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self.backing, Backing::Adopted { .. })
+    }
+
     /// Terminate the shell process backing this PTY and reap it.
     ///
-    /// Without this the child shell outlives the session: dropping the master
+    /// Only meaningful for an `Owned` backing (the server spawned the shell as a
-    /// alone is not guaranteed to take the process down, and the `Child` handle
+    /// child). For an `Adopted` backing the shell belongs to the holder process,
-    /// used to be discarded at spawn time, which leaked one shell per
+    /// so this is a no-op here; reaping a persistent session is done by asking
-    /// abandoned session.
+    /// the holder to shut down (see `persist::request_shutdown`).
     pub fn kill(&self) {
-        if let Ok(mut child) = self.child.lock() {
+        if let Backing::Owned { child, .. } = &self.backing
+            && let Ok(mut child) = child.lock()
+        {
             let _ = child.kill();
             let _ = child.wait();
         }
@@ -46,8 +90,27 @@ impl PtyHandle {
 
 impl Drop for PtyHandle {
     fn drop(&mut self) {
+        // Adopted handles must NOT kill the shell: it lives in the holder so it
+        // can outlive this server. Dropping just closes our fd / stops the
+        // reader. Owned handles keep the original kill-on-drop behavior.
+        if let Backing::Owned { .. } = &self.backing {
             self.kill();
         }
+    }
+}
+
+fn resize_fd(fd: RawFd, cols: u16, rows: u16) -> Result<()> {
+    let winsize = libc::winsize {
+        ws_row: rows,
+        ws_col: cols,
+        ws_xpixel: 0,
+        ws_ypixel: 0,
+    };
+    let rc = unsafe { libc::ioctl(fd, libc::TIOCSWINSZ, &winsize) };
+    if rc != 0 {
+        return Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error()).context("TIOCSWINSZ");
+    }
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug)]
@@ -74,12 +137,82 @@ pub fn spawn_pty_session(
             pixel_height: 0,
         })
         .context("open pty")?;
+    let cmd = build_shell_command(shell, env);
+    let child = pair.slave.spawn_command(cmd).context("spawn shell")?;
+    drop(pair.slave);
+
+    let writer = pair.master.take_writer().context("take pty writer")?;
+    let reader = pair.master.try_clone_reader().context("clone pty reader")?;
+    spawn_reader_thread(session, reader, tx)?;
+
+    Ok(PtyHandle {
+        writer: Arc::new(Mutex::new(writer)),
+        backing: Backing::Owned {
+            child: Mutex::new(child),
+            _master: pair.master,
+        },
+    })
+}
+
+/// Whether this host has a terminfo entry for `term`, searching the standard
+/// ncurses directories. Both the legacy single-letter (`x/xterm`) and the
+/// hashed (`78/xterm`) subdirectory layouts are checked.
+fn terminfo_available(term: &str) -> bool {
+    let Some(first) = term.chars().next() else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    let letter = first.to_string();
+    let hashed = format!("{:x}", first as u32);
+    let mut dirs: Vec<PathBuf> = Vec::new();
+    if let Ok(t) = std::env::var("TERMINFO")
+        && !t.is_empty()
+    {
+        dirs.push(PathBuf::from(t));
+    }
+    if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
+        dirs.push(home.join(".terminfo"));
+    }
+    if let Ok(td) = std::env::var("TERMINFO_DIRS") {
+        for d in td.split(':').filter(|d| !d.is_empty()) {
+            dirs.push(PathBuf::from(d));
+        }
+    }
+    for d in [
+        "/etc/terminfo",
+        "/lib/terminfo",
+        "/usr/share/terminfo",
+        "/usr/lib/terminfo",
+        "/usr/share/lib/terminfo",
+    ] {
+        dirs.push(PathBuf::from(d));
+    }
+    dirs.iter()
+        .any(|dir| dir.join(&letter).join(term).exists() || dir.join(&hashed).join(term).exists())
+}
+
+/// Build the [`CommandBuilder`] for a dosh shell, identically for the in-process
+/// `spawn_pty_session` and the out-of-process holder, so a persistent session's
+/// environment matches a non-persistent one.
+pub fn build_shell_command(shell: &str, env: &[(String, String)]) -> CommandBuilder {
     let mut cmd = CommandBuilder::new(shell);
-    cmd.env("TERM", "xterm-256color");
     cmd.env("COLORTERM", "truecolor");
     for (name, value) in env {
         cmd.env(name, value);
     }
+    // The client's TERM is propagated, but a server that lacks that terminal's
+    // terminfo entry (e.g. xterm-ghostty, xterm-kitty) breaks ncurses apps like
+    // tmux/vim with "missing or unsuitable terminal". Keep the requested TERM
+    // only when this host actually has its terminfo; otherwise fall back to a
+    // universally available entry so remote apps always work.
+    let term = match env
+        .iter()
+        .find(|(n, _)| n == "TERM")
+        .map(|(_, v)| v.as_str())
+    {
+        Some(requested) if terminfo_available(requested) => requested.to_string(),
+        _ => "xterm-256color".to_string(),
+    };
+    cmd.env("TERM", term);
     cmd.env("SHELL", shell);
     if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
         cmd.env("HOME", home.as_os_str());
@@ -88,11 +221,39 @@ pub fn spawn_pty_session(
     } else if let Some(parent) = Path::new(shell).parent() {
         cmd.env("PWD", parent.as_os_str());
     }
-    let child = pair.slave.spawn_command(cmd).context("spawn shell")?;
+    cmd
-    drop(pair.slave);
+}
 
-    let writer = pair.master.take_writer().context("take pty writer")?;
+/// Build a [`PtyHandle`] from a master fd received from a holder process.
-    let mut reader = pair.master.try_clone_reader().context("clone pty reader")?;
+///
+/// `master_fd` is an fd this handle takes ownership of (it is wrapped in a
+/// `File` and closed on drop). The shell is NOT a child of this process; it
+/// belongs to the holder, so dropping this handle leaves it running.
+pub fn adopt_pty_from_fd(
+    session: String,
+    master_fd: RawFd,
+    tx: mpsc::UnboundedSender<PtyOutput>,
+) -> Result<PtyHandle> {
+    // Take ownership of the fd. A clone gives us an independent reader so the
+    // reader thread and the writer/resize side hold separate `File`s and don't
+    // get closed out from under each other.
+    let master = unsafe { std::fs::File::from_raw_fd(master_fd) };
+    let reader_file = master.try_clone().context("clone master for reader")?;
+    let writer_file = master.try_clone().context("clone master for writer")?;
+    spawn_reader_thread(session, Box::new(reader_file), tx)?;
+    Ok(PtyHandle {
+        writer: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Box::new(writer_file))),
+        backing: Backing::Adopted {
+            master: Mutex::new(master),
+        },
+    })
+}
+
+fn spawn_reader_thread(
+    session: String,
+    mut reader: Box<dyn Read + Send>,
+    tx: mpsc::UnboundedSender<PtyOutput>,
+) -> Result<()> {
     let reader_session = session.clone();
     thread::Builder::new()
         .name(format!("dosh-pty-{session}"))
@@ -109,12 +270,14 @@ pub fn spawn_pty_session(
                         break;
                     }
                     Ok(n) => {
+                        for chunk in buf[..n].chunks(PTY_OUTPUT_CHUNK_BYTES) {
                             let _ = tx.send(PtyOutput {
                                 session: reader_session.clone(),
-                            bytes: buf[..n].to_vec(),
+                                bytes: chunk.to_vec(),
                                 exited: false,
                             });
                         }
+                    }
                     Err(_) => {
                         let _ = tx.send(PtyOutput {
                             session: reader_session.clone(),
@@ -127,10 +290,21 @@ pub fn spawn_pty_session(
             }
         })
         .context("spawn pty reader")?;
+    Ok(())
+}
 
-    Ok(PtyHandle {
+#[cfg(test)]
-        writer: Arc::new(Mutex::new(writer)),
+mod tests {
-        child: Mutex::new(child),
+    use super::*;
-        _master: pair.master,
+
-    })
+    const _: () = assert!(PTY_OUTPUT_CHUNK_BYTES <= 1200);
+
+    #[test]
+    fn terminfo_available_detects_known_and_unknown() {
+        // A near-universal entry should be present on any host with ncurses.
+        assert!(terminfo_available("xterm") || terminfo_available("xterm-256color"));
+        // Bogus / empty names must report missing so we fall back.
+        assert!(!terminfo_available("definitely-not-a-real-terminal-xyz"));
+        assert!(!terminfo_available(""));
+    }
 }

src/server.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,705 @@
+use crate::config::{ServerConfig, load_server_config};
+use crate::crypto;
+use crate::native::{
+    self, ForwardingKind, ForwardingRequest, NativeAuthOk, NativeServerHello,
+    derive_native_session_key, generate_native_ephemeral, host_public_key, load_or_create_host_key,
+    sign_server_hello, verify_native_user_auth_from_config,
+};
+use crate::protocol::{
+    self, AttachReject, CLIENT_TO_SERVER, NativeAuthOkBody, NativeClientHelloBody,
+    NativeServerHelloBody, NativeUserAuthBody, PacketKind, SERVER_TO_CLIENT,
+};
+use crate::transport::{
+    DoshTransport, SessionEvent, SessionRole, SessionTransportConfig, TransportConfig,
+    service_name_from_target,
+};
+use crate::udp::is_transient_udp_send_error;
+use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow, bail};
+use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
+use std::net::SocketAddr;
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct DoshServerConfig {
+    pub server: ServerConfig,
+    pub bind_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
+    pub services: HashSet<String>,
+    pub transport: TransportConfig,
+    pub require_current_user: bool,
+    pub auth_timeout: Duration,
+}
+
+impl DoshServerConfig {
+    pub fn new(server: ServerConfig) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            server,
+            bind_addr: None,
+            services: HashSet::new(),
+            transport: TransportConfig::default(),
+            require_current_user: true,
+            auth_timeout: Duration::from_secs(30),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn bind_addr(mut self, addr: SocketAddr) -> Self {
+        self.bind_addr = Some(addr);
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn service(mut self, name: impl Into<String>) -> Result<Self> {
+        self.services.insert(validate_service_name(name.into())?);
+        Ok(self)
+    }
+
+    pub fn services(mut self, names: impl IntoIterator<Item = impl Into<String>>) -> Result<Self> {
+        for name in names {
+            self.services.insert(validate_service_name(name.into())?);
+        }
+        Ok(self)
+    }
+
+    pub fn require_current_user(mut self, value: bool) -> Self {
+        self.require_current_user = value;
+        self
+    }
+
+    pub fn transport(mut self, transport: TransportConfig) -> Self {
+        self.transport = transport;
+        self
+    }
+}
+
+impl Default for DoshServerConfig {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new(ServerConfig::default())
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct DoshAccepted {
+    pub conn_id: [u8; 16],
+    pub user: String,
+    pub session: String,
+    pub services: Vec<String>,
+    pub peer_addr: SocketAddr,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum DoshServerEvent {
+    Accepted(DoshAccepted),
+    Session {
+        conn_id: [u8; 16],
+        event: SessionEvent,
+    },
+    Ignored,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+struct PendingServerAuth {
+    client: native::NativeClientHello,
+    server: NativeServerHello,
+    session_key: [u8; 32],
+    peer: SocketAddr,
+    created_at: Instant,
+}
+
+pub struct DoshServer {
+    socket: Arc<UdpSocket>,
+    config: DoshServerConfig,
+    host_signing: SigningKey,
+    pending: HashMap<[u8; 16], PendingServerAuth>,
+    transports: HashMap<[u8; 16], DoshTransport>,
+    accepted: HashMap<[u8; 16], DoshAccepted>,
+}
+
+impl DoshServer {
+    pub async fn load() -> Result<Self> {
+        Self::bind(DoshServerConfig::new(load_server_config(None)?)).await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn load_from_path(path: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<Self> {
+        Self::bind(DoshServerConfig::new(load_server_config(path)?)).await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn bind(config: DoshServerConfig) -> Result<Self> {
+        let bind_addr = match config.bind_addr {
+            Some(addr) => addr,
+            None => format!("{}:{}", config.server.bind, config.server.port)
+                .parse()
+                .with_context(|| {
+                    format!(
+                        "parse Dosh bind address {}:{}",
+                        config.server.bind, config.server.port
+                    )
+                })?,
+        };
+        let host_signing = load_or_create_host_key(&config.server)?;
+        let socket = Arc::new(UdpSocket::bind(bind_addr).await?);
+        Ok(Self {
+            socket,
+            config,
+            host_signing,
+            pending: HashMap::new(),
+            transports: HashMap::new(),
+            accepted: HashMap::new(),
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn local_addr(&self) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
+        Ok(self.socket.local_addr()?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn connection(&self, conn_id: &[u8; 16]) -> Option<&DoshAccepted> {
+        self.accepted.get(conn_id)
+    }
+
+    pub fn transport(&self, conn_id: &[u8; 16]) -> Option<&DoshTransport> {
+        self.transports.get(conn_id)
+    }
+
+    pub fn transport_mut(&mut self, conn_id: &[u8; 16]) -> Option<&mut DoshTransport> {
+        self.transports.get_mut(conn_id)
+    }
+
+    pub async fn recv(&mut self) -> Result<DoshServerEvent> {
+        let mut buf = vec![0u8; 65535];
+        loop {
+            self.expire_pending();
+            let (n, peer) = self.socket.recv_from(&mut buf).await?;
+            let packet = match protocol::decode(&buf[..n]) {
+                Ok(packet) => packet,
+                Err(_) => continue,
+            };
+            if packet.header.kind == PacketKind::NativeClientHello {
+                self.handle_client_hello(peer, packet.body).await?;
+                return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Ignored);
+            }
+            if packet.header.kind == PacketKind::NativeUserAuth {
+                return self.handle_user_auth(peer, &packet).await;
+            }
+            if let Some(transport) = self.transports.get_mut(&packet.header.conn_id) {
+                let event = transport.handle_datagram(&buf[..n], peer).await?;
+                return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Session {
+                    conn_id: packet.header.conn_id,
+                    event,
+                });
+            }
+            self.send_reject(peer, packet.header.conn_id, "unknown Dosh connection")
+                .await?;
+            return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Ignored);
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub async fn accept_stream(&mut self, conn_id: [u8; 16], stream_id: u64) -> Result<()> {
+        self.transport_mut(&conn_id)
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("unknown Dosh connection"))?
+            .accept_stream(stream_id)
+            .await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn reject_stream(
+        &mut self,
+        conn_id: [u8; 16],
+        stream_id: u64,
+        reason: impl Into<String>,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        self.transport_mut(&conn_id)
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("unknown Dosh connection"))?
+            .reject_stream(stream_id, reason)
+            .await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn send(
+        &mut self,
+        conn_id: [u8; 16],
+        stream_id: u64,
+        bytes: impl Into<Vec<u8>>,
+    ) -> Result<()> {
+        self.transport_mut(&conn_id)
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("unknown Dosh connection"))?
+            .send(stream_id, bytes)
+            .await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn close(&mut self, conn_id: [u8; 16], stream_id: u64) -> Result<()> {
+        self.transport_mut(&conn_id)
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("unknown Dosh connection"))?
+            .close(stream_id)
+            .await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn maintenance(&mut self) -> Result<()> {
+        for transport in self.transports.values_mut() {
+            transport.maintenance().await?;
+        }
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    async fn handle_client_hello(&mut self, peer: SocketAddr, body: Vec<u8>) -> Result<()> {
+        let req: NativeClientHelloBody = protocol::from_body(&body)?;
+        if let Err(err) =
+            native::check_native_protocol_version(req.hello.protocol_version, "client")
+        {
+            self.send_reject(peer, [0u8; 16], &err.to_string()).await?;
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        let result = self.build_server_hello(req.hello, peer);
+        let (pending_id, hello) = match result {
+            Ok(value) => value,
+            Err(err) => {
+                self.send_reject(peer, [0u8; 16], &err.to_string()).await?;
+                return Ok(());
+            }
+        };
+        let body = protocol::to_body(&NativeServerHelloBody { hello })?;
+        let out = protocol::encode_plain(PacketKind::NativeServerHello, pending_id, 1, 0, &body)?;
+        let _ = send_udp(&self.socket, &out, peer).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn build_server_hello(
+        &mut self,
+        client: native::NativeClientHello,
+        peer: SocketAddr,
+    ) -> Result<([u8; 16], NativeServerHello)> {
+        if !self.config.server.native_auth {
+            bail!("native auth disabled");
+        }
+        if !client
+            .supported_aead
+            .iter()
+            .any(|algorithm| algorithm == "chacha20poly1305")
+        {
+            bail!("native auth requires chacha20poly1305");
+        }
+        if !client
+            .supported_user_key_algorithms
+            .iter()
+            .any(|algorithm| native::is_supported_user_signature_algorithm(algorithm))
+        {
+            bail!("native auth requires a supported user key algorithm");
+        }
+        if self.config.require_current_user {
+            let current_user = std::env::var("USER").unwrap_or_else(|_| "unknown".to_string());
+            if client.requested_user != current_user {
+                bail!("native auth user mismatch");
+            }
+        }
+
+        let (server_secret, server_public) = generate_native_ephemeral();
+        let mut server = NativeServerHello {
+            protocol_version: native::NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            server_random: crypto::random_32(),
+            server_ephemeral_public: server_public,
+            host_key: host_public_key(&self.host_signing),
+            chosen_aead: "chacha20poly1305".to_string(),
+            server_key_epoch: 1,
+            auth_challenge: crypto::random_32(),
+            rate_limit_remaining: None,
+            host_signature: Vec::new(),
+        };
+        sign_server_hello(&self.host_signing, &client, &mut server)?;
+        let session_key = derive_native_session_key(
+            &server_secret,
+            client.client_ephemeral_public,
+            &client,
+            &server,
+        )?;
+        let mut pending_id = [0u8; 16];
+        pending_id.copy_from_slice(&server.auth_challenge[..16]);
+        self.pending.insert(
+            pending_id,
+            PendingServerAuth {
+                client,
+                server: server.clone(),
+                session_key,
+                peer,
+                created_at: Instant::now(),
+            },
+        );
+        Ok((pending_id, server))
+    }
+
+    async fn handle_user_auth(
+        &mut self,
+        peer: SocketAddr,
+        packet: &protocol::Packet,
+    ) -> Result<DoshServerEvent> {
+        let Some(pending) = self.pending.get(&packet.header.conn_id).cloned() else {
+            self.send_reject(peer, packet.header.conn_id, "unknown native auth")
+                .await?;
+            return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Ignored);
+        };
+        if pending.peer != peer {
+            self.send_reject(peer, packet.header.conn_id, "native auth peer changed")
+                .await?;
+            return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Ignored);
+        }
+        if pending.created_at.elapsed() > self.config.auth_timeout {
+            self.pending.remove(&packet.header.conn_id);
+            self.send_reject(peer, packet.header.conn_id, "native auth expired")
+                .await?;
+            return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Ignored);
+        }
+
+        let body = match protocol::decrypt_body(packet, &pending.session_key, CLIENT_TO_SERVER) {
+            Ok(body) => body,
+            Err(_) => {
+                self.send_reject(peer, packet.header.conn_id, "native auth decrypt failed")
+                    .await?;
+                return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Ignored);
+            }
+        };
+        let req: NativeUserAuthBody = match protocol::from_body(&body) {
+            Ok(req) => req,
+            Err(_) => {
+                self.send_reject(peer, packet.header.conn_id, "invalid native auth body")
+                    .await?;
+                return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Ignored);
+            }
+        };
+        let services = match self.verify_auth_and_services(&pending, &req.auth) {
+            Ok(services) => services,
+            Err(err) => {
+                self.send_reject(peer, packet.header.conn_id, &format!("{err:#}"))
+                    .await?;
+                return Ok(DoshServerEvent::Ignored);
+            }
+        };
+        self.pending.remove(&packet.header.conn_id);
+
+        let conn_id = crypto::random_16();
+        let key_id = protocol::session_key_id(&pending.session_key);
+        let ok = NativeAuthOk {
+            client_id: conn_id,
+            session: pending.client.requested_session.clone(),
+            mode: pending.client.requested_mode.clone(),
+            session_key: pending.session_key,
+            session_key_id: key_id,
+            attach_ticket: Vec::new(),
+            attach_ticket_psk: crypto::random_32(),
+            initial_seq: 1,
+            snapshot: Vec::new(),
+            policy_flags: services
+                .iter()
+                .map(|service| format!("service:{service}"))
+                .collect(),
+        };
+        let body = protocol::to_body(&NativeAuthOkBody { ok })?;
+        let out = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+            PacketKind::NativeAuthOk,
+            conn_id,
+            1,
+            packet.header.seq,
+            &pending.session_key,
+            SERVER_TO_CLIENT,
+            &body,
+        )?;
+        let _ = send_udp(&self.socket, &out, peer).await?;
+
+        let transport = DoshTransport::new(
+            Arc::clone(&self.socket),
+            SessionTransportConfig {
+                role: SessionRole::Server,
+                conn_id,
+                session_key: pending.session_key,
+                peer_addr: peer,
+                initial_send_seq: 2,
+                initial_ack: packet.header.seq,
+                stream: self.config.transport.clone(),
+            },
+        );
+        let accepted = DoshAccepted {
+            conn_id,
+            user: pending.client.requested_user,
+            session: pending.client.requested_session,
+            services,
+            peer_addr: peer,
+        };
+        self.transports.insert(conn_id, transport);
+        self.accepted.insert(conn_id, accepted.clone());
+        Ok(DoshServerEvent::Accepted(accepted))
+    }
+
+    fn verify_auth_and_services(
+        &self,
+        pending: &PendingServerAuth,
+        auth: &native::NativeUserAuth,
+    ) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+        verify_native_user_auth_from_config(
+            &self.config.server,
+            &pending.client,
+            &pending.server,
+            auth,
+            Some(pending.peer.ip()),
+        )
+        .context("verify native user auth")?;
+        validate_requested_services(&self.config.services, &auth.requested_forwardings)
+    }
+
+    async fn send_reject(&self, peer: SocketAddr, conn_id: [u8; 16], reason: &str) -> Result<()> {
+        let body = protocol::to_body(&AttachReject {
+            reason: reason.to_string(),
+        })?;
+        let out = protocol::encode_plain(PacketKind::AttachReject, conn_id, 0, 0, &body)?;
+        let _ = send_udp(&self.socket, &out, peer).await?;
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
+    fn expire_pending(&mut self) {
+        let timeout = self.config.auth_timeout;
+        self.pending
+            .retain(|_, pending| pending.created_at.elapsed() <= timeout);
+    }
+}
+
+async fn send_udp(socket: &UdpSocket, packet: &[u8], peer: SocketAddr) -> Result<bool> {
+    match socket.send_to(packet, peer).await {
+        Ok(_) => Ok(true),
+        Err(err) if is_transient_udp_send_error(&err) => Ok(false),
+        Err(err) => Err(err).with_context(|| format!("send UDP packet to {peer}")),
+    }
+}
+
+fn validate_requested_services(
+    allowed_services: &HashSet<String>,
+    requests: &[ForwardingRequest],
+) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let mut services = Vec::new();
+    for request in requests {
+        if request.kind != ForwardingKind::Local {
+            bail!("embedded Dosh services only accept local service requests");
+        }
+        if request.listen_port != 0 || request.target_port != Some(0) {
+            bail!("embedded Dosh service requests must use port 0");
+        }
+        let target = request
+            .target_host
+            .as_deref()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("embedded Dosh service request is missing target host"))?;
+        let service = service_name_from_target(target)
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("target {target:?} is not a Dosh service"))?;
+        if !allowed_services.contains(service) {
+            bail!("Dosh service {service:?} is not registered");
+        }
+        if !services.iter().any(|existing| existing == service) {
+            services.push(service.to_string());
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(services)
+}
+
+fn validate_service_name(name: String) -> Result<String> {
+    crate::transport::service_target(&name)?;
+    Ok(name)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::client::DoshClient;
+    use crate::config::{ClientConfig, HostsConfig};
+    use crate::protocol::{CLIENT_TO_SERVER, NativeUserAuthBody};
+    use crate::transport::TransportEvent;
+    use ed25519_dalek::SigningKey;
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn sdk_client_and_server_exchange_service_stream() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let host_key = dir.path().join("host_key");
+        let authorized_keys = dir.path().join("authorized_keys");
+        let identity = dir.path().join("id_ed25519");
+        let known_hosts = dir.path().join("known_hosts");
+
+        let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[91u8; 32]);
+        let keypair = ssh_key::private::Ed25519Keypair::from(&signing);
+        let private =
+            ssh_key::PrivateKey::new(ssh_key::private::KeypairData::from(keypair), "").unwrap();
+        private
+            .write_openssh_file(&identity, ssh_key::LineEnding::LF)
+            .unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(
+            &authorized_keys,
+            format!("{}\n", private.public_key().to_openssh().unwrap()),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let server_config = ServerConfig {
+            host_key: host_key.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
+            authorized_keys: vec![authorized_keys.to_string_lossy().to_string()],
+            ..ServerConfig::default()
+        };
+        let server_config = DoshServerConfig::new(server_config)
+            .bind_addr("127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap())
+            .service("echo")
+            .unwrap()
+            .require_current_user(false);
+        let mut server = DoshServer::bind(server_config).await.unwrap();
+        let server_port = server.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+
+        let client_config = ClientConfig {
+            dosh_port: server_port,
+            trust_on_first_use: true,
+            known_hosts: known_hosts.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
+            identity_files: vec![identity.to_string_lossy().to_string()],
+            use_ssh_agent: false,
+            ..ClientConfig::default()
+        };
+        let client = DoshClient::with_config(client_config, HostsConfig::default());
+        let connect = client
+            .connect("127.0.0.1")
+            .user("sdk-user")
+            .service("echo")
+            .connect();
+        let accept = async {
+            loop {
+                if let DoshServerEvent::Accepted(accepted) = server.recv().await.unwrap() {
+                    break accepted;
+                }
+            }
+        };
+        let (connected, accepted) = tokio::join!(connect, accept);
+        let mut client_transport = connected.unwrap().into_transport();
+        let conn_id = accepted.conn_id;
+        assert_eq!(accepted.services, vec!["echo".to_string()]);
+
+        let stream_id = client_transport.open_service("echo").await.unwrap();
+        match server.recv().await.unwrap() {
+            DoshServerEvent::Session {
+                event: SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::Open(open)),
+                ..
+            } => {
+                assert_eq!(open.stream_id, stream_id);
+                server.accept_stream(conn_id, open.stream_id).await.unwrap();
+            }
+            other => panic!("unexpected event {other:?}"),
+        }
+        assert!(matches!(
+            client_transport.recv().await.unwrap(),
+            SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::OpenOk { .. })
+        ));
+
+        client_transport
+            .send(stream_id, b"ping".to_vec())
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        loop {
+            match server.recv().await.unwrap() {
+                DoshServerEvent::Session {
+                    event: SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::Data(data)),
+                    ..
+                } => {
+                    assert_eq!(data.chunks, vec![b"ping".to_vec()]);
+                    server
+                        .send(conn_id, data.stream_id, b"pong".to_vec())
+                        .await
+                        .unwrap();
+                    break;
+                }
+                DoshServerEvent::Session { .. } | DoshServerEvent::Ignored => {}
+                other => panic!("unexpected event {other:?}"),
+            }
+        }
+        loop {
+            match client_transport.recv().await.unwrap() {
+                SessionEvent::Stream(TransportEvent::Data(data)) => {
+                    assert_eq!(data.chunks, vec![b"pong".to_vec()]);
+                    break;
+                }
+                SessionEvent::Stream(_) | SessionEvent::Ignored => {}
+                other => panic!("unexpected event {other:?}"),
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn bad_native_auth_does_not_consume_pending_challenge() {
+        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+        let host_key = dir.path().join("host_key");
+        let authorized_keys = dir.path().join("authorized_keys");
+        let signing = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[93u8; 32]);
+        let keypair = ssh_key::private::Ed25519Keypair::from(&signing);
+        let private =
+            ssh_key::PrivateKey::new(ssh_key::private::KeypairData::from(keypair), "").unwrap();
+        std::fs::write(
+            &authorized_keys,
+            format!("{}\n", private.public_key().to_openssh().unwrap()),
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let server_config = ServerConfig {
+            host_key: host_key.to_string_lossy().to_string(),
+            authorized_keys: vec![authorized_keys.to_string_lossy().to_string()],
+            ..ServerConfig::default()
+        };
+        let server_config = DoshServerConfig::new(server_config)
+            .bind_addr("127.0.0.1:0".parse().unwrap())
+            .require_current_user(false);
+        let mut server = DoshServer::bind(server_config).await.unwrap();
+        let peer: SocketAddr = "127.0.0.1:9".parse().unwrap();
+        let (client_secret, client_public) = native::generate_native_ephemeral();
+        let hello = native::NativeClientHello {
+            protocol_version: native::NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+            client_random: crypto::random_32(),
+            client_ephemeral_public: client_public,
+            requested_host: "127.0.0.1".to_string(),
+            requested_user: "sdk-user".to_string(),
+            requested_session: "test".to_string(),
+            requested_mode: "forward-only".to_string(),
+            terminal_size: (80, 24),
+            supported_aead: vec!["chacha20poly1305".to_string()],
+            supported_user_key_algorithms: vec!["ssh-ed25519".to_string()],
+            cached_host_key_fingerprint: None,
+            attach_ticket_envelope: None,
+            requested_env: Vec::new(),
+        };
+        let (pending_id, server_hello) = server.build_server_hello(hello.clone(), peer).unwrap();
+        let session_key = native::derive_native_session_key(
+            &client_secret,
+            server_hello.server_ephemeral_public,
+            &hello,
+            &server_hello,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let auth = native::sign_user_auth(&signing, &hello, &server_hello, Vec::new()).unwrap();
+        let body = protocol::to_body(&NativeUserAuthBody { auth }).unwrap();
+        let bad = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+            PacketKind::NativeUserAuth,
+            pending_id,
+            2,
+            1,
+            &[7u8; 32],
+            CLIENT_TO_SERVER,
+            &body,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let bad = protocol::decode(&bad).unwrap();
+
+        assert!(matches!(
+            server.handle_user_auth(peer, &bad).await.unwrap(),
+            DoshServerEvent::Ignored
+        ));
+        assert!(server.pending.contains_key(&pending_id));
+
+        let valid = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+            PacketKind::NativeUserAuth,
+            pending_id,
+            2,
+            1,
+            &session_key,
+            CLIENT_TO_SERVER,
+            &body,
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let valid = protocol::decode(&valid).unwrap();
+        assert!(matches!(
+            server.handle_user_auth(peer, &valid).await.unwrap(),
+            DoshServerEvent::Accepted(_)
+        ));
+        assert!(!server.pending.contains_key(&pending_id));
+    }
+}

src/ssh_agent.rs

@@ -1,26 +1,43 @@
+use crate::native::{ForwardingRequest, NativeClientHello, NativeServerHello, NativeUserAuth};
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use crate::native::{
-    ForwardingRequest, NativeClientHello, NativeServerHello, NativeUserAuth,
+    is_supported_user_key_algorithm, parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob, user_auth_transcript,
-    parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob, user_auth_transcript,
 };
-use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow, bail};
+#[cfg(unix)]
+use anyhow::{Context, bail};
+use anyhow::{Result, anyhow};
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use std::io::{Read, Write};
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use std::os::unix::net::UnixStream;
 use std::path::Path;
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH_AGENT_FAILURE: u8 = 5;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: u8 = 11;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER: u8 = 12;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: u8 = 13;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE: u8 = 14;
+#[cfg(unix)]
+const SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512: u32 = 4;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const MAX_AGENT_PACKET: usize = 256 * 1024;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub struct AgentIdentity {
     pub key_blob: Vec<u8>,
-    pub public_key: [u8; 32],
+    pub public_key_algorithm: String,
+    pub public_key: Vec<u8>,
+    pub sign_algorithm: String,
+    pub sign_flags: u32,
     pub comment: String,
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent(
     client: &NativeClientHello,
     server: &NativeServerHello,
@@ -30,6 +47,18 @@ pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent(
     sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(sock, client, server, requested_forwardings)
 }
 
+#[cfg(not(unix))]
+pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent(
+    _client: &NativeClientHello,
+    _server: &NativeServerHello,
+    _requested_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
+) -> Result<NativeUserAuth> {
+    Err(anyhow!(
+        "ssh-agent native auth is not supported on this platform yet; use identity_files"
+    ))
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
 pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(
     socket_path: impl AsRef<Path>,
     client: &NativeClientHello,
@@ -38,13 +67,13 @@ pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(
 ) -> Result<NativeUserAuth> {
     let mut agent = UnixStream::connect(socket_path.as_ref())
         .with_context(|| format!("connect ssh-agent {}", socket_path.as_ref().display()))?;
-    let identities = request_ed25519_identities(&mut agent)?;
+    let identities = request_supported_identities(&mut agent)?;
     let identity = identities
         .first()
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("ssh-agent has no ssh-ed25519 identities"))?;
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("ssh-agent has no supported identities"))?;
     let mut auth = NativeUserAuth {
-        public_key_algorithm: "ssh-ed25519".to_string(),
+        public_key_algorithm: identity.sign_algorithm.clone(),
-        public_key: identity.public_key.to_vec(),
+        public_key: identity.public_key.clone(),
         signature: Vec::new(),
         requested_forwardings,
     };
@@ -54,7 +83,20 @@ pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(
     Ok(auth)
 }
 
-fn request_ed25519_identities(agent: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<AgentIdentity>> {
+#[cfg(not(unix))]
+pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(
+    _socket_path: impl AsRef<Path>,
+    _client: &NativeClientHello,
+    _server: &NativeServerHello,
+    _requested_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
+) -> Result<NativeUserAuth> {
+    Err(anyhow!(
+        "ssh-agent native auth is not supported on this platform yet; use identity_files"
+    ))
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+fn request_supported_identities(agent: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<AgentIdentity>> {
     write_agent_packet(agent, &[SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES])?;
     let payload = read_agent_packet(agent)?;
     let mut cursor = payload.as_slice();
@@ -72,18 +114,51 @@ fn request_ed25519_identities(agent: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<AgentIdentit
     for _ in 0..count {
         let key_blob = read_ssh_string(&mut cursor)?.to_vec();
         let comment = String::from_utf8_lossy(read_ssh_string(&mut cursor)?).to_string();
-        if let Ok(public_key) = parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob(&key_blob) {
+        if let Some(identity) = supported_identity(key_blob, comment)? {
-            identities.push(AgentIdentity {
+            identities.push(identity);
-                key_blob,
-                public_key,
-                comment,
-            });
         }
     }
     anyhow::ensure!(cursor.is_empty(), "trailing data in ssh-agent identities");
     Ok(identities)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
+fn supported_identity(key_blob: Vec<u8>, comment: String) -> Result<Option<AgentIdentity>> {
+    let algorithm = key_blob_algorithm(&key_blob)?;
+    if !is_supported_user_key_algorithm(&algorithm) {
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    let identity = match algorithm.as_str() {
+        "ssh-ed25519" => AgentIdentity {
+            public_key_algorithm: algorithm.clone(),
+            public_key: parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob(&key_blob)?.to_vec(),
+            sign_algorithm: "ssh-ed25519".to_string(),
+            sign_flags: 0,
+            key_blob,
+            comment,
+        },
+        "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" => AgentIdentity {
+            public_key_algorithm: algorithm.clone(),
+            public_key: key_blob.clone(),
+            sign_algorithm: algorithm,
+            sign_flags: 0,
+            key_blob,
+            comment,
+        },
+        "ssh-rsa" => AgentIdentity {
+            public_key_algorithm: algorithm,
+            public_key: key_blob.clone(),
+            sign_algorithm: "rsa-sha2-512".to_string(),
+            sign_flags: SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512,
+            key_blob,
+            comment,
+        },
+        _ => return Ok(None),
+    };
+    Ok(Some(identity))
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn sign_with_agent(
     agent: &mut UnixStream,
     identity: &AgentIdentity,
@@ -93,7 +168,7 @@ fn sign_with_agent(
     request.push(SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST);
     write_ssh_string(&mut request, &identity.key_blob);
     write_ssh_string(&mut request, transcript);
-    request.extend_from_slice(&0u32.to_be_bytes());
+    request.extend_from_slice(&identity.sign_flags.to_be_bytes());
     write_agent_packet(agent, &request)?;
 
     let payload = read_agent_packet(agent)?;
@@ -114,23 +189,21 @@ fn sign_with_agent(
 
     let mut signature_cursor = signature_blob;
     let algorithm = read_ssh_string(&mut signature_cursor)?;
+    let algorithm = String::from_utf8_lossy(algorithm);
     anyhow::ensure!(
-        algorithm == b"ssh-ed25519",
+        algorithm == identity.sign_algorithm,
-        "ssh-agent returned unsupported signature algorithm {}",
+        "ssh-agent returned signature algorithm {algorithm}, expected {}",
-        String::from_utf8_lossy(algorithm)
+        identity.sign_algorithm
     );
     let signature = read_ssh_string(&mut signature_cursor)?;
     anyhow::ensure!(
         signature_cursor.is_empty(),
         "trailing data in ssh-agent signature blob"
     );
-    anyhow::ensure!(
-        signature.len() == 64,
-        "ssh-agent Ed25519 signature was not 64 bytes"
-    );
     Ok(signature.to_vec())
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn read_agent_packet(stream: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut len = [0u8; 4];
     stream
@@ -145,6 +218,7 @@ fn read_agent_packet(stream: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     Ok(payload)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn write_agent_packet(stream: &mut UnixStream, payload: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
     anyhow::ensure!(
         payload.len() <= MAX_AGENT_PACKET,
@@ -155,6 +229,7 @@ fn write_agent_packet(stream: &mut UnixStream, payload: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn read_u8(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u8> {
     anyhow::ensure!(!cursor.is_empty(), "truncated u8");
     let value = cursor[0];
@@ -162,6 +237,7 @@ fn read_u8(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u8> {
     Ok(value)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn read_u32(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u32> {
     anyhow::ensure!(cursor.len() >= 4, "truncated u32");
     let value = u32::from_be_bytes(cursor[..4].try_into().unwrap());
@@ -169,6 +245,7 @@ fn read_u32(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u32> {
     Ok(value)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn read_ssh_string<'a>(cursor: &mut &'a [u8]) -> Result<&'a [u8]> {
     let len = read_u32(cursor)? as usize;
     anyhow::ensure!(cursor.len() >= len, "truncated SSH string");
@@ -177,12 +254,20 @@ fn read_ssh_string<'a>(cursor: &mut &'a [u8]) -> Result<&'a [u8]> {
     Ok(value)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn write_ssh_string(out: &mut Vec<u8>, value: &[u8]) {
     out.extend_from_slice(&(value.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
     out.extend_from_slice(value);
 }
 
-#[cfg(test)]
+#[cfg(unix)]
+fn key_blob_algorithm(blob: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
+    let mut cursor = blob;
+    let algorithm = read_ssh_string(&mut cursor)?;
+    Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(algorithm).to_string())
+}
+
+#[cfg(all(test, unix))]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use crate::native::{
@@ -253,8 +338,8 @@ mod tests {
             protocol_version: crate::native::NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
             client_random: [1u8; 32],
             client_ephemeral_public: [2u8; 32],
-            requested_host: "palav".to_string(),
+            requested_host: "homelab".to_string(),
-            requested_user: "palav".to_string(),
+            requested_user: "alice".to_string(),
             requested_session: "term".to_string(),
             requested_mode: "read-write".to_string(),
             terminal_size: (80, 24),

src/udp.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+//! UDP error classification shared by Dosh clients, servers, and embedders.
+
+pub fn is_transient_udp_send_error(err: &std::io::Error) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        err.kind(),
+        std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted
+            | std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut
+            | std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock
+    ) || err.raw_os_error().is_some_and(is_transient_udp_os_error)
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
+fn is_transient_udp_os_error(code: i32) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        code,
+        libc::EADDRNOTAVAIL
+            | libc::ECONNREFUSED
+            | libc::ECONNRESET
+            | libc::EHOSTDOWN
+            | libc::EHOSTUNREACH
+            | libc::ENETDOWN
+            | libc::ENETRESET
+            | libc::ENETUNREACH
+            | libc::ETIMEDOUT
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(windows)]
+fn is_transient_udp_os_error(code: i32) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        code,
+        10049  // WSAEADDRNOTAVAIL
+            | 10050 // WSAENETDOWN
+            | 10051 // WSAENETUNREACH
+            | 10052 // WSAENETRESET
+            | 10054 // WSAECONNRESET
+            | 10060 // WSAETIMEDOUT
+            | 10061 // WSAECONNREFUSED
+            | 10064 // WSAEHOSTDOWN
+            | 10065 // WSAEHOSTUNREACH
+    )
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(any(unix, windows)))]
+fn is_transient_udp_os_error(_code: i32) -> bool {
+    false
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::is_transient_udp_send_error;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn classifies_portable_transient_send_errors() {
+        for kind in [
+            std::io::ErrorKind::Interrupted,
+            std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut,
+            std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock,
+        ] {
+            assert!(is_transient_udp_send_error(&std::io::Error::from(kind)));
+        }
+        assert!(!is_transient_udp_send_error(&std::io::Error::from(
+            std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
+        )));
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(unix)]
+    #[test]
+    fn classifies_unix_network_churn_as_transient() {
+        for code in [
+            libc::EADDRNOTAVAIL,
+            libc::ECONNREFUSED,
+            libc::ECONNRESET,
+            libc::EHOSTDOWN,
+            libc::EHOSTUNREACH,
+            libc::ENETDOWN,
+            libc::ENETRESET,
+            libc::ENETUNREACH,
+            libc::ETIMEDOUT,
+        ] {
+            assert!(is_transient_udp_send_error(
+                &std::io::Error::from_raw_os_error(code)
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[cfg(windows)]
+    #[test]
+    fn classifies_windows_network_churn_as_transient() {
+        for code in [
+            10049, 10050, 10051, 10052, 10054, 10060, 10061, 10064, 10065,
+        ] {
+            assert!(is_transient_udp_send_error(
+                &std::io::Error::from_raw_os_error(code)
+            ));
+        }
+    }
+}

tests/hostile_network.rs

@@ -18,9 +18,15 @@
 //! Determinism: the relay's drop/reorder/dup behavior is driven by a fixed-seed
 //! PRNG and by explicit one-shot toggles, never by wall-clock timing, so the
 //! tests are reproducible and fast.
+#![allow(
+    clippy::collapsible_if,
+    clippy::explicit_counter_loop,
+    clippy::single_match
+)]
 
 use std::fs;
-use std::net::{SocketAddr, UdpSocket};
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::net::{SocketAddr, TcpListener, UdpSocket};
 use std::process::{Child, Command, Stdio};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU64, Ordering};
@@ -28,13 +34,18 @@ use std::sync::mpsc::{Receiver, Sender, channel};
 use std::thread;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
+use base64::Engine;
+use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD;
 use dosh::auth::{BootstrapResponse, build_bootstrap, load_or_create_server_secret};
 use dosh::config::load_server_config;
 use dosh::crypto;
+use dosh::native::{self, ForwardingKind, ForwardingRequest, NativeAuthOk, NativeClientHello};
 use dosh::protocol::{
-    self, AttachOk, CLIENT_TO_SERVER, Frame, Header, Input, PacketKind, ResumeRequest,
+    self, AttachOk, AttachReject, CLIENT_TO_SERVER, Frame, Header, Input, NativeAuthOkBody,
-    SERVER_TO_CLIENT,
+    NativeClientHelloBody, NativeServerHelloBody, NativeUserAuthBody, PacketKind, ResumeRequest,
+    SERVER_TO_CLIENT, StreamData, StreamOpen, StreamOpenOk, StreamWindowAdjust,
 };
+use ed25519_dalek::{SigningKey, VerifyingKey};
 use rand::rngs::StdRng;
 use rand::{Rng, SeedableRng};
 
@@ -67,6 +78,7 @@ sessions_dir = "{sessions}"
 secret_path = "{secret}"
 host_key = "{host_key}"
 authorized_keys = ["{authorized_keys}"]
+persist_sessions = false
 "#,
             sessions = dir.path().join("sessions").display(),
             secret = dir.path().join("secret").display(),
@@ -78,6 +90,23 @@ authorized_keys = ["{authorized_keys}"]
     config
 }
 
+fn authorize_ed25519_key(dir: &tempfile::TempDir, signing_key: &SigningKey) {
+    let verifying = VerifyingKey::from(signing_key);
+    let mut blob = Vec::new();
+    write_ssh_string(&mut blob, b"ssh-ed25519");
+    write_ssh_string(&mut blob, verifying.as_bytes());
+    fs::write(
+        dir.path().join("authorized_keys"),
+        format!("ssh-ed25519 {} hostile-test\n", STANDARD.encode(blob)),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+}
+
+fn write_ssh_string(out: &mut Vec<u8>, value: &[u8]) {
+    out.extend_from_slice(&(value.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    out.extend_from_slice(value);
+}
+
 fn start_server(dir: &tempfile::TempDir, config: &std::path::Path) -> Child {
     let server = env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_dosh-server");
     let child = Command::new(server)
@@ -229,7 +258,8 @@ fn relay_loop(
     let mut upstream = new_upstream();
     let mut client_addr: Option<SocketAddr> = None;
     let mut rng = StdRng::seed_from_u64(seed);
-    let mut held: Option<(Vec<u8>, bool)> = None; // (packet, is_c2s) held for reorder
+    let mut held_c2s: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
+    let mut held_s2c: Option<Vec<u8>> = None;
     let mut buf = [0u8; 65535];
 
     loop {
@@ -259,10 +289,9 @@ fn relay_loop(
                         &upstream,
                         server_addr,
                         packet,
-                        true,
                         &controls,
                         &mut rng,
-                        &mut held,
+                        &mut held_c2s,
                     );
                 }
             }
@@ -281,7 +310,12 @@ fn relay_loop(
                     let drop_pct = controls.drop_s2c_percent.load(Ordering::SeqCst);
                     if drop_pct == 0 || rng.gen_range(0..100) >= drop_pct {
                         forward_with_effects(
-                            &front, dst, packet, false, &controls, &mut rng, &mut held,
+                            &front,
+                            dst,
+                            packet,
+                            &controls,
+                            &mut rng,
+                            &mut held_s2c,
                         );
                     }
                 }
@@ -307,23 +341,22 @@ fn forward_with_effects(
     out: &UdpSocket,
     dst: SocketAddr,
     packet: Vec<u8>,
-    is_c2s: bool,
     controls: &RelayControls,
     rng: &mut StdRng,
-    held: &mut Option<(Vec<u8>, bool)>,
+    held: &mut Option<Vec<u8>>,
 ) {
     // Reorder: if armed, hold this packet and release the previously held one
     // afterward (so two consecutive packets swap order).
     if controls.reorder_next.swap(false, Ordering::SeqCst) {
-        if let Some((prev, _)) = held.take() {
+        if let Some(prev) = held.take() {
             let _ = out.send_to(&packet, dst);
             let _ = out.send_to(&prev, dst);
             return;
         }
-        *held = Some((packet, is_c2s));
+        *held = Some(packet);
         return;
     }
-    if let Some((prev, _)) = held.take() {
+    if let Some(prev) = held.take() {
         let _ = out.send_to(&prev, dst);
     }
 
@@ -401,6 +434,122 @@ fn attach_through_relay(
     }
 }
 
+struct NativeAttached {
+    socket: UdpSocket,
+    ok: NativeAuthOk,
+}
+
+fn native_attach_through_relay(
+    relay: &Relay,
+    signing_key: &SigningKey,
+    requested_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
+) -> NativeAttached {
+    let socket = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+    socket
+        .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_millis(500)))
+        .unwrap();
+    let (client_secret, client_public) = native::generate_native_ephemeral();
+    let hello = NativeClientHello {
+        protocol_version: native::NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+        client_random: crypto::random_32(),
+        client_ephemeral_public: client_public,
+        requested_host: "127.0.0.1".to_string(),
+        requested_user: std::env::var("USER").unwrap_or_else(|_| "unknown".to_string()),
+        requested_session: "default".to_string(),
+        requested_mode: "read-write".to_string(),
+        terminal_size: (80, 24),
+        supported_aead: vec!["chacha20poly1305".to_string()],
+        supported_user_key_algorithms: native::supported_user_key_algorithms(),
+        cached_host_key_fingerprint: None,
+        attach_ticket_envelope: None,
+        requested_env: Vec::new(),
+    };
+    let packet = protocol::encode_plain(
+        PacketKind::NativeClientHello,
+        [0u8; 16],
+        1,
+        0,
+        &protocol::to_body(&NativeClientHelloBody {
+            hello: hello.clone(),
+        })
+        .unwrap(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let hello_deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
+    let server_hello = loop {
+        socket.send_to(&packet, relay.front_addr()).unwrap();
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 65535];
+        match socket.recv_from(&mut buf) {
+            Ok((n, _)) => {
+                let packet = protocol::decode(&buf[..n]).unwrap();
+                match packet.header.kind {
+                    PacketKind::NativeServerHello => {
+                        let body: NativeServerHelloBody =
+                            protocol::from_body(&packet.body).unwrap();
+                        native::verify_server_hello(&hello, &body.hello).unwrap();
+                        break body.hello;
+                    }
+                    PacketKind::AttachReject => {
+                        let reject: AttachReject = protocol::from_body(&packet.body).unwrap();
+                        panic!("native hello rejected: {}", reject.reason);
+                    }
+                    kind => panic!("unexpected native hello response: {kind:?}"),
+                }
+            }
+            Err(_) if Instant::now() < hello_deadline => {}
+            Err(err) => panic!("native server hello timed out: {err}"),
+        }
+    };
+
+    let session_key = native::derive_native_session_key(
+        &client_secret,
+        server_hello.server_ephemeral_public,
+        &hello,
+        &server_hello,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let auth =
+        native::sign_user_auth(signing_key, &hello, &server_hello, requested_forwardings).unwrap();
+    let mut pending_id = [0u8; 16];
+    pending_id.copy_from_slice(&server_hello.auth_challenge[..16]);
+    let auth_packet = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+        PacketKind::NativeUserAuth,
+        pending_id,
+        2,
+        1,
+        &session_key,
+        CLIENT_TO_SERVER,
+        &protocol::to_body(&NativeUserAuthBody { auth }).unwrap(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    let auth_deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
+    let ok = loop {
+        socket.send_to(&auth_packet, relay.front_addr()).unwrap();
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 65535];
+        match socket.recv_from(&mut buf) {
+            Ok((n, _)) => {
+                let packet = protocol::decode(&buf[..n]).unwrap();
+                match packet.header.kind {
+                    PacketKind::NativeAuthOk => {
+                        let plain = protocol::decrypt_body(&packet, &session_key, SERVER_TO_CLIENT)
+                            .unwrap();
+                        let body: NativeAuthOkBody = protocol::from_body(&plain).unwrap();
+                        break body.ok;
+                    }
+                    PacketKind::AttachReject => {
+                        let reject: AttachReject = protocol::from_body(&packet.body).unwrap();
+                        panic!("native auth rejected: {}", reject.reason);
+                    }
+                    kind => panic!("unexpected native auth response: {kind:?}"),
+                }
+            }
+            Err(_) if Instant::now() < auth_deadline => {}
+            Err(err) => panic!("native auth ok timed out: {err}"),
+        }
+    };
+    NativeAttached { socket, ok }
+}
+
 fn send_input(
     socket: &UdpSocket,
     relay: &Relay,
@@ -430,6 +579,152 @@ fn send_raw(socket: &UdpSocket, relay: &Relay, packet: &[u8]) {
     socket.send_to(packet, relay.front_addr()).unwrap();
 }
 
+fn send_stream_packet(
+    socket: &UdpSocket,
+    relay: &Relay,
+    ok: &NativeAuthOk,
+    kind: PacketKind,
+    seq: u64,
+    ack: u64,
+    body: Vec<u8>,
+) {
+    let packet = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+        kind,
+        ok.client_id,
+        seq,
+        ack,
+        &ok.session_key,
+        CLIENT_TO_SERVER,
+        &body,
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    socket.send_to(&packet, relay.front_addr()).unwrap();
+}
+
+fn recv_stream_packet<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
+    socket: &UdpSocket,
+    key: &[u8; 32],
+    kind: PacketKind,
+) -> Option<(Header, T)> {
+    let mut buf = [0u8; 65535];
+    let (n, _) = socket.recv_from(&mut buf).ok()?;
+    let packet = protocol::decode(&buf[..n]).ok()?;
+    if packet.header.kind != kind {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let plain = protocol::decrypt_body(&packet, key, SERVER_TO_CLIENT).ok()?;
+    let body = protocol::from_body(&plain).ok()?;
+    Some((packet.header, body))
+}
+
+fn wait_for_stream_open_ok(
+    socket: &UdpSocket,
+    key: &[u8; 32],
+    stream_id: u64,
+    millis: u64,
+) -> Option<Header> {
+    let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(millis);
+    while Instant::now() < deadline {
+        if let Some((header, ok)) =
+            recv_stream_packet::<StreamOpenOk>(socket, key, PacketKind::StreamOpenOk)
+        {
+            if ok.stream_id == stream_id {
+                return Some(header);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+fn wait_for_stream_data(
+    socket: &UdpSocket,
+    key: &[u8; 32],
+    stream_id: u64,
+    millis: u64,
+) -> Option<(Header, StreamData)> {
+    let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(millis);
+    while Instant::now() < deadline {
+        if let Some((header, data)) =
+            recv_stream_packet::<StreamData>(socket, key, PacketKind::StreamData)
+        {
+            if data.stream_id == stream_id {
+                return Some((header, data));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+fn start_tcp_collector() -> (u16, Receiver<Vec<u8>>) {
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+    let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+    let (tx, rx) = channel();
+    thread::spawn(move || {
+        let Ok((mut stream, _)) = listener.accept() else {
+            return;
+        };
+        stream
+            .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_millis(100)))
+            .unwrap();
+        let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
+        while Instant::now() < deadline {
+            match stream.read(&mut buf) {
+                Ok(0) => return,
+                Ok(n) => {
+                    let _ = tx.send(buf[..n].to_vec());
+                }
+                Err(ref err)
+                    if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock
+                        || err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut => {}
+                Err(_) => return,
+            }
+        }
+    });
+    (port, rx)
+}
+
+fn start_tcp_echo() -> u16 {
+    let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+    let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
+    thread::spawn(move || {
+        let Ok((mut stream, _)) = listener.accept() else {
+            return;
+        };
+        stream
+            .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_millis(100)))
+            .unwrap();
+        let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
+        while Instant::now() < deadline {
+            match stream.read(&mut buf) {
+                Ok(0) => return,
+                Ok(n) => {
+                    let _ = stream.write_all(&buf[..n]);
+                }
+                Err(ref err)
+                    if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock
+                        || err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut => {}
+                Err(_) => return,
+            }
+        }
+    });
+    port
+}
+
+fn collect_tcp(rx: &Receiver<Vec<u8>>, millis: u64) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(millis);
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    while Instant::now() < deadline {
+        match rx.recv_timeout(Duration::from_millis(50)) {
+            Ok(chunk) => out.extend_from_slice(&chunk),
+            Err(std::sync::mpsc::RecvTimeoutError::Timeout) => {}
+            Err(std::sync::mpsc::RecvTimeoutError::Disconnected) => break,
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
 fn recv_frame(socket: &UdpSocket, key: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<(Header, Frame)> {
     let mut buf = [0u8; 65535];
     let (n, _) = socket.recv_from(&mut buf).ok()?;
@@ -476,13 +771,53 @@ fn wait_for_text(socket: &UdpSocket, key: &[u8; 32], needle: &str, millis: u64)
     acc.contains(needle)
 }
 
+fn wait_for_text_with_ack(
+    socket: &UdpSocket,
+    relay: &Relay,
+    client_id: [u8; 16],
+    seq: &mut u64,
+    key: &[u8; 32],
+    needle: &str,
+    millis: u64,
+) -> bool {
+    let prev = socket.read_timeout().unwrap();
+    socket
+        .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_millis(100)))
+        .unwrap();
+    let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_millis(millis);
+    let mut acc = String::new();
+    while Instant::now() < deadline {
+        if let Some((_header, frame)) = recv_frame(socket, key) {
+            acc.push_str(&String::from_utf8_lossy(&frame.bytes));
+            let ack = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+                PacketKind::Ack,
+                client_id,
+                *seq,
+                frame.output_seq,
+                key,
+                CLIENT_TO_SERVER,
+                b"",
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+            *seq += 1;
+            socket.send_to(&ack, relay.front_addr()).unwrap();
+            if acc.contains(needle) {
+                socket.set_read_timeout(prev).unwrap();
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    socket.set_read_timeout(prev).unwrap();
+    acc.contains(needle)
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn session_survives_packet_loss_and_reorder() {
     let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
     let port = free_udp_port();
     let config = write_server_config(&dir, port);
     let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
-    let relay = Relay::spawn(port, 0x105_5u64 ^ 0x1111);
+    let relay = Relay::spawn(port, 0x1055_u64 ^ 0x1111);
 
     let (socket, bootstrap, ok) = attach_through_relay(&config, &relay);
 
@@ -529,6 +864,94 @@ fn session_survives_packet_loss_and_reorder() {
     );
 }
 
+#[test]
+#[ignore = "30-minute hostile-network TUI soak; run with `DOSH_BADNET_SOAK_SECONDS=1800 cargo test --test hostile_network bad_network_tui_work_soak_30m -- --ignored --nocapture`"]
+fn bad_network_tui_work_soak_30m() {
+    let soak_secs = std::env::var("DOSH_BADNET_SOAK_SECONDS")
+        .ok()
+        .and_then(|value| value.parse::<u64>().ok())
+        .unwrap_or(30 * 60);
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let port = free_udp_port();
+    let config = write_server_config(&dir, port);
+    let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
+    let relay = Relay::spawn(port, 0xBADC0DEu64);
+    let (socket, bootstrap, ok) = attach_through_relay(&config, &relay);
+
+    relay.set_drop_c2s(15);
+    relay.set_drop_s2c(20);
+    relay.set_dup(10);
+
+    let deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(soak_secs);
+    let mut seq = 2u64;
+    let mut iteration = 0u64;
+    while Instant::now() < deadline {
+        if iteration.is_multiple_of(2) {
+            relay.arm_reorder();
+        }
+        if iteration > 0 && iteration.is_multiple_of(7) {
+            let _ = relay.rebind_upstream();
+        }
+        if iteration > 0 && iteration.is_multiple_of(11) {
+            relay.set_drop_s2c(100);
+            thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(750));
+            relay.set_drop_s2c(20);
+        }
+
+        let marker = format!("DOSH_BADNET_TUI_{iteration}");
+        let command = format!(
+            "stty -echo; \
+             printf '\\033[?1049h\\033[?2026h\\033[?25l'; \
+             for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do \
+               printf '\\033[%s;4H{} ⠀⠁⠃⠇⡇⣇⣧⣷⣿ █▇▆▅▄▃▂▁ %s\\033[0m' \"$i\" \"$i\"; \
+             done; \
+             printf '\\033[?25h\\033[?2026l\\033[?1049l'\n",
+            marker
+        );
+
+        let step_deadline = Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(8);
+        let mut seen = false;
+        let mut attempts = 0;
+        while Instant::now() < step_deadline && attempts < 12 {
+            send_input(
+                &socket,
+                &relay,
+                ok.client_id,
+                seq,
+                0,
+                &bootstrap.session_key,
+                command.as_bytes(),
+            );
+            seq += 1;
+            attempts += 1;
+            if wait_for_text_with_ack(
+                &socket,
+                &relay,
+                ok.client_id,
+                &mut seq,
+                &bootstrap.session_key,
+                &marker,
+                500,
+            ) {
+                seen = true;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        assert!(
+            seen,
+            "TUI marker {marker} did not arrive during hostile-network soak"
+        );
+
+        iteration += 1;
+        thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
+    }
+
+    relay.clear_impairments();
+    drop(relay);
+    let _ = server.kill();
+    let _ = server.wait();
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn duplicated_and_replayed_input_is_applied_at_most_once() {
     let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
@@ -602,6 +1025,215 @@ fn duplicated_and_replayed_input_is_applied_at_most_once() {
     );
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn forwarded_stream_data_survives_reorder_and_rejects_replay() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let port = free_udp_port();
+    let config = write_server_config(&dir, port);
+    let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[42u8; 32]);
+    authorize_ed25519_key(&dir, &signing_key);
+    let (target_port, tcp_rx) = start_tcp_collector();
+    let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
+    let relay = Relay::spawn(port, 0xF0E0D0u64);
+
+    let attached = native_attach_through_relay(
+        &relay,
+        &signing_key,
+        vec![ForwardingRequest {
+            kind: ForwardingKind::Local,
+            bind_host: Some("127.0.0.1".to_string()),
+            listen_port: 0,
+            target_host: Some("127.0.0.1".to_string()),
+            target_port: Some(target_port),
+        }],
+    );
+    let stream_id = 44;
+    let open = StreamOpen {
+        stream_id,
+        target_host: "127.0.0.1".to_string(),
+        target_port,
+    };
+    send_stream_packet(
+        &attached.socket,
+        &relay,
+        &attached.ok,
+        PacketKind::StreamOpen,
+        3,
+        attached.ok.initial_seq,
+        protocol::to_body(&open).unwrap(),
+    );
+    let open_ok =
+        wait_for_stream_open_ok(&attached.socket, &attached.ok.session_key, stream_id, 3000)
+            .expect("stream did not open");
+
+    // Swap the first two StreamData packets in flight. The server's replay
+    // window must accept both out-of-order packets and write both to the TCP
+    // target exactly once.
+    relay.arm_reorder();
+    send_stream_packet(
+        &attached.socket,
+        &relay,
+        &attached.ok,
+        PacketKind::StreamData,
+        4,
+        open_ok.seq,
+        protocol::to_body(&StreamData {
+            stream_id,
+            offset: 0,
+            bytes: b"A".to_vec(),
+        })
+        .unwrap(),
+    );
+    relay.arm_reorder();
+    send_stream_packet(
+        &attached.socket,
+        &relay,
+        &attached.ok,
+        PacketKind::StreamData,
+        5,
+        open_ok.seq,
+        protocol::to_body(&StreamData {
+            stream_id,
+            offset: 1,
+            bytes: b"B".to_vec(),
+        })
+        .unwrap(),
+    );
+
+    let mut seen = collect_tcp(&tcp_rx, 1500);
+    assert!(
+        seen.starts_with(b"AB"),
+        "reordered stream bytes were not delivered once in-order to TCP target: {:?}",
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&seen)
+    );
+
+    // Now send one encrypted StreamData packet repeatedly, with relay-level
+    // duplication enabled too. This is a true replay: same sequence, same nonce,
+    // same ciphertext. It must be applied to the TCP target at most once.
+    let replayed = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+        PacketKind::StreamData,
+        attached.ok.client_id,
+        6,
+        open_ok.seq,
+        &attached.ok.session_key,
+        CLIENT_TO_SERVER,
+        &protocol::to_body(&StreamData {
+            stream_id,
+            offset: 2,
+            bytes: b"X".to_vec(),
+        })
+        .unwrap(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    relay.set_dup(100);
+    for _ in 0..12 {
+        send_raw(&attached.socket, &relay, &replayed);
+        thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(25));
+    }
+    relay.set_dup(0);
+
+    seen.extend(collect_tcp(&tcp_rx, 1500));
+    let replay_count = seen.iter().filter(|byte| **byte == b'X').count();
+
+    drop(relay);
+    let _ = server.kill();
+    let _ = server.wait();
+
+    assert!(
+        replay_count <= 1,
+        "replayed/duplicated StreamData was applied {replay_count} times: {:?}",
+        String::from_utf8_lossy(&seen)
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn forwarded_stream_data_recovers_after_server_to_client_loss() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let port = free_udp_port();
+    let config = write_server_config(&dir, port);
+    let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&[43u8; 32]);
+    authorize_ed25519_key(&dir, &signing_key);
+    let target_port = start_tcp_echo();
+    let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
+    let relay = Relay::spawn(port, 0xA11CEu64);
+
+    let attached = native_attach_through_relay(
+        &relay,
+        &signing_key,
+        vec![ForwardingRequest {
+            kind: ForwardingKind::Local,
+            bind_host: Some("127.0.0.1".to_string()),
+            listen_port: 0,
+            target_host: Some("127.0.0.1".to_string()),
+            target_port: Some(target_port),
+        }],
+    );
+    let stream_id = 55;
+    let open = StreamOpen {
+        stream_id,
+        target_host: "127.0.0.1".to_string(),
+        target_port,
+    };
+    send_stream_packet(
+        &attached.socket,
+        &relay,
+        &attached.ok,
+        PacketKind::StreamOpen,
+        3,
+        attached.ok.initial_seq,
+        protocol::to_body(&open).unwrap(),
+    );
+    let open_ok =
+        wait_for_stream_open_ok(&attached.socket, &attached.ok.session_key, stream_id, 3000)
+            .expect("stream did not open");
+
+    // Drop the first server->client echo and at least one retransmit tick. Once
+    // the link clears, the unacked stream chunk must be re-encrypted with a new
+    // packet sequence and delivered at the same stream offset.
+    relay.set_drop_s2c(100);
+    send_stream_packet(
+        &attached.socket,
+        &relay,
+        &attached.ok,
+        PacketKind::StreamData,
+        4,
+        open_ok.seq,
+        protocol::to_body(&StreamData {
+            stream_id,
+            offset: 0,
+            bytes: b"PING".to_vec(),
+        })
+        .unwrap(),
+    );
+    thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(300));
+    relay.set_drop_s2c(0);
+
+    let (_header, data) =
+        wait_for_stream_data(&attached.socket, &attached.ok.session_key, stream_id, 3000)
+            .expect("lost server->client stream data was not retransmitted");
+    assert_eq!(data.offset, 0);
+    assert_eq!(data.bytes, b"PING");
+
+    send_stream_packet(
+        &attached.socket,
+        &relay,
+        &attached.ok,
+        PacketKind::StreamWindowAdjust,
+        5,
+        open_ok.seq,
+        protocol::to_body(&StreamWindowAdjust {
+            stream_id,
+            received_offset: 4,
+            bytes: 4,
+        })
+        .unwrap(),
+    );
+
+    drop(relay);
+    let _ = server.kill();
+    let _ = server.wait();
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn stale_packets_after_resume_are_ignored_not_fatal() {
     let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();

tests/protocol_auth.rs

@@ -58,6 +58,19 @@ fn encrypted_packet_round_trips() {
     assert_eq!(plain, b"hello");
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn plaintext_packet_never_decrypts_as_authenticated_body() {
+    let key = crypto::random_32();
+    let mut decoded = protocol::decode(
+        &protocol::encode_plain(PacketKind::Input, crypto::random_16(), 1, 0, b"hello").unwrap(),
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+    decoded.header.session_key_id = protocol::session_key_id(&key);
+
+    let err = protocol::decrypt_body(&decoded, &key, CLIENT_TO_SERVER).unwrap_err();
+    assert!(err.to_string().contains("not encrypted"));
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn encrypted_packet_rejects_wrong_session_key_id_before_decrypt() {
     let key = crypto::random_32();

tests/release_scripts.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#[test]
+fn quiet_update_keeps_prebuilt_enabled_by_default() {
+    let install = include_str!("../install.sh");
+    assert!(install.contains("use_prebuilt=\"${DOSH_USE_PREBUILT:-1}\""));
+    assert!(
+        !install.contains("use_prebuilt=0"),
+        "quiet updates must not force source builds"
+    );
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn release_scripts_skip_stale_artifacts_when_auto_discovering() {
+    let upload = include_str!("../scripts/upload-gitea-release.sh");
+    assert!(upload.contains("skipping $artifact: version"));
+    assert!(upload.contains("expected_version"));
+
+    let publish = include_str!("../scripts/publish-gitea-release.sh");
+    assert!(publish.contains("skipping stale artifact"));
+    assert!(publish.contains("actual=\"$(artifact_version \"$artifact\" || true)\""));
+}
+
+#[test]
+fn systemd_service_does_not_sandbox_remote_shells() {
+    let service = include_str!("../packaging/systemd/dosh-server.service");
+    let install = include_str!("../install.sh");
+    for raw in [service, install] {
+        assert!(raw.contains("KillMode=process"));
+        assert!(
+            raw.contains("Restart=always"),
+            "dosh-server should come back after accidental SIGTERM while preserving child shells"
+        );
+        for directive in [
+            "NoNewPrivileges=",
+            "PrivateTmp=",
+            "ProtectSystem=",
+            "ProtectHome=",
+            "RestrictAddressFamilies=",
+            "RestrictRealtime=",
+            "LockPersonality=",
+            "MemoryDenyWriteExecute=",
+        ] {
+            assert!(
+                !raw.contains(directive),
+                "dosh sessions are user shells; systemd sandbox directive {directive} changes terminal/app behavior"
+            );
+        }
+        assert!(
+            !raw.contains("ReadWritePaths="),
+            "remote shells must not be restricted to dosh config/data paths"
+        );
+    }
+}

vscode-extension/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Dosh Remote
+
+Open VS Code Remote-SSH windows through Dosh.
+
+The extension writes a managed SSH config entry like:
+
+```sshconfig
+Host dosh-palav
+    HostName 127.0.0.1
+    HostKeyAlias palav
+    ProxyCommand dosh proxy-stdio palav %h %p
+```
+
+VS Code still uses Remote-SSH, so server install, extensions, terminals, and
+normal SSH behavior stay intact. Dosh carries the SSH TCP byte stream.

vscode-extension/extension.js

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+const vscode = require('vscode');
+const fs = require('fs');
+const os = require('os');
+const path = require('path');
+
+function activate(context) {
+  context.subscriptions.push(
+    vscode.commands.registerCommand('dosh.openRemote', openRemote),
+    vscode.commands.registerCommand('dosh.configureHost', configureHostCommand),
+    vscode.commands.registerCommand('dosh.showSshConfig', showSshConfig)
+  );
+}
+
+async function openRemote() {
+  const configured = await configureHost();
+  if (!configured) {
+    return;
+  }
+  const remotePath = await vscode.window.showInputBox({
+    title: 'Remote path',
+    prompt: 'Path to open on the remote host',
+    value: '~'
+  });
+  if (remotePath === undefined) {
+    return;
+  }
+  const suffix = remotePath ? `/${remotePath.replace(/^\/+/, '')}` : '';
+  await vscode.commands.executeCommand(
+    'vscode.openFolder',
+    vscode.Uri.parse(`vscode-remote://ssh-remote+${configured.alias}${suffix}`),
+    { forceNewWindow: true }
+  );
+}
+
+async function configureHostCommand() {
+  const configured = await configureHost();
+  if (configured) {
+    vscode.window.showInformationMessage(`Dosh Remote-SSH host ready: ${configured.alias}`);
+  }
+}
+
+async function configureHost() {
+  const host = await vscode.window.showInputBox({
+    title: 'Dosh host',
+    prompt: 'Dosh host alias, e.g. palav',
+    ignoreFocusOut: true
+  });
+  if (!host) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  const user = await vscode.window.showInputBox({
+    title: 'Remote SSH user',
+    prompt: 'Optional. Leave blank to let SSH config decide.',
+    ignoreFocusOut: true
+  });
+  const config = vscode.workspace.getConfiguration('dosh');
+  const alias = `dosh-${safeAlias(host)}`;
+  const block = sshBlock({
+    alias,
+    host,
+    user: user || undefined,
+    executable: config.get('executable') || 'dosh',
+    targetHost: config.get('targetHost') || '127.0.0.1',
+    targetPort: Number(config.get('targetPort') || 22),
+    doshPort: Number(config.get('doshPort') || 0)
+  });
+  const sshDir = path.join(os.homedir(), '.ssh');
+  fs.mkdirSync(sshDir, { recursive: true });
+  const generatedPath = config.get('generatedSshConfig') || path.join(sshDir, 'config.dosh');
+  const mainConfig = path.join(sshDir, 'config');
+  ensureInclude(mainConfig, path.basename(generatedPath));
+  upsertBlock(generatedPath, alias, block);
+  return { alias, generatedPath };
+}
+
+function sshBlock(options) {
+  let proxy = shellQuote(options.executable);
+  if (options.doshPort > 0) {
+    proxy += ` --dosh-port ${options.doshPort}`;
+  }
+  proxy += ` proxy-stdio ${shellQuote(options.host)} %h %p`;
+  const lines = [
+    `# BEGIN DOSH ${options.alias}`,
+    `Host ${options.alias}`,
+    `    HostName ${options.targetHost}`,
+    `    Port ${options.targetPort}`,
+    `    HostKeyAlias ${options.host}`,
+    options.user ? `    User ${options.user}` : undefined,
+    '    ClearAllForwardings yes',
+    '    ServerAliveInterval 15',
+    '    ServerAliveCountMax 3',
+    `    ProxyCommand ${proxy}`,
+    `# END DOSH ${options.alias}`,
+    ''
+  ].filter(Boolean);
+  return lines.join('\n');
+}
+
+function ensureInclude(configPath, includeFile) {
+  const raw = fs.existsSync(configPath) ? fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8') : '';
+  if (raw.split(/\r?\n/).some((line) => line.trim().toLowerCase() === `include ${includeFile}`.toLowerCase())) {
+    return;
+  }
+  fs.writeFileSync(configPath, `Include ${includeFile}\n${raw ? `\n${raw}` : ''}`);
+}
+
+function upsertBlock(configPath, alias, block) {
+  const raw = fs.existsSync(configPath) ? fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf8') : '';
+  const begin = `# BEGIN DOSH ${alias}`;
+  const end = `# END DOSH ${alias}`;
+  const lines = raw.split(/\r?\n/);
+  const out = [];
+  let skipping = false;
+  let replaced = false;
+  for (const line of lines) {
+    if (line.trim() === begin) {
+      out.push(block.trimEnd());
+      skipping = true;
+      replaced = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (skipping) {
+      if (line.trim() === end) {
+        skipping = false;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (line.length > 0 || out.length > 0) {
+      out.push(line);
+    }
+  }
+  if (!replaced) {
+    if (out.length > 0 && out[out.length - 1] !== '') {
+      out.push('');
+    }
+    out.push(block.trimEnd());
+  }
+  fs.writeFileSync(configPath, `${out.join('\n').trimEnd()}\n`);
+}
+
+async function showSshConfig() {
+  const config = vscode.workspace.getConfiguration('dosh');
+  const sshDir = path.join(os.homedir(), '.ssh');
+  const generatedPath = config.get('generatedSshConfig') || path.join(sshDir, 'config.dosh');
+  if (!fs.existsSync(generatedPath)) {
+    vscode.window.showWarningMessage('No generated Dosh SSH config yet.');
+    return;
+  }
+  const doc = await vscode.workspace.openTextDocument(generatedPath);
+  await vscode.window.showTextDocument(doc);
+}
+
+function safeAlias(value) {
+  const alias = value.replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]+/g, '-').replace(/^-+|-+$/g, '');
+  return alias || 'host';
+}
+
+function shellQuote(value) {
+  if (/^[a-zA-Z0-9_./:-]+$/.test(value)) {
+    return value;
+  }
+  return `'${value.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'`;
+}
+
+function deactivate() {}
+
+module.exports = {
+  activate,
+  deactivate
+};

vscode-extension/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+{
+  "name": "dosh-vscode",
+  "displayName": "Dosh Remote",
+  "description": "Open VS Code Remote-SSH windows through Dosh.",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "publisher": "palav",
+  "license": "MIT",
+  "engines": {
+    "vscode": "^1.90.0"
+  },
+  "categories": [
+    "Other"
+  ],
+  "extensionDependencies": [
+    "ms-vscode-remote.remote-ssh"
+  ],
+  "activationEvents": [
+    "onCommand:dosh.openRemote",
+    "onCommand:dosh.configureHost",
+    "onCommand:dosh.showSshConfig"
+  ],
+  "main": "./extension.js",
+  "contributes": {
+    "commands": [
+      {
+        "command": "dosh.openRemote",
+        "title": "Dosh: Open Remote Folder"
+      },
+      {
+        "command": "dosh.configureHost",
+        "title": "Dosh: Configure Remote-SSH Host"
+      },
+      {
+        "command": "dosh.showSshConfig",
+        "title": "Dosh: Show Generated SSH Config"
+      }
+    ],
+    "configuration": {
+      "title": "Dosh Remote",
+      "properties": {
+        "dosh.executable": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "default": "dosh",
+          "description": "Path to the local dosh executable."
+        },
+        "dosh.targetHost": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "default": "127.0.0.1",
+          "description": "Host opened from the Dosh server side for VS Code's SSH connection."
+        },
+        "dosh.targetPort": {
+          "type": "number",
+          "default": 22,
+          "description": "SSH port opened from the Dosh server side."
+        },
+        "dosh.doshPort": {
+          "type": "number",
+          "default": 0,
+          "description": "Optional Dosh UDP port override. 0 uses Dosh config."
+        },
+        "dosh.generatedSshConfig": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "default": "",
+          "description": "Path for generated SSH config. Empty means ~/.ssh/config.dosh."
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}