Refresh reconnect send address and guard prebuilts

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -48,6 +48,17 @@ jobs:
         if: steps.nightly.outcome != 'success' || steps.install.outcome != 'success'
         run: echo "cargo-fuzz / nightly toolchain unavailable; skipped fuzz smoke run."
 
+  windows-client:
+    runs-on: windows-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      - uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
+      - name: Build Windows client
+        run: cargo build --release --bin dosh-client --bin dosh-bench
+      - name: Package Windows client
+        shell: bash
+        run: sh scripts/package-release.sh
+
   package-release:
     if: github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch' || startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/')
     strategy:

Cargo.lock

@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ dependencies = [
 
 [[package]]
 name = "dosh"
-version = "0.1.1"
+version = "0.1.3"
 dependencies = [
  "anyhow",
  "base64",

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "dosh"
-version = "0.1.1"
+version = "0.1.3"
 edition = "2024"
 license = "MIT"
 
@@ -38,4 +38,4 @@ opt-level = 2
 codegen-units = 16
 incremental = true
 lto = false
-strip = false
+strip = "debuginfo"

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: build test fmt install package-release bench-report bench-local bench-local-json bench-docker-ssh bench-docker-mosh fuzz-smoke fuzz-deep soak-local
+.PHONY: build test fmt install package-release package-release-linux package-release-windows publish-release bench-report bench-local bench-local-json bench-docker-ssh bench-docker-mosh fuzz-smoke fuzz-deep soak-local tui-harness
 
 build:
 	cargo build --release
@@ -10,11 +10,20 @@ fmt:
 	cargo fmt
 
 install:
-	sh packaging/install.sh
+	sh install.sh --from-current
 
 package-release:
 	sh scripts/package-release.sh
 
+package-release-linux:
+	DOSH_PACKAGE_OS=linux DOSH_PACKAGE_ARCH=x86_64 sh scripts/package-release.sh
+
+package-release-windows:
+	DOSH_PACKAGE_OS=windows DOSH_PACKAGE_ARCH=x86_64 DOSH_PACKAGE_TARGET=x86_64-pc-windows-gnu sh scripts/package-release.sh
+
+publish-release:
+	sh scripts/publish-gitea-release.sh
+
 bench-report:
 	sh scripts/bench-report.sh
 
@@ -42,6 +51,9 @@ fuzz-smoke:
 fuzz-deep:
 	DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS=$${DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS:-300} sh scripts/fuzz-run.sh
 
+tui-harness:
+	sh scripts/tui-harness.sh
+
 # 30-minute launch soak by default. Override with DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS=NN.
 soak-local:
 	DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS=$${DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS:-1800} cargo test --test integration_smoke sleep_roaming_soak_30m -- --ignored --nocapture

README.md

@@ -1,403 +1,82 @@
-# dosh - Dormant Shell
+# Dosh
 
-dosh is a low-latency remote terminal designed around fast attach and fast reconnect.
+Dosh is an encrypted remote terminal for fast reconnecting shells. It is meant
-It is mosh-shaped, but not a mosh clone: the server is a resident daemon, terminal
+to replace Mosh and day-to-day interactive SSH sessions.
-sessions stay hot, and repeat connects try encrypted UDP before starting SSH.
 
-The core target is simple:
+It runs a `dosh-server` on the remote machine and a `dosh` client locally. The
+first setup can use SSH. After that, Dosh can attach over encrypted UDP with
+cached credentials, keep terminal sessions alive, reconnect after network
+changes, and forward TCP ports.
 
-- First secure trust establishment uses SSH.
+## Support
-- Existing sessions attach in one encrypted UDP exchange whenever cached credentials allow it.
-- Reconnect after sleep, roaming, or network change resumes in one encrypted UDP exchange.
-- Cold SSH fallback stays competitive with plain `ssh` by doing less after auth.
 
-## Why not just mosh?
+- Client: macOS, Linux, Windows
+- Server: Unix-like systems with PTYs
+- Windows: client only
+- UDP port: one configured server port, default `50000`
 
-mosh is excellent at roaming and high-latency interactivity. Its startup path still
+Dosh is not an SCP/SFTP client and does not implement X11 forwarding. Windows
-has work dosh can avoid:
+is client-only.
-
-1. SSH connects to the host.
-2. SSH starts `mosh-server`.
-3. The client receives connection material over SSH.
-4. SSH exits and the mosh UDP session begins.
-
-dosh keeps `dosh-server` running before the client arrives. Named PTY sessions can
-also be prewarmed, so attaching to `default` does not need to spawn a daemon, create
-a PTY, or start a shell on the user's critical path.
-
-This is not an encryption argument against mosh. dosh also encrypts its UDP data
-channel; the speed difference comes from keeping the server and session hot.
-
-## Fast Path Order
-
-The client always tries the cheapest valid path first:
-
-1. **UDP resume:** existing `ClientId` and session key. No SSH. One encrypted UDP
-   request, one encrypted UDP reply.
-2. **UDP attach ticket:** cached server-issued attach ticket for the same
-   host/user/session/mode. No SSH. One encrypted UDP request, one encrypted UDP
-   reply.
-3. **SSH bootstrap:** `ssh -T user@host ~/.local/bin/dosh-auth ...`, then one encrypted UDP
-   attach.
-4. **New session:** same as attach, but the server must create the PTY/shell unless
-   the session was prewarmed.
-
-The fastest path is not a custom SSH replacement. SSH remains the first trust root;
-dosh removes SSH from repeat attaches when the server has already issued valid
-credentials.
-
-Attach tickets are implemented because they are the way a fresh client process can
-skip SSH after a recent successful bootstrap.
-
-## Connection Speed Contract
-
-dosh is measured by terminal-ready time: elapsed time from running `dosh host` to the
-first usable terminal screen.
-
-- UDP resume: <= one measured UDP RTT + local render time.
-- UDP attach ticket: <= one measured UDP RTT + local render time.
-- Warm attach with ControlMaster: <= `ssh host true` over the existing master + one
-  measured UDP RTT.
-- Cold attach without ControlMaster: <= cold `ssh host` terminal-ready time + one
-  measured UDP RTT.
-- New session: measured separately because it may need PTY and shell creation.
-
-Server-side client resume state is kept for a day by default, so a sleeping laptop
-can resume the same encrypted client association without depending on a still-valid
-attach ticket. Attach tickets remain the fast path for fresh client processes.
-
-The client emits timing spans for credential lookup, SSH bootstrap, UDP resume,
-UDP ticket attach, and terminal-ready time.
-
-## Architecture
-
-```text
-dosh-server
-  UDP socket on one configurable port
-  session table keyed by name
-  one PTY per named session
-  optional prewarmed sessions, default ["default"]
-  terminal parser/screen state per session
-  client table per session
-  encrypted UDP protocol
-  tiny SSH-invoked dosh-auth helper mode
-  persistent sessions (persist_sessions, currently opt-in): each shell runs in a
-    detached per-session holder process; the server adopts its PTY master fd via
-    SCM_RIGHTS and re-adopts it after a restart, so sessions survive crash/upgrade
-
-dosh-client
-  terminal raw mode
-  local credential cache
-  UDP resume/attach first
-  SSH bootstrap fallback
-  PTY input/output forwarding
-  reconnect and roaming state machine
-```
 
 ## Install
 
-Default UDP port: `50000`. This is intentionally inside the common forwarded range
+Server and client on Unix/macOS:
-`50000-52000/udp`.
 
-Install on each Linux server you want to attach to:
+```sh
-
+curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh -s -- both --repo https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git --port 50000
-```bash
-curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh \
-  | DOSH_REPO=https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git DOSH_PORT=50000 sh -s -- server
 ```
 
-Install the client on macOS:
+Client only on Unix/macOS:
 
-```bash
+```sh
-curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh \
+curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh | sh -s -- client --repo https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git
-  | DOSH_REPO=https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git DOSH_PORT=50000 sh -s -- client
 ```
 
-Update an installed client later:
+Windows client:
-
-```bash
-dosh update
-dosh update --check
-dosh --version
-```
-
-`dosh update` first tries a release tarball named for the platform
-(`dosh-macos-aarch64.tar.gz`, `dosh-linux-x86_64.tar.gz`, etc.) from the latest
-Gitea/GitHub release. Gitea's concrete tag download route is detected when
-`/releases/latest/download/...` is not supported. If that asset is not published
-yet, it falls back to the source build path. If the release also publishes
-`<artifact>.sha256`, the installer verifies the archive before installing it.
-
-Install the client on Windows PowerShell:
 
 ```powershell
-$env:DOSH_REPO="https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git"; $env:DOSH_PORT="50000"; irm https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.ps1 | iex
+irm https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.ps1 | iex
 ```
 
-Attach:
+## Commands
 
-```bash
+```sh
-dosh user@server.example.com
+dosh setup HOST          # import SSH config and trust the Dosh host key
+dosh HOST                # connect
+dosh HOST COMMAND        # connect and run a command
+dosh update              # update Dosh
+dosh status HOST         # show remote tmux sessions and Dosh service status
+dosh restart HOST        # restart dosh-server and show service status
+dosh doctor HOST         # check config and connectivity
+dosh recover HOST        # clear cached attach state and re-check
 ```
 
-First-time setup for an existing SSH alias:
+Examples:
 
-```bash
+```sh
-dosh setup homelab
+dosh palav
-dosh selftest homelab
+dosh palav tm
-dosh homelab
+dosh forward palav -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80
+dosh forward palav -D 1080
+dosh forward palav -R 2222:127.0.0.1:22
 ```
 
-`dosh setup <ssh-alias>` imports the OpenSSH alias into
+Agent forwarding is opt-in with `-A` and must be enabled on the server.
-`~/.config/dosh/hosts.toml`, pins the Dosh host key over SSH, runs `dosh doctor`,
-and prints next commands. `dosh selftest <host>` checks local terminal overlay
-safety, forwarding syntax, and the remote doctor path.
 
-Plain `dosh user@server.example.com` opens a fresh terminal session. Use named
+## Config
-sessions when you want to reattach to the same persistent terminal from multiple
-clients:
 
-```bash
+```text
-dosh --session work user@server.example.com
+~/.config/dosh/client.toml
-dosh --session logs user@server.example.com
+~/.config/dosh/hosts.toml
+~/.config/dosh/server.toml
 ```
 
-Press `Ctrl-]` to detach the current client while leaving the server session alive.
+Common client settings:
-Typing `exit` in the remote shell closes that Dosh session and returns the client.
-If UDP packets stop arriving, Dosh keeps the terminal open, sends keepalive pings,
-and attempts ticket-based reconnect. While the link is silent it shows a single,
-non-destructive status line on the bottom screen row (`[dosh] last contact Ns ago
-— reconnecting…`), drawn with save/restore cursor so it never moves the app cursor
-or corrupts a full-screen TUI, and cleared the instant packets resume. (The old
-in-band overlay wrote over the active line and could corrupt TUIs; this draws only
-the last row.) Disable it with `disconnect_status = false` in `client.toml` or
-`DOSH_DISCONNECT_STATUS=0`.
-
-If SSH and UDP use different public names, specify the UDP address:
-
-```bash
-dosh-client --dosh-host public.example.com --dosh-port 50000 user@host
-```
-
-Forwarding can use SSH-shaped flags directly or the forward-only wrapper:
-
-```bash
-dosh -N -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80 homelab
-dosh forward homelab -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80 -D 1080
-```
-
-Dosh already lets OpenSSH handle SSH aliases, users, keys, ports, known-hosts,
-ProxyJump, and other SSH config during bootstrap. It also runs `ssh -G` to infer the
-UDP host from an SSH alias when `dosh_host` is not configured. To make that explicit
-in Dosh's host config:
-
-```bash
-dosh import-ssh homelab
-dosh homelab
-```
-
-Optional command extensions are just config-side startup shortcuts; Dosh has no
-compile-time dependency on the tools they run. For example, to make a separately
-installed server-side `tm` dashboard easy to open:
 
 ```toml
-# ~/.config/dosh/client.toml
+default_session = "new"
-[extensions.tm]
+auth_preference = "native,ssh"
-command = "tm {args}"
+predict = true
-description = "Open the server-side tmux dashboard"
+cache_attach_tickets = true
+disconnect_status = true
 ```
-
-Then `dosh homelab tm` sends `tm`, and `dosh homelab tm dosh` sends `tm 'dosh'`.
-Remove that table to remove the integration. Hosts can override or opt out:
-
-```toml
-# ~/.config/dosh/hosts.toml
-[homelab.extensions.tm]
-command = "/opt/tm/bin/tm {args}"
-
-[other-host.extensions.tm]
-disabled = true
-```
-
-## Develop
-
-Build:
-
-```bash
-cargo build
-```
-
-Attach locally, using local bootstrap instead of SSH:
-
-```bash
-target/debug/dosh-client --local-auth --no-cache local
-```
-
-Benchmark local attach:
-
-```bash
-target/debug/dosh-bench --local-auth --server local --iterations 5
-```
-
-Benchmark a remote host over SSH bootstrap:
-
-```bash
-target/release/dosh-bench --server user@host --ssh-port 22 --iterations 3
-```
-
-Benchmark the ControlMaster-backed SSH bootstrap path:
-
-```bash
-target/release/dosh-bench --server user@host --controlmaster --iterations 3
-```
-
-Run the Docker OpenSSH benchmark gate used by CI. It checks cold SSH bootstrap,
-ControlMaster-backed SSH bootstrap, native cold auth after one-time `dosh trust`,
-and cached attach against a containerized `sshd` plus resident `dosh-server`:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-ssh
-```
-
-Run the same Docker comparison with Mosh installed in the benchmark container:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-mosh
-```
-
-That prints `ssh_true_ms`, `dosh_attach_ms`, `dosh_cold_native_ms`,
-`dosh_cached_attach_ms`, and, for the Mosh target, `mosh_start_true_ms` under the
-same container, key, DNS, and network path. `dosh_cached_attach_ms` is the real Dosh
-fast path after the first authentication has issued an attach ticket. See
-`docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` before using the numbers publicly; Dosh's current
-strongest claim is fast attach/reconnect plus native encrypted forwarding on
-Dosh-installed servers, not generic SSH compatibility.
-
-The latest local release evidence is in
-`docs/RELEASE_EVIDENCE_2026-06-20.md`.
-
-Generate a publishable Markdown benchmark report:
-
-```bash
-make bench-report
-```
-
-Set `DOSH_BENCH_SERVER`, `DOSH_BENCH_ITERS`, `DOSH_BENCH_ARGS`, and
-`DOSH_BENCH_REPORT` to target a real host and choose the output path.
-
-Run the explicit pre-launch soak and fuzz gates:
-
-```bash
-make soak-local                 # 30-minute sleep/roaming gate by default
-make fuzz-deep                  # 5 minutes per fuzz target by default
-```
-
-Both are configurable for shorter local shakedowns:
-
-```bash
-DOSH_SOAK_SECONDS=30 make soak-local
-DOSH_FUZZ_SECONDS=60 make fuzz-deep
-```
-
-The CI workflow includes an optional remote benchmark job. It runs when
-`DOSH_BENCH_HOST`, `DOSH_BENCH_USER`, and `DOSH_BENCH_SSH_KEY` repository secrets are
-configured.
-
-Install release binaries and the user systemd service:
-
-```bash
-make install
-```
-
-Build release tarballs for upload to Gitea/GitHub releases:
-
-```bash
-make package-release
-GITEA_TOKEN=... scripts/upload-gitea-release.sh v0.1.0 target/dosh-release/dosh-*
-```
-
-## Performance Rules
-
-The stack is performance-driven, not fixed by taste. Rust is the default because the
-likely bottlenecks are network RTT, SSH startup/auth, PTY/shell creation, packet
-size, and terminal rendering. Change language or runtime only if measurements show
-they are the bottleneck.
-
-Hot-path rules:
-
-- Custom UDP protocol with AEAD for v0; no QUIC handshake on attach.
-- Fixed binary packet headers for terminal traffic; no JSON on the protocol path.
-- Preallocated buffers; avoid per-packet heap churn.
-- Single-thread event loop is preferred for the hot path.
-- No PTY allocation, shell spawn, shell rc files, or MOTD on attach to an existing
-  session.
-- Initial snapshot should be sent in the first UDP reply when it fits under the
-  packet budget.
-
-## Goals
-
-- Connection speed as specified above.
-- UDP roaming and reconnect.
-- Encrypted terminal data.
-- Reuse SSH pubkeys for first trust establishment.
-- Named persistent sessions.
-- Multiple clients attached to one session.
-- Optional view-only clients.
-- Single server port, not one port per session.
-- Static server and client binaries where practical.
-
-## Non-Goals
-
-- Replacing SSH as the first public-key trust mechanism.
-- Multi-user access control.
-- Windows server/full parity in v0; the client installer supports prebuilt Windows
-  client artifacts when published.
-- Full mosh compatibility.
-- Perfect predictive local echo in the first MVP.
-
-## Status
-
-Rust implementation is present in this repository. It contains `dosh-server`,
-`dosh-client`, `dosh-auth`, `dosh-bench`, shared auth/crypto/protocol modules, a
-resident PTY server, encrypted UDP bootstrap attach, UDP resume, sealed UDP attach
-tickets, client ACKs, server retransmit bookkeeping, sliding replay protection,
-server-side `vt100` screen snapshots/diffs, a hardened user systemd unit, an install
-script, Docker SSH benchmark gates, CI, and protocol/integration tests.
-
-### Native v1
-
-Beyond the SSH-bootstrap core, native v1 (`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`) is substantially
-implemented and aims to replace the day-to-day `ssh host` workflow on Dosh-installed
-servers:
-
-- **Native UDP auth** with X25519 key exchange; transcript-bound Ed25519, ECDSA
-  P-256, and RSA-SHA2 user auth via ssh-agent or OpenSSH identity files;
-  ChaCha20-Poly1305 transport; and `authorized_keys` policy enforcement (`from=`,
-  `no-port-forwarding`, `permitopen=`; unsupported options fail closed).
-- **Dosh host-key trust**: pinned `known_hosts`, `dosh trust [--remove|--replace]`,
-  TOFU only when explicitly enabled, and hard-fail on host-key mismatch.
-- **TCP forwarding**: local `-L`, remote `-R` (loopback bind by default), dynamic
-  SOCKS5 `-D`, forward-only `-N`, and background `-f`, with per-stream flow control so
-  bulk transfers do not lag the terminal.
-- **Agent forwarding** (opt-in, security-gated): `-A` / `forward_agent` exports your
-  local `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` to a per-session proxy socket on the server (private dir,
-  mode 0600) and tunnels each connection back to your agent over a Dosh stream. Only
-  active on explicit client opt-in **and** server `allow_agent_forwarding = true`; it
-  applies to freshly spawned shells (not an already-running attached/prewarmed
-  session, the same constraint ssh/mosh have).
-- **Diagnostics**: `dosh doctor host` for config/auth/UDP/forwarding-policy checks.
-
-Native auth is **opt-in alongside SSH fallback** (`auth_preference = "native,ssh"`):
-the native authenticated path is tried first and falls back to SSH bootstrap
-explicitly when native auth is disabled, unavailable, or rejected. It never silently
-degrades to an unauthenticated mode.
-
-Native v1 is **not externally audited yet**. Local 30-minute sleep/roaming soak,
-fuzz-smoke, and Docker SSH/Mosh benchmark evidence is captured in
-`docs/RELEASE_EVIDENCE_2026-06-20.md`. See `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` for the
-published threat model and accepted residual risks, `docs/PROTOCOL_VERSIONING.md`
-for the v1 versioning policy, `docs/AUDIT_PACKET.md` for the external security
-review handoff, and the "Native v1 verification checklist status" table in
-`docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` for the item-by-item state. Dosh does not claim generic
-SSH compatibility; its defensible claim is fast encrypted native attach/reconnect
-and forwarding on Dosh-installed servers with SSH bootstrap fallback.

SPEC.md

@@ -1,604 +0,0 @@
-# dosh - Dormant Shell Spec
-
-**Status:** Implemented Rust build with local and Docker SSH verification  
-**Default language:** Rust, unless benchmarks prove the stack is the bottleneck  
-**Binaries:** `dosh-server`, `dosh-client`, `dosh-auth`, `dosh-bench`  
-**Helper mode:** `dosh-server auth` or `~/.local/bin/dosh-auth`, invoked by SSH with `-T`  
-**Native v1 plan:** `docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` (substantially implemented; see its v1 status block)  
-**Threat model:** `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`
-
----
-
-## 1. Product Shape
-
-dosh is a fast-attach remote terminal. It borrows the useful shape of mosh - UDP
-transport, roaming, and latency-tolerant terminal rendering - but optimizes a
-different first-order problem: getting the user back into an already-running terminal
-as quickly as possible.
-
-The daemon is resident. Sessions are named. A session owns one PTY and one
-authoritative terminal screen. Clients attach to that session over encrypted UDP.
-SSH is used for first trust establishment and as fallback when cached credentials are
-missing, expired, or rejected. Native Dosh auth is specified separately in
-`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` as the path toward replacing the day-to-day SSH workflow on
-Dosh-installed servers.
-
----
-
-## 2. Design Goals
-
-- Connection speed first:
-  - UDP resume: one encrypted UDP request and one encrypted UDP reply.
-  - UDP attach ticket: one encrypted UDP request and one encrypted UDP reply.
-  - Warm SSH bootstrap: existing-ControlMaster SSH command latency plus one UDP RTT.
-  - Cold SSH bootstrap: cold `ssh host` terminal-ready time plus at most one UDP RTT.
-- No daemon spawn, PTY spawn, shell startup, rc file execution, or MOTD on attach to
-  an existing session.
-- Prewarm configured sessions at daemon startup, including `default` by default.
-- Encrypted UDP terminal data.
-- Single configurable UDP port.
-- Multiple clients attached to one session.
-- Optional read-only clients.
-- Named persistent sessions.
-- Reuse existing SSH key infrastructure.
-- Instrument connection timing from the first implementation.
-
----
-
-## 3. Non-Goals
-
-- Replacing SSH as the first public-key trust mechanism.
-- Multi-user authorization or ACLs.
-- Windows support in v0.
-- Full mosh protocol compatibility.
-- Perfect local echo/prediction in the first MVP.
-- QUIC in v0. QUIC can be revisited if measurements show custom UDP is not enough.
-
----
-
-## 4. Connection Speed Contract
-
-Measure terminal-ready time: elapsed time from launching `dosh ...` to first usable
-terminal render.
-
-Benchmarks must use the same host, network, key, DNS path, and SSH config.
-
-| Path | Acceptance gate |
-| --- | --- |
-| UDP resume | <= one measured UDP RTT + local render time |
-| UDP attach ticket | <= one measured UDP RTT + local render time |
-| Warm SSH bootstrap | <= `ssh host true` over existing ControlMaster + one measured UDP RTT |
-| Cold SSH bootstrap | <= cold `ssh host` terminal-ready time + one measured UDP RTT |
-| New session | Report separately; PTY/shell creation is expected |
-
-Required timing evidence:
-
-- Client stderr spans for credential lookup, SSH bootstrap, UDP resume, UDP ticket
-  attach, and terminal-ready time.
-- `dosh-bench` samples for SSH `true`, Dosh attach, and optional ControlMaster-backed
-  SSH `true`.
-- `make bench-docker-ssh` gates both cold SSH bootstrap and ControlMaster-backed SSH
-  bootstrap against containerized OpenSSH plus resident `dosh-server`.
-
----
-
-## 5. Fast Path Order
-
-The client always tries the cheapest path that is valid for the requested
-host/user/session/mode:
-
-1. **UDP resume**
-   - Requires cached `ClientId`, session key, server identity, and unexpired resume
-     metadata.
-   - Sends `ResumeRequest`.
-   - Receives `ResumeOk` with a snapshot or diff.
-
-2. **UDP attach ticket**
-   - Requires cached attach ticket scoped to server identity, SSH username, session,
-     mode, and expiry.
-   - Sends `TicketAttachRequest`.
-   - Receives `AttachOk` with session key, `ClientId`, and snapshot.
-
-3. **SSH bootstrap**
-   - Runs `ssh -T user@host ~/.local/bin/dosh-auth ...`.
-   - Receives attach token, attach ticket, session key material, and server metadata.
-   - Sends `BootstrapAttachRequest`.
-   - Receives `AttachOk` with `ClientId` and snapshot.
-
-4. **New session**
-   - Same as attach, but if the session does not exist and is not prewarmed, the server
-     creates PTY and shell before first paint.
-
----
-
-## 6. Architecture
-
-```text
-dosh-server
-  config loader
-  secret manager
-  UDP socket on one port
-  session table: HashMap<SessionName, Session>
-  optional prewarm of configured sessions
-  auth helper mode for SSH bootstrap
-  metrics/timing logger
-
-Session
-  PTY master
-  child process/shell
-  terminal parser
-  authoritative screen model
-  scrollback ring
-  monotonic output sequence
-  client table: HashMap<ClientId, ClientState>
-
-ClientState
-  ClientId
-  UDP endpoint
-  mode: read-write | view-only
-  session key id
-  last acked sequence
-  terminal size
-  last seen timestamp
-
-dosh-client
-  config loader
-  local credential cache
-  terminal raw mode
-  UDP protocol engine
-  SSH bootstrap runner
-  reconnect state machine
-  renderer
-```
-
-Server hot-path ownership should avoid locks on every broadcast. A single event-loop
-owner per session is preferred. Cross-thread designs are allowed only if benchmarked.
-
----
-
-## 7. Security Model
-
-SSH is the first trust root and the recovery/bootstrap fallback. The v0 core relies
-on SSH for first authentication. Native v1 (`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`) adds an opt-in
-native public-key login over the Dosh UDP transport that is tried before SSH, with
-its assets, attackers, and residual risks documented in `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`. SSH
-remains the explicit fallback and the host-key trust bootstrap path.
-
-The UDP channel uses AEAD. Recommended default: `ChaCha20-Poly1305` for portable
-speed, with `AES-GCM` allowed when hardware acceleration is known to be available.
-The negotiated algorithm is recorded in the bootstrap response.
-
-All encrypted packets use:
-
-- Unique nonce per `(session_key_id, direction)`.
-- Monotonic packet counter.
-- Associated data containing protocol version, packet type, session name hash,
-  client id when known, and sequence numbers.
-- Replay rejection using the packet counter window.
-
-Secrets:
-
-- `server_secret`: generated on first server start; stored mode `0600`.
-- `session_key`: random 256-bit key per client attachment, rotated on SSH bootstrap
-  or ticket attach.
-- `attach_ticket_key`: derived from `server_secret` and rotated by server key epoch.
-
-No terminal bytes are sent outside AEAD after the attach handshake begins.
-
----
-
-## 8. SSH Bootstrap Auth
-
-Client command:
-
-```bash
-ssh -T user@host ~/.local/bin/dosh-auth \
-  --protocol 1 \
-  --nonce <client_nonce> \
-  --session <name> \
-  --mode <read-write|view-only> \
-  --size <cols>x<rows> \
-  --client-version <version>
-```
-
-`dosh-auth` must:
-
-- Not allocate a PTY.
-- Not start a shell.
-- Not run user shell rc files.
-- Read server config and secret directly.
-- Return one compact binary or base64url response on stdout.
-- Exit immediately.
-
-Bootstrap response fields:
-
-- `protocol_version`
-- `server_id`
-- `server_key_epoch`
-- `issued_at`
-- `expires_at`
-- `user`
-- `session`
-- `mode`
-- `terminal_size`
-- `attach_token`
-- `attach_ticket`
-- `attach_ticket_psk`
-- `session_key`
-- `session_key_id`
-- `udp_host`
-- `udp_port`
-- `aead_algorithm`
-
-`attach_token = HMAC-SHA256(server_secret, user || session || mode || terminal_size ||
-client_nonce || issued_at || expires_at || session_key_id)`.
-
-The token TTL defaults to 30 seconds. Attach tickets default to 1 hour and are
-server-configurable.
-
----
-
-## 9. Attach Tickets
-
-Attach tickets let a new client process attach without spawning SSH again.
-
-Ticket properties:
-
-- Server-sealed and authenticated by `attach_ticket_key`.
-- Paired with a client-held random `attach_ticket_psk` returned during SSH bootstrap.
-- Scoped to server identity, SSH username, session, mode, and key epoch.
-- Short-lived by default.
-- Revoked implicitly when server secret/key epoch changes.
-- Stored client-side with mode `0600`, along with `attach_ticket_psk`.
-
-Ticket attach does not prove fresh possession of the SSH private key. It proves recent
-possession of a server-issued credential. This is acceptable for speed, configurable,
-and can be disabled with `allow_attach_tickets = false`.
-
-Ticket attach flow:
-
-1. Client sends `TicketAttachRequest` containing the sealed ticket, client nonce, and
-   requested terminal size.
-2. The request body is AEAD-encrypted with a key derived from
-   `HKDF(attach_ticket_psk, client_nonce || "ticket-attach-request")`.
-3. Server opens the sealed ticket, validates scope/expiry/key epoch, derives the same
-   request key, and decrypts the request.
-4. Server creates a fresh session key and `ClientId`.
-5. `AttachOk` is AEAD-encrypted with
-   `HKDF(attach_ticket_psk, client_nonce || server_nonce || "ticket-attach-ok")` and
-   carries the fresh session key metadata plus first snapshot.
-6. Subsequent terminal packets use the fresh session key, not the ticket PSK.
-
----
-
-## 10. UDP Protocol
-
-UDP port defaults to `50000`. One socket handles all sessions and clients.
-
-Hot-path terminal packets use a fixed binary header:
-
-```text
-magic      4 bytes   "DOSH"
-version    1 byte    1
-type       1 byte
-flags      2 bytes
-conn_id    16 bytes  zero before client id is assigned
-seq        8 bytes   sender packet sequence
-ack        8 bytes   latest received peer sequence
-body_len   2 bytes
-body       body_len bytes
-tag        AEAD tag, length depends on algorithm
-```
-
-Packet types:
-
-| Type | Direction | Encrypted | Purpose |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| `BootstrapAttachRequest` | client -> server | token-authenticated | Attach after SSH bootstrap |
-| `TicketAttachRequest` | client -> server | ticket PSK | Attach with cached ticket |
-| `AttachOk` | server -> client | yes | Assign client id and send first snapshot |
-| `AttachReject` | server -> client | no terminal bytes | Reject and require SSH |
-| `ResumeRequest` | client -> server | yes | Resume known client |
-| `ResumeOk` | server -> client | yes | Endpoint updated; diff/snapshot follows |
-| `Input` | client -> server | yes | PTY input bytes |
-| `Resize` | client -> server | yes | Terminal size update |
-| `Frame` | server -> client | yes | Screen diff or PTY byte frame |
-| `Ack` | both | yes | Ack without payload |
-| `Ping` / `Pong` | both | yes | Keepalive and RTT |
-| `Detach` | client -> server | yes | Remove client, keep session |
-
-MTU target:
-
-- Default payload target: 1200 bytes.
-- Larger datagrams may be enabled only after path MTU discovery.
-- Snapshots larger than the target are chunked.
-
-Reliability:
-
-- Input packets are reliable and ordered per client.
-- Output frames are sequenced; clients ack rendered sequence.
-- Server retransmits unacked frames within a bounded window.
-- If a client falls too far behind, server sends a fresh snapshot instead of replaying
-  unlimited diffs.
-
----
-
-## 11. Sessions and PTYs
-
-Named sessions:
-
-```bash
-dosh host                  # open a fresh generated session
-dosh --session work host   # attach/create named persistent session
-dosh --session work --view-only host
-```
-
-Session behavior:
-
-- One PTY per session.
-- Sessions persist until killed or server exits.
-- If a session has zero clients, the PTY keeps running.
-- Plain client attaches use generated session names by default.
-- `--session <name>` intentionally reuses or shares a persistent session.
-- Configured sessions are prewarmed at daemon startup.
-- If a requested session does not exist:
-  - `attach` creates it only when `create_on_attach = true`.
-  - `new` always creates it and fails if it already exists.
-
-Resize policy:
-
-- One PTY means one size.
-- Read-write clients may resize.
-- View-only clients never resize.
-- Default policy: latest read-write resize wins.
-
----
-
-## 12. Screen State
-
-Server maintains the authoritative terminal model:
-
-- Visible grid.
-- Cursor position and style.
-- Alternate screen.
-- Text attributes and colors.
-- Scrollback ring.
-- Monotonic output sequence.
-
-Initial attach:
-
-- Server sends a snapshot in the first UDP reply if it fits the packet budget.
-- If not, server sends a minimal first frame immediately and follows with chunks.
-
-Diffs:
-
-- Diffs are computed per client from that client's last acked rendered sequence.
-- Lagging clients may receive larger diffs or a full snapshot.
-- Diffs are preferred over raw PTY bytes for reconnect correctness.
-
-Encoding:
-
-- Hot terminal frames use fixed binary headers and compact binary payloads.
-- MessagePack is allowed only for non-hot control/list/config responses.
-- JSON is not used on the protocol path.
-
----
-
-## 13. Multi-Client Model
-
-Default mode is shared input. Any read-write client can write to the session PTY.
-All clients see the same resulting screen.
-
-View-only mode:
-
-- Client suppresses local input.
-- Server rejects `Input` from view-only clients even if a malformed client sends it.
-- Promotion/demotion requires reconnect.
-
-Client timeout:
-
-- Clients are removed after `client_timeout_secs` without ack/ping.
-- The default is intentionally long enough for laptop sleep/resume, currently one
-  day. Short timeouts make Dosh fall back to attach tickets or SSH after sleep.
-- Removing a client never kills the session.
-
----
-
-## 14. Local Echo
-
-MVP local echo is conservative:
-
-- Printable keystrokes may be rendered optimistically only when the client is in a
-  simple shell line-editing state.
-- Server output is always authoritative.
-- On mismatch, client replaces local prediction with server state.
-
-Full mosh-style predictive display is a later feature. It must not delay the first
-implementation of fast attach/resume.
-
----
-
-## 15. Reconnect and Roaming
-
-Client detects possible disconnect when no server packet arrives for
-`reconnect_timeout_secs`.
-
-Reconnect order:
-
-1. Send encrypted `ResumeRequest` to the configured host/port.
-2. If accepted, update endpoint server-side and receive diff/snapshot.
-3. If rejected, try attach ticket.
-4. If ticket attach is rejected, run SSH bootstrap.
-
-The server matches resume by `ClientId` and session key id, not by source address.
-Successful resume updates the client's UDP endpoint.
-
----
-
-## 16. Configuration
-
-Server config: `~/.config/dosh/server.toml`
-
-```toml
-port = 50000
-bind = "0.0.0.0"
-scrollback = 5000
-auth_ttl_secs = 30
-attach_ticket_ttl_secs = 3600
-allow_attach_tickets = true
-client_timeout_secs = 86400
-retransmit_window = 256
-default_input_mode = "read-write"
-prewarm_sessions = ["default"]
-create_on_attach = true
-shell = "/usr/bin/zsh"
-sessions_dir = "~/.local/share/dosh/sessions"
-secret_path = "~/.config/dosh/secret"
-```
-
-Client config: `~/.config/dosh/client.toml`
-
-```toml
-server = "user@example.com"
-update_repo = "https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh.git"
-update_port = 50000
-ssh_auth_command = "~/.local/bin/dosh-auth"
-# ssh_port = 22
-dosh_port = 50000
-default_session = "new"
-reconnect_timeout_secs = 5
-view_only = false
-predict = true
-predict_mode = "experimental"
-cache_attach_tickets = true
-credential_cache = "~/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
-```
-
----
-
-## 17. Performance-First Stack
-
-Default implementation:
-
-```text
-# server/client shared
-bytes
-chacha20poly1305
-aes-gcm optional
-hmac
-hkdf
-sha2
-rand
-serde
-toml
-
-# server
-mio or tokio    # benchmark; single-thread hot path either way
-rustix          # PTY/process/syscall wrappers where possible
-vt100           # authoritative terminal parser/model
-
-# client
-mio or tokio
-crossterm       # raw terminal mode
-vt100 optional  # only if client-side model is needed for prediction
-```
-
-Rules:
-
-- Benchmark `mio` vs single-thread `tokio` before committing to runtime.
-- Avoid locks on per-packet session broadcast.
-- Preallocate packet buffers.
-- Avoid serde on terminal frames.
-- Keep `dosh-auth` tiny and static where practical.
-- Optimize startup path before throughput.
-
----
-
-## 18. MVP Scope
-
-MVP must include:
-
-- `dosh-server` daemon.
-- `dosh-auth` SSH helper mode.
-- `dosh-client`.
-- One UDP port.
-- Prewarmed `default` session.
-- SSH bootstrap attach.
-- Attach-ticket UDP attach.
-- Encrypted UDP channel.
-- UDP resume.
-- Raw terminal input/output.
-- Basic resize.
-- Timing instrumentation.
-
-MVP may defer:
-
-- Sophisticated predictive local echo.
-- Per-cell minimal diffs; raw frame plus snapshot fallback is acceptable initially if
-  reconnect correctness is preserved.
-- Multi-session management commands beyond `attach`, `new`, `list`, and `kill`.
-
----
-
-## 19. Verification Checklist
-
-A build is not done until these are demonstrated:
-
-- Cold attach timing compared against cold `ssh host`.
-- Warm attach timing compared against `ssh host true` with ControlMaster.
-- UDP resume completes without spawning SSH.
-- Existing session attach does not spawn PTY or shell.
-- Prewarmed `default` exists before first client.
-- Terminal data is encrypted on UDP.
-- Replay counters reject duplicate encrypted packets.
-- View-only clients cannot write to PTY.
-- Multiple clients see the same screen.
-- Client survives source port/IP change by resume.
-- Snapshot fallback repairs a lagging client.
-- `README.md` and `SPEC.md` remain consistent with implemented behavior.
-
----
-
-## 20. Status
-
-Spec complete. The Rust implementation is present in this repository.
-
-Implemented:
-
-- Rust workspace and binaries: `dosh-server`, `dosh-client`, `dosh-auth`.
-- Server config and secret creation.
-- SSH/local bootstrap response generation.
-- HMAC bootstrap verification.
-- ChaCha20-Poly1305 encrypted UDP packets.
-- Fixed DOSH packet header.
-- Resident server with prewarmed named PTY sessions.
-- Authoritative server-side `vt100` terminal parser.
-- Full attach/resume snapshots from terminal screen state.
-- Per-client screen-state diffs for broadcast frames.
-- Raw terminal client attach.
-- UDP resume from cached client credentials.
-- Sealed attach-ticket UDP attach after server restart or unknown-client resume.
-- Client ACKs and server-side bounded pending retransmit window.
-- Sliding replay window for encrypted client packet counters.
-- View-only server-side input rejection.
-- Basic resize handling.
-- Timing output for bootstrap and terminal-ready.
-- `dosh-bench` benchmark harness for attach timing, SSH key/known-host options, and
-  ControlMaster-backed SSH measurement.
-- Hardened user systemd unit.
-- Release install script.
-- Docker OpenSSH benchmark gate covering cold SSH bootstrap and ControlMaster-backed
-  SSH bootstrap.
-- GitHub Actions CI for format, tests, release build, and Docker SSH benchmark gate.
-- Optional GitHub Actions remote benchmark job gated by repository secrets.
-- Auth/protocol tests.
-- Integration smoke tests for local attach, ticket attach after server restart, and
-  view-only input rejection.
-- Integration tests for retransmit, resize, multi-client shared screen, and UDP
-  endpoint roaming.
-
-Optional deployment evidence:
-
-- Configure `DOSH_BENCH_HOST`, `DOSH_BENCH_USER`, and `DOSH_BENCH_SSH_KEY` repository
-  secrets to run the same benchmark against a real remote host in addition to the
-  Docker OpenSSH gate.

build.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+use std::process::Command;
+
+fn git(args: &[&str]) -> Option<String> {
+    let output = Command::new("git").args(args).output().ok()?;
+    if !output.status.success() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let text = String::from_utf8(output.stdout).ok()?;
+    Some(text.trim().to_string())
+}
+
+fn main() {
+    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git/HEAD");
+    println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git/index");
+
+    let hash = git(&["rev-parse", "--short=12", "HEAD"]).unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".into());
+    let date = git(&["show", "-s", "--format=%cs", "HEAD"]).unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".into());
+    let dirty = Command::new("git")
+        .args(["diff", "--quiet", "--ignore-submodules", "--"])
+        .status()
+        .map(|status| if status.success() { "" } else { "+dirty" })
+        .unwrap_or("");
+
+    println!("cargo:rustc-env=DOSH_GIT_HASH={hash}{dirty}");
+    println!("cargo:rustc-env=DOSH_COMMIT_DATE={date}");
+}

docs/AUDIT_PACKET.md

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Native v1 Audit Packet
-
-This is the handoff checklist for an external security review.
-
-## Scope
-
-Review the security properties of Dosh native v1:
-
-- Native UDP authentication and key exchange
-- Host key trust and known-host mismatch behavior
-- Authorized key parsing and policy enforcement
-- Transport encryption, replay protection, rekeying, resume, and stale packet handling
-- Attach ticket sealing/opening
-- TCP forwarding and agent forwarding authorization boundaries
-- Parser robustness for untrusted wire/config data
-
-Primary files:
-
-- `src/native.rs`
-- `src/protocol.rs`
-- `src/auth.rs`
-- `src/ssh_agent.rs`
-- `src/bin/dosh-client.rs`
-- `src/bin/dosh-server.rs`
-- `src/config.rs`
-- `tests/parser_robustness.rs`
-- `tests/protocol_auth.rs`
-- `tests/hostile_network.rs`
-- `tests/integration_smoke.rs`
-- `fuzz/fuzz_targets/*`
-
-Primary docs:
-
-- `docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`
-- `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`
-- `docs/PROTOCOL_VERSIONING.md`
-- `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md`
-- `docs/RELEASE_EVIDENCE_2026-06-20.md`
-
-## Required Reviewer Questions
-
-1. Is the native handshake transcript complete enough to bind client/server keys,
-   requested session, mode, env, and forwarding permissions?
-2. Are host-key trust transitions fail-closed, especially unknown vs mismatch vs
-   explicit TOFU?
-3. Are authorized-key options parsed conservatively enough, and are unsupported
-   options rejected safely?
-4. Can replayed, reordered, delayed, stale, or cross-epoch packets affect terminal
-   input or forwarded streams more than once?
-5. Does key rotation preserve confidentiality without creating split-brain epoch
-   states?
-6. Do attach tickets create any bearer-token replay or privilege-extension issue?
-7. Can UDP endpoint migration be abused for hijack or reflection?
-8. Are local/remote/dynamic TCP forwarding and agent forwarding gated correctly by
-   client opt-in, server config, and authorized-key options?
-9. Are parser and packet-size limits sufficient against malicious inputs?
-10. Are there any unsafe assumptions in process/session persistence or holder
-    adoption?
-
-## Current Local Evidence
-
-As of 2026-06-20:
-
-- `cargo test`: `153 passed, 1 ignored`
-- `make soak-local`: passed 30-minute sleep/roaming soak
-- `make fuzz-smoke`: passed all configured fuzz targets for 20s each
-- `make bench-docker-mosh`: passed SSH, ControlMaster, native, cached, and Mosh
-  comparison gates
-
-## Explicit Non-Claims Before Audit
-
-- No claim of generic SSH protocol replacement.
-- No claim of full Mosh compatibility.
-- No claim that native v1 is externally audited.
-- No claim that Windows server support is production-ready.

docs/BENCHMARKS.md

@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Benchmarks
-
-This document explains how to run the Dosh benchmarks, what each metric means,
-and how to read the results honestly. Dosh's headline claim is *insane speed on
-repeat attach/reconnect* — these benchmarks exist to make that claim measurable
-and reproducible.
-
-> **Read first:** `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md`. The defensible public claim is fast
-> attach/reconnect, not full Mosh feature parity, and **not** cold startup. Cite
-> `dosh_cached_attach_ms` for the core speed claim; cite cold metrics only to show
-> the fallback path stays competitive with ordinary SSH.
-
-## TL;DR
-
-```bash
-make bench-local          # safe, self-contained matrix on a throwaway server
-make bench-local-json     # same, machine-readable JSON with raw samples
-make bench-docker-ssh     # containerized SSH-vs-Dosh gate used by CI
-make bench-docker-mosh    # same, with Mosh installed for a three-way comparison
-make bench-report         # Markdown report wrapper around dosh-bench
-```
-
-`make bench-local` never touches a running production server: it builds release
-binaries, starts its own `dosh-server` bound to `127.0.0.1` on a random free UDP
-port inside a temporary `HOME`, runs the matrix, prints raw samples plus summary
-statistics, and tears everything down on exit. It will refuse to bind UDP port
-`50000` (the default production port).
-
-## The benchmark binary: `dosh-bench`
-
-`dosh-bench` spawns the real `dosh-client` once per iteration and times the whole
-process from launch to terminal-ready-and-detached. That wall-clock cost is the
-apples-to-apples comparison against `ssh host true`: it is the startup price each
-tool pays before any useful remote work begins.
-
-Every run prints, per metric, a summary line (count, min, median, p95, mean, max
-in milliseconds) **and** a raw-samples line. Pass `--json` for one machine-readable
-object per run (with the full `samples_ms` array) so published numbers can always
-include raw data, as required by `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md`. Pass `--markdown` for a
-publishable Markdown table, and `--output path/to/report.md` to write it to disk.
-
-### Path matrix
-
-`dosh-bench` can benchmark these Dosh attach paths. Without an explicit path flag
-it keeps its legacy single-path behavior (driven by `--local-auth` / `--warm-cache`
-/ `--no-cache`) so existing CI scripts keep working.
-
-| Flag | Metric | What it measures |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `--cold-native` | `dosh_cold_native_ms` | Native cold auth: full `--auth native --no-cache` handshake to first frame and detach. The cold fallback when no cache exists. |
-| `--cached-ticket` | `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | Cached attach-ticket fast path. Warms the cache once, then measures repeat attaches using cached UDP credentials/tickets. **This is the core speed claim.** |
-| `--resume` | `dosh_resume_ms` | UDP resume of a session whose endpoint changes. See the caveat below — only meaningful when a live session is kept open out-of-band. |
-| `--local-auth` | `dosh_local_attach_ms` | Self-contained local bootstrap; no SSH, no native handshake. Useful as a lower-bound sanity check on loopback. |
-| *(default, no flag)* | `dosh_attach_ms` | Cold SSH bootstrap plus UDP attach (legacy single-path mode). |
-
-Existing baseline/comparison metrics are unchanged:
-
-| Metric | Meaning |
-| --- | --- |
-| `ssh_true_ms` | `ssh host true` with the same key/options. |
-| `mosh_start_true_ms` | `mosh host -- true` bootstrap, run `true`, exit (timed inside a PTY). |
-
-### Assertions / gates
-
-| Flag | Gate |
-| --- | --- |
-| `--assert-ssh-plus-ms N` | The primary Dosh metric must be ≤ `ssh_true_ms` mean + `N` ms. |
-| `--assert-mosh-minus-ms N` | The primary Dosh metric must be at least `N` ms faster than `mosh_start_true_ms`. |
-| `--assert-dosh-max-ms N` | The primary Dosh metric mean must be ≤ `N` ms. |
-
-The "primary Dosh metric" for assertions is, in priority order:
-`dosh_cached_attach_ms` → `dosh_resume_ms` → `dosh_cold_native_ms` →
-`dosh_attach_ms` → `dosh_local_attach_ms`.
-
-## What each benchmark does
-
-### `make bench-local` (`scripts/bench-local.sh`)
-
-Self-contained, no SSH, no Docker. It:
-
-1. Builds release binaries (`DOSH_BENCH_PROFILE=debug` for the debug profile).
-2. Picks a free UDP port (never `50000`) and a temp `HOME`.
-3. Generates a throwaway client identity (`ssh-keygen`), authorizes it on the
-   server, and writes a throwaway server + client config (native auth,
-   trust-on-first-use, localhost UDP).
-4. Starts `dosh-server serve` bound to `127.0.0.1` on that port.
-5. Runs `dosh-bench --cold-native --cached-ticket`, then `--local-auth --no-cache`.
-6. Sanity-checks that native cold auth actually trusted the host (so a silent
-   config-parse fallback can't make the benchmark measure the wrong path).
-7. Kills the server and removes the temp `HOME` on exit.
-
-Tunables: `scripts/bench-local.sh [ITERATIONS]` (default 20), `DOSH_BENCH_JSON=1`,
-`DOSH_BENCH_PROFILE=release|debug`.
-
-### `make bench-docker-ssh` / `make bench-docker-mosh` (`scripts/ci-docker-ssh-bench.sh`)
-
-Builds one Ubuntu image with OpenSSH, `dosh-server`, `dosh-auth` (and Mosh for the
-`-mosh` target), then runs `ssh_true_ms`, cold + ControlMaster SSH-bootstrap
-`dosh_attach_ms`, one-time `dosh trust` followed by native-cold
-`dosh_cold_native_ms`, `dosh_cached_attach_ms`, and optionally
-`mosh_start_true_ms` against the same container, key, and loopback network path.
-This is the gate CI enforces; it asserts cold SSH-bootstrap Dosh stays within
-500 ms of SSH, native-cold Dosh beats SSH mean by default, and cached attach stays
-under a small budget. See `README.md` "Develop" for the exact invocations.
-
-## Methodology and caveats
-
-- **Same machine, same network path.** `bench-local` runs everything on loopback,
-  so it isolates Dosh's own process/handshake/render overhead and removes network
-  RTT from the comparison. Real-world cached attach is approximately *network RTT
-  plus the local overhead these numbers measure*. Publish the machine, OS, CPU,
-  network path, and sample count alongside any numbers.
-- **Wall-clock of the whole client process.** Each sample includes process spawn,
-  attach, first-frame render, and detach. That is deliberately the same thing
-  `ssh host true` pays, but it means a few ms is fixed process-startup cost, not
-  protocol cost.
-- **Do not cite cold metrics as the headline.** `dosh_cold_native_ms` and
-  `dosh_attach_ms` still pay first-authentication cost. They exist to show the
-  fallback path stays competitive with ordinary SSH. Cite `dosh_cached_attach_ms`
-  for repeat attach/reconnect, per `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md`.
-- **UDP resume is the roaming path, not cold reconnect.** Resume reconnects a
-  client that is *still attached* when its network endpoint changes (sleep/Wi-Fi
-  switch). The `--attach-only` benchmark model detaches after every iteration,
-  which removes the client on the server, so a fresh-process resume has nothing
-  live to resume and is not meaningful in `bench-local`. The cold fresh-process
-  reconnect fast path is the attach ticket (`dosh_cached_attach_ms`). Roaming
-  resume correctness is covered by the integration test
-  `resume_updates_udp_endpoint_for_roaming` in `tests/integration_smoke.rs`.
-  `dosh-bench --resume` remains available for scenarios that keep a live session
-  open out-of-band (for example remote soak tests).
-- **These are not identical workloads.** SSH/Mosh/Dosh do different work at
-  startup. The comparison is still useful because it measures the startup tax each
-  tool charges before useful remote work begins.
-
-## Sample results (loopback, self-contained)
-
-Captured with `make bench-local` (`scripts/bench-local.sh 20`), all times in
-milliseconds, 20 samples per metric.
-
-- Machine: Intel Core i5-9500 @ 3.00 GHz, 6 cores
-- OS: Ubuntu 24.04.4 LTS, Linux 6.8.0-124-generic, x86_64
-- Toolchain: rustc 1.96.0, release profile
-- Network path: loopback (`127.0.0.1`), throwaway server on a free UDP port
-- Workload: `dosh-client --attach-only` to first frame and detach
-
-| Metric | n | min | median | p95 | mean | max |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| `dosh_cold_native_ms` | 20 | 8.32 | 8.77 | 9.34 | 8.82 | 9.52 |
-| `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | 20 | 2.83 | 3.23 | 3.75 | 3.24 | 3.77 |
-| `dosh_local_attach_ms` | 20 | 2.84 | 3.21 | 3.96 | 3.28 | 3.98 |
-
-Raw samples (ms):
-
-```
-dosh_cold_native_ms:
-8.82, 8.60, 8.69, 8.71, 9.33, 8.82, 8.90, 8.64, 8.39, 8.75, 8.79, 8.70, 8.64,
-9.52, 8.72, 8.32, 9.06, 8.93, 8.96, 9.04
-
-dosh_cached_attach_ms:
-3.04, 3.06, 2.98, 2.91, 2.96, 2.95, 3.05, 3.66, 3.37, 2.88, 2.83, 3.16, 3.49,
-3.30, 3.77, 3.32, 3.49, 3.75, 3.56, 3.33
-
-dosh_local_attach_ms:
-3.08, 3.96, 3.36, 3.30, 2.88, 2.99, 3.96, 3.98, 3.25, 2.84, 3.29, 3.59, 3.65,
-3.47, 3.13, 2.92, 2.87, 2.91, 2.98, 3.18
-```
-
-Reading these numbers: cold native auth is ~9 ms because it pays the native
-handshake; cached attach is ~3 ms because it reuses cached credentials and skips
-the handshake entirely. On loopback there is no network RTT, so this is the local
-overhead floor. Over a real link, expect cached attach ≈ this floor + one network
-round trip — which is exactly the "near network RTT" target in the spec. There is
-no SSH/Mosh baseline in this loopback table because those paths need an SSH server;
-use `make bench-docker-ssh` / `make bench-docker-mosh` for the head-to-head.
-
-## Sample results (Docker SSH/Mosh comparison)
-
-Captured with `make bench-docker-mosh`, all times in milliseconds. This is the
-same-container comparison gate: one generated key, one OpenSSH server, one
-`dosh-server`, loopback-published TCP/UDP ports.
-
-| Metric | n | min | median | p95 | mean | max |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| `ssh_true_ms` (cold SSH baseline for native-cold gate) | 5 | 214.53 | 216.84 | 220.55 | 217.60 | 220.91 |
-| `dosh_cold_native_ms` | 5 | 8.62 | 8.96 | 9.78 | 9.15 | 9.88 |
-| `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | 10 | 8.41 | 8.83 | 9.52 | 8.90 | 9.53 |
-| `mosh_start_true_ms` | 3 | 528.03 | 530.87 | 539.23 | 533.02 | 540.16 |
-
-Raw samples (ms):
-
-```
-ssh_true_ms (native-cold gate):
-216.84, 216.61, 214.53, 220.91, 219.09
-
-dosh_cold_native_ms:
-9.39, 8.88, 8.96, 8.62, 9.88
-
-dosh_cached_attach_ms:
-8.44, 8.41, 8.80, 8.48, 9.53, 9.51, 8.85, 8.69, 9.33, 8.96
-
-mosh_start_true_ms:
-540.16, 528.03, 530.87
-```

docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md

@@ -1,666 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Native v1 Spec
-
-> **v1 status (annotation, not part of the spec text below).** Native v1 is
-> substantially implemented and being stabilized; it is not yet fully verified.
-> Milestone progress against section 15:
->
-> - Milestone 1 — host identity and trust: **done.** Host key generation, `dosh trust`,
->   `known_hosts`, and mismatch hard-fail are implemented.
-> - Milestone 2 — native user auth: **done.** `ClientHello`/`ServerHello`/`UserAuth`/
->   `AuthOk`, ssh-agent and OpenSSH identity-file auth for Ed25519, ECDSA P-256,
->   and RSA-SHA2, plus `authorized_keys` verification, exist.
-> - Milestone 3 — default native auth: **done.** `auth_preference = "native,ssh"` is
->   the default with explicit, visible SSH fallback. Local and Docker benchmark gates
->   cover cached attach, SSH fallback, and native cold auth (Track C /
->   `BENCHMARKS.md`).
-> - Milestone 4 — forwarding: **implemented.** Stream mux, `-L`, `-R`, `-D`, `-N`,
->   `-f`, per-stream flow control, ordered stream offsets/ACKs, and stream-data
->   retransmission exist. Terminal-priority/load, replay/reorder, and dropped
->   server-to-client `StreamData` recovery regressions are covered.
-> - Milestone 5 — hardening: **partly done.** Per-IP token-bucket rate limiting,
->   fail-closed protocol-version checks with a documented v1 policy, parser fuzz
->   targets, fuzz-smoke/deep CI entry points, scripted TUI transport tests,
->   forwarding load/priority/replay/loss tests, and independent persistent session
->   restart tests exist. Published long-soak evidence is not yet complete. The threat
->   model is published (`docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`).
-> - Milestone 6 — workflow parity: **mostly done.** `dosh doctor`, host-trust
->   management, and the encrypted-key prompt flow exist; cross-OS daily-driver soak is
->   ongoing.
->
-> The section 16 verification checklist is **not yet fully green** — see the
-> item-by-item status table in `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` and the residual-risk list in
-> `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`. The section 17 public-claim gate is therefore **not met**.
-
-Native Dosh is a remote-login protocol for Dosh-installed servers. It is intended to
-replace the user's day-to-day `ssh host` workflow for terminals and forwarding while
-keeping SSH as a compatibility and recovery fallback.
-
-Native Dosh is not an RFC-compatible SSH implementation. It deliberately avoids the
-full SSH transport/channel protocol and implements the smaller set of behavior Dosh
-needs: authenticated login, encrypted terminal transport, reconnect/roaming, and TCP
-forwarding.
-
-## 1. Product Contract
-
-User-facing commands:
-
-```bash
-dosh host
-dosh host command...
-dosh -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80 host
-dosh -R 9000:127.0.0.1:9000 host
-dosh --session work host
-dosh --view-only --session work host
-dosh host tm
-```
-
-Compatibility expectations:
-
-- Existing SSH keys and `ssh-agent` are reused.
-- Server-side authorization uses `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`.
-- Host trust is pinned in a Dosh known-hosts file and can be bootstrapped by SSH.
-- `~/.ssh/config` host aliases, `HostName`, `User`, `Port`, `IdentityFile`,
-  `ProxyJump`, and `UserKnownHostsFile` are honored where practical.
-- SSH bootstrap remains available with `--auth=ssh` and is used automatically when
-  native auth is disabled or cannot complete.
-
-Native v1 is complete only if a normal interactive user can switch their daily
-workflow from `ssh` to `dosh` without keeping SSH open in another tab for routine
-tasks.
-
-Non-goals for v1:
-
-- RFC-compatible SSH server/client behavior.
-- Arbitrary SSH subsystems.
-- X11 forwarding.
-- SFTP/SCP compatibility.
-- Multi-user daemon mode with privileged account switching.
-- Replacing OpenSSH on hosts that do not run `dosh-server`.
-
-## 2. SSH Workflow Parity Target
-
-Native v1 targets the SSH workflows interactive users actually use, not the entire
-OpenSSH feature universe.
-
-Must work in v1:
-
-- Interactive shell: `dosh host`.
-- Remote command: `dosh host command...`.
-- Fresh terminal by default.
-- Named persistent terminal: `dosh --session work host`.
-- Shared/view-only session: `dosh --view-only --session work host`.
-- Local forwarding: `dosh -L [bind:]listen:target:target_port host`.
-- Remote forwarding: `dosh -R [bind:]listen:target:target_port host`.
-- Dynamic forwarding: `dosh -D [bind:]listen host`, if stream flow control is proven;
-  otherwise it is the first v1.1 item and must be called out honestly.
-- Multiple forwards in one connection.
-- Forward-only mode: `dosh -N -L ... host`.
-- Background forwarding: `dosh -f -N -L ... host`, or an equivalent supervised
-  user-service mode.
-- SSH-agent authentication.
-- Encrypted OpenSSH private-key authentication with prompt.
-- `~/.ssh/config` host aliases for `Host`, `HostName`, `User`, `Port`,
-  `IdentityFile`, `ProxyJump`, `UserKnownHostsFile`, and `IdentitiesOnly`.
-- Dosh host config overrides for user, Dosh-specific UDP host/port/auth policy.
-- Clear host-key trust and mismatch errors.
-- Clear auth failure errors that name the attempted key source.
-- Stable reconnect after sleep, network switch, NAT rebinding, and server packet loss.
-- `dosh update`.
-- `dosh doctor host` for config/auth/UDP reachability diagnostics.
-- `dosh sessions host` for session visibility.
-- Optional command extensions such as `dosh host tm` for companion tools that are
-  installed separately from Dosh.
-
-Should work in v1 if it does not compromise the transport schedule:
-
-- Agent forwarding with an explicit opt-in flag and clear warning.
-- `ProxyJump` through SSH for bootstrap/trust and through Dosh-native relay later.
-- `SendEnv`/`SetEnv` equivalent for explicit environment variables.
-- Clipboard integration as a separate opt-in channel.
-
-Explicitly not v1:
-
-- X11 forwarding.
-- SFTP/SCP wire compatibility.
-- Full OpenSSH config language.
-- Full `sshd` replacement for arbitrary SSH clients.
-- Forced-command subsystems beyond fail-closed enforcement.
-
-## 3. Stability Contract
-
-Native v1 must be boring under real use:
-
-- A closed laptop must not kill the remote session.
-- A client crash must not kill the remote session.
-- A server restart must not kill the remote session when `persist_sessions` is on
-  (currently opt-in until stress-tested): each session's shell runs in a detached
-  per-session *holder*
-  process whose PTY master fd the server passes back to itself via SCM_RIGHTS, so
-  the shell + scrollback survive a server crash/upgrade/`systemctl restart` and a
-  reattaching client lands on the same shell with its screen restored. With
-  `persist_sessions = false` the old behavior applies: live PTYs drop on restart,
-  but the client must still fail clearly and reconnect cleanly afterward.
-- Decrypt failures from stale packets must be ignored or trigger reconnect, never
-  terminate the terminal by themselves.
-- Terminal cleanup must restore cursor, mouse mode, bracketed paste, alternate
-  screen, and raw mode on exit.
-- Forwarding streams must close cleanly without leaving orphan listeners.
-- Every public error must be actionable: host trust, auth failure, UDP blocked,
-  forwarding denied, version mismatch, or server unavailable.
-- `dosh host` must never attach to another active unnamed terminal by accident.
-- The default install must be secure without hand-editing configs.
-- Upgrades must preserve existing trusted host keys and credentials unless explicitly
-  rotated.
-
-## 4. Security Contract
-
-Native Dosh must match the security properties users rely on from SSH for this use
-case:
-
-- Server authentication before terminal data is trusted.
-- User authentication by possession of an authorized private key or agent key.
-- Forward secrecy for terminal and forwarding traffic.
-- AEAD encryption and authentication for every post-handshake packet.
-- Replay protection for handshake and transport packets.
-- Host-key pinning with explicit first-use behavior.
-- No plaintext terminal bytes after handshake begins.
-- No custom cryptographic primitives.
-- Clear downgrade behavior: native auth failure must not silently fall back to an
-  unauthenticated mode.
-
-Native Dosh does not claim SSH's full protocol security surface. It claims equivalent
-security for Dosh terminal and forwarding sessions on Dosh-installed servers.
-
-## 5. Threat Model
-
-In scope:
-
-- Passive network observer.
-- Active network attacker that can spoof, drop, replay, reorder, or modify packets.
-- NAT rebinding and client IP/port changes.
-- Stolen attach-ticket cache without the user's private key.
-- Server restart and key rotation.
-- Malicious unauthenticated client flooding auth attempts.
-- Compromised low-privilege local user trying to read Dosh caches on a shared client.
-
-Out of scope:
-
-- Compromised client machine.
-- Compromised server account.
-- Malicious kernel, terminal emulator, or PTY implementation.
-- Protecting against a server that is already authorized and then becomes malicious.
-
-## 6. Cryptographic Building Blocks
-
-Allowed primitives:
-
-- Handshake pattern: Noise `NK` or `XX` through a maintained Rust Noise framework, or
-  a small audited construction over `x25519-dalek` plus transcript binding.
-- KEX: X25519.
-- Signatures for user auth: Ed25519 and ECDSA P-256 via SSH-agent and OpenSSH key
-  formats. RSA may be accepted only for compatibility and must use SHA-2 signatures.
-- AEAD: ChaCha20-Poly1305 by default; AES-GCM optional when hardware support is known.
-- KDF: HKDF-SHA256.
-- Hash/transcript: SHA-256.
-- Randomness: OS CSPRNG only.
-
-Disallowed:
-
-- Homegrown ciphers, MACs, padding, or key derivation.
-- Reusing a nonce/key pair.
-- Unauthenticated encryption.
-- MD5/SHA-1 signatures for user auth.
-
-## 7. Identity And Trust
-
-### Server Identity
-
-Each `dosh-server` has a persistent host key:
-
-```text
-~/.config/dosh/host_key
-~/.config/dosh/host_key.pub
-```
-
-Default host-key algorithm: Ed25519.
-
-Client pins host keys in:
-
-```text
-~/.config/dosh/known_hosts
-```
-
-Entry format:
-
-```text
-host-pattern key-type base64-public-key first-seen=unix-seconds source=tofu|ssh|manual
-```
-
-First-use policy:
-
-- Default for public internet: refuse unknown native host key and suggest
-  `dosh trust host` or SSH bootstrap.
-- Default for local/private hosts may be TOFU only when `trust_on_first_use = true`.
-- `dosh trust host` may verify the Dosh host key over the existing SSH bootstrap path.
-
-Host-key mismatch:
-
-- Hard fail.
-- Print old fingerprint, new fingerprint, and known-hosts file path.
-- Never auto-replace.
-
-### User Identity
-
-Native auth user identity is the login user resolved from:
-
-1. Explicit CLI user: `user@host`.
-2. Dosh host config.
-3. `ssh -G host` `user`.
-4. Local username.
-
-Server verifies user keys against:
-
-```text
-~/.ssh/authorized_keys
-~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys
-```
-
-`~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys` is optional and may restrict Dosh access without
-changing SSH access.
-
-Authorized-key options required in v1:
-
-- `from=`
-- `command=` must reject native Dosh terminal login unless explicitly supported later.
-- `restrict`
-- `no-port-forwarding`
-- `permitopen=`
-
-Unsupported restrictive options must fail closed.
-
-## 8. Native Auth Handshake
-
-Native auth runs over UDP on the same Dosh port. It establishes a short-lived
-authenticated control channel and returns the same terminal attach material that SSH
-bootstrap returns today.
-
-Target path:
-
-```text
-client -> server: ClientHello
-server -> client: ServerHello
-client -> server: UserAuth
-server -> client: AuthOk + first terminal snapshot
-```
-
-The server may combine `AuthOk` and `AttachOk` to get terminal-ready in the final
-handshake flight.
-
-### ClientHello
-
-Fields:
-
-- protocol version
-- client random
-- client ephemeral X25519 public key
-- requested host alias
-- requested user
-- requested session
-- requested mode
-- terminal size
-- supported AEAD algorithms
-- supported user key algorithms
-- optional cached host-key id
-- optional attach ticket envelope
-
-### ServerHello
-
-Fields:
-
-- protocol version
-- server random
-- server ephemeral X25519 public key
-- server host public key
-- server host-key signature over transcript
-- chosen AEAD
-- server key epoch
-- auth challenge
-- rate-limit metadata when applicable
-
-The client must verify the host key before sending user authentication.
-
-### UserAuth
-
-Fields:
-
-- selected public key
-- key algorithm
-- signature over transcript and auth challenge
-- optional agent identity metadata
-- optional requested forwarding declarations
-
-The signature must bind:
-
-- both ephemeral keys
-- both randoms
-- server host key
-- requested user/session/mode/terminal size
-- selected algorithms
-- protocol version
-
-### AuthOk
-
-Fields:
-
-- assigned `ClientId`
-- session name
-- mode
-- session key id
-- encrypted session key material or derived key confirmation
-- attach ticket
-- attach ticket PSK encrypted to the handshake key
-- initial output sequence
-- first snapshot
-- server policy flags
-
-`AuthOk` is AEAD-encrypted under the handshake traffic key.
-
-## 9. Key Schedule
-
-Handshake transcript:
-
-```text
-H = SHA256(protocol_label || ClientHello || ServerHello || UserAuth)
-```
-
-Shared secret:
-
-```text
-dh = X25519(client_ephemeral, server_ephemeral)
-```
-
-Handshake key:
-
-```text
-handshake_key = HKDF-SHA256(dh, H, "dosh/native/handshake/v1")
-```
-
-Session traffic keys:
-
-```text
-c2s_key = HKDF-SHA256(handshake_key, H, "dosh/native/c2s/v1")
-s2c_key = HKDF-SHA256(handshake_key, H, "dosh/native/s2c/v1")
-```
-
-Attach ticket PSKs and rotated session keys must be derived independently from server
-secret material and fresh randomness. They must not reuse handshake traffic keys.
-
-## 10. Attach Tickets And Cache
-
-Native attach tickets replace most cold auth after first login.
-
-Ticket properties:
-
-- Server-sealed AEAD blob.
-- Scoped to server host key, user, session, mode, client key fingerprint, server key
-  epoch, and policy flags.
-- Paired with a client-held random PSK.
-- Default TTL: 24 hours for trusted personal machines, configurable down to zero.
-- Stored mode `0600`.
-- Revoked by server host-key rotation, server secret rotation, or user key removal.
-
-Client cache path:
-
-```text
-~/.local/share/dosh/credentials/
-```
-
-Cache entries must include:
-
-- host identity fingerprint
-- user
-- session
-- mode
-- ticket expiry
-- last rendered sequence
-- client id
-- session key id
-- attach ticket
-- attach ticket PSK
-
-## 11. Transport
-
-Post-auth terminal traffic continues to use the current Dosh UDP packet model:
-
-- fixed binary header
-- AEAD body
-- monotonic packet sequence
-- ack field
-- replay window
-- server snapshots for recovery
-
-Required v1 changes:
-
-- Separate packet namespaces for terminal frames, control messages, and forwarding
-  streams.
-- Explicit `key_epoch` or `session_key_id` in packet metadata so stale packets can be
-  ignored without fatal decrypt errors.
-- Rekey command after configurable packet count or wall-clock interval.
-- Connection migration must be accepted after any valid encrypted packet from a new
-  source address.
-
-## 12. Forwarding
-
-Native forwarding is a Dosh stream multiplexer over the encrypted transport.
-
-CLI:
-
-```bash
-dosh -L [bind_host:]listen_port:target_host:target_port host
-dosh -R [bind_host:]listen_port:target_host:target_port host
-dosh -D [bind_host:]listen_port host
-dosh -A host   # forward the local ssh-agent (opt-in, server-gated)
-```
-
-Stream packet types:
-
-- `StreamOpen`
-- `StreamOpenOk`
-- `StreamOpenReject`
-- `StreamData`
-- `StreamWindowAdjust`
-- `StreamEof`
-- `StreamClose`
-
-Forwarding rules:
-
-- Terminal traffic has priority over stream bulk data.
-- Each stream has independent flow control.
-- `StreamData` carries a per-stream byte offset and is delivered to TCP in order.
-- `StreamWindowAdjust` carries a cumulative received byte offset; peers free
-  retransmit buffers and replenish send credit only for acknowledged contiguous
-  bytes.
-- Unacknowledged stream bytes are retransmitted as newly encrypted transport packets
-  with fresh packet sequence numbers/nonces.
-- Backpressure must not block PTY input or output.
-- Server enforces `no-port-forwarding` and `permitopen=`.
-- Remote listeners bind to loopback by default.
-- Non-loopback remote bind requires explicit config.
-- `-N` opens forwarding without creating a PTY.
-- `-f` backgrounds only after all requested listeners are successfully active.
-- Listener setup failures fail the entire command unless `--partial-forwarding` is
-  explicitly requested.
-- Forwarding reconnect must preserve listeners and re-open streams after network
-  migration when protocol state allows it.
-- Stream packet scheduling must enforce terminal priority; a large port-forward copy
-  cannot make shell keystrokes lag.
-
-### 12.1 SSH-Agent Forwarding (opt-in, security-gated)
-
-- Activated only on explicit client opt-in (`-A` / `forward_agent = true`) **and**
-  server `allow_agent_forwarding = true`. Off by default on both ends.
-- The client requests a `ForwardingKind::Agent` entry during auth. If the server
-  policy allows it, the server binds a per-session proxy unix socket in a
-  process-private directory (dir 0700, socket 0600) and exports its path as the
-  spawned shell's `SSH_AUTH_SOCK`.
-- Each connection from a remote process to that proxy socket is tunneled to the
-  client over a server-initiated `StreamOpen` carrying the reserved target sentinel
-  `@dosh-agent` (port 0). The client splices it into its local `SSH_AUTH_SOCK`
-  (a unix socket, not a TCP target). Data/window/close reuse the existing stream
-  packets unchanged.
-- Only applies to a freshly spawned shell; an already-running attached/prewarmed
-  session keeps its existing environment (same constraint as ssh/mosh).
-- SECURITY: forwarding exposes the local agent to the remote host for the session's
-  lifetime, which is why it is double-gated and never the default.
-
-## 13. Diagnostics And Operations
-
-Native v1 must include operations commands:
-
-```bash
-dosh doctor host
-dosh trust host
-dosh trust --remove host
-dosh sessions host
-dosh update
-```
-
-`dosh doctor host` checks:
-
-- host alias resolution
-- Dosh known-host state
-- SSH fallback reachability
-- native UDP reachability
-- server version
-- native auth enabled/disabled
-- usable keys from ssh-agent and identity files
-- server authorization result without opening a terminal
-- configured forwarding policy
-
-`dosh trust host` checks:
-
-- fetch Dosh host key through SSH fallback when available
-- show fingerprint before writing trust
-- refuse overwrite on mismatch unless `--replace` is explicit
-
-## 14. Config
-
-Client:
-
-```toml
-auth_preference = "native,ssh"
-trust_on_first_use = false
-native_auth_timeout_ms = 700
-known_hosts = "~/.config/dosh/known_hosts"
-credential_cache = "~/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
-identity_files = ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519"]
-use_ssh_agent = true
-forward_agent = false
-send_env = ["LANG", "LC_*", "TERM", "COLORTERM"]
-set_env = {}
-forwardings = []
-
-[extensions.tm]
-command = "tm {args}"
-description = "Open an optional server-side tmux dashboard"
-```
-
-Server:
-
-```toml
-native_auth = true
-host_key = "~/.config/dosh/host_key"
-authorized_keys = ["~/.ssh/authorized_keys", "~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys"]
-native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute = 30
-attach_ticket_ttl_secs = 86400
-allow_tcp_forwarding = true
-allow_remote_forwarding = false
-allow_remote_non_loopback_bind = false
-allow_agent_forwarding = false
-accept_env = ["LANG", "LC_*", "TERM", "COLORTERM"]
-```
-
-## 15. Migration Plan
-
-Milestone 1: host identity and trust
-
-- Generate Dosh host key on server install.
-- Add `dosh trust host`.
-- Add known-hosts file and mismatch handling.
-- Keep SSH bootstrap as the only auth path.
-
-Milestone 2: native user auth
-
-- Implement `ClientHello`/`ServerHello`/`UserAuth`/`AuthOk`.
-- Support ssh-agent Ed25519 first.
-- Verify against `authorized_keys`.
-- Add `--auth=native|ssh|auto`.
-
-Milestone 3: default native auth
-
-- Make `auth_preference = "native,ssh"` default.
-- Keep SSH fallback explicit and visible.
-- Add benchmark gates for native cold auth.
-
-Milestone 4: forwarding
-
-- Add stream mux.
-- Add `-L`, `-N`, and `-f`.
-- Add `-R`.
-- Add `-D` only after flow control is proven.
-
-Milestone 5: hardening
-
-- Fuzz packet parsing, authorized-key parsing, known-host parsing, and handshake state.
-- Add hostile-network integration tests.
-- Keep a public hardening checklist and threat model before public security claims.
-
-Milestone 6: workflow parity
-
-- Implement `dosh doctor`.
-- Implement complete host-trust management.
-- Implement private-key prompt flow.
-- Implement forwarding policy diagnostics.
-- Run daily-driver soak on macOS and Linux clients.
-
-## 16. Verification
-
-Native v1 is not complete until all are true:
-
-- Unknown host key fails by default unless TOFU is explicitly enabled.
-- Known host key mismatch hard fails.
-- Native Ed25519 auth succeeds via ssh-agent.
-- Native Ed25519 auth succeeds via encrypted private key prompt.
-- Removed authorized key can no longer authenticate.
-- Restrictive unsupported authorized-key options fail closed.
-- Replayed handshake packets are rejected.
-- Replayed transport packets are rejected.
-- Stale encrypted packets after reconnect are ignored, not fatal.
-- Client IP/port change preserves the session.
-- Native cold auth benchmark beats cold `ssh host true` on the same host.
-- Cached attach remains near network RTT plus local render overhead.
-- `-L` forwarding works without delaying terminal input.
-- `-R` forwarding enforces bind and permission policy.
-- `-N -L` forward-only mode does not allocate a PTY.
-- `-f -N -L` backgrounds only after listener readiness.
-- Multiple forwards in one command work.
-- `dosh doctor` identifies UDP-blocked, auth-denied, host-key-mismatch, and
-  forwarding-denied states.
-- Closing the laptop for at least 30 minutes does not kill the remote session.
-- Three concurrent Dosh terminals remain independent unless explicitly named.
-- Large forwarded transfers do not add visible terminal input lag.
-- Fuzz targets run in CI.
-- Threat model is updated with any accepted residual risks.
-
-## 17. Public Claim Gate
-
-Dosh may claim "native SSH replacement for Dosh-installed servers" only after:
-
-- Native auth is default on at least one real host.
-- SSH fallback remains available.
-- The verification checklist is green.
-- The threat model is published.
-- Benchmarks include raw samples for SSH cold, Dosh native cold, Dosh cached attach,
-  and Mosh startup.
-
-Dosh must not claim generic SSH compatibility unless it implements the SSH protocol.

docs/PROTOCOL_VERSIONING.md

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Protocol Versioning
-
-Dosh v1 uses a deliberately simple compatibility policy: **single-version,
-fail-closed, explicit error**.
-
-The wire header carries `protocol::VERSION`. The native handshake carries
-`native::NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION`. A peer that speaks any other version is rejected
-before application data is accepted:
-
-- foreign wire `VERSION` packets get an `AttachReject` with
-  `protocol version mismatch - upgrade dosh`;
-- foreign native handshake `protocol_version` values get the same named upgrade
-  error with local/remote versions;
-- there is no silent downgrade, compatibility fallback, or best-effort decoding.
-
-## When To Bump
-
-Bump `protocol::VERSION` when a change affects packet framing, packet kind meaning,
-serialized protocol structs carried outside native handshake negotiation, or anything
-an older peer could misparse.
-
-Bump `native::NATIVE_PROTOCOL_VERSION` when a change affects native handshake
-transcripts, native auth semantics, algorithm negotiation, attach tickets, or any
-field that is signed or key-derived by native auth.
-
-If both layers are affected, bump both.
-
-## Compatibility Window
-
-Native v1 supports exactly the current version. That keeps the implementation small
-and makes security review tractable. Multi-version negotiation can be added later
-only with an explicit downgrade-resistance design:
-
-- negotiated version must be transcript-bound;
-- the selected version must be visible in diagnostics;
-- tests must prove an active attacker cannot force an older mutually supported
-  version;
-- unsupported peers must still get the same named upgrade error.
-
-Until that exists, the public policy is: upgrade both sides together.

docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md

@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Public Readiness
-
-Dosh's defensible public claim is fast terminal attach/reconnect plus native
-encrypted forwarding on Dosh-installed servers. It should not claim generic SSH
-compatibility unless it implements the SSH protocol, and public benchmark claims
-must be reproducible outside the author's homelab.
-
-The plan for replacing the day-to-day SSH workflow with native Dosh authentication
-and forwarding is specified in `docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`, and the published threat
-model is in `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`. Native v1 is now substantially implemented:
-native key-exchange + user auth, host-key pinning/trust, `-L`/`-R`/`-D` forwarding,
-`dosh doctor`, token-bucket auth rate limiting, and fuzz-smoke CI all exist (see the
-feature matrix and the verification-checklist status table below). It is **not yet
-fully verified**: long sleep/roaming soak and deeper fuzzing results are still open
-launch evidence. Until the verification checklist (`NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 16)
-is green, Dosh's defensible public security claim remains fast encrypted native
-attach/reconnect and forwarding with SSH bootstrap fallback, not generic SSH
-compatibility.
-
-## Objective Benchmarks
-
-Run the same-host SSH comparison:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-ssh
-```
-
-Run the Dosh, SSH, and Mosh comparison:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-mosh
-```
-
-The Mosh-inclusive target builds one Docker image with OpenSSH, Mosh, `dosh-server`,
-and `dosh-auth`. It uses the same generated key, localhost network path, SSH server,
-and container for all samples.
-
-Reported metrics:
-
-| Metric | Meaning |
-| --- | --- |
-| `ssh_true_ms` | Time to run `ssh host true` with the same key/options. |
-| `dosh_attach_ms` | Time for `dosh-client --attach-only` to render the first frame and detach on the configured path. With `--no-cache`, this is cold SSH bootstrap plus UDP attach. |
-| `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | Time for a warmed Dosh client to attach using cached UDP credentials/tickets, render the first frame, and detach. This is the fast-path claim and should be approximately network RTT plus local process/render overhead. |
-| `mosh_start_true_ms` | Time for `mosh host -- true` to bootstrap, run `true`, and exit. |
-
-These are not identical workloads. They are still useful because they measure the
-startup path each tool must pay before useful remote work begins. Public numbers
-must include the command, machine, OS, CPU, network path, and sample count.
-
-Do not cite cold `dosh_attach_ms` as the core speed claim. Cold Dosh still pays SSH
-startup/authentication. Cite `dosh_cached_attach_ms` for repeat attach/reconnect
-speed, and cite cold `dosh_attach_ms` only to show that fallback remains competitive
-with ordinary SSH.
-
-## Feature Matrix
-
-| Feature | Mosh | Dosh now | Public status |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| SSH-based first authentication | yes | yes | ready |
-| Native UDP key auth (no SSH per attach) | no | yes, Ed25519, ECDSA P-256, and RSA-SHA2 via ssh-agent or OpenSSH identity files | implemented; pending full verification |
-| Dosh host-key pinning and trust | no | yes, `known_hosts` + `dosh trust` + mismatch hard-fail | implemented |
-| `authorized_keys` policy enforcement | no | yes, `from=`/`no-port-forwarding`/`permitopen=`, unsupported fail closed | implemented |
-| `dosh doctor` diagnostics | no | yes, config/auth/UDP/forwarding-policy check | implemented |
-| Encrypted UDP terminal data | yes | yes | ready |
-| Roaming by client address change | yes | yes | implemented; hostile-network covered, 30-minute soak gate available |
-| Survive sleep or network loss | yes | yes | implemented; run `make soak-local` before public launch |
-| Fast repeat attach without SSH | no | yes, via attach tickets | core differentiator |
-| Resident server daemon | no | yes | core differentiator |
-| One UDP port for all sessions | port range by default | yes | ready |
-| Fresh session by default | yes | yes | ready |
-| Named persistent sessions | no built-in shared session model | yes, plus opt-in server-restart holders | implemented; holder mode needs stress-testing |
-| Multiple clients on one session | no | yes | implemented; needs conflict-policy docs |
-| View-only clients | no | yes | ready |
-| Full-screen TUI correctness | yes | yes, scripted transport coverage for control sequences | implemented; needs broader app matrix |
-| Predictive local echo | mature | guarded printable-only opt-in | not parity |
-| Non-destructive disconnect UI | yes | yes, bottom-row save/restore status line | implemented |
-| Unicode edge-case handling | strong | basic terminal emulator dependent | not parity |
-| X11 forwarding | no | no | non-goal unless tunneled separately |
-| SSH agent forwarding | no | yes, explicit `-A` / `forward_agent` plus server allow-list | implemented; opt-in only |
-| Local TCP forwarding, `-L` | no | yes, native encrypted stream mux | implemented; load/priority, replay/reorder, and stream retransmit tested |
-| Remote TCP forwarding, `-R` | no | yes, loopback bind by default | implemented; policy and stream mux covered |
-| Dynamic SOCKS forwarding, `-D` | no | yes, SOCKS5 over native streams | implemented over the same reliable stream mux |
-| Forward-only / background forwarding, `-N` / `-f` | no | yes, `-f` requires `-N` | implemented |
-| Per-stream flow control / terminal priority | no | yes, windowed credit per stream | implemented; covered by blocked-stream and local-forward load tests |
-
-## SSH Config Inheritance
-
-Dosh intentionally delegates SSH parsing and authentication to OpenSSH. Bootstrap
-uses the user's normal `ssh` command, so `~/.ssh/config` options such as `Host`,
-`HostName`, `User`, `Port`, `IdentityFile`, `ProxyJump`, and `UserKnownHostsFile`
-continue to apply.
-
-Dosh also calls `ssh -G <alias>` to infer the UDP target host when no `dosh_host` is
-configured. To write explicit Dosh host entries from SSH aliases:
-
-```bash
-dosh import-ssh homelab
-```
-
-This appends entries to `~/.config/dosh/hosts.toml` without trying to become an
-OpenSSH config parser.
-
-## Optional Command Extensions
-
-Dosh can expose companion tools without taking a dependency on them. Command
-extensions live in client or host config and expand only the first trailing word:
-
-```toml
-[extensions.tm]
-command = "tm {args}"
-description = "Open the server-side tmux dashboard"
-```
-
-With that config, `dosh homelab tm` runs `tm` in the remote Dosh shell and
-`dosh homelab tm dosh` runs `tm 'dosh'`. Removing the table removes the integration.
-Host config can override a global extension, or disable it:
-
-```toml
-[homelab.extensions.tm]
-command = "/opt/tm/bin/tm {args}"
-
-[other-host.extensions.tm]
-disabled = true
-```
-
-## Forwarding (Implemented)
-
-SSH forwarding cannot be copied by keeping the bootstrap SSH connection open,
-because that would remove Dosh's fast reconnect advantage and would break after
-roaming. Dosh forwarding therefore runs as native encrypted stream channels over the
-Dosh transport, and is now implemented.
-
-| CLI | Meaning |
-| --- | --- |
-| `dosh -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80 host` | Local listener on the client; server connects to target. |
-| `dosh -R 8080:127.0.0.1:80 host` | Remote listener on the server (loopback by default); client connects to target. |
-| `dosh -D 1080 host` | SOCKS5 listener on the client; server connects to whatever the SOCKS request names. |
-
-Implemented:
-
-- `StreamOpen`/`StreamOpenOk`/`StreamOpenReject`/`StreamData`/`StreamWindowAdjust`/
-  `StreamEof`/`StreamClose` packet types.
-- Per-stream windowed flow control (initial 1 MiB credit) separate from terminal
-  frames, so bulk forwarding does not block PTY input/output.
-- Ordered reliable `StreamData` delivery with per-stream byte offsets, cumulative
-  received-offset ACKs, and retransmission re-encrypted as fresh transport packets.
-- Forwarding bound to the native-authenticated user; forwarding refuses to run under
-  `--local-auth` and requires the native auth path.
-- Server-side policy enforcement: `allow_tcp_forwarding`, `allow_remote_forwarding`,
-  loopback-only remote bind unless `allow_remote_non_loopback_bind`, plus per-key
-  `no-port-forwarding` and `permitopen=`.
-- `-N` forward-only (no PTY) and `-f` background (requires `-N`, backgrounds only
-  after listeners are ready).
-
-Still open before claiming forwarding parity:
-
-- More real-host load soak. The integration suite already covers terminal-priority
-  behavior while a local forward is under blocked-stream pressure, plus hostile
-  replay/reorder and server-to-client stream retransmission after UDP loss.
-
-## Native v1 Verification Checklist Status
-
-This maps each item in `NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 16 to its status based on what the
-code in `src/` actually does. Done = implemented and exercised by tests or obvious
-from code; in progress = partially implemented; pending = not yet implemented.
-
-| Spec section 16 item | Status | Evidence / note |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| Unknown host key fails unless TOFU explicitly enabled | done | Client refuses `KnownHostStatus::Unknown` unless `trust_on_first_use`. |
-| Known host-key mismatch hard fails | done | `KnownHostStatus::Mismatch` aborts; `trust_host` refuses overwrite without `--replace`. |
-| Native Ed25519 auth via ssh-agent | done | `src/ssh_agent.rs` signs the user-auth transcript. |
-| Native Ed25519 auth via encrypted key prompt | done | `load_ed25519_identity_with_passphrase` decrypts OpenSSH keys. |
-| Native ECDSA P-256 auth | done | ssh-agent and OpenSSH identity-file paths are wired; `native_user_auth_accepts_ecdsa_p256_private_key` verifies the direct key path. |
-| Native RSA-SHA2 auth | done | ssh-agent requests `rsa-sha2-512`; direct OpenSSH RSA identities sign with `rsa-sha2-512`; legacy SHA-1 `ssh-rsa` signatures are rejected. |
-| Removed authorized key can no longer authenticate | done | Covered by `native_user_auth_accepts_authorized_key_and_rejects_removed_key`. |
-| Unsupported authorized-key options fail closed | done | `ensure_native_allowed` bails on any unsupported option. |
-| Replayed handshake packets rejected | done | Handshake is transcript-bound and signature-verified; pending entries TTL-evicted. |
-| Replayed transport packets rejected | done | `ReplayWindow` (128-wide) over per-direction counter. |
-| Stale encrypted packets after reconnect ignored, not fatal | done | `session_key_id` mismatch drops the packet instead of erroring fatally. |
-| Client IP/port change preserves session | done | Server matches by `ClientId`/session key id, updates endpoint. |
-| Native cold auth beats cold `ssh host true` | done | Docker gate runs `dosh-bench --cold-native` after one-time `dosh trust` and requires Dosh mean <= SSH mean. |
-| Cached attach near network RTT | done | Local loopback samples are ~3 ms; Docker cached gate is under 25 ms. See `docs/BENCHMARKS.md`. |
-| `-L` works without delaying terminal input | done | Per-stream windowing plus `native_local_forward_bulk_load_does_not_delay_interactive_terminal` and blocked-stream priority regression. |
-| `-R` enforces bind and permission policy | done | `remote_bind_allowed` + `start_remote_forwards` policy checks. |
-| `-N -L` does not allocate a PTY | done | `forward-only` mode skips PTY allocation. |
-| `-f -N -L` backgrounds only after listener readiness | done | `spawn_background_forwarder` waits for a readiness token. |
-| Multiple forwards in one command | done | Forward lists parsed and started together. |
-| `dosh doctor` identifies UDP-blocked/auth-denied/mismatch/forwarding-denied | done | `run_doctor_command` reports each state. |
-| Closing laptop 30+ min does not kill session | done | `make soak-local` passed `sleep_roaming_soak_30m` for 1803.54s locally. Keep rerunning before tagged releases. |
-| Three concurrent terminals independent unless named | done | Generated session names per attach; named sessions shared on purpose. |
-| Large forwarded transfers add no visible input lag | done | Covered by the local-forward bulk-load integration test; still needs real-host soak before launch claims. |
-| Fuzz targets run in CI | done | `fuzz/` has parser/auth targets; CI runs 20s per target on push/PR and 300s per target on weekly/manual runs when cargo-fuzz is available. |
-| Threat model updated with accepted residual risks | done | `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`. |
-
-Additional security hardening tracked outside the section 16 list:
-
-- Full per-IP token-bucket rate limiting: implemented for native auth and covered by
-  unit/integration tests. It still needs real-host tuning under abusive traffic.
-- Protocol VERSION handling: v1 policy is single-version, fail-closed reject at the
-  packet/header and native-handshake layers. See `docs/PROTOCOL_VERSIONING.md`.
-- ECDSA P-256 / SHA-2 RSA user keys: implemented for ssh-agent and OpenSSH
-  identity-file native auth. RSA is compatibility-only and uses SHA-2 signatures;
-  legacy SHA-1 `ssh-rsa` signatures are not accepted.
-
-## Before Public Launch
-
-- Keep `cargo test`, `make bench-docker-ssh`, and `make bench-docker-mosh` green.
-- Run `make soak-local` before each tagged release to refresh 30-minute sleep/roaming evidence.
-- Run `make fuzz-deep` before launch, or use the scheduled/manual CI fuzz pass, and
-  publish the target durations.
-- Keep scripted TUI tests green and add a broader app matrix for real alternate-screen
-  tools.
-- Publish benchmark output with raw samples, not just averages.
-- Mark prediction as experimental until it has a real framebuffer model.
-- Stress-test `persist_sessions = true` before making restart-survivable holders the
-  default.
-- Tune the native auth token bucket under abusive real-host traffic.
-- Complete the native-v1 verification checklist above before making any "native SSH
-  replacement for Dosh-installed servers" claim (`NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 17).

docs/RELEASE_EVIDENCE_2026-06-20.md

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Release Evidence - 2026-06-20
-
-Runtime code benchmarked: `b44ff8e Improve release and benchmark tooling`
-
-Release docs/default cleanup after that benchmark removed personal host aliases from
-public examples and test fixtures; it did not change release runtime paths.
-
-Environment:
-
-- Host: local homelab runner
-- Benchmark harness: `make bench-docker-mosh`
-- Container SSH server: OpenSSH 9.6p1 on Ubuntu
-- Same container, key, DNS, loopback, and Dosh server path for all Docker samples
-
-## Release Artifacts
-
-Generated locally with:
-
-```bash
-sh scripts/package-release.sh
-```
-
-Artifacts:
-
-| artifact | sha256 |
-| --- | --- |
-| `dosh-linux-x86_64.tar.gz` | `9f586852a506cca3caf618743e12967265879ee10f5294d179cdcd668db1e808` |
-| `dosh-0.1.0-linux-x86_64.tar.gz` | `9f586852a506cca3caf618743e12967265879ee10f5294d179cdcd668db1e808` |
-| `dosh-macos-aarch64.tar.gz` | `dd1151aa2b40be37288dc19a07521b0ec72d1106439eb484cdff01cca3b891c6` |
-| `dosh-0.1.0-macos-aarch64.tar.gz` | `dd1151aa2b40be37288dc19a07521b0ec72d1106439eb484cdff01cca3b891c6` |
-
-The installer verifies `<artifact>.sha256` when the sidecar is published.
-
-## Docker SSH/Mosh Benchmark
-
-Command:
-
-```bash
-make bench-docker-mosh
-```
-
-### Cold SSH Bootstrap
-
-| metric | n | min ms | median ms | p95 ms | mean ms | max ms |
-| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
-| `ssh_true_ms` | 3 | 216.58 | 220.27 | 224.64 | 220.66 | 225.12 |
-| `dosh_attach_ms` | 3 | 232.37 | 235.56 | 239.13 | 235.82 | 239.53 |
-
-Raw samples:
-
-- `ssh_true_ms`: [216.58, 220.27, 225.12]
-- `dosh_attach_ms`: [235.56, 232.37, 239.53]
-
-Gate: `dosh_attach_ms avg 235.82ms <= ssh avg 220.66ms + 500.00ms`
-
-### ControlMaster SSH Bootstrap
-
-| metric | n | min ms | median ms | p95 ms | mean ms | max ms |
-| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
-| `ssh_true_ms` | 3 | 7.29 | 7.50 | 47.51 | 22.25 | 51.95 |
-| `dosh_attach_ms` | 3 | 16.62 | 17.01 | 17.77 | 17.16 | 17.85 |
-
-Raw samples:
-
-- `ssh_true_ms`: [51.95, 7.29, 7.50]
-- `dosh_attach_ms`: [17.01, 16.62, 17.85]
-
-Gate: `dosh_attach_ms avg 17.16ms <= ssh avg 22.25ms + 500.00ms`
-
-### Native Cold Auth
-
-| metric | n | min ms | median ms | p95 ms | mean ms | max ms |
-| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
-| `ssh_true_ms` | 5 | 215.72 | 222.68 | 227.05 | 221.32 | 227.82 |
-| `dosh_cold_native_ms` | 5 | 8.63 | 8.84 | 9.16 | 8.88 | 9.23 |
-
-Raw samples:
-
-- `ssh_true_ms`: [216.40, 223.99, 227.82, 222.68, 215.72]
-- `dosh_cold_native_ms`: [8.84, 8.63, 9.23, 8.88, 8.84]
-
-Gate: `dosh_cold_native_ms avg 8.88ms <= ssh avg 221.32ms + 0.00ms`
-
-### Cached Attach
-
-| metric | n | min ms | median ms | p95 ms | mean ms | max ms |
-| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
-| `dosh_cached_attach_ms` | 10 | 8.07 | 8.96 | 9.83 | 8.98 | 9.84 |
-
-Raw samples:
-
-- `dosh_cached_attach_ms`: [8.07, 9.09, 9.02, 8.66, 8.71, 8.90, 8.45, 9.84, 9.25, 9.82]
-
-Gate: `dosh_cached_attach_ms avg 8.98ms <= 25.00ms`
-
-### Mosh Comparison
-
-| metric | n | min ms | median ms | p95 ms | mean ms | max ms |
-| --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
-| `ssh_true_ms` | 3 | 216.48 | 218.93 | 219.49 | 218.32 | 219.55 |
-| `dosh_attach_ms` | 3 | 229.59 | 233.00 | 233.31 | 231.98 | 233.35 |
-| `mosh_start_true_ms` | 3 | 527.13 | 563.34 | 573.09 | 554.89 | 574.18 |
-
-Raw samples:
-
-- `ssh_true_ms`: [219.55, 216.48, 218.93]
-- `dosh_attach_ms`: [233.00, 229.59, 233.35]
-- `mosh_start_true_ms`: [563.34, 527.13, 574.18]
-
-## Soak And Fuzz Evidence
-
-- `cargo test`: `153 passed, 1 ignored`
-- `make soak-local`: `sleep_roaming_soak_30m ... ok`, finished in `1803.54s`
-- `make fuzz-smoke`: passed all configured targets for 20s each:
-  `packet_decode`, `from_body`, `authorized_keys`, `known_hosts`,
-  `handshake_structs`, `attach_ticket`
-
-## Public Claim Boundary
-
-This evidence supports:
-
-- Dosh cached attach and native auth are much faster than cold SSH/Mosh startup in
-  this benchmark environment.
-- Dosh remains mosh-shaped, not mosh-compatible.
-- Dosh does not claim generic SSH replacement compatibility.
-- Native v1 security still needs external review before making hard public security
-  claims.

docs/THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-# Dosh Threat Model
-
-This is the published threat model for Dosh native v1, derived from
-`docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` sections 4-6. It states the assets Dosh protects, the
-attackers it does and does not defend against, the security properties Dosh claims
-relative to SSH, the cryptographic building blocks actually in use, and an honest
-list of accepted residual risks and known gaps.
-
-Dosh is a remote-login transport for Dosh-installed servers. It is intended to
-replace the day-to-day `ssh host` workflow for terminals and TCP forwarding while
-keeping OpenSSH as a recovery and bootstrap fallback. Dosh is **not** an
-RFC-compatible SSH implementation and does not claim SSH's entire protocol security
-surface. It claims security that is **equivalent to, and in some respects stronger
-than, SSH for the Dosh terminal and forwarding use case** on hosts running
-`dosh-server`.
-
-## 1. Assets
-
-Dosh protects:
-
-- **Terminal session contents.** Keystrokes, command output, and the authoritative
-  screen state for every named or generated session.
-- **Forwarded TCP streams.** Bytes carried over `-L`, `-R`, and `-D` channels.
-- **User authentication credentials.** The user's SSH/Dosh private keys and any
-  ssh-agent identities. Dosh never sees private key material in plaintext on the
-  wire; signatures are produced locally or by the agent.
-- **Server-issued credentials.** Session keys, `ClientId` association state,
-  server-sealed attach tickets, and the client-held attach-ticket PSK.
-- **Server identity.** The persistent Dosh host key (`~/.config/dosh/host_key`) and
-  the server secret used to seal attach tickets and derive bootstrap material.
-- **Host-trust state.** The client's pinned known-hosts file
-  (`~/.config/dosh/known_hosts`).
-- **Authorization policy.** `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` /
-  `~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys` and the forwarding policy they encode.
-
-## 2. Attackers
-
-### In scope (Dosh must defend against these)
-
-- **Passive network observer.** May record all UDP traffic between client and
-  server.
-- **Active network attacker.** May spoof, drop, replay, reorder, or modify any
-  packet, and may attempt to inject forged packets in either direction.
-- **NAT rebinding / roaming.** Client source IP and port may change mid-session,
-  including across sleep, network switch, and NAT timeout.
-- **Stolen attach-ticket cache without the user's private key.** An attacker who
-  reads a client cache copies a server-sealed ticket plus its PSK but does not have
-  the user's SSH private key.
-- **Server restart and key rotation.** Stale session keys, tickets, and replay
-  state must not be usable after the server rotates its secret or host key.
-- **Malicious unauthenticated client flooding auth attempts.** A peer that has no
-  authorized key tries to exhaust server resources or guess credentials.
-- **Compromised low-privilege local user on a shared client.** A different local
-  user attempts to read Dosh credential caches on the same machine.
-
-### Out of scope (explicitly not defended against)
-
-- **Compromised client machine.** If the endpoint running `dosh-client` is owned by
-  the attacker, the attacker has the user's keys and terminal.
-- **Compromised server account.** If the login account on the server is owned, the
-  attacker already has the shell Dosh would have given them.
-- **Malicious kernel, terminal emulator, or PTY implementation** on either side.
-- **A server that was legitimately authorized and later turns malicious.** Host-key
-  pinning detects a *substituted* server, not a trusted server that decides to
-  misbehave.
-
-These exclusions match SSH's own boundaries: SSH likewise cannot protect a
-compromised endpoint or a malicious authorized peer.
-
-## 3. Security Properties Claimed vs SSH
-
-| Property | SSH | Dosh native v1 | Notes |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| Server authentication before trusting session data | yes | yes | Host key signs the handshake transcript; client verifies before sending user auth or accepting terminal bytes. |
-| User authentication by private-key possession | yes | yes | Ed25519, ECDSA P-256, and RSA-SHA2 via ssh-agent or OpenSSH key; signature binds the full transcript. |
-| Forward secrecy | yes | yes | Ephemeral X25519 per connection; long-term host/user keys never derive the traffic key. |
-| AEAD on every post-handshake packet | yes | yes | ChaCha20-Poly1305 with per-direction, per-sequence nonces. |
-| Replay protection | yes | yes | Sliding replay window over the AEAD packet counter, plus transcript-bound handshake. |
-| Host-key pinning with explicit first use | TOFU, weakly tied to transport | yes, with explicit policy | Default refuses unknown host keys; TOFU only when `trust_on_first_use` is set; mismatch hard-fails and never auto-replaces. |
-| No plaintext terminal bytes after handshake | yes | yes | All `Frame`/`Input`/stream packets are AEAD-sealed. |
-| No custom cryptographic primitives | yes | yes | Standard X25519/HKDF-SHA256/ChaCha20-Poly1305/signature crates only. |
-| Fail-closed downgrade behavior | yes | yes | Native auth failure surfaces an explicit error and SSH fallback is explicit; it never silently drops to an unauthenticated mode. |
-| Fast resumption without re-auth | ControlMaster only | yes, native | Cached session/ticket attach skips a fresh round of public-key proof; this is a deliberate speed/security trade discussed in section 6. |
-
-### Where Dosh aims to *exceed* SSH for this use case
-
-- **Tighter transcript binding.** A user-auth signature binds both ephemeral keys,
-  both randoms, the server host key, requested user/session/mode/terminal size,
-  selected algorithms, and protocol version into one transcript. This forecloses
-  cross-protocol and partial-replay confusion classes for the narrow Dosh surface.
-- **Smaller attack surface.** Dosh deliberately omits the full SSH transport/channel
-  machinery, arbitrary subsystems, X11, SFTP/SCP, and forced-command subsystems.
-  Fewer features means fewer parsers and fewer reachable states.
-- **Explicit, file-pinned host trust.** Host trust is a first-class, inspectable
-  known-hosts entry with source provenance (`tofu`/`ssh`/`manual`) and a hard-fail
-  mismatch path, rather than the looser default TOFU behavior most SSH clients ship.
-- **Modern primitives only.** Ed25519 and X25519 by default; ECDSA P-256 and
-  RSA-SHA2 are accepted for SSH-key compatibility; no DSA, no SHA-1 signatures, no
-  CBC-and-MAC constructions.
-
-Dosh does **not** claim generic SSH compatibility and must not be described as an
-SSH-protocol implementation.
-
-## 4. Cryptographic Building Blocks (as implemented)
-
-These reflect the code in `src/crypto.rs`, `src/native.rs`, `src/auth.rs`, and
-`src/protocol.rs`, not just the spec.
-
-- **Key exchange:** X25519 ephemeral-ephemeral (`x25519-dalek`). The shared secret
-  is checked for contributory behaviour; a non-contributory result is rejected.
-- **Handshake/transport KDF:** HKDF-SHA256 (`hkdf`), salted with the SHA-256 of the
-  serialized `ClientHello` and `ServerHello`, binding traffic keys to the transcript.
-- **AEAD:** ChaCha20-Poly1305 (`chacha20poly1305`) for every encrypted packet and
-  for sealed attach tickets. Nonces are derived as `direction || sequence`, giving a
-  unique nonce per `(key, direction, sequence)`. AES-GCM is reserved for later and is
-  not selectable today.
-- **Host-key signatures:** Ed25519 (`ed25519-dalek`) over the handshake transcript.
-- **User-auth signatures:** Ed25519, ECDSA P-256, and RSA-SHA2, produced either by
-  ssh-agent over a Unix socket (`src/ssh_agent.rs`) or from an encrypted/plaintext
-  OpenSSH private key (`ssh-key`). The signature covers the user-auth transcript
-  described above. RSA public keys are matched as `ssh-rsa` authorized keys, but
-  native signatures must be `rsa-sha2-256` or `rsa-sha2-512`; legacy SHA-1
-  `ssh-rsa` signatures are rejected.
-- **Bootstrap auth (SSH fallback path):** HMAC-SHA256 attach tokens and HKDF-SHA256
-  derived session keys, with attach tickets sealed under an HKDF-derived
-  ticket key. Token comparison is constant-time.
-- **Hashing/transcript:** SHA-256 (`sha2`).
-- **Randomness:** OS CSPRNG via `rand::thread_rng()` / `OsRng`.
-
-No homegrown ciphers, MACs, padding schemes, or key derivation are used. No nonce or
-key pair is reused within a direction.
-
-## 5. How the Properties Are Enforced (handshake and transport)
-
-- **Server authentication.** `ServerHello` carries the host public key and an Ed25519
-  signature over `dosh/native/server-hello/v1 || ClientHello || ServerHello(unsigned)`.
-  The client verifies this signature *and* checks the host key against its pinned
-  known-hosts entry before sending user auth or accepting terminal bytes. Unknown
-  keys are refused unless TOFU is enabled; mismatches hard-fail with both
-  fingerprints and the file path.
-- **User authentication.** `UserAuth` carries an Ed25519 signature over
-  `dosh/native/user-auth/v1 || ClientHello || ServerHello || UserAuth(unsigned)`. The
-  server looks the public key up in `authorized_keys`, enforces authorized-key
-  options, then verifies the signature. A removed key can no longer authenticate.
-- **Authorization options.** `from=` (with CIDR, glob, and negation),
-  `no-port-forwarding`, and `permitopen=` are enforced. `command=` is rejected for
-  native terminal login. Any unrecognized restrictive option fails closed rather than
-  being silently ignored.
-- **Forwarding policy.** The server enforces `allow_tcp_forwarding`,
-  `allow_remote_forwarding`, and a loopback-only default for remote binds
-  (`allow_remote_non_loopback_bind`), in addition to per-key `permitopen=` /
-  `no-port-forwarding`.
-- **Replay protection.** A 128-wide sliding window over the per-direction packet
-  counter rejects duplicates and stale sequences. Sequence 0 is never accepted.
-- **Stale-key tolerance.** Each encrypted packet carries a `session_key_id`; packets
-  under an old key are dropped as "stale or wrong session key id" rather than treated
-  as fatal decrypt failures, so reconnect after rotation is non-destructive.
-- **Roaming.** The server keys clients by `ClientId` and session key id, not by
-  source address, and updates the endpoint after any valid encrypted packet from a
-  new address — without weakening authentication, because the packet must still
-  decrypt and verify.
-
-## 6. Accepted Residual Risks and Known Gaps
-
-These are stated openly so the public claim gate (`NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 17) can
-be evaluated honestly. Items here are *not* yet "green".
-
-### Accepted residual risks (by design)
-
-- **Attach tickets prove recent server-issued possession, not fresh private-key
-  possession.** A stolen client cache containing both the sealed ticket and its PSK
-  can attach until the ticket expires (default TTL 24h, configurable down to zero) or
-  until the server rotates its secret/host key or the user key is removed. This is the
-  deliberate speed trade. It is bounded by TTL, scoped to host/user/session/mode, and
-  can be disabled. SSH ControlMaster has an analogous live-socket exposure.
-- **Local cache confidentiality relies on filesystem permissions.** Host keys,
-  server secret, known-hosts, and credential caches are written `0600`. A
-  same-machine attacker who can already read another user's `0600` files (e.g. via
-  root) is out of scope, as with SSH's `~/.ssh`.
-- **A trusted server that turns malicious is not detected.** Host-key pinning
-  detects substitution, not betrayal by an already-authorized server. This matches
-  SSH.
-
-### Known gaps / work in progress (must close before the public claim)
-
-- **Native-auth rate limiting needs tuning, not first implementation.** The server
-  enforces a per-source token bucket before expensive native-auth work, evicts
-  half-finished handshakes on a TTL, and reports remaining capacity in
-  `ServerHello`. It is covered by unit/integration tests, but still needs abusive
-  real-host tuning before public hardening claims.
-- **Protocol VERSION compatibility is intentionally single-version for v1.** The
-  packet header rejects any non-matching `VERSION` byte and the native handshake
-  rejects any non-matching `protocol_version`; peers get a named upgrade error, not
-  a silent downgrade. `docs/PROTOCOL_VERSIONING.md` defines the bump rules and the
-  post-v1 requirements for any future multi-version negotiation.
-- **Deep fuzzing still needs launch evidence.** CI runs parser/auth fuzz targets for
-  20 seconds per target on push/PR and 300 seconds per target on weekly/manual runs
-  when nightly/cargo-fuzz is available. That catches obvious panics and parser
-  robustness regressions; public security claims should cite a completed
-  `make fuzz-deep` or scheduled CI run with durations.
-- **User-key algorithm coverage now matches the v1 target.** Ed25519, ECDSA P-256,
-  and compatibility RSA-SHA2 native auth are implemented for ssh-agent and OpenSSH
-  identity files. RSA remains compatibility-only and deliberately rejects legacy
-  SHA-1 `ssh-rsa` signatures.
-- **Forwarded stream data uses ordered retransmission.** Streams carry byte offsets,
-  cumulative received-offset ACKs, and retransmit unacknowledged chunks as fresh
-  encrypted transport packets. Hostile-network tests cover replay/reorder and
-  server-to-client stream recovery after deliberate UDP loss; broader real-host load
-  soak remains launch evidence.
-- **Long-soak evidence is a launch gate.** Roaming, retransmit, resize, and
-  multi-client tests exist, and `sleep_roaming_soak_30m` / `make soak-local` provide
-  the 30-minute sleep/roaming gate. That gate should be run and published before
-  public security/reliability claims.
-- **No third-party audit claim.** Dosh maintains a public threat model and hardening
-  checklist, but should not market itself as externally audited unless that actually
-  happens.
-
-### Auth posture
-
-Native auth is **opt-in alongside SSH fallback**. `auth_preference` defaults to
-`native,ssh`: Dosh tries the native authenticated path first and falls back to SSH
-bootstrap explicitly and visibly when native auth is disabled, unavailable, or
-rejected. Native auth failure never silently degrades to an unauthenticated mode.
-Forwarding (`-L`/`-R`/`-D`) requires the native authenticated path and refuses to run
-under `--local-auth`.
-
-## 7. Verification and Public-Claim Status
-
-Dosh may claim "native SSH replacement for Dosh-installed servers" only after the
-conditions in `NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` section 17 are met: native auth default on a real
-host, SSH fallback available, the section 16 checklist green, this threat model
-published, and benchmarks with raw samples for SSH cold, Dosh native cold, Dosh
-cached attach, and Mosh startup.
-
-Current status: this threat model is published (this document). The verification
-checklist is **not yet fully green** — see the item-by-item status table in
-`docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` ("Native v1 verification checklist status") and the known
-gaps in section 6 above. Until the gaps close, Dosh's defensible public claim remains
-**fast, encrypted native attach/reconnect and forwarding with SSH bootstrap
-fallback** on Dosh-installed servers, not generic SSH compatibility or a third-party
-audited security product.

fuzz/README.md

@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-# dosh fuzz targets
-
-cargo-fuzz / libFuzzer harnesses for the `dosh` parsers and handshake verifiers
-(spec milestone 5 / §16: "Fuzz packet parsing, authorized-key parsing,
-known-host parsing, and handshake state", "Fuzz targets run in CI").
-
-This is a **standalone crate** (its own `[workspace]`) so it never affects the
-main crate's `cargo build` / `cargo test` / `cargo fmt --check`.
-
-## Targets
-
-| Target | Parser(s) exercised |
-| --- | --- |
-| `packet_decode` | `protocol::Header::parse`, `protocol::decode`, `protocol::decrypt_body` |
-| `from_body` | `protocol::from_body::<T>` for every protocol & native wire struct |
-| `authorized_keys` | `native::parse_authorized_keys`, `native::parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob` |
-| `known_hosts` | `native::parse_known_hosts`, `native::parse_host_public_key_line` |
-| `handshake_structs` | handshake struct decode + `verify_server_hello`, `user_auth_transcript`, `verify_native_user_auth` |
-| `attach_ticket` | `auth::open_attach_ticket`, `auth::verify_attach_ticket`, `auth::decode_bootstrap` |
-
-Every target's objective is the same: **no panics on any input** (a panic on
-untrusted bytes is a robustness/DoS bug per threat model §5).
-
-## Prerequisites
-
-```sh
-rustup toolchain install nightly
-cargo install cargo-fuzz
-```
-
-cargo-fuzz requires a nightly toolchain (it builds with `-Z sanitizer=address`).
-
-## Run
-
-From the repository root:
-
-```sh
-# Run all targets for a short smoke pass
-make fuzz-smoke
-
-# Run all targets for the pre-launch deep pass (default: 300s each)
-make fuzz-deep
-
-# List targets
-cargo +nightly fuzz list --fuzz-dir fuzz
-
-# Run a single target indefinitely
-cargo +nightly fuzz run --fuzz-dir fuzz packet_decode
-
-# Short, CI-style smoke run of one target (10 seconds)
-cargo +nightly fuzz run --fuzz-dir fuzz packet_decode -- -max_total_time=10
-```
-
-Or from inside `fuzz/`:
-
-```sh
-cd fuzz
-cargo +nightly fuzz run packet_decode -- -max_total_time=10
-```
-
-## CI
-
-`.github/workflows/ci.yml` has a `fuzz-smoke` job that installs nightly +
-cargo-fuzz and runs each target. Push/PR runs use a short 20-second-per-target
-smoke pass. Weekly scheduled and manual workflow runs use a 300-second-per-target
-deep pass by default. The job is tolerant if the toolchain/tooling is unavailable
-so it never blocks the main test gate.

install.ps1

@@ -70,6 +70,36 @@ function Release-DownloadUrl {
     "$web/releases/download/$BinaryVersion/$name"
 }
 
+function Release-LatestTagDownloadUrl {
+    if ($BinaryUrl -or $BinaryBase -or $BinaryVersion -ne "latest") {
+        return $null
+    }
+    $web = Repo-WebBase $Repo
+    if (-not $web) {
+        return $null
+    }
+    try {
+        $response = Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri "$web/releases/latest" -MaximumRedirection 5
+        $effective = $null
+        if ($response.BaseResponse.ResponseUri) {
+            $effective = $response.BaseResponse.ResponseUri.AbsoluteUri
+        } elseif ($response.BaseResponse.RequestMessage -and $response.BaseResponse.RequestMessage.RequestUri) {
+            $effective = $response.BaseResponse.RequestMessage.RequestUri.AbsoluteUri
+        }
+        $prefix = "$web/releases/tag/"
+        if ($effective -and $effective.StartsWith($prefix)) {
+            $tag = $effective.Substring($prefix.Length)
+            if ($tag) {
+                return "$web/releases/download/$tag/$(Release-ArtifactName)"
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        return $null
+    }
+    return $null
+}
+
 function Verify-ArchiveChecksum($Url, $Archive) {
     $checksumPath = "$Archive.sha256"
     try {
@@ -86,12 +116,40 @@ function Verify-ArchiveChecksum($Url, $Archive) {
     }
 }
 
+function Expected-ArchiveVersion($Url) {
+    if ($Url -match "/releases/download/v([^/]+)/") {
+        return $Matches[1]
+    }
+    if (-not $BinaryUrl -and -not $BinaryBase -and $BinaryVersion -ne "latest") {
+        return $BinaryVersion.TrimStart("v")
+    }
+    return $null
+}
+
+function Verify-ArchiveVersion($ExtractDir, $Url) {
+    $expected = Expected-ArchiveVersion $Url
+    if (-not $expected) {
+        return
+    }
+    $versionFile = Get-ChildItem -Path $ExtractDir -Recurse -File -Filter VERSION | Select-Object -First 1
+    if (-not $versionFile) {
+        throw "prebuilt archive missing VERSION for $Url"
+    }
+    $actual = (Get-Content $versionFile.FullName -Raw).Trim()
+    if ($actual -ne $expected) {
+        throw "prebuilt archive version mismatch for ${Url}: expected $expected, got $actual"
+    }
+}
+
 $bindir = Join-Path $Prefix "bin"
 $configDir = Join-Path $HOME ".config\dosh"
 New-Item -ItemType Directory -Force -Path $bindir, $configDir | Out-Null
 
 function Install-Prebuilt {
+    $url = Release-LatestTagDownloadUrl
+    if (-not $url) {
         $url = Release-DownloadUrl
+    }
     if (-not $url) {
         return $false
     }
@@ -104,6 +162,7 @@ function Install-Prebuilt {
         Invoke-WebRequest -UseBasicParsing -Uri $url -OutFile $zip
         Verify-ArchiveChecksum $url $zip
         Expand-Archive -Force -Path $zip -DestinationPath $extract
+        Verify-ArchiveVersion $extract $url
         foreach ($bin in @("dosh-client.exe", "dosh-bench.exe")) {
             $found = Get-ChildItem -Path $extract -Recurse -File -Filter $bin | Select-Object -First 1
             if (-not $found) {
@@ -188,6 +247,7 @@ predict = true
 predict_mode = "experimental"
 cache_attach_tickets = true
 credential_cache = "~/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
+escape_key = "^]"
 "@ | Set-Content -NoNewline -Encoding utf8 $clientConfig
 }
 

install.sh

@@ -12,7 +12,11 @@ start_server=1
 force_config=0
 update_cache="${DOSH_UPDATE_CACHE:-$HOME/.cache/dosh/source}"
 quiet="${DOSH_UPDATE_QUIET:-0}"
-use_prebuilt="${DOSH_USE_PREBUILT:-1}"
+if [ "${DOSH_UPDATE_QUIET:-0}" = "1" ] && [ "${DOSH_BINARY_REQUIRED:-0}" != "1" ]; then
+  use_prebuilt=0
+else
+  use_prebuilt="${DOSH_USE_PREBUILT:-1}"
+fi
 binary_url="${DOSH_BINARY_URL:-}"
 binary_base="${DOSH_BINARY_BASE:-}"
 binary_name="${DOSH_BINARY_NAME:-}"
@@ -43,7 +47,7 @@ Environment alternatives:
   DOSH_BINARY_URL URL
                   Exact release tarball URL to install
   DOSH_BINARY_BASE URL
-                  Release download base; defaults to REPO/releases/latest/download
+                  Release download base; otherwise derived from the latest tag
   DOSH_BINARY_NAME NAME
                   Release tarball name; defaults to dosh-OS-ARCH.tar.gz
   DOSH_BINARY_VERSION TAG
@@ -264,8 +268,42 @@ verify_archive_checksum() {
   fi
 }
 
+expected_archive_version() {
+  url="$1"
+  case "$url" in
+    */releases/download/v*/*)
+      tag="${url#*/releases/download/v}"
+      tag="${tag%%/*}"
+      printf '%s\n' "$tag"
+      return 0
+      ;;
+  esac
+  if [ -z "$binary_url" ] && [ -z "$binary_base" ] && [ "$binary_version" != "latest" ]; then
+    printf '%s\n' "${binary_version#v}"
+    return 0
+  fi
+  return 1
+}
+
+verify_archive_version() {
+  extract_dir="$1"
+  url="$2"
+  expected="$(expected_archive_version "$url" || true)"
+  [ -n "$expected" ] || return 0
+  version_file="$(find "$extract_dir" -type f -name VERSION 2>/dev/null | sed -n '1p')"
+  if [ -z "$version_file" ]; then
+    echo "prebuilt archive missing VERSION for $url" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+  actual="$(tr -d '\r\n' <"$version_file")"
+  if [ "$actual" != "$expected" ]; then
+    echo "prebuilt archive version mismatch for $url: expected $expected, got $actual" >&2
+    return 1
+  fi
+}
+
 try_install_prebuilt() {
-  download_url="$(release_download_url)" || return 1
+  download_url="$(release_latest_tag_download_url || release_download_url)" || return 1
   tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
   archive="$tmpdir/$(release_artifact_name)"
   checksum_file="$archive.sha256"
@@ -273,7 +311,7 @@ try_install_prebuilt() {
   need curl
   need tar
   if ! curl -fsL "$download_url" -o "$archive" 2>/dev/null; then
-    alt_download_url="$(release_latest_tag_download_url || true)"
+    alt_download_url="$(release_download_url || true)"
     if [ -z "$alt_download_url" ] || ! curl -fsL "$alt_download_url" -o "$archive"; then
       echo "prebuilt unavailable: $download_url" >&2
       [ -z "$alt_download_url" ] || echo "prebuilt unavailable: $alt_download_url" >&2
@@ -287,6 +325,7 @@ try_install_prebuilt() {
     echo "prebuilt archive could not be extracted: $download_url" >&2
     return 1
   fi
+  verify_archive_version "$tmpdir/extract" "$download_url" || return 1
   install_extracted_binary "$tmpdir/extract" dosh-client "$bindir/dosh-client" || return 1
   ln -sf dosh-client "$bindir/dosh"
   if [ "$role" = "server" ] || [ "$role" = "both" ]; then
@@ -416,8 +455,9 @@ scrollback = 5000
 auth_ttl_secs = 30
 attach_ticket_ttl_secs = 3600
 allow_attach_tickets = true
-client_timeout_secs = 86400
+client_timeout_secs = 2592000
 retransmit_window = 256
+output_frame_interval_ms = 16
 default_input_mode = "read-write"
 prewarm_sessions = ["default"]
 create_on_attach = true
@@ -431,6 +471,7 @@ native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute = 30
 allow_tcp_forwarding = true
 allow_remote_forwarding = false
 allow_agent_forwarding = false
+persist_sessions = true
 EOF
   fi
 
@@ -492,6 +533,7 @@ known_hosts = "~/.config/dosh/known_hosts"
 identity_files = ["~/.ssh/id_ed25519"]
 use_ssh_agent = true
 forward_agent = false
+escape_key = "^]"
 EOF
   fi
 

llms.txt

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-# dosh (Dormant Shell)
-
-> dosh is a low-latency remote terminal for homelab/personal servers. It is mosh-shaped
-> but not a mosh clone: `dosh-server` is a resident daemon that keeps terminal sessions
-> hot, and the client reconnects over encrypted UDP — so attach and reconnect are
-> near-instant (~3 ms of local overhead + one network RTT). SSH is used once to
-> establish trust; after that, repeat attaches skip SSH entirely. It also does SSH-style
-> TCP port forwarding (`-L`/`-R`/`-D`) over the same encrypted transport, which is what
-> makes back-and-forth client↔server homelab comms easy.
-
-This file orients an AI agent (or a human) on what dosh is, what it can do, and how to
-drive it. It is intentionally self-contained. For deeper detail, see the linked docs at
-the bottom.
-
-## What dosh is for
-
-Use dosh instead of `ssh`/`mosh` for **interactive shells and TCP forwarding** to a
-server where you control both ends and have installed `dosh-server` (typically a homelab
-box, VPS, or workstation). It shines when you:
-
-- want a terminal that survives laptop sleep, Wi-Fi changes, and NAT rebinding, and
-  resumes instantly instead of hanging;
-- reconnect to the same box many times a day and don't want to pay SSH startup each time;
-- need to reach services on the server from your laptop (or vice-versa) without standing
-  up a VPN.
-
-dosh is **not** a drop-in for every SSH use. It does not do `scp`/`sftp` file transfer,
-X11, or act as an `sshd` for arbitrary SSH clients. Keep `ssh` installed for those.
-
-## Core capabilities
-
-- **Encrypted UDP terminal transport** — AEAD-encrypted, with packet sequencing, a
-  sliding replay window, ACKs, and server-side retransmit of unacked output.
-- **Resident server + hot sessions** — `dosh-server` runs as a daemon; named sessions
-  (and a prewarmed `default`) stay alive across client disconnects.
-- **Fast attach / reconnect** — see "Fast path order" below; cached attach is ~one RTT.
-- **Roaming** — the session follows the client across IP/port changes.
-- **Named & shared sessions** — reattach the same persistent terminal from multiple
-  clients; optional **view-only** clients.
-- **TCP port forwarding** — local (`-L`), remote (`-R`), and dynamic SOCKS (`-D`) over
-  the encrypted transport, with per-stream flow control and terminal-priority
-  scheduling (bulk transfers don't lag your keystrokes).
-- **Native UDP auth** — Ed25519 user auth via ssh-agent or an (optionally encrypted)
-  OpenSSH key, verified against `authorized_keys`. Falls back to SSH bootstrap when
-  native auth isn't available. SSH host config (`HostName`, `User`, `Port`,
-  `IdentityFile`, `ProxyJump`, etc.) is honored.
-- **Host-key pinning** — TOFU/known-hosts with hard-fail on mismatch.
-- **Speculative local echo** — optional predictive echo for laggy links (display-only;
-  real input is always sent to the server).
-- **Ops commands** — `doctor`, `sessions`, `trust`, `import-ssh`, `update`.
-
-## Quickstart
-
-Install the server on each box you want to reach (default UDP port `50000`):
-
-```bash
-curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh \
-  | DOSH_PORT=50000 sh -s -- server
-```
-
-Install the client (macOS/Linux), then attach:
-
-```bash
-curl -fsSL https://git.palav.dev/Palav/dosh/raw/branch/main/install.sh \
-  | DOSH_SERVER=homelab DOSH_HOST=homelab.example.com DOSH_PORT=50000 sh -s -- client
-
-dosh homelab                 # fresh interactive shell
-dosh homelab uptime          # run one command
-dosh --session work homelab  # named, persistent, reattachable session
-```
-
-- Detach (leave the server session running): **Ctrl-]**.
-- End the session: type `exit` in the remote shell.
-- If UDP stalls, dosh keeps the terminal open, sends keepalives, and ticket-reconnects.
-
-## Client↔server homelab comms (the back-and-forth)
-
-Forwarding is the key to "make homelab comms easy." Three directions:
-
-| Command | Direction | Effect |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `dosh -L [bind:]LPORT:THOST:TPORT host` | pull server→you | A listener on **your machine** (`bind`, default localhost) forwards to `THOST:TPORT` reached **from the server**. |
-| `dosh -R [bind:]LPORT:THOST:TPORT host` | push you→server | A listener on **the server** (loopback by default) forwards to `THOST:TPORT` reached **from your machine**. |
-| `dosh -D [bind:]LPORT host` | SOCKS via server | A SOCKS5 proxy on **your machine**; traffic egresses **from the server**. |
-
-Concrete homelab patterns:
-
-```bash
-# Reach the homelab's internal Grafana (server-side :3000) from your laptop browser:
-dosh -L 3000:127.0.0.1:3000 homelab            # open http://localhost:3000
-
-# Reach a DB that only listens on the homelab LAN:
-dosh -L 5432:10.0.0.5:5432 homelab             # psql -h 127.0.0.1 -p 5432
-
-# Let the homelab hit a dev server running on your laptop (e.g. a webhook target):
-dosh -R 9000:127.0.0.1:8080 homelab           # homelab curls http://127.0.0.1:9000
-
-# Route browser traffic out through the homelab's network:
-dosh -D 1080 homelab                           # SOCKS5 proxy at 127.0.0.1:1080
-
-# Forward-only, no shell; multiple forwards; background after listeners are up:
-dosh -N -L 3000:127.0.0.1:3000 -L 5432:10.0.0.5:5432 homelab
-dosh -f -N -L 3000:127.0.0.1:3000 homelab
-```
-
-Server policy controls forwarding: `allow_tcp_forwarding`, `allow_remote_forwarding`,
-`allow_remote_non_loopback_bind`, and per-key `permitopen=`/`no-port-forwarding` in
-`authorized_keys`. Remote listeners bind to loopback unless explicitly allowed.
-
-## Fast path order (why it's quick)
-
-The client tries the cheapest valid path first:
-
-1. **UDP resume** — existing client id + session key; one encrypted UDP round-trip.
-2. **UDP attach ticket** — cached server-issued ticket; one round-trip, no SSH.
-3. **Native UDP auth** — Ed25519 handshake (ssh-agent/key) when enabled.
-4. **SSH bootstrap** — `ssh user@host dosh-auth …` once, then a UDP attach.
-
-Measured locally (loopback, release): cached attach ≈ **3 ms**, cold native auth ≈ 9 ms.
-Over a real link, add one RTT. See `docs/BENCHMARKS.md`.
-
-## Architecture (1-minute model)
-
-- **dosh-server** — single UDP socket on one port; a session table keyed by name; one
-  PTY per named session; per-session terminal screen state (vt100) for snapshots/diffs;
-  a per-session client table; encrypted UDP protocol; a small SSH-invoked `dosh-auth`
-  helper. Abandoned (clientless, non-prewarmed) sessions and their shells are reaped
-  after a grace period; prewarmed sessions stay hot.
-- **dosh-client** — raw-mode terminal; local credential cache; tries resume/ticket/native
-  before SSH; forwards PTY I/O; reconnect/roaming state machine; optional predictive echo.
-- **Binaries** — `dosh-server`, `dosh-client` (symlinked as `dosh`), `dosh-auth`
-  (SSH-invoked trust helper), `dosh-bench` (benchmarks).
-
-## Security model (summary)
-
-- First trust via SSH; thereafter encrypted Dosh transport. Native auth available.
-- KEX X25519; AEAD ChaCha20-Poly1305; KDF HKDF-SHA256; host & user auth Ed25519;
-  SHA-256 transcript binding. Per-direction, per-sequence nonces; replay window.
-- Host keys pinned in `~/.config/dosh/known_hosts`; mismatch hard-fails.
-- User auth against `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` (+ optional `~/.config/dosh/authorized_keys`);
-  removed keys can't authenticate; unsupported restrictive options fail closed.
-- Forward secrecy from ephemeral X25519; attach tickets are server-sealed and scoped.
-
-dosh claims security **equivalent to, and in places stronger than, SSH for the dosh
-terminal/forwarding use case** — not full SSH-protocol parity. Read `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`
-for the honest stance, residual risks, and what's still pending before public claims.
-
-## Configuration
-
-- **Client** `~/.config/dosh/client.toml` — `auth_preference` (e.g. `"native,ssh"`),
-  `trust_on_first_use`, `identity_files`, `use_ssh_agent`, `forward_agent`, `send_env`,
-  `set_env`, `dosh_port`, `default_session`, `predict`, `reconnect_timeout_secs`,
-  `credential_cache`, `known_hosts`.
-- **Hosts** `~/.config/dosh/hosts.toml` — per-alias `[name]` with `ssh`, `dosh_host`,
-  `port`, `user`, `default_command`, `predict`. Generate from SSH aliases with
-  `dosh import-ssh <alias> <name>`.
-- **Server** `~/.config/dosh/server.toml` — `port`, `bind`, `shell`, `prewarm_sessions`,
-  `native_auth`, `host_key`, `authorized_keys`, `attach_ticket_ttl_secs`,
-  `client_timeout_secs`, `allow_tcp_forwarding`, `allow_remote_forwarding`,
-  `allow_remote_non_loopback_bind`, `allow_agent_forwarding`, `accept_env`,
-  `native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute`.
-
-Paths: host key `~/.config/dosh/host_key`; credential cache
-`~/.local/share/dosh/credentials/`.
-
-## Operating & diagnostics
-
-```bash
-dosh doctor homelab     # host resolution, trust state, UDP reachability, server
-                        # version, usable keys, auth result, forwarding policy
-dosh sessions homelab   # list live sessions
-dosh trust homelab      # fetch + pin the Dosh host key (via SSH fallback)
-dosh trust --remove homelab
-dosh import-ssh homelab   # write a hosts.toml entry from an SSH alias
-dosh update             # update the installed client
-```
-
-If something fails, `dosh doctor <host>` is the first stop — every public error is meant
-to be actionable (host trust, auth failure, UDP blocked, forwarding denied, version
-mismatch, server unavailable).
-
-## For agents driving dosh
-
-- Run one command and exit: `dosh <host> <cmd...>`. Render one frame and detach:
-  `dosh --attach-only <host>`. Both are non-interactive-friendly.
-- A real terminal size is needed for full-screen rendering; with no TTY the client falls
-  back to 80×24. Pass `-v`/`-vv` for timing/diagnostic logs on stderr.
-- Prefer `--session <name>` to reattach a known session; bare `dosh <host>` opens a
-  fresh, uniquely-named session each time.
-- Never assume file transfer or X11 — use `ssh`/`scp` for those.
-- Diagnostics are scriptable via `dosh doctor <host>`.
-
-## Reference docs
-
-- `README.md` — overview, install, develop, performance rules.
-- `docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md` — the native auth + forwarding v1 contract and verification
-  checklist (with current status).
-- `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md` — security claims, threat model, residual risks.
-- `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md` — feature matrix and §16 verification status.
-- `docs/BENCHMARKS.md` — how to benchmark; metric definitions; sample numbers.
-- `SPEC.md` — protocol/wire details.

packaging/install.sh

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env sh
-set -eu
-
-repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
-cd "$repo_root"
-exec sh ./install.sh --from-current "$@"

packaging/systemd/dosh-server.service

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ Type=simple
 ExecStart=%h/.local/bin/dosh-server serve
 Restart=on-failure
 RestartSec=1
+KillMode=process
 NoNewPrivileges=true
 PrivateTmp=true
 ProtectSystem=strict

scripts/bench-local.sh

@@ -183,8 +183,7 @@ server_pid=""
 # meaningful here. The cold fresh-process reconnect fast path is the attach
 # ticket (measured above). Roaming resume is validated by the integration test
 # `resume_updates_udp_endpoint_for_roaming`. `dosh-bench --resume` exists for
-# scenarios that keep a live session out-of-band (e.g. remote soak tests); see
+# scenarios that keep a live session out-of-band (e.g. remote soak tests).
-# docs/BENCHMARKS.md.
 rm -rf "$home/.local/share/dosh/credentials"
 write_client_config true
 start_server

scripts/package-release.sh

@@ -26,8 +26,16 @@ normalize_arch() {
   esac
 }
 
-os="$(normalize_os)"
+host_os="$(normalize_os)"
-arch="$(normalize_arch)"
+os="${DOSH_PACKAGE_OS:-$host_os}"
+arch="${DOSH_PACKAGE_ARCH:-$(normalize_arch)}"
+target="${DOSH_PACKAGE_TARGET:-}"
+if [ -z "$target" ] && [ "$os" = "windows" ] && [ "$host_os" != "windows" ]; then
+  case "$arch" in
+    x86_64) target="x86_64-pc-windows-gnu" ;;
+    *) echo "set DOSH_PACKAGE_TARGET for windows/$arch" >&2; exit 1 ;;
+  esac
+fi
 if [ "$os" = "windows" ]; then
   artifact="dosh-$os-$arch.zip"
   versioned_artifact="dosh-$version-$os-$arch.zip"
@@ -36,16 +44,66 @@ else
   versioned_artifact="dosh-$version-$os-$arch.tar.gz"
 fi
 stage="$out_dir/stage/dosh"
+write_versioned="${DOSH_PACKAGE_VERSIONED:-0}"
 
-cargo build --release
+if [ -n "$target" ]; then
+  release_dir="target/$target/release"
+else
+  release_dir="target/release"
+fi
+
+if [ "$os" = "windows" ]; then
+  if [ -n "$target" ]; then
+    cargo build --release --target "$target" --bin dosh-client --bin dosh-bench
+  else
+    cargo build --release --bin dosh-client --bin dosh-bench
+  fi
+else
+  if [ -n "$target" ]; then
+    cargo build --release --target "$target"
+  else
+    cargo build --release
+  fi
+fi
 
 rm -rf "$stage"
 mkdir -p "$stage/bin" "$out_dir"
 for bin in dosh-client dosh-server dosh-auth dosh-bench; do
-  if [ -f "target/release/$bin" ]; then
+  if [ -f "$release_dir/$bin" ]; then
-    install -m 0755 "target/release/$bin" "$stage/bin/$bin"
+    install -m 0755 "$release_dir/$bin" "$stage/bin/$bin"
+  elif [ -f "$release_dir/$bin.exe" ]; then
+    install -m 0755 "$release_dir/$bin.exe" "$stage/bin/$bin.exe"
   fi
 done
+if [ -f "$stage/bin/dosh-client.exe" ]; then
+  cp "$stage/bin/dosh-client.exe" "$stage/bin/dosh.exe"
+elif [ -f "$stage/bin/dosh-client" ]; then
+  cp "$stage/bin/dosh-client" "$stage/bin/dosh"
+fi
+
+strip_bin() {
+  file="$1"
+  [ -f "$file" ] || return 0
+  case "$file" in
+    *.exe)
+      if command -v x86_64-w64-mingw32-strip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        x86_64-w64-mingw32-strip "$file" 2>/dev/null || true
+      elif command -v strip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        strip "$file" 2>/dev/null || true
+      fi
+      ;;
+    *)
+      if command -v strip >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        strip "$file" 2>/dev/null || true
+      fi
+      ;;
+  esac
+}
+
+for bin in "$stage"/bin/*; do
+  strip_bin "$bin"
+done
+
 printf '%s\n' "$version" >"$stage/VERSION"
 
 if [ "$os" = "windows" ]; then
@@ -60,8 +118,6 @@ if [ "$os" = "windows" ]; then
 else
   tar -C "$out_dir/stage" -czf "$out_dir/$artifact" dosh
 fi
-cp "$out_dir/$artifact" "$out_dir/$versioned_artifact"
-
 write_sha256() {
   file="$1"
   if command -v sha256sum >/dev/null 2>&1; then
@@ -74,12 +130,21 @@ write_sha256() {
 }
 
 write_sha256 "$out_dir/$artifact"
-write_sha256 "$out_dir/$versioned_artifact"
 
+if [ "$write_versioned" = "1" ]; then
+  cp "$out_dir/$artifact" "$out_dir/$versioned_artifact"
+  write_sha256 "$out_dir/$versioned_artifact"
+fi
+
+printf 'Wrote:\n'
 cat <<EOF
-Wrote:
   $out_dir/$artifact
   $out_dir/$artifact.sha256
+EOF
+
+if [ "$write_versioned" = "1" ]; then
+  cat <<EOF
   $out_dir/$versioned_artifact
   $out_dir/$versioned_artifact.sha256
 EOF
+fi

scripts/publish-gitea-release.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+usage() {
+  cat <<'EOF'
+Usage:
+  scripts/publish-gitea-release.sh [TAG]
+
+Publishes the current Dosh release to Gitea.
+
+Defaults:
+  TAG                 v<Cargo.toml version>
+  DOSH_PUBLISH_BUILD 1: run scripts/package-release.sh first
+  DOSH_PUBLISH_PUSH  1: push TAG to origin
+  DOSH_PUBLISH_PRUNE 1: remove stale dosh-<version>-* duplicate assets
+
+Environment:
+  GITEA_URL, GITEA_REPO, GITEA_TOKEN: same as upload-gitea-release.sh
+  DOSH_PUBLISH_ALLOW_DIRTY=1          allow uncommitted changes
+EOF
+}
+
+if [ "${1:-}" = "-h" ] || [ "${1:-}" = "--help" ]; then
+  usage
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repo_root"
+
+version="$(sed -n 's/^version = "\(.*\)"/\1/p' Cargo.toml | sed -n '1p')"
+tag="${1:-v$version}"
+base="${GITEA_URL:-https://git.palav.dev}"
+repo="${GITEA_REPO:-Palav/dosh}"
+token="${GITEA_TOKEN:-}"
+build="${DOSH_PUBLISH_BUILD:-1}"
+push_tag="${DOSH_PUBLISH_PUSH:-1}"
+prune="${DOSH_PUBLISH_PRUNE:-1}"
+
+if [ -z "$token" ] && [ -f "$HOME/.config/dosh/gitea-token" ]; then
+  token="$(tr -d '\r\n' <"$HOME/.config/dosh/gitea-token")"
+fi
+
+need() {
+  if ! command -v "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "missing required command: $1" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+}
+
+need git
+need curl
+
+if [ "${DOSH_PUBLISH_ALLOW_DIRTY:-0}" != "1" ] && [ -n "$(git status --porcelain)" ]; then
+  echo "refusing to publish with uncommitted changes" >&2
+  echo "commit first, or set DOSH_PUBLISH_ALLOW_DIRTY=1" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+head="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
+if git rev-parse -q --verify "refs/tags/$tag" >/dev/null; then
+  tagged="$(git rev-list -n 1 "$tag")"
+  if [ "$tagged" != "$head" ]; then
+    echo "tag $tag points at $tagged, not HEAD $head" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+else
+  git tag "$tag" "$head"
+fi
+
+if [ "$push_tag" = "1" ]; then
+  git push origin "$tag"
+fi
+
+if [ "$build" = "1" ]; then
+  sh scripts/package-release.sh
+fi
+
+scripts/upload-gitea-release.sh "$tag"
+
+api="$base/api/v1/repos/$repo"
+auth_header="Authorization: token $token"
+release_json="$(curl -fsS -H "$auth_header" "$api/releases/tags/$tag")"
+release_id=""
+if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  release_id="$(printf '%s\n' "$release_json" | jq -r '.id // empty')"
+fi
+
+if [ "$prune" = "1" ] && [ -n "$release_id" ] && command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  printf '%s\n' "$release_json" \
+    | jq -r '.assets[]? | select(.name | test("^dosh-[0-9]")) | [.id, .name] | @tsv' \
+    | while IFS="$(printf '\t')" read -r asset_id name; do
+      [ -n "$asset_id" ] || continue
+      echo "deleting duplicate $name"
+      curl -fsS -H "$auth_header" -X DELETE "$api/releases/$release_id/assets/$asset_id" >/dev/null
+    done
+  release_json="$(curl -fsS -H "$auth_header" "$api/releases/tags/$tag")"
+fi
+
+web_repo="${base%/}/${repo}"
+failed=0
+for artifact in target/dosh-release/dosh-linux-*.tar.gz target/dosh-release/dosh-macos-*.tar.gz target/dosh-release/dosh-windows-*.zip; do
+  [ -f "$artifact" ] || continue
+  name="$(basename "$artifact")"
+  case "$name" in
+    dosh-[0-9]*)
+      continue
+      ;;
+  esac
+  url="$web_repo/releases/download/$tag/$name"
+  if curl -fsSI "$url" >/dev/null; then
+    echo "verified $url"
+  else
+    echo "missing release asset: $url" >&2
+    failed=1
+  fi
+done
+
+if [ "$failed" != "0" ]; then
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  printf '%s\n' "$release_json" | jq -r '"assets=\(.assets|length)", (.assets[] | "\(.name) \(.size)")'
+fi

scripts/tui-harness.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env sh
+set -eu
+
+repo_root="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")/.." && pwd)"
+cd "$repo_root"
+
+for test_name in \
+  live_output_forwards_terminal_control_sequences \
+  tui_control_sequences_survive_transport_verbatim \
+  unicode_output_survives_transport \
+  large_tui_paint_is_delivered_in_mtu_safe_frames \
+  resume_snapshot_preserves_alternate_screen_mode
+do
+  cargo test --test integration_smoke "$test_name" -- --nocapture
+done

scripts/upload-gitea-release.sh

@@ -31,13 +31,32 @@ repo="${GITEA_REPO:-Palav/dosh}"
 token="${GITEA_TOKEN:-}"
 title="${GITEA_TITLE:-$tag}"
 
+if [ -z "$token" ] && [ -f "$HOME/.config/dosh/gitea-token" ]; then
+  token="$(tr -d '\r\n' <"$HOME/.config/dosh/gitea-token")"
+fi
+
 if [ -z "$token" ]; then
-  echo "GITEA_TOKEN is required" >&2
+  echo "GITEA_TOKEN is required (or put it in ~/.config/dosh/gitea-token)" >&2
   exit 2
 fi
 
 if [ "$#" -eq 0 ]; then
-  set -- target/dosh-release/dosh-*
+  for artifact in \
+    target/dosh-release/dosh-linux-*.tar.gz \
+    target/dosh-release/dosh-macos-*.tar.gz \
+    target/dosh-release/dosh-windows-*.zip; do
+    [ -f "$artifact" ] || continue
+    case "$(basename "$artifact")" in
+      dosh-[0-9]*)
+        continue
+        ;;
+    esac
+    if [ -f "$artifact.sha256" ]; then
+      set -- "$@" "$artifact" "$artifact.sha256"
+    else
+      set -- "$@" "$artifact"
+    fi
+  done
 fi
 
 api="$base/api/v1/repos/$repo"
@@ -83,6 +102,7 @@ delete_existing_asset() {
     done
 }
 
+uploaded=0
 for artifact in "$@"; do
   if [ ! -f "$artifact" ]; then
     continue
@@ -95,4 +115,10 @@ for artifact in "$@"; do
     -X POST \
     -F "attachment=@$artifact" \
     "$api/releases/$release_id/assets?name=$name" >/dev/null
+  uploaded=$((uploaded + 1))
 done
+
+if [ "$uploaded" -eq 0 ]; then
+  echo "no release artifacts uploaded" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi

src/auth.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ use base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::fs;
 use std::io::Write;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
 use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
 
@@ -82,10 +83,11 @@ pub fn load_or_create_server_secret(config: &ServerConfig) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
         fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| format!("create {}", parent.display()))?;
     }
     let secret = crypto::random_32();
-    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+    let mut options = fs::OpenOptions::new();
-        .create_new(true)
+    options.create_new(true).write(true);
-        .write(true)
+    #[cfg(unix)]
-        .mode(0o600)
+    options.mode(0o600);
+    let mut file = options
         .open(&path)
         .with_context(|| format!("create {}", path.display()))?;
     file.write_all(URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(secret).as_bytes())?;
@@ -93,6 +95,7 @@ pub fn load_or_create_server_secret(config: &ServerConfig) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
     Ok(secret)
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub fn build_bootstrap(
     config: &ServerConfig,
     secret: &[u8; 32],
@@ -159,6 +162,7 @@ pub fn build_bootstrap(
     })
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub fn attach_token(
     secret: &[u8; 32],
     user: &str,
@@ -204,6 +208,7 @@ pub fn verify_bootstrap(resp: &BootstrapResponse, secret: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<b
     Ok(expected == resp.attach_token)
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 pub fn build_attach_ticket(
     secret: &[u8; 32],
     server_id: [u8; 32],

src/bin/dosh-auth.rs

@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ use dosh::config::load_server_config;
 use dosh::native::{host_public_key, host_public_key_line, load_or_create_host_key};
 
 #[derive(Debug, Parser)]
+#[command(
+    name = "dosh-auth",
+    version = dosh::build_info::VERSION,
+    long_version = dosh::build_info::LONG_VERSION
+)]
 struct Args {
     #[arg(long, default_value_t = 1)]
     protocol: u8,

src/bin/dosh-bench.rs

@@ -11,7 +11,11 @@ use std::sync::mpsc;
 use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
 
 #[derive(Debug, Parser)]
-#[command(name = "dosh-bench")]
+#[command(
+    name = "dosh-bench",
+    version = dosh::build_info::VERSION,
+    long_version = dosh::build_info::LONG_VERSION
+)]
 struct Args {
     #[arg(long, default_value = "local")]
     server: String,

src/bin/dosh-server.rs

@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ static AGENT_SOCK_COUNTER: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
 const NATIVE_HANDSHAKE_TTL_SECS: u64 = 30;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Parser)]
-#[command(name = "dosh-server")]
+#[command(
+    name = "dosh-server",
+    version = dosh::build_info::VERSION,
+    long_version = dosh::build_info::LONG_VERSION
+)]
 struct Args {
     #[command(subcommand)]
     command: Command,
@@ -215,6 +219,19 @@ async fn serve(config_path: Option<std::path::PathBuf>) -> Result<()> {
         }
     });
 
+    let pacing_state = Arc::clone(&state);
+    let pacing_socket = Arc::clone(&socket);
+    let pacing_interval_ms = config.output_frame_interval_ms.max(1);
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_millis(pacing_interval_ms));
+        loop {
+            interval.tick().await;
+            if let Err(err) = flush_paced_snapshots(&pacing_state, &pacing_socket).await {
+                eprintln!("paced snapshot error: {err:#}");
+            }
+        }
+    });
+
     let cleanup_state = Arc::clone(&state);
     tokio::spawn(async move {
         let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(5));
@@ -370,6 +387,8 @@ struct ClientState {
     rows: u16,
     last_seen: Instant,
     pending: VecDeque<PendingFrame>,
+    last_frame_sent: Instant,
+    paced_snapshot_due: bool,
     allowed_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
     stream_writers: HashMap<u64, mpsc::Sender<Vec<u8>>>,
     opened_streams: HashSet<u64>,
@@ -486,16 +505,12 @@ impl ServerState {
 
     /// Whether a session named `name` should be backed by a persistent holder.
     ///
-    /// Persistence is only worthwhile for sessions a user can actually reattach
+    /// With persistence enabled, every PTY session gets a detached holder. That
-    /// to by name: prewarmed sessions and explicitly-named ones (`--session`).
+    /// includes implicit `term-<millis>-<pid>` sessions: a reconnecting client has
-    /// Implicit `term-<millis>-<pid>` names (from `dosh host` with no session)
+    /// the exact session name in its ticket cache, so it can reattach after a
-    /// are ephemeral — persisting them just leaves unreattachable holders
+    /// quick server restart without forcing users to name sessions manually.
-    /// lingering across restarts, so they use the in-process (dies-on-restart)
+    fn should_persist_session(&self, _name: &str) -> bool {
-    /// shell that reaps normally on disconnect.
-    fn should_persist_session(&self, name: &str) -> bool {
         self.config.persist_sessions
-            && (self.config.prewarm_sessions.iter().any(|s| s == name)
-                || !protocol::is_implicit_session_name(name))
     }
 
     /// Spawn (or, in the persistent case, spawn-and-adopt) a PTY for a session.
@@ -640,11 +655,11 @@ impl ServerState {
     /// Remove a client from whichever session holds it, keeping the index in
     /// sync. Returns true when a client was actually removed.
     fn remove_client_everywhere(&mut self, client_id: &[u8; 16]) -> bool {
-        if let Some(session_name) = self.client_index.remove(client_id) {
+        if let Some(session_name) = self.client_index.remove(client_id)
-            if let Some(session) = self.sessions.get_mut(&session_name) {
+            && let Some(session) = self.sessions.get_mut(&session_name)
+        {
             return session.clients.remove(client_id).is_some();
         }
-        }
         false
     }
 
@@ -663,8 +678,9 @@ impl ServerState {
     /// previous epoch's key must still decrypt instead of being dropped as fatal
     /// (spec: "stale encrypted packets ... ignored, not fatal"). We pick whichever
     /// of the current or retained-previous key matches the packet's
-    /// `session_key_id`, falling back to the current key when neither matches (so
+    /// `session_key_id`. If neither key id matches, the client is on a stale
-    /// a genuinely stale/forged packet still fails the AEAD check, not silently).
+    /// epoch and should be forced through the normal reconnect path instead of
+    /// waiting for a silent timeout.
     fn lookup_client_key_for(
         &self,
         client_id: &[u8; 16],
@@ -681,7 +697,7 @@ impl ServerState {
         {
             return Some((previous, session_name.clone()));
         }
-        Some((client.session_key, session_name.clone()))
+        None
     }
 
     /// O(1) mutable access to a live client via the conn_id index.
@@ -825,7 +841,7 @@ async fn handle_packet(
         | PacketKind::StreamEof
         | PacketKind::StreamWindowAdjust
         | PacketKind::RekeyAck
-            if find_client_key(state, &packet.header.conn_id).is_err() =>
+            if find_client_decrypt_key(state, &packet.header).is_err() =>
         {
             send_reject_to_client(socket, peer, packet.header.conn_id, "unknown client").await
         }
@@ -976,9 +992,9 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
     let body = protocol::decrypt_body(packet, &pending.session_key, CLIENT_TO_SERVER)?;
     let req: NativeUserAuthBody = protocol::from_body(&body)?;
     if pending.client.requested_mode == "doctor" {
-        let check = {
+        let check_result = {
             let locked = state.lock().expect("server state poisoned");
-            if let Err(err) = verify_native_user_auth_from_config(
+            verify_native_user_auth_from_config(
                 &locked.config,
                 &pending.client,
                 &pending.server,
@@ -986,16 +1002,7 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
                 Some(peer.ip()),
             )
             .context("verify native user auth")
-            {
+            .map(|_| NativeAuthCheckOkBody {
-                return send_reject_to_client(
-                    socket,
-                    peer,
-                    packet.header.conn_id,
-                    &format!("{err:#}"),
-                )
-                .await;
-            }
-            NativeAuthCheckOkBody {
                 requested_user: pending.client.requested_user.clone(),
                 native_auth_enabled: locked.config.native_auth,
                 allow_tcp_forwarding: locked.config.allow_tcp_forwarding,
@@ -1003,6 +1010,18 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
                 allow_agent_forwarding: locked.config.allow_agent_forwarding,
                 policy_flags: Vec::new(),
                 server_version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string(),
+            })
+        };
+        let check = match check_result {
+            Ok(check) => check,
+            Err(err) => {
+                return send_reject_to_client(
+                    socket,
+                    peer,
+                    packet.header.conn_id,
+                    &format!("{err:#}"),
+                )
+                .await;
             }
         };
         let body = protocol::to_body(&check)?;
@@ -1054,17 +1073,19 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
         });
     }
 
-    let attached: Result<(
+    struct NativeAttachResult {
-        [u8; 16],
+        client_id: [u8; 16],
-        [u8; 16],
+        key_id: [u8; 16],
-        Vec<u8>,
+        attach_ticket: Vec<u8>,
-        [u8; 32],
+        attach_ticket_psk: [u8; 32],
-        String,
+        session_name: String,
-        String,
+        mode: String,
-        u64,
+        output_seq: u64,
-        Vec<u8>,
+        snapshot: Vec<u8>,
-        Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
+        requested_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
-    )> = {
+    }
+
+    let attached: Result<NativeAttachResult> = {
         let mut locked = state.lock().expect("server state poisoned");
         verify_native_user_auth_from_config(
             &locked.config,
@@ -1122,6 +1143,8 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
                     rows,
                     last_seen: Instant::now(),
                     pending: VecDeque::new(),
+                    last_frame_sent: Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(3600),
+                    paced_snapshot_due: false,
                     allowed_forwardings: req.auth.requested_forwardings.clone(),
                     stream_writers: HashMap::new(),
                     opened_streams: HashSet::new(),
@@ -1137,7 +1160,7 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
                     previous_session_key: None,
                 },
             );
-            Ok((
+            Ok(NativeAttachResult {
                 client_id,
                 key_id,
                 attach_ticket,
@@ -1146,22 +1169,12 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
                 mode,
                 output_seq,
                 snapshot,
-                req.auth.requested_forwardings.clone(),
+                requested_forwardings: req.auth.requested_forwardings.clone(),
-            ))
+            })
         })
     };
 
-    let (
+    let attached = match attached {
-        client_id,
-        key_id,
-        attach_ticket,
-        attach_ticket_psk,
-        session_name,
-        mode,
-        output_seq,
-        snapshot,
-        requested_forwardings,
-    ) = match attached {
         Ok(attached) => attached,
         Err(err) => {
             // Auth/session setup failed: clean up the agent socket we bound early.
@@ -1172,11 +1185,12 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
                 .await;
         }
     };
+    let client_id = attached.client_id;
     if let Err(err) = start_remote_forwards(
         state,
         socket,
         client_id,
-        requested_forwardings.clone(),
+        attached.requested_forwardings.clone(),
         pending.client.requested_session.clone(),
     )
     .await
@@ -1194,14 +1208,14 @@ async fn handle_native_user_auth(
 
     let ok = NativeAuthOk {
         client_id,
-        session: session_name,
+        session: attached.session_name,
-        mode,
+        mode: attached.mode,
         session_key: pending.session_key,
-        session_key_id: key_id,
+        session_key_id: attached.key_id,
-        attach_ticket,
+        attach_ticket: attached.attach_ticket,
-        attach_ticket_psk,
+        attach_ticket_psk: attached.attach_ticket_psk,
-        initial_seq: output_seq,
+        initial_seq: attached.output_seq,
-        snapshot,
+        snapshot: attached.snapshot,
         policy_flags: Vec::new(),
     };
     let body = protocol::to_body(&NativeAuthOkBody { ok })?;
@@ -1225,15 +1239,16 @@ async fn handle_bootstrap_attach(
     body: Vec<u8>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let req: BootstrapAttachRequest = protocol::from_body(&body)?;
-    let (client_id, key, key_id, session_name, mode, output_seq, snapshot) = {
+    type BootstrapAttachResult = ([u8; 16], [u8; 32], [u8; 16], String, String, u64, Vec<u8>);
+    let attached: Result<BootstrapAttachResult> = {
         let mut locked = state.lock().expect("server state poisoned");
         if !verify_bootstrap(&req.bootstrap, &locked.secret)? {
-            return send_reject(socket, peer, "invalid or expired bootstrap").await;
+            Err(anyhow!("invalid or expired bootstrap"))
-        }
+        } else if !locked.sessions.contains_key(&req.bootstrap.session)
-        if !locked.sessions.contains_key(&req.bootstrap.session) && !locked.config.create_on_attach
+            && !locked.config.create_on_attach
         {
-            return send_reject(socket, peer, "session does not exist").await;
+            Err(anyhow!("session does not exist"))
-        }
+        } else {
             locked.ensure_session(
                 &req.bootstrap.session,
                 req.cols,
@@ -1271,6 +1286,8 @@ async fn handle_bootstrap_attach(
                     rows: req.rows,
                     last_seen: Instant::now(),
                     pending: VecDeque::new(),
+                    last_frame_sent: Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(3600),
+                    paced_snapshot_due: false,
                     allowed_forwardings: Vec::new(),
                     stream_writers: HashMap::new(),
                     opened_streams: HashSet::new(),
@@ -1286,7 +1303,7 @@ async fn handle_bootstrap_attach(
                     previous_session_key: None,
                 },
             );
-        (
+            Ok((
                 client_id,
                 req.bootstrap.session_key,
                 req.bootstrap.session_key_id,
@@ -1294,7 +1311,12 @@ async fn handle_bootstrap_attach(
                 req.bootstrap.mode.clone(),
                 output_seq,
                 snapshot,
-        )
+            ))
+        }
+    };
+    let (client_id, key, key_id, session_name, mode, output_seq, snapshot) = match attached {
+        Ok(attached) => attached,
+        Err(err) => return send_reject(socket, peer, &err.to_string()).await,
     };
     let ok = AttachOk {
         client_id,
@@ -1326,11 +1348,11 @@ async fn handle_ticket_attach(
     body: Vec<u8>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let env: TicketAttachEnvelope = protocol::from_body(&body)?;
-    let (ticket, request_plain) = {
+    let opened = {
         let locked = state.lock().expect("server state poisoned");
         if !locked.config.allow_attach_tickets {
-            return send_reject(socket, peer, "attach tickets disabled").await;
+            Err(anyhow!("attach tickets disabled"))
-        }
+        } else {
             let ticket = open_attach_ticket(&locked.secret, &env.ticket)?;
             let request_key = crypto::hkdf32(
                 &ticket.psk,
@@ -1343,7 +1365,12 @@ async fn handle_ticket_attach(
                 b"dosh-ticket-attach-request-v1",
                 &env.ciphertext,
             )?;
-        (ticket, request_plain)
+            Ok((ticket, request_plain))
+        }
+    };
+    let (ticket, request_plain) = match opened {
+        Ok(opened) => opened,
+        Err(err) => return send_reject(socket, peer, &err.to_string()).await,
     };
     let req: TicketAttachBody = protocol::from_body(&request_plain)?;
     if req.session != ticket.session || req.mode != ticket.mode {
@@ -1352,11 +1379,11 @@ async fn handle_ticket_attach(
 
     let session_key = crypto::random_32();
     let session_key_id = protocol::session_key_id(&session_key);
-    let (client_id, output_seq, snapshot) = {
+    let attached = {
         let mut locked = state.lock().expect("server state poisoned");
         if !locked.sessions.contains_key(&req.session) && !locked.config.create_on_attach {
-            return send_reject(socket, peer, "session does not exist").await;
+            Err(anyhow!("session does not exist"))
-        }
+        } else {
             locked.ensure_session(
                 &req.session,
                 req.cols,
@@ -1394,6 +1421,8 @@ async fn handle_ticket_attach(
                     rows: req.rows,
                     last_seen: Instant::now(),
                     pending: VecDeque::new(),
+                    last_frame_sent: Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(3600),
+                    paced_snapshot_due: false,
                     allowed_forwardings: Vec::new(),
                     stream_writers: HashMap::new(),
                     opened_streams: HashSet::new(),
@@ -1409,7 +1438,12 @@ async fn handle_ticket_attach(
                     previous_session_key: None,
                 },
             );
-        (client_id, output_seq, snapshot)
+            Ok((client_id, output_seq, snapshot))
+        }
+    };
+    let (client_id, output_seq, snapshot) = match attached {
+        Ok(attached) => attached,
+        Err(err) => return send_reject(socket, peer, &err.to_string()).await,
     };
 
     let ok = AttachOk {
@@ -2630,6 +2664,8 @@ async fn broadcast_output(
         let mut locked = state.lock().expect("server state poisoned");
         let scrollback = locked.config.scrollback;
         let retransmit_window = locked.config.retransmit_window;
+        let frame_interval = Duration::from_millis(locked.config.output_frame_interval_ms);
+        let now = Instant::now();
         let session = locked
             .sessions
             .get_mut(&output.session)
@@ -2664,6 +2700,15 @@ async fn broadcast_output(
         }
         let mut sends = Vec::new();
         for (client_id, client) in session.clients.iter_mut() {
+            let terminal_control =
+                output.bytes.contains(&0x1b) || session.parser.screen().alternate_screen();
+            if !terminal_control
+                && !frame_interval.is_zero()
+                && now.duration_since(client.last_frame_sent) < frame_interval
+            {
+                client.paced_snapshot_due = true;
+                continue;
+            }
             client.send_seq += 1;
             // Count traffic toward the packet-count rekey trigger (spec §11).
             client.epoch_packets = client.epoch_packets.saturating_add(1);
@@ -2702,6 +2747,8 @@ async fn broadcast_output(
                 last_sent: Instant::now(),
                 attempts: 0,
             });
+            client.last_frame_sent = now;
+            client.paced_snapshot_due = false;
             sends.push((client.endpoint, packet));
         }
         sends
@@ -2780,6 +2827,7 @@ fn screen_snapshot(screen: &vt100::Screen) -> Vec<u8> {
     let mut bytes = Vec::new();
     if screen.alternate_screen() {
         bytes.extend_from_slice(b"\x1b[?1049h");
+        bytes.extend_from_slice(b"\x1b[H\x1b[2J");
     } else {
         bytes.extend_from_slice(b"\x1b[?1049l");
     }
@@ -2852,6 +2900,76 @@ async fn retransmit_pending(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+async fn flush_paced_snapshots(
+    state: &Arc<Mutex<ServerState>>,
+    socket: &Arc<UdpSocket>,
+) -> Result<()> {
+    let sends = {
+        let mut locked = state.lock().expect("server state poisoned");
+        let frame_interval = Duration::from_millis(locked.config.output_frame_interval_ms);
+        if frame_interval.is_zero() {
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        let retransmit_window = locked.config.retransmit_window;
+        let now = Instant::now();
+        let mut sends = Vec::new();
+        for (session_name, session) in locked.sessions.iter_mut() {
+            let due = session.clients.values().any(|client| {
+                client.paced_snapshot_due
+                    && now.duration_since(client.last_frame_sent) >= frame_interval
+            });
+            if !due {
+                continue;
+            }
+            let snapshot = screen_snapshot(session.parser.screen());
+            let output_seq = session.output_seq;
+            for (client_id, client) in session.clients.iter_mut() {
+                if !client.paced_snapshot_due
+                    || now.duration_since(client.last_frame_sent) < frame_interval
+                {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                client.send_seq += 1;
+                client.epoch_packets = client.epoch_packets.saturating_add(1);
+                let frame = Frame {
+                    session: session_name.clone(),
+                    output_seq,
+                    bytes: snapshot.clone(),
+                    snapshot: true,
+                    closed: false,
+                };
+                let body = protocol::to_body(&frame)?;
+                let packet = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+                    PacketKind::Frame,
+                    *client_id,
+                    client.send_seq,
+                    client.last_acked,
+                    &client.session_key,
+                    SERVER_TO_CLIENT,
+                    &body,
+                )?;
+                while client.pending.len() >= retransmit_window {
+                    client.pending.pop_front();
+                }
+                client.pending.push_back(PendingFrame {
+                    output_seq,
+                    packet: packet.clone(),
+                    last_sent: now,
+                    attempts: 0,
+                });
+                client.last_frame_sent = now;
+                client.paced_snapshot_due = false;
+                sends.push((client.endpoint, packet));
+            }
+        }
+        sends
+    };
+    for (endpoint, packet) in sends {
+        socket.send_to(&packet, endpoint).await?;
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 /// How long the previous epoch's key is retained after a rekey so in-flight
 /// pre-rekey packets still decrypt instead of being dropped as fatal.
 const REKEY_PREVIOUS_KEY_GRACE_SECS: u64 = 5;
@@ -3060,19 +3178,10 @@ fn cleanup_disconnected_clients(state: &Arc<Mutex<ServerState>>) {
     }
 }
 
-fn find_client_key(
+/// Select the client key (current or retained previous epoch) matching the
-    state: &Arc<Mutex<ServerState>>,
+/// packet header's `session_key_id`, so a packet sealed under the pre-rekey key
-    client_id: &[u8; 16],
+/// during the grace window still decrypts while an expired/stale epoch is
-) -> Result<([u8; 32], String)> {
+/// treated as an unknown client and triggers a client reconnect.
-    let locked = state.lock().expect("server state poisoned");
-    locked
-        .lookup_client(client_id)
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("unknown client"))
-}
-
-/// Like [`find_client_key`] but selects the key (current or retained previous
-/// epoch) matching the packet header's `session_key_id`, so a packet sealed
-/// under the pre-rekey key during the grace window still decrypts.
 fn find_client_decrypt_key(
     state: &Arc<Mutex<ServerState>>,
     header: &protocol::Header,
@@ -3115,7 +3224,7 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
     #[test]
-    fn persists_named_and_prewarmed_but_not_implicit_sessions() {
+    fn persists_all_sessions_when_enabled() {
         let (pty_tx, _rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
         let config = ServerConfig {
             persist_sessions: true,
@@ -3125,7 +3234,7 @@ mod tests {
         let state = ServerState::new(config, [0u8; 32], pty_tx);
         assert!(state.should_persist_session("default")); // prewarmed
         assert!(state.should_persist_session("work")); // explicitly named
-        assert!(!state.should_persist_session("term-1781470634216-76685")); // implicit
+        assert!(state.should_persist_session("term-1781470634216-76685")); // implicit reconnect
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -3185,6 +3294,11 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(limiter.buckets.is_empty());
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn default_client_timeout_supports_long_sleep() {
+        assert_eq!(ServerConfig::default().client_timeout_secs, 2_592_000);
+    }
+
     fn test_client_state(session_key: [u8; 32]) -> ClientState {
         ClientState {
             endpoint: "127.0.0.1:9".parse().unwrap(),
@@ -3197,6 +3311,8 @@ mod tests {
             rows: 24,
             last_seen: Instant::now(),
             pending: VecDeque::new(),
+            last_frame_sent: Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(3600),
+            paced_snapshot_due: false,
             allowed_forwardings: Vec::new(),
             stream_writers: HashMap::new(),
             opened_streams: HashSet::new(),
@@ -3397,6 +3513,8 @@ mod tests {
                         rows: 24,
                         last_seen: Instant::now(),
                         pending: VecDeque::new(),
+                        last_frame_sent: Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(3600),
+                        paced_snapshot_due: false,
                         allowed_forwardings: Vec::new(),
                         stream_writers: HashMap::new(),
                         opened_streams: HashSet::new(),
@@ -3490,6 +3608,8 @@ mod tests {
                         rows: 24,
                         last_seen: Instant::now(),
                         pending: VecDeque::new(),
+                        last_frame_sent: Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(3600),
+                        paced_snapshot_due: false,
                         allowed_forwardings: Vec::new(),
                         stream_writers: HashMap::new(),
                         opened_streams: HashSet::from([42]),
@@ -3557,6 +3677,89 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(frame.bytes, b"terminal-priority");
     }
 
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn output_pacing_coalesces_fast_frames_into_snapshot() {
+        let (pty_tx, _pty_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
+        let config = ServerConfig {
+            output_frame_interval_ms: 1000,
+            ..ServerConfig::default()
+        };
+        let mut state = ServerState::new(config, [0u8; 32], pty_tx);
+        state
+            .ensure_session("test", 80, 24, "forward-only", &[])
+            .unwrap();
+        let client_id = [42u8; 16];
+        let session_key = [7u8; 32];
+        let receiver = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let sender = Arc::new(UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap());
+        let mut client = test_client_state(session_key);
+        client.endpoint = receiver.local_addr().unwrap();
+        state.insert_client("test", client_id, client);
+        let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(state));
+
+        broadcast_output(
+            &state,
+            &sender,
+            PtyOutput {
+                session: "test".to_string(),
+                bytes: b"first".to_vec(),
+                exited: false,
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+        broadcast_output(
+            &state,
+            &sender,
+            PtyOutput {
+                session: "test".to_string(),
+                bytes: b"second".to_vec(),
+                exited: false,
+            },
+        )
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let mut buf = [0u8; 4096];
+        let (n, _) = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), receiver.recv_from(&mut buf))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .unwrap();
+        let packet = protocol::decode(&buf[..n]).unwrap();
+        let plain = protocol::decrypt_body(&packet, &session_key, SERVER_TO_CLIENT).unwrap();
+        let frame: Frame = protocol::from_body(&plain).unwrap();
+        assert!(!frame.snapshot);
+        assert_eq!(frame.bytes, b"first");
+        assert!(
+            tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_millis(30), receiver.recv_from(&mut buf))
+                .await
+                .is_err(),
+            "second frame should be coalesced"
+        );
+
+        {
+            let mut locked = state.lock().unwrap();
+            let client = locked
+                .sessions
+                .get_mut("test")
+                .unwrap()
+                .clients
+                .get_mut(&client_id)
+                .unwrap();
+            client.last_frame_sent = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(2);
+        }
+        flush_paced_snapshots(&state, &sender).await.unwrap();
+        let (n, _) = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), receiver.recv_from(&mut buf))
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .unwrap();
+        let packet = protocol::decode(&buf[..n]).unwrap();
+        let plain = protocol::decrypt_body(&packet, &session_key, SERVER_TO_CLIENT).unwrap();
+        let frame: Frame = protocol::from_body(&plain).unwrap();
+        assert!(frame.snapshot);
+        assert_eq!(frame.output_seq, 2);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn remote_non_loopback_bind_requires_explicit_config() {
         let config = ServerConfig::default();

src/build_info.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+pub const VERSION: &str = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
+pub const GIT_HASH: &str = env!("DOSH_GIT_HASH");
+pub const COMMIT_DATE: &str = env!("DOSH_COMMIT_DATE");
+pub const LONG_VERSION: &str = concat!(
+    env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION"),
+    " (",
+    env!("DOSH_GIT_HASH"),
+    ", ",
+    env!("DOSH_COMMIT_DATE"),
+    ")"
+);

src/config.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ pub struct ServerConfig {
     pub allow_attach_tickets: bool,
     pub client_timeout_secs: u64,
     pub retransmit_window: usize,
+    #[serde(default = "default_output_frame_interval_ms")]
+    pub output_frame_interval_ms: u64,
     pub default_input_mode: String,
     pub prewarm_sessions: Vec<String>,
     pub create_on_attach: bool,
@@ -46,16 +48,9 @@ pub struct ServerConfig {
     pub allow_agent_forwarding: bool,
     #[serde(default = "default_accept_env")]
     pub accept_env: Vec<String>,
-    /// Run each terminal session's shell under a small per-session *holder*
+    /// Run terminal sessions under per-session holder processes so shells
-    /// process so it survives a `dosh-server` restart (crash/upgrade/
+    /// survive a quick `dosh-server` restart and clients can reconnect.
-    /// `systemctl restart`). On startup the server re-adopts live holders and
+    #[serde(default = "default_true")]
-    /// reattaching clients land on the same shell with screen state intact. When
-    /// `false`, sessions behave exactly as before: the shell is a child of the
-    /// server and dies with it.
-    // Opt-in for now: this changes the core session model (per-session holder
-    // processes + fd passing), so it stays OFF by default until it has been
-    // stress-tested on a real host. Set `persist_sessions = true` to enable.
-    #[serde(default)]
     pub persist_sessions: bool,
 }
 
@@ -68,8 +63,9 @@ impl Default for ServerConfig {
             auth_ttl_secs: 30,
             attach_ticket_ttl_secs: 3600,
             allow_attach_tickets: true,
-            client_timeout_secs: 86400,
+            client_timeout_secs: 2_592_000,
             retransmit_window: 256,
+            output_frame_interval_ms: default_output_frame_interval_ms(),
             default_input_mode: "read-write".to_string(),
             prewarm_sessions: vec!["default".to_string()],
             create_on_attach: true,
@@ -87,7 +83,7 @@ impl Default for ServerConfig {
             allow_remote_non_loopback_bind: false,
             allow_agent_forwarding: false,
             accept_env: default_accept_env(),
-            persist_sessions: false,
+            persist_sessions: true,
         }
     }
 }
@@ -132,6 +128,8 @@ pub struct ClientConfig {
     /// full-screen TUI, and cleared the instant packets resume. Default on.
     #[serde(default = "default_true")]
     pub disconnect_status: bool,
+    #[serde(default = "default_escape_key")]
+    pub escape_key: String,
     #[serde(default = "default_send_env")]
     pub send_env: Vec<String>,
     #[serde(default)]
@@ -205,6 +203,7 @@ impl Default for ClientConfig {
             use_ssh_agent: true,
             forward_agent: false,
             disconnect_status: true,
+            escape_key: default_escape_key(),
             send_env: default_send_env(),
             set_env: HashMap::new(),
             extensions: HashMap::new(),
@@ -231,6 +230,10 @@ fn default_native_auth_rate_limit_per_minute() -> u32 {
     30
 }
 
+fn default_output_frame_interval_ms() -> u64 {
+    16
+}
+
 fn default_rekey_after_packets() -> u64 {
     // Rotate well before any AEAD nonce-reuse concern; ChaCha20-Poly1305 with a
     // per-direction monotonic seq is safe far beyond this, but a bounded epoch
@@ -259,6 +262,10 @@ fn default_known_hosts() -> String {
     "~/.config/dosh/known_hosts".to_string()
 }
 
+fn default_escape_key() -> String {
+    "^]".to_string()
+}
+
 fn default_identity_files() -> Vec<String> {
     vec!["~/.ssh/id_ed25519".to_string()]
 }
@@ -304,10 +311,10 @@ pub fn load_hosts_config(path: Option<PathBuf>) -> Result<HostsConfig> {
 }
 
 pub fn expand_tilde(path: &str) -> PathBuf {
-    if let Some(rest) = path.strip_prefix("~/") {
+    if let Some(rest) = path.strip_prefix("~/")
-        if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
+        && let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir()
+    {
         return home.join(rest);
     }
-    }
     PathBuf::from(path)
 }

src/lib.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 pub mod auth;
+pub mod build_info;
 pub mod config;
 pub mod crypto;
 pub mod native;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 pub mod persist;
 pub mod protocol;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 pub mod pty;
 pub mod ssh_agent;

src/native.rs

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ use signature::{SignatureEncoding, Signer as SignatureSigner, Verifier as Signat
 use std::fs;
 use std::io::Write;
 use std::net::IpAddr;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
 use std::path::Path;
 use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -153,10 +154,11 @@ pub fn load_or_create_host_key(config: &ServerConfig) -> Result<SigningKey> {
         fs::create_dir_all(parent).with_context(|| format!("create {}", parent.display()))?;
     }
     let bytes = crypto::random_32();
-    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+    let mut options = fs::OpenOptions::new();
-        .create_new(true)
+    options.create_new(true).write(true);
-        .write(true)
+    #[cfg(unix)]
-        .mode(0o600)
+    options.mode(0o600);
+    let mut file = options
         .open(&path)
         .with_context(|| format!("create {}", path.display()))?;
     file.write_all(URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(bytes).as_bytes())?;
@@ -1233,11 +1235,11 @@ fn write_known_host_entries(path: &Path, entries: &[KnownHost]) -> Result<()> {
         ));
         out.push('\n');
     }
-    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
+    let mut options = fs::OpenOptions::new();
-        .create(true)
+    options.create(true).truncate(true).write(true);
-        .truncate(true)
+    #[cfg(unix)]
-        .write(true)
+    options.mode(0o600);
-        .mode(0o600)
+    let mut file = options
         .open(path)
         .with_context(|| format!("write {}", path.display()))?;
     file.write_all(out.as_bytes())

src/persist.rs

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ use std::time::Duration;
 /// One-byte commands a server sends to a holder over its control socket after
 /// the holder has handed back the master fd.
 const HOLDER_CMD_SHUTDOWN: u8 = b'X';
+const HOLDER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(750);
 
 /// Magic written into a holder's `meta` file, bumped if the on-disk layout
 /// changes so a stale holder from an incompatible build is ignored.
@@ -236,11 +237,14 @@ pub fn spawn_holder(
     // Wait (briefly) for the holder to come up. The holder forks/setsids before
     // creating the socket; once the socket exists we can connect. We also reap
     // the short-lived launcher child so it never becomes a zombie.
-    let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(5);
+    let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + HOLDER_STARTUP_TIMEOUT;
     loop {
         if sock.exists() {
             break;
         }
+        if let Some(status) = child.try_wait().context("wait holder launcher")? {
+            bail!("holder launcher for session {session} exited before socket was ready: {status}");
+        }
         if std::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
             let _ = child.kill();
             let _ = child.wait();

src/pty.rs

@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ fn spawn_reader_thread(
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
+    const _: () = assert!(PTY_OUTPUT_CHUNK_BYTES <= 1200);
+
     #[test]
     fn terminfo_available_detects_known_and_unknown() {
         // A near-universal entry should be present on any host with ncurses.
@@ -305,9 +307,4 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!terminfo_available("definitely-not-a-real-terminal-xyz"));
         assert!(!terminfo_available(""));
     }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn pty_output_chunk_size_stays_mtu_safe() {
-        assert!(PTY_OUTPUT_CHUNK_BYTES <= 1200);
-    }
 }

src/ssh_agent.rs

@@ -1,18 +1,30 @@
+use crate::native::{ForwardingRequest, NativeClientHello, NativeServerHello, NativeUserAuth};
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use crate::native::{
-    ForwardingRequest, NativeClientHello, NativeServerHello, NativeUserAuth,
     is_supported_user_key_algorithm, parse_ssh_ed25519_public_blob, user_auth_transcript,
 };
-use anyhow::{Context, Result, anyhow, bail};
+#[cfg(unix)]
+use anyhow::{Context, bail};
+use anyhow::{Result, anyhow};
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use std::io::{Read, Write};
+#[cfg(unix)]
 use std::os::unix::net::UnixStream;
 use std::path::Path;
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH_AGENT_FAILURE: u8 = 5;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: u8 = 11;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER: u8 = 12;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: u8 = 13;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE: u8 = 14;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512: u32 = 4;
+#[cfg(unix)]
 const MAX_AGENT_PACKET: usize = 256 * 1024;
 
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -25,6 +37,7 @@ pub struct AgentIdentity {
     pub comment: String,
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent(
     client: &NativeClientHello,
     server: &NativeServerHello,
@@ -34,6 +47,18 @@ pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent(
     sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(sock, client, server, requested_forwardings)
 }
 
+#[cfg(not(unix))]
+pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent(
+    _client: &NativeClientHello,
+    _server: &NativeServerHello,
+    _requested_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
+) -> Result<NativeUserAuth> {
+    Err(anyhow!(
+        "ssh-agent native auth is not supported on this platform yet; use identity_files"
+    ))
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
 pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(
     socket_path: impl AsRef<Path>,
     client: &NativeClientHello,
@@ -58,6 +83,19 @@ pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(
     Ok(auth)
 }
 
+#[cfg(not(unix))]
+pub fn sign_user_auth_with_agent_at(
+    _socket_path: impl AsRef<Path>,
+    _client: &NativeClientHello,
+    _server: &NativeServerHello,
+    _requested_forwardings: Vec<ForwardingRequest>,
+) -> Result<NativeUserAuth> {
+    Err(anyhow!(
+        "ssh-agent native auth is not supported on this platform yet; use identity_files"
+    ))
+}
+
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn request_supported_identities(agent: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<AgentIdentity>> {
     write_agent_packet(agent, &[SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES])?;
     let payload = read_agent_packet(agent)?;
@@ -84,6 +122,7 @@ fn request_supported_identities(agent: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<AgentIdent
     Ok(identities)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn supported_identity(key_blob: Vec<u8>, comment: String) -> Result<Option<AgentIdentity>> {
     let algorithm = key_blob_algorithm(&key_blob)?;
     if !is_supported_user_key_algorithm(&algorithm) {
@@ -119,6 +158,7 @@ fn supported_identity(key_blob: Vec<u8>, comment: String) -> Result<Option<Agent
     Ok(Some(identity))
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn sign_with_agent(
     agent: &mut UnixStream,
     identity: &AgentIdentity,
@@ -163,6 +203,7 @@ fn sign_with_agent(
     Ok(signature.to_vec())
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn read_agent_packet(stream: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     let mut len = [0u8; 4];
     stream
@@ -177,6 +218,7 @@ fn read_agent_packet(stream: &mut UnixStream) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
     Ok(payload)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn write_agent_packet(stream: &mut UnixStream, payload: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
     anyhow::ensure!(
         payload.len() <= MAX_AGENT_PACKET,
@@ -187,6 +229,7 @@ fn write_agent_packet(stream: &mut UnixStream, payload: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn read_u8(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u8> {
     anyhow::ensure!(!cursor.is_empty(), "truncated u8");
     let value = cursor[0];
@@ -194,6 +237,7 @@ fn read_u8(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u8> {
     Ok(value)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn read_u32(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u32> {
     anyhow::ensure!(cursor.len() >= 4, "truncated u32");
     let value = u32::from_be_bytes(cursor[..4].try_into().unwrap());
@@ -201,6 +245,7 @@ fn read_u32(cursor: &mut &[u8]) -> Result<u32> {
     Ok(value)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn read_ssh_string<'a>(cursor: &mut &'a [u8]) -> Result<&'a [u8]> {
     let len = read_u32(cursor)? as usize;
     anyhow::ensure!(cursor.len() >= len, "truncated SSH string");
@@ -209,18 +254,20 @@ fn read_ssh_string<'a>(cursor: &mut &'a [u8]) -> Result<&'a [u8]> {
     Ok(value)
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn write_ssh_string(out: &mut Vec<u8>, value: &[u8]) {
     out.extend_from_slice(&(value.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
     out.extend_from_slice(value);
 }
 
+#[cfg(unix)]
 fn key_blob_algorithm(blob: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
     let mut cursor = blob;
     let algorithm = read_ssh_string(&mut cursor)?;
     Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(algorithm).to_string())
 }
 
-#[cfg(test)]
+#[cfg(all(test, unix))]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use crate::native::{

tests/hostile_network.rs

@@ -18,6 +18,11 @@
 //! Determinism: the relay's drop/reorder/dup behavior is driven by a fixed-seed
 //! PRNG and by explicit one-shot toggles, never by wall-clock timing, so the
 //! tests are reproducible and fast.
+#![allow(
+    clippy::collapsible_if,
+    clippy::explicit_counter_loop,
+    clippy::single_match
+)]
 
 use std::fs;
 use std::io::{Read, Write};
@@ -768,7 +773,7 @@ fn session_survives_packet_loss_and_reorder() {
     let port = free_udp_port();
     let config = write_server_config(&dir, port);
     let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
-    let relay = Relay::spawn(port, 0x105_5u64 ^ 0x1111);
+    let relay = Relay::spawn(port, 0x1055_u64 ^ 0x1111);
 
     let (socket, bootstrap, ok) = attach_through_relay(&config, &relay);
 

tests/integration_smoke.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+#![allow(clippy::collapsible_if)]
+
 use std::fs;
 use std::io::{Read, Write};
 use std::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream, UdpSocket};
@@ -499,6 +501,7 @@ fn direct_attach_session(
     (socket, bootstrap, ok)
 }
 
+#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
 fn send_encrypted(
     socket: &UdpSocket,
     port: u16,
@@ -617,6 +620,48 @@ fn disconnected_client_times_out_and_gets_reject() {
     assert_eq!(reject.reason, "unknown client");
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn known_client_with_stale_key_id_gets_reject_not_timeout() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let port = free_udp_port();
+    let config = write_server_config(&dir, port);
+    let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
+    let (_bootstrap, ok) = {
+        let (_socket, bootstrap, ok) = direct_attach(&config, port, "read-write");
+        (bootstrap, ok)
+    };
+    let socket = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
+    socket
+        .set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
+        .unwrap();
+    let stale_key = crypto::random_32();
+    let packet = protocol::encode_encrypted(
+        PacketKind::Ping,
+        ok.client_id,
+        99,
+        0,
+        &stale_key,
+        CLIENT_TO_SERVER,
+        b"",
+    )
+    .unwrap();
+
+    socket
+        .send_to(&packet, format!("127.0.0.1:{port}"))
+        .unwrap();
+    let mut buf = [0u8; 65535];
+    let (n, _) = socket.recv_from(&mut buf).unwrap();
+    let packet = protocol::decode(&buf[..n]).unwrap();
+    let reject: AttachReject = protocol::from_body(&packet.body).unwrap();
+
+    let _ = server.kill();
+    let _ = server.wait();
+
+    assert_eq!(packet.header.kind, PacketKind::AttachReject);
+    assert_eq!(packet.header.conn_id, ok.client_id);
+    assert_eq!(reject.reason, "unknown client");
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn local_attach_only_smoke() {
     let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
@@ -1334,9 +1379,12 @@ fn tui_control_sequences_survive_transport_verbatim() {
         "\x1b[?2004h",           // bracketed paste on
         "\x1b[?1000h",           // mouse tracking on
         "\x1b[?1006h",           // SGR mouse encoding on
+        "\x1b]0;DOSH_TITLE\x07", // OSC title
         "\x1b[?25l",             // cursor hidden
         "\x1b[12;34H",           // absolute cursor movement
+        "\x1b[1;31m",            // bold red
         "DOSH_TUI_VERBATIM",
+        "\x1b[0m",
         "\x1b[?25h",
         "\x1b[?1006l",
         "\x1b[?1000l",
@@ -1366,9 +1414,12 @@ fn tui_control_sequences_survive_transport_verbatim() {
         "\x1b[?2004h",
         "\x1b[?1000h",
         "\x1b[?1006h",
+        "\x1b]0;DOSH_TITLE\x07",
         "\x1b[?25l",
         "\x1b[12;34H",
+        "\x1b[1;31m",
         "DOSH_TUI_VERBATIM",
+        "\x1b[0m",
         "\x1b[?25h",
         "\x1b[?1006l",
         "\x1b[?1000l",
@@ -1382,6 +1433,39 @@ fn tui_control_sequences_survive_transport_verbatim() {
     }
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn unicode_output_survives_transport() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let port = free_udp_port();
+    let config = write_server_config(&dir, port);
+    let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
+    let (socket, bootstrap, ok) = direct_attach(&config, port, "read-write");
+
+    let marker = "DOSH_UNICODE 你 e\u{301} 🚀";
+    let input = Input {
+        bytes: format!("printf '{}\\n'\n", marker).into_bytes(),
+    };
+    send_encrypted(
+        &socket,
+        port,
+        PacketKind::Input,
+        ok.client_id,
+        2,
+        0,
+        &bootstrap.session_key,
+        &protocol::to_body(&input).unwrap(),
+    );
+    let text = collect_frame_text(&socket, &bootstrap.session_key, 2000);
+
+    let _ = server.kill();
+    let _ = server.wait();
+
+    assert!(
+        text.contains(marker),
+        "expected UTF-8 output marker to survive transport, got {text:?}"
+    );
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn large_tui_paint_is_delivered_in_mtu_safe_frames() {
     let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
@@ -1483,8 +1567,8 @@ fn resume_snapshot_preserves_alternate_screen_mode() {
 
     assert!(resume_frame.snapshot);
     assert!(
-        resume_frame.bytes.starts_with(b"\x1b[?1049h"),
+        resume_frame.bytes.starts_with(b"\x1b[?1049h\x1b[H\x1b[2J"),
-        "snapshot did not enter alternate screen first: {:?}",
+        "snapshot did not enter and clear alternate screen first: {:?}",
         String::from_utf8_lossy(&resume_frame.bytes)
     );
 }
@@ -2299,6 +2383,72 @@ fn session_survives_server_restart_same_shell_and_screen() {
     );
 }
 
+#[test]
+fn implicit_session_survives_server_restart_for_same_ticket_holder() {
+    let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
+    let sessions_dir = dir.path().join("sessions");
+    let port = free_udp_port();
+    let config = write_persistent_server_config(&dir, port);
+    let session = protocol::generate_implicit_session_name();
+
+    let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
+    let (socket, bootstrap, ok) = direct_attach_session(&config, port, "read-write", &session);
+    let key = bootstrap.session_key;
+    type_line(
+        &socket,
+        port,
+        &ok,
+        &key,
+        2,
+        "export IMPLICIT_MARK=implicit_restart_42\n",
+    );
+    let _ = collect_frame_text(&socket, &key, 1000);
+    thread::sleep(Duration::from_secs(3));
+
+    let shell_pid_before = holder_shell_pid(&sessions_dir, &session);
+    assert!(
+        shell_pid_before.is_some(),
+        "implicit sessions should get a persistent holder when persistence is enabled"
+    );
+
+    let _ = server.kill();
+    let _ = server.wait();
+    thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(300));
+
+    let pid = shell_pid_before.unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        unsafe { libc::kill(pid, 0) } == 0,
+        "implicit session shell pid {pid} must survive server restart"
+    );
+
+    let mut server = start_server(&dir, &config);
+    let (socket2, bootstrap2, ok2) = direct_attach_session(&config, port, "read-write", &session);
+    let key2 = bootstrap2.session_key;
+    type_line(
+        &socket2,
+        port,
+        &ok2,
+        &key2,
+        2,
+        "printf 'IMPLICIT_MARK=%s\\n' \"$IMPLICIT_MARK\"\n",
+    );
+    let post = collect_frame_text(&socket2, &key2, 2000);
+    let shell_pid_after = holder_shell_pid(&sessions_dir, &session);
+
+    let _ = server.kill();
+    let _ = server.wait();
+    kill_holder(&sessions_dir, &session);
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        shell_pid_after, shell_pid_before,
+        "implicit session should re-adopt the same shell pid"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        post.contains("IMPLICIT_MARK=implicit_restart_42"),
+        "implicit session state must survive restart, got {post:?}"
+    );
+}
+
 #[test]
 fn multiple_persistent_named_sessions_survive_restart_independently() {
     let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();