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76 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
76 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
# Dosh Native v1 Audit Packet
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This is the handoff checklist for an external security review.
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## Scope
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Review the security properties of Dosh native v1:
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- Native UDP authentication and key exchange
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- Host key trust and known-host mismatch behavior
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- Authorized key parsing and policy enforcement
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- Transport encryption, replay protection, rekeying, resume, and stale packet handling
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- Attach ticket sealing/opening
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- TCP forwarding and agent forwarding authorization boundaries
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- Parser robustness for untrusted wire/config data
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Primary files:
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- `src/native.rs`
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- `src/protocol.rs`
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- `src/auth.rs`
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- `src/ssh_agent.rs`
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- `src/bin/dosh-client.rs`
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- `src/bin/dosh-server.rs`
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- `src/config.rs`
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- `tests/parser_robustness.rs`
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- `tests/protocol_auth.rs`
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- `tests/hostile_network.rs`
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- `tests/integration_smoke.rs`
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- `fuzz/fuzz_targets/*`
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Primary docs:
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- `docs/NATIVE_V1_SPEC.md`
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- `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`
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- `docs/PROTOCOL_VERSIONING.md`
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- `docs/PUBLIC_READINESS.md`
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- `docs/RELEASE_EVIDENCE_2026-06-20.md`
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## Required Reviewer Questions
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1. Is the native handshake transcript complete enough to bind client/server keys,
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requested session, mode, env, and forwarding permissions?
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2. Are host-key trust transitions fail-closed, especially unknown vs mismatch vs
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explicit TOFU?
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3. Are authorized-key options parsed conservatively enough, and are unsupported
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options rejected safely?
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4. Can replayed, reordered, delayed, stale, or cross-epoch packets affect terminal
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input or forwarded streams more than once?
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5. Does key rotation preserve confidentiality without creating split-brain epoch
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states?
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6. Do attach tickets create any bearer-token replay or privilege-extension issue?
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7. Can UDP endpoint migration be abused for hijack or reflection?
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8. Are local/remote/dynamic TCP forwarding and agent forwarding gated correctly by
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client opt-in, server config, and authorized-key options?
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9. Are parser and packet-size limits sufficient against malicious inputs?
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10. Are there any unsafe assumptions in process/session persistence or holder
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adoption?
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## Current Local Evidence
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As of 2026-06-20:
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- `cargo test`: `153 passed, 1 ignored`
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- `make soak-local`: passed 30-minute sleep/roaming soak
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- `make fuzz-smoke`: passed all configured fuzz targets for 20s each
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- `make bench-docker-mosh`: passed SSH, ControlMaster, native, cached, and Mosh
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comparison gates
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## Explicit Non-Claims Before Audit
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- No claim of generic SSH protocol replacement.
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- No claim of full Mosh compatibility.
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- No claim that native v1 is externally audited.
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- No claim that Windows server support is production-ready.
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